(PC)Rodriguez v. Clemmons

Filing 31

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Jeremy D. Peterson on 10/15/2020 GRANTING in part defendant's 18 motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's official capacity claims against defendant are DISMISSED without prejudice. The motion is DENIED in all other respects. (Yin, K)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JOSE DeJESUS RODRIGUEZ,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:20-cv-173-JDP (PC)

v.

ORDER

MICHELLE CLEMMONS,

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Defendant.

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Plaintiff, proceeding without counsel under section 1983, sued defendant Michelle

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Clemmons (“defendant”), a welfare case worker, for an alleged violation of his due process

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rights. Defendant has now filed a motion to dismiss. 1 ECF No. 18. Plaintiff has filed two

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oppositions, ECF Nos. 23 & 27, and defendant has filed a reply, ECF No. 25. I will grant

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defendant’s motion in part.

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Legal Standards

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A complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

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granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a

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plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility when the

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The parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. ECF No. 30.
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plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

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(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability

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requirement,” but it requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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For purposes of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally considers only

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allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly

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subject to judicial notice, and construes all well-pleaded, material factual allegations in the light

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most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710

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F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012).

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Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either: (1) the absence of a cognizable

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legal theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Chubb Custom Ins. Co.,

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710 F.3d at 956. Dismissal is also appropriate if the complaint alleges a fact that necessarily

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defeats the claim. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 1984).

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Pro se pleadings are held to a less-stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers.

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Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). However, the court need not accept as

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true unreasonable inferences or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual

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allegations. See Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Western Mining

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Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)).

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Analysis

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I.

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Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated when defendant, a welfare case

Background

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worker employed by San Joaquin County, terminated his Medi-Cal welfare benefits without a

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“fair hearing.” 2 ECF No. 1 at 3. He is suing defendant in both her individual and official

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capacities. Id. at 3. A previous screening order found that, because due process safeguards are

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As noted in the previous screening order, plaintiff’s complaint does not identify the
welfare benefits at issue. ECF No. 4 at 3. However, the California Department of Health Care
Services administrative decision appended to the complaint shows that Medi-Cal benefits are at
issue. Id. at 19.
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applicable to Medicare benefits, plaintiff had stated a potentially cognizable claim. ECF No. 4 at

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4 (citing Zinman v. Shalala, 835 F. Supp. 1163, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 1993)).

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II.

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Defendant raises three arguments in support of her motion to dismiss. First, she states that

Analysis

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the complaint fails to allege any causal connection between her conduct and the alleged violation

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of plaintiff’s rights. ECF No. 18 at 5. Second, she states that plaintiff has failed to allege the

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elements of an official capacity claim against San Joaquin County. Id. Third, she claims that,

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based on documents which the court should take judicial notice of, this action is now moot. Id. at

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6. I consider mootness first, since it could relieve the court of jurisdiction. See Church of

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Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (“It has long been settled that a federal court

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has no authority to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare

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principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.”) (internal

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quotation marks omitted).

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A.

Mootness

Defendant argues that this action is moot because plaintiff received “timely and adequate

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notice” of the intended termination of his Medi-Cal benefits. ECF No. 18 at 3-4. In support of

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that argument, she asks the court to take judicial notice of three exhibits: (1) a Medi-Cal renewal

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form sent to plaintiff and dated September 5, 2019 (ECF No. 18-3 at 4-34); (2) a reminder notice

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sent to plaintiff and dated October 25, 2019, indicating that the County of San Joaquin had not

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received his Medi-Cal renewal form (id. at 36); and (3) a notice of action dated November 18,

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2019 that informed plaintiff that his Medi-Cal benefits were being stopped because he had not

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provided the required renewal information (id. at 38-40). I will take judicial notice of the

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existence and facial content of these documents. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also United States

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v. 14.02 Acres of Land More or Less in Fresno County, 547 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2008)

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(“Judicial notice is appropriate for records and reports of administrative bodies.”); Grant v.

