(PC) Ransom v. Herr et al

Filing 63

ORDER and FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis M. Cota on 03/04/25 ORDERING the 47 Third Amended Complaint be STRICKEN as having been improperly filed without stipulation or leave of court. It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED 59 M otion to Dismiss be granted; Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Alvarez be dismissed with prejudice; Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief be dismissed as moot; and Defendants Marchal, Cagnina, Petty, Lor, Herr, and Pangelian be ordere d to file an answer to Plaintiff's second amended complaint on Plaintiff's damages claims under the First Amendment against Defendants acting in their individual capacities and Plaintiff's negligence claims. Referred to Judge Daniel J. Calabretta. Objections due within 14 days after being served with theses Findings and Recommendations. (Deputy Clerk KML)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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BRYAN E. RANSOM,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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HERR, et al.,

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No. 2:20-CV-1209-DJC-DMC-P

ORDER
and
Defendants.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42

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U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss. See ECF No. 59.

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Plaintiff has not filed an opposition. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned finds that

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Defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted.

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In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of

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material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardusthis, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007).

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The Court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See

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Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees,

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425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All

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ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen,

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395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual

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factual allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009).
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In addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers.

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See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement

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of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair

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notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly,

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550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order

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to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain

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more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual

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allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555-56. The

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complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at

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570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

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court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

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Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but

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it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a

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defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement

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to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court generally may not consider materials

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outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998);

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Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court may, however, consider: (1)

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documents whose contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no

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party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454; (2) documents whose authenticity is not in question,

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and upon which the complaint necessarily relies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see

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Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials

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of which the court may take judicial notice, see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir.

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1994).

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Finally, leave to amend must be granted “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no

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amendment can cure the defects.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per

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curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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I. BACKGROUND

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A.

Procedural History
On February 2, 2021, the Court issued an order addressing the sufficiency of

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Plaintiff’s original complaint and provided Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See ECF No. 10.

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Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on March 3, 2021. See ECF No. 11. The Court

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determined the first amended complaint was appropriate for service on all named defendants. See

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ECF No. 12. The Court summarized Plaintiff’s allegations as follows:

