(PS) Staffin v. Bosenko et al

Filing 14

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis M. Cota on 9/16/2022 RECOMMENDING that this action be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Referred to Judge Kimberly J. Mueller. Objections to F&R due within 14 days. (Zignago, K.)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CHRISTOPHER DALE STAFFIN,

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No. 2:19-CV-01058-KJM-DMC

Plaintiff,
v.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

TOM BOSENKO, et al.,
Defendants.

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Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. The Court screened

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Plaintiff’s original complaint and concluded that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against the named

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Defendants and provided Plaintiff an opportunity to file a first amended complaint. See ECF No.

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6. Plaintiff thereafter timely filed a first amended complaint. ECF No. 7. As with the original

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complaint, the Court determined the first amended complaint failed to state a cognizable claim

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against the named Defendants and provided Plaintiff one final opportunity to amend to allege

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facts sufficient to show how each of the named Defendants were liable. See ECF No. 8, pg. 7.

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Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. ECF No. 12.

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by litigants who have been

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granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under this screening

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provision, the Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(A), (B).

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Moreover, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), this Court must dismiss an

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action if the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Because Plaintiff has been

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granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court will screen the second amended complaint

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pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). Pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3), the Court will also consider as a threshold

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matter whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction.

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I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

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As with the original and first amended complaints, Plaintiff continues to name in

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his second amended complaint (1) Tom Bosenko, Sheriff, Shasta County Sherriff’s Department,

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(2) Leonard Moty, Supervisor, Shasta County Board of Supervisors, and (3) Lester Baugh,

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Supervisor, Shasta County Board of Supervisors. ECF No. 12, pgs. 2-3. Plaintiff no longer

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names any other defendants. Id., pg. 7 (“I find it appropriate to drop all other named parties to

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this matter at this time.”); see also ECF Nos. 1, 7.
In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff claims jurisdiction of this Court based

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on federal question due to “police ‘due process’ violations, ongoing harassment, unwarranted

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surveillance, [and] electronic surveillance.” ECF No. 12, pg. 4. Plaintiff alleges the “Shasta

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Count[y] Board of Supervisors (2009) had no ordinances at the time [Plaintiff’s] business was

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established therefore the Shasta County Sherriff’s Department violated [Plaintiff’s] constitutional

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rights to due process of law, hence destroying [Plaintiff’s] business and perpetuating ongoing due

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process [sic] in an attempt repeatedly to criminalize [Plaintiff] illegitimately.” Id., pg. 5. Plaintiff

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requests that the Court “injunct the ongoing “‘due process’ violations that presently have caused

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compounded ongoing mental and physical stress, exacerbating a serious life[-]threatening medical

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conditions [sic] (pre-existing).” Id., pg. 6.

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II. DISCUSSION

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In considering whether a complaint states a claim, the Court must accept all

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allegations of material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94

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(2007). The Court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff.

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See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp.

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Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per

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curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the Plaintiff’s favor. See Jenkins v.

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McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by

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actual factual allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50

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(2009). In addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by

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lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement

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of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair

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notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly,

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550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order

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to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic

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recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to

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raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555-56. The complaint must contain

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“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has

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facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

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reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at

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1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more

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than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

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at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability,

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it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement to relief.” Id.

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(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

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Here, the Court finds the second amended complaint suffers deficiencies greater

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than Plaintiff’s previous complaints. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how the conditions

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complained of have resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights, allege in specific terms

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how each named Defendant is involved, or set forth some link or connection between each

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Defendant and the claimed deprivation. While the Court is generally more permissive with

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respect to pro se pleadings, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is simply void of the necessary

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facts to establish that Plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought.

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In its order regarding Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, the Court provided
Plaintiff with one final opportunity to amend in order to cure any deficiencies and allege facts that

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show how each of the named Defendants is liable. Plaintiff failed to make that showing here, as

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further set forth below.

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A.

Link to Named Defendants
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual

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connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See

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Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A

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person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of

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§ 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to

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perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is

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made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations

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concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

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Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth

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specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional

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deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

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In this case, Plaintiff states generally that “Shasta Count[y] Board of Supervisors

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(2009) had no ordinances at the time [Plaintiff’s] business was established therefore the Shasta

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County Sherriff’s Department violated [Plaintiff’s] constitutional rights to due process of law,

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hence destroying [Plaintiff’s] business and perpetuating ongoing due process [sic] in an attempt

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repeatedly to criminalize [Plaintiff] illegitimately.” Plaintiff does not (1) identify which of
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Plaintiff’s rights were allegedly violated, (2) explain how the alleged violations occurred, or

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(3) allege with any specificity which named Defendants are responsible for what behaviors.

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Instead, Plaintiff makes a conclusory statement not supported by any factual allegations sufficient

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to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face and more than mere speculation.

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As pleaded, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails to satisfy the requirements

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of Rule 8, discussed above, as it does not contain sufficiently specific allegations of facts to put

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the named Defendants on notice of the nature of Plaintiff’s claims against them.

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B.

Supervisor Liability
The three Defendants named in the complaint are all supervisory personnel.

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Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees.

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See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no respondeat

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superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of

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subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The Supreme

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Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on knowledge and

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acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government officials, regardless

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of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct and not the conduct

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of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory personnel who implement

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a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and the moving

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force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be liable even where such personnel do not

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overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446

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(9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).

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When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such

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defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.

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Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.

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1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in

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civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

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1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s

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own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676.
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Plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails to contain any allegations to support

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the liability of the three named supervisory Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that “Shasta Count[y]

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Board of Supervisors (2009) had no ordinances at the time [Plaintiff’s] business was established

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therefore the Shasta County Sherriff’s Department violated [Plaintiff’s] constitutional rights to

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due process of law, hence destroying [Plaintiff’s] business and perpetuating ongoing due process

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[sic] in an attempt repeatedly to criminalize [Plaintiff] illegitimately.” However, Plaintiff fails to

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specifically plead any facts linking the named Defendants to any wrongdoing. Plaintiff’s second

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amended complaint is empty of any facts whatsoever showing how each Defendant was involved

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and what actions each named Defendant took that caused Plaintiff harm or violated his rights.

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III. CONCLUSION

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Despite the Court advising Plaintiff of the pleading defects of his prior complaints

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and providing him with the appropriate legal standards for pleading a claim, Plaintiff makes no

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effort here to correct the defects. ECF No. 8, pg. 8. Plaintiff was informed that if he submitted a

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second amended complaint, the Court could not refer to prior pleadings in order to make

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complete Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. See ECF No. 8, pg. 7; see also Local Rule 220.

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Thus, all claims previously alleged, which are not alleged in Plaintiff’s second amended

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complaint, are deemed waived. Given Plaintiff’s failure to cure the defects in his second

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amended complaint, despite being provided two opportunities to do so, the Court finds further

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leave to amend is not warranted and recommends this action be dismissed in its entirety with

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prejudice for failure to state a claim.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

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after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

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with the Court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of objections.

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Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v.

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Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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Dated: September 16, 2022

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DENNIS M. COTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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