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Aurora Loan Servs., 736 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1263-64 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (taking judicial notice of

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documents recorded by Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office). This does not, however,

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establish mootness.
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A case is moot “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally

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cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). Here,

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judicially noticeable fact cannot establish mootness. The existence of the aforementioned

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documents does not show that plaintiff actually received timely and adequate notice (and plaintiff

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says that he did not). See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 669 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A]

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court may not take judicial notice of a fact that is ‘subject to reasonable dispute.’”); Hennessy v.

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Penril Datacomm Networks, 69 F.3d 1344, 1354 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In order for a fact to be

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judicially noticed, indisputability is a prerequisite. Given that there was considerable argument

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over the significance of the 10-K form, the judge properly found that its contents were subject to

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dispute.”); Rivera v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 395 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The notes of the

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advisory committee with regard to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 explain that ‘[a] high degree of

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indisputability is the essential prerequisite’ to taking judicial notice of adjudicative facts and that

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‘the tradition [of taking judicial notice] has been one of caution in requiring that the matter be

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beyond reasonable controversy.’”) (alterations in original)). We don’t know, for example, that

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the letters reached plaintiff.

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Defendant also argues that the case is moot because the documents establish that

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“[plaintiff] is now eligible for Medi-Cal benefits upon submission of the appropriate packet of

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information.” ECF No. 18 at 6. This argument also relies on an inference outside the facial

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contents of the judicially noticed documents. Based on the documents themselves, we can’t say

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that plaintiff is still eligible for benefits if he resubmitted today. And even if defendant’s

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argument is accepted it does not establish mootness. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in

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addition to injunctive relief. ECF No. 1 at 5. A court in this district rejected a similar claim of

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mootness after reasoning that the claimant might still be entitled to damages based on the alleged

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denial of due process. See Rodriguez v. Vega, No. 2:15-cv-0158-GGH-PS, 2015 U.S. Dist.

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LEXIS 151910, *10-11 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2015) (“Defendant moves to dismiss the action,

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claiming that plaintiff has been found eligible and is receiving Medi-Cal and CalFresh benefits,

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and it is up to him to complete a new application for GA benefits with proof of filing an SSI

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(Social Security Supplemental Income) application . . . . However, since plaintiff is seeking only
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damages, his claims are not moot.”).
B.

Causation

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Next, defendant argues that plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege a causal connection

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between her conduct and the violation of his due process rights. ECF No. 18 at 5. This argument

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is unpersuasive.

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Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges that defendant, by her intentional conduct,

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violated his due process rights. A successful procedural due process claim is comprised of two

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elements: “deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest and denial of

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adequate procedural protection.” Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nevada Sys. of

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Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). Here, plaintiff has

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alleged that he was deprived of a protected interest—his Medi-Cal benefits—and was denied

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adequate procedural protection insofar as he was not afforded any notice prior to the deprivation.

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ECF No. 1 at 3. And to establish personal liability, he need only allege that defendant acted

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under color of state law and caused the deprivation of his federal right. See Kentucky v. Graham,

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473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“[T]o establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to

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show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.”)

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(emphasis in original). Plaintiff has alleged as much. The complaint is not a model of specificity

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or organization, but pro se pleadings, especially in the context of a motion to dismiss, are held to

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a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by counsel. See Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F. 2d

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1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977).

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C.

Official Capacity Claims

Defendant correctly argues that plaintiff has failed to allege the elements of an official

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capacity claim against San Joaquin County. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985) (“[A]

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judgment against a public servant ‘in his official capacity’ imposes liability on the entity that he

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represents provided, of course, the public entity received notice and an opportunity to respond.”).

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To sustain a claim against the county, plaintiff must allege that the constitutional violation

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resulted from an official policy or custom. See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261

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F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001). The complaint fails to identify any county policy or custom that
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contributed to the alleged violation of plaintiff’s due process rights. I therefore will dismiss his

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official capacity claims without prejudice.

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Order
It is ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 18, is GRANTED in part.

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Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against defendant are dismissed without prejudice. The motion

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is denied in all other respects.

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Dated: October 15, 2020

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