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Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Herr, a
Correctional Officer at California State Prison – Solano (CSP-Sol.); (2)
Lore, a Correctional Officer at CSP-Sol.; (3) G. Alvarez, the Assistant
Food Manager at CSP-Sol.; (4) A. Petty; (5) C. Pangelian; (6) D. Marchal;
and (7) C. Cagnina. See ECF No. 11, pgs. 1, 3.
Plaintiff alleges he has been receiving Kosher meals
consistent with his Jewish faith and pursuant to California prison
regulations. See id. at 4. According to Plaintiff, participants in the Kosher
meal program sign a “contract agreement” whereby inmates agree to only
accept the provided Kosher meals and not the regular meals provided for
prisoners not participating in the Kosher meal program. See id. Plaintiff
states that “violators” of this agreement are subject to removal from the
Kosher meal program “without any exceptions.” Id. Plaintiff states that all
participants in the Kosher meal program are issued a “Religious Diet
Card” with their name and photograph on it for proof of participation. Id.
at 5.
Plaintiff states that participants in the Kosher meal program
at CSP-Sol. Are required to pick up their breakfast and lunch by 5:30 a.m.
and their dinner by 3:00 p.m. See id. According to Plaintiff, his work
schedule, which runs Mondays through Thursdays, did not allow him to
pick up his Kosher dinner by 3:00 p.m., so he was permitted to pick up his
dinner during the “regular chow release” after 5:00 p.m. See id.
Plaintiff alleges that, on February 12, 2020, at about 5:30
a.m., Plaintiff went to pick up his Kosher breakfast and lunch. See id.
Plaintiff contends that the C-Facility dining room officer, Defendant Herr,
refused to issue him his Kosher meals because Plaintiff’s name was no
longer on the “Inmate Meal Tracking System (IMTS) ‘Kitchen List.’” Id.
at 5-6. According to Plaintiff, he showed Defendant Herr his Religious
Diet Card authorizing Kosher meals and asked Defendant Herr to re-check
the list. See id. at 6. Plaintiff states that this request was “to no avail” and
that Defendant Herr refused to feed Plaintiff breakfast or lunch. Id.
Plaintiff states that he was “at a loss as to what to do” because the contract
agreement for Kosher meals “made no exception or provision for such a
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situation.” Id. As a result, Plaintiff states he went without breakfast or
lunch. See id.
According to Plaintiff, later that same day he went to the CFacility dining room to pick up his Kosher dinner. See id. Plaintiff
contends that an unidentified John Doe defendant refused to issue Plaintiff
his Kosher dinner, stating that Plaintiff’s name was no longer on his
Kitchen List. Id. As with Defendant Herr, Plaintiff states he showed this
unidentified John Doe defendant his Religious Diet Card but that he was
nonetheless refused his Kosher dinner. See id. Again, Plaintiff states that
he went without his evening meal, hoping the situation would eventually
work itself out. See id. at 7.
Plaintiff claims that, with the exception of February 20,
2020, he was refused Kosher meals by Defendants Herr, Lore and
unidentified John/Jane Does 1 through 6. See id. Each time, Plaintiff was
informed his name was no longer on the Kitchen List. See id. According
to Plaintiff, he showed his Religious Diet Card each time to no avail. See
id. Despite showing his card, Plaintiff was refused his meals. See id.
Plaintiff states that, on February 27, 2020, “it was revealed that Plaintiff’s
name had been on the IMTS Kitchen List all along.” Id. at 7-8.
Plaintiff states that, on February 21, 2020, he submitted an
emergency inmate appeal complaining that he had not been provided a
total of 23 meals over the preceding nine days. See id. at 9. According to
Plaintiff, Defendants Petty, Pangelian, Marchal, and Cagnina received and
reviewed his appeal but refused to treat it as an emergency and instead set
the matter for a hearing on April 7, 2020. See id. at 9-10. Plaintiff claims
this action allowed for the protracted continuation of the denial of
religious meals “and starvation.” Id. at 10.
Plaintiff states that, on February 21, 2020, he submitted a
staff misconduct complaint regarding the protracted denial of meals. See
id. at 11. Plaintiff claims that, on February 24, 2020, Defendants Cagnina
and unidentified John/Jane Does 7 through 9 “took it upon themselves to
deliberately and nefariously mis-categorize Plaintiff’s ‘Staff Misconduct
Complaint’ as a Category 9 ‘Living Condition Complaint.’” Id. at 12-13.
Plaintiff alleges this was done in order to “foster a code of silence” and
circumvent Plaintiff’s rights to a separate staff misconduct investigation
under California prison regulations. See id. at 13.
Plaintiff contends that, on February 26, 2020, he went to
the C-Facility dining hall for his daily Kosher breakfast and lunch. See id.
at 13-14. Upon arrival, the Assistant Correctional Food Manager,
Defendant Alvarez, was waiting to interview Plaintiff regarding his
pending inmate grievances alleging that prison officials were withholding
his Kosher meals. See id. at 14. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Alvarez
told Plaintiff she had reviewed Plaintiff’s appeal issues and found that
Plaintiff had not been receiving his Kosher meals because medical staff
had placed Plaintiff on a new “renal diet” which overrode his Kosher diet.
Id. Alvarez told Plaintiff he should have been receiving his meals from the
medical facility for the last 16 to 17 days. See id. Plaintiff states he was
told by Alvarez that she had done all she could, and that Plaintiff should
withdraw his grievances and submit a medical grievance against the
“Medical Dietician.” Id. Plaintiff states he told Alvarez he would not
withdraw his appeals. See id. at 15.
According to Plaintiff, this was all a ruse as he went to the
medical facility to request meals and was told by Correctional Officer
McCullen that she had no recollection of Plaintiff ever being placed on a
“renal diet.” Id. According to Plaintiff, McCullen called the dietician to
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confirm and was told by the dietician that there is not nor has there ever
been an order for Plaintiff to receive a “renal diet.” Id. at 15-16.
Plaintiff states that he ultimately went without meals that
day because he had to report for his work assignment. See id. at 16.
According to Plaintiff, later that evening he went to the C-Facility dining
hall and presented his diet card to receive his Kosher dinner. See id.
Plaintiff states that, once again, he was refused his meal by an unidentified
John/Jane Doe defendant, who told him that his name was not on the
Kitchen List. See id.
Plaintiff contends that he went to the dining hall on
February 27, 2020, at 5:30 a.m. to receive his Kosher breakfast and lunch.
See id. Plaintiff states that, once again, Defendant Alvarez was waiting
and told Plaintiff that she had mistaken Plaintiff for another prisoner who
had been removed from the Kosher meal program and placed on a renal
diet. See id. According to Plaintiff, he was told by Alvarez this time that
the reason Plaintiff’s name had not been showing up on the IMST Kitchen
List for the last 17 days was because Plaintiff name had been moved from
page 2 to page 1 of the Kitchen List and that the kitchen cook had only
been providing custody staff with page 2 of the Kitchen List. See id. at 17.

