Coy v. Southern Home Care Services, Inc., et al.,

Filing 18

ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 4/23/21; REMANDING CASE to the Sacramento County Superior Court, but DENIES Plaintiff's request for fees and costs associated with the Motion. Certified copy of remand order sent to the state court. CASE CLOSED (Kastilahn, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ELIZABETH COY, on behalf of
herself and Aggrieved
Employees,

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Plaintiff,

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No.

2:21-cv-00067-JAM-CKD

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

v.

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SOUTHERN HOME CARE SERVICES,
INC., a Delaware corporation;
et al.,

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Defendants.

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Elizabeth Coy (“Plaintiff”) moves to remand this wage and

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hour action back to the Sacramento County Superior Court.

Mot.

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to Remand (“Mot.”), ECF No. 4.

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Inc., Res-care California, Inc., Res-care, Inc., and RSCR

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California, Inc. (“Defendants”) filed an opposition, Opp’n, ECF

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No. 6, to which Plaintiff replied, Reply, ECF No. 8.

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reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to

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Remand.1

Southern Home Care Services,

For the

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for March 9, 2021.
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I.

BACKGROUND

Defendants provide 24-hour residential and home-based care

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services to disabled and/or elderly individuals in California.

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Compl. ¶ 18, Ex. A to Montoya Decl., ECF No. 1-1.

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worked for Defendants as an on-call scheduler and care provider

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from approximately August 2017 to March 16, 2020.

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alleges she and other aggrieved employees were, among other

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things, not properly paid reimbursement expenses, minimum and

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overtime wages, and reporting time pay wages.

Plaintiff

Id.

Plaintiff

Id. ¶ 4.

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Additionally, for the last portion of her employment with

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Defendants, Plaintiff was a member of the Service Employees

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International Union Local 2015 for Long-Term Caregivers in

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California (“the Union”) and thus covered by the Collective

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Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) entered into between the Union and

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Defendants.

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Not. of Removal ¶ 8, ECF No. 1.

On November 25, 2020, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the

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Sacramento County Superior Court.

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Plaintiff brings nine individual state law claims against

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Defendants for: (1) failure to pay overtime wages, (2) failure to

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pay minimum wages, (3) failure to provide meal periods,

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(4) failure to provide rest periods, (5) failure to provide

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accurate itemized statements, (6) waiting time penalties,

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(7) failure to provide reimbursement expenses, (8) failure to

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keep accurate time records, and (9) violation of California

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Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.

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Additionally, Plaintiff asserts a Private Attorney General Act

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(“PAGA”) claim for failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay

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overtime wages, failure to pay reporting time pay wages, failure
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See generally Compl.

Id. ¶¶ 29-75.

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to pay reimbursements for expenses, failure to pay final wages,

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failure to maintain accurate records, failure to provide accurate

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wage statements, and violation of the provisions regulating hours

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and days of work.

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Id. ¶¶ 76-80.

On January 13, 2021, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal,

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invoking this Court’s federal question jurisdiction.

Not. of

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Removal ¶ 5 (citing to 28 U.S.C. § 1331).

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pled only state law claims, Defendants removed on the grounds

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that Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by Section 301 of the Labor

Although Plaintiff has

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Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185.

Id. ¶¶ 5-12.

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In response, Plaintiff filed this Motion to Remand.

See Mot.

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Plaintiff additionally requests attorney’s fees and costs

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associated with this Motion.

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II.

Mot. at 13.
OPINION

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A.

Legal Standard

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Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a defendant may remove a civil

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action from state to federal court if there is subject matter

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jurisdiction over the case.

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of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997).

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question jurisdiction over all civil actions “arising under the

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Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”

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§ 1331.

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removal and federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any

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doubt as to the right of removal.

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564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Moore-Thomas v. Alaska

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Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]ny doubt

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about the right of removal requires resolution in favor of

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remand.”)

See City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll.
Courts have federal

28 U.S.C.

Courts strictly construe the removal statute against

Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d

The party seeking removal bears the burden of
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establishing jurisdiction.

Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d

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1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988).

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B.

Analysis

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Defendants removed this case on the grounds that Section 301

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of the LMRA preempts Plaintiff’s claims.

Not. of Removal at

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¶¶ 5, 10-12.

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cannot be adjudicated without interpreting the CBA governing

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Plaintiff’s and other aggrieved employees’ employment with

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Defendants and therefore her claims are preempted.

Specifically, Defendants contend that these claims

Opp’n at 1.

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Plaintiff does not dispute that there was a CBA in place for a

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portion of her employment with Defendants, but argues the “mere

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existence of, or consultation with” the CBA is insufficient to

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establish preemption under Section 301 of the LMRA.

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Mot. at 5.

As the parties acknowledge, the Ninth Circuit’s Burnside

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test governs their dispute.

See Burnside v. Kiewett Pac. Corp.,

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491 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007).

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set forth a two-part test for determining whether a cause of

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action is preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA.

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1060.

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action involves a right conferred upon an employee by virtue of

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state law,” independent of a CBA.

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solely because of the CBA, then the claim is preempted, and the

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analysis ends there.

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solely because of the CBA, the court moves onto step two:

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deciding whether the claim “substantially depends” on an

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interpretation of a CBA.