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ECF No. 12, pgs. 1-3.

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First Motion to Dismiss

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Defendants waived service and filed a motion to dismiss the first amended

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complaint on December 17, 2021. See ECF No. 20. On April 20, 2023, the District Judge issued

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an order resolving Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See ECF No. 35. The District Judge ordered

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as follows:
[1].
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 20) is granted in
part and denied in part;

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[2].
Plaintiff’s damages claims against Defendants acting in
their official capacities are dismissed with prejudice;

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[3].
Plaintiff’s damages claims under RLUIPA [Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act] against Defendants acting in their
individual capacities are dismissed with prejudice;

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[4].
This action proceed against all Defendants except
Defendant Alvarez on the following claims:

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a. Plaintiff’s damages claims under the First Amendment against
defendants in their individual capacities,

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b. Plaintiff’s injunctive relief claims under the First Amendment
and RLUIPA against Defendants acting in their official and
individual capacities, and

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c. Plaintiff’s negligence claims.

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[5].
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Alvarez are dismissed
with leave to amend. Within thirty days of this order, Plaintiff is directed
to file a Notice of How to Proceed informing the court of whether he
wishes to proceed on his remaining claims and defendants or if he wishes
to be granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.

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ECF No. 35, pg. 6.

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After informing the Court of his intention to file a second amended complaint,

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Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint on June 30, 2023. See ECF No. 41.

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Motion to Revoke Plaintiff’s In Forma Pauperis Status

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Defendants responded to the second amended complaint by way of a motion to

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revoke Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis (IFP) status. See ECF No. 43. On March 8, 2024, the

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District Judge issued an order granting Defendant’s motion and directing Plaintiff to pay the full

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filing fees for this case within 21 days. See ECF No. 45. Plaintiff paid fees on May 7, 2024. 1

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Second Motion to Dismiss

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Defendants filed the pending motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second amended

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complaint on May 28, 2024. See ECF No. 59. The proof of service accompanying Defendants’

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motion indicates that it was served on Plaintiff at his address of record in Los Angeles, California.

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See id. at 19. On July 25, 2024, the Court issued a minute order vacating the hearing scheduled

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for Defendants’ motion to dismiss and submitting the matter on the papers for decision without

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oral arguments. See ECF No. 62. The minute order was also served on Plaintiff at his address of

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record. See unenumerated docket entry following ECF No. 62 indicating service of process. To

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date, mail directed to Plaintiff at his address of record has not been returned unserved, and

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While Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status was pending and before
it was resolved by the District Judge, Plaintiff filed a notice of change of address indicating his
release from prison and relocation to a private residence in Los Angeles, California. See ECF No.
53. The docket reflects that Plaintiff has received the Court’s order since his change of address as
demonstrated by compliance with the District Judge’s order to pay fees.
Also during the time Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status was
pending, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend along with a proposed third amended
complaint. See ECF Nos. 46 and 47. In the context of findings and recommendations to the
District Judge regarding Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status, the undersigned
ordered that Plaintiff’s motion to amend be denied without prejudice to renewal following the
District Judge’s final order on Defendants’ motion to revoke. See ECF No. 54 (order and
findings and recommendations). To date, Plaintiff has not renewed his motion for leave to
amend. The third amended complaint at ECF No. 47 is not before the Court. This case proceeds
on the second amended complaint. The Court will order the third amended complaint at ECF No.
47 be stricken.
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Plaintiff has not filed any opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended

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complaint.

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B.

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Plaintiff's Allegations
This action currently proceeds on Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, which

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was filed after the District Judge’s order providing an opportunity to amend to include additional

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allegations as to his claims against Defendant Alvarez. See ECF No. 41. Plaintiff’s allegations

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are the same as those outlined in the first amended complaint with the notable exception that the

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second amended complaint omits certain facts concerning Defendant Alvarez which were alleged

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in the first amended complaint. Compare ECF Nos. 11 and 41.

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Defendants submit the following statement regarding Plaintiff’s current allegations
as to Defendant Alvarez, which the Court accepts given that Defendants’ motion is unopposed:
Plaintiff submitted an “emergency…602” inmate grievance on
February 21, 2020, about his lack of kosher meals. ([ECF No. 41] at ¶ 31.)
On February 24, 2020, Defendants Petty, Pangelian, Marchal, and Cagnina
“received and reviewed the emergency…602…but refused to process it as
an emergency,” setting a hearing date in April. (Id. at ¶ 32.) Plaintiff
admits that on February 26, 2020, Defendant Alvarez was assigned to
interview him and investigate his grievance. (Id. at ¶¶ 45-46.)
On February 26, 2020, Plaintiff went to the dining room at 5:30
a.m. to receive his breakfast and lunch and was met by Defendant Alvarez
who was “waiting to interview” Plaintiff about the filed grievance and
investigate the issue he had raised. (Id.) Alvarez initially informed
Plaintiff that “through her investigation” she had learned that medical staff
had placed Plaintiff on a renal diet “which over-road [sic] his Kosher
meals” and that he “should have been picking up his meals at the CTC
medical facility for the last 16 to 17 days.” (Id. at ¶ 46.) Plaintiff went to
the medical facility and was told he was not ordered to receive a renal diet.
(Id. at ¶ 52.) Plaintiff alleged he was not provided kosher meals that day.
(Id. at 54.) The next day, February 27, 2020, Plaintiff asserts that “it was
revealed that Plaintiff’s name had been on the IMTS kitchen list all along.
(See Claim No. 4) [this is the claim against Defendant Alvarez]. (Id. at ¶
28.)
In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff did not add any
additional factual allegations about Defendant Alvarez that are not found
in the First Amended Complaint. (Compare ECF No. 11 to ECF No. 41.)
Instead, Plaintiff omitted several facts about her. In the First Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff admits that on February 27, 2020, Defendant Alvarez
told Plaintiff that “yesterday she had mistaken Plaintiff as another prisoner
who had been removed from the kosher meal program and placed on a
renal diet.” And that “Defendant Alvarez further stated that the reason
Plaintiff’s name had not been showing up on the IMST Kitchen list for the
last 17 days is that Plaintiff’s name had been moved from page 2 to page
one (1) of the IMST Kitchen list and that Correctional Cook John Doe 10
was only providing custody staff page 2 of the IMST kitchen list.” (ECF
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No. 11 at ¶¶ 58-59.) But in the Second Amended Complaint, the
allegations found in the First Amended Complaint at paragraphs 58 and 59
are omitted. Instead, Plaintiff only states that the reason why he was not
receiving kosher meals, that a page of the list delivered to the kitchen was
missing, was “revealed” to him (ECF No. 41 at ¶ 28), without stating who
revealed this information to him. But Plaintiff has previously admitted this
information was delivered to him by Defendant Alvarez as a result of her
continued investigation into the matter. (ECF No. 11 at ¶ 59.)

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ECF No. 59, pgs. 10-11.

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II. DISCUSSION

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In the pending unopposed motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that, despite having

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been advised of the pleading defects as to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Alvarez by the

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District Judge and having been provided leave to amend, the second amended complaint

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continues to plead insufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief. See ECF No. 59.

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Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief have been rendered moot by

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Plaintiff’s release from prison. 2 See id.

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A.

Claims Against Defendant Alvarez

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The question now before the Court is whether the second amended complaint

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pleads sufficient additional facts to cure the defects as to Defendant Alvarez identified in the

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District Judge’s order resolving Defendants’ first motion to dismiss. The undersigned’s analysis,

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therefore, begins with the District Judge’s April 20, 2023, order. Regarding Defendant Alvarez,

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the District Judge stated:
. . . Regarding Defendant Alvarez, the Court agrees that Plaintiff
has not alleged any facts that would link Defendant Alvarez’s actions with
the alleged constitutional violations in this case. Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). That requirement is not met
here. According to the Plaintiff, while Defendant Alvarez erroneously

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Defendants raise no arguments concerning Plaintiff’s damages claims under the
First Amendment against Defendants acting in their individual capacities or Plaintiff’s negligence
claims, which were deemed sufficient to proceed by the District Judge and which have been
realleged in the operative second amended complaint.
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informed Plaintiff that he was supposed to be on a renal diet, she corrected
her mistake the next day and informed Plaintiff that in fact he had been
mistakenly left off the kitchen list, an error she appears to have fixed.
(First Am. Compl. (ECF No. 11), ¶¶ 44-59.) Given that Defendant Alvarez
quickly corrected her error, the Court cannot reasonably infer that the
intent of Defendant Alvarez was to attempt to “throw Plaintiff off the trail
and falsely accuse medical staff.” Id. at ¶ 51. Absent additional
allegations, there is no plausible theory by which Defendant Alvarez’s
mistake was not reasonable and is thus protected by qualified immunity.
Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty. 693 F.3d 896, 915 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Under
qualified immunity, an officer is protected from suit when he makes a
reasonable mistake of law or fact.”). The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to
amend as Defendant Alvarez.

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ECF No. 35, pg. 2.

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Plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails to satisfy the District Judge’s order.

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Specifically, Plaintiff has not added any new allegations to suggest that Defendant Alvarez’

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conduct was unreasonable and, therefore, not subject to qualified immunity. To the contrary,

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Plaintiff has omitted certain allegations apparently to make Defendant Alvarez’ involvement

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somewhat murkier. In doing so, the second amended complaint moves even further from the

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realm of plausibility required under Rule 8. The undersigned answers the question before the

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Court in the negative and finds that Plaintiff continues to fail to plead sufficient facts to show that

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Defendant Alvarez’ conduct was unreasonable.
B.

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Claims for Injunctive Relief
The District Judge concluded that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief, under

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both the First Amendment and RLUIPA, are sufficient to proceed. See ECF No. 35. These

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claims have been realleged in the second amended complaint. See ECF No. 41.
At the time the District Judge issued this ruling in April 2023, Plaintiff was in

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custody. Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint in June 2023. See id. In October 2023,

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Plaintiff filed a notice of change of address indicating that he had been released from prison and

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was living at a private address in Los Angeles. See ECF No. 53. Defendants now argue that

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Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief have been rendered moot by his release. See ECF No. 59,

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pg. 17.

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The Court agrees. As Defendants note, an inmate’s release from prison while

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claims for injunctive relief concerning conditions of confinement are pending will render such

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claims moot. See Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012); Dilley v. Gunn, 64

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F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Sams v. Lundy, 2023 WL 9058354, at *5 (E.D. Cal.

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2023).

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III. CONCLUSION

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Based on the foregoing, the undersigned orders and recommends as follows:

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1.

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It is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, ECF No. 47, is

stricken as having been improperly filed without stipulation or leave of court.

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2.

It is RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 59,

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3.

It is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Alvarez

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be dismissed with prejudice.

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4.

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be granted.

It is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief be

dismissed as moot.

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5.

It is RECOMMENDED that Defendants Marchal, Cagnina, Petty, Lor,

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Herr, and Pangelian be ordered to file an answer to Plaintiff’s second amended complaint on

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Plaintiff’s damages claims under the First Amendment against Defendants acting in their

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individual capacities and Plaintiff’s negligence claims.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

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after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

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with the Court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of objections.

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Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v.

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Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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Dated: March 4, 2025

____________________________________
DENNIS M. COTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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