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the claim is preempted by Section 301; if not, then the claim can

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proceed under state law.”

In Burnside, the Ninth Circuit

Id. at 1059-

First, courts must determine if the “asserted cause of

Id.

Id.

If the right exists

If, however, the right does not exist

Id.

“If such dependence exists, then

Id.
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Here, the parties agree that Plaintiff’s claims are not

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preempted under part one of Burnside.

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The parties do dispute, however, whether the claims are preempted

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under part two of Burnside.

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Mot. at 6-7; Opp’n at 4.

The analysis under the second part of Burnside – which as

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stated above requires this Court to determine whether Plaintiff’s

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claims are substantially dependent on interpretation of the CBA -

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turns on “whether the claim can be resolved by ‘looking to’

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versus interpreting the CBA.”

Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l

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Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal

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citations omitted).

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the former, it is not.”

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context is “defined narrowly – it means something more than

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‘consider’, ‘refer to’, or ‘apply.’”

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“If the latter, the claim is preempted; if
Id.

Additionally, “interpret” in this

Id.

Defendants argue that the CBA here must be interpreted, not

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just consulted or referenced, to resolve Plaintiff’s claims and

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insist they have provided several examples demonstrating how and

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why the CBA must be interpreted.

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Defendants stress that not only do Plaintiff’s individual claims

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require interpretation of the CBA, but those asserted on behalf

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of the alleged aggrieved employees “certainly do.”

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According to Plaintiff, however, Defendants have not carried

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their burden to show that interpretation of the CBA is required;

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at most, she argues, Defendants have shown that the CBA

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hypothetically may need to be consulted or referenced.

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10-13; Reply at 1, 3-5.

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Defendants have not carried their burden to show interpretation

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of the CBA is necessary as required under part two of Burnside.

Opp’n at 4-5.

Further,

Opp’n at 2.

Mot. at

The Court agrees and finds that

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The Supreme Court has instructed that “not every dispute

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concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a

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collective-bargaining agreement, is preempted by § 301.”

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Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985).

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“alleging a hypothetical connection between the claim and the

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terms of the CBA is not enough” to trigger preemption.

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Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2001); see

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also Humble v. Boeing Co., 305 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002)

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(explaining “a CBA provision does not trigger preemption when it

Allis-

Therefore,

Cramer v.

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is only potentially relevant to the state law claims, without any

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guarantee that interpretation or direct reliance on the CBA terms

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will occur”).

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Here, Article 13 of the CBA sets forth wage rates and

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premium pay applicable to Plaintiff and other alleged aggrieved

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employees.

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the CBA as establishing “a complex pay structure for caregivers

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based on various differentials including shift/visit length, the

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number of clients for whom care is provided during a shift, the

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specific behavioral/personal needs of the client receiving

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services, and/or the length/difficulty of traveling to the

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client.”

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The CBA, according to Defendants, addresses compensation payable

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to Plaintiff and alleged aggrieved employees “under very context-

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specific and non-formulaic circumstances,” such that the CBA is

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not “a straightforward or unambiguous chart with defined

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variables the Court can simply reference to determine wages owed

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to alleged aggrieved employees.”

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Defendants argue, interpretation of the CBA is required to

See generally CBA, Art. 13.

Defendants characterize

Opp’n at 3 (citing to Art. 13, §§ 3.1(c), 13.4-13.6).

Id. at 3, 6.

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As such,

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determine which pay provisions apply to on-call

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schedulers/caregivers, see Opp’n at 7-9, and to determine their

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regular rate of pay, see Opp’n at 9-13.

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position, Defendants provide a handful of examples indicating how

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and why interpretation of the CBA may be required.

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13.

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the phrase “unable to work” in the context of the CBA’s reporting

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time laws.

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phrases in the CBA - such as “certain assignments,” “extreme

In support of this

Opp’n at 7-

For instance, they posit the Court would need to interpret

Opp’n at 8.

They also highlight other “ambiguous”

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behavioral issues,” or “extensive personal care needs” – that

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they state the Court would need to interpret in order to decide

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when premium payments and shift differentials apply.

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Id. at 12.

Defendants’ argument and proffered examples, however,

fail

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to show these interpretation issues would necessarily arise.

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Indeed, Plaintiff contends that these issues will not arise as

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there is no actual dispute between her claims and the terms of

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the CBA.

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their burden to show otherwise.

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Humble, Defendants have shown only that the provisions set forth

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in Article 13 of the CBA are “potentially relevant to the state

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law claims, without any guarantee that interpretation or direct

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reliance on the CBA terms will occur.”

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“speculative reliance on the CBA will not suffice to preempt a

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state law claim.”

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federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to

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the right of removal.

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there is such doubt.

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See Reply.

The Court finds Defendants have not carried

Id. at 1008.

Rather, in the language of

305 F.3d at 1010.

But,

Further, it bears repeating that

Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244.

Here,

Finally, the parties vigorously dispute the applicability of
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Wilson-Davis v. SSP Am. Inc., 434 F.Supp.3d 806 (C.D. Cal. 2020).

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Mot. at 10-11; Opp’n at 10-12.

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California state law wage and hour class action that, like the

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present case, was removed to federal court on the grounds that

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Section 301 of the LMRA preempted the plaintiff-employee’s

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claims.

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to remand, arguing in relevant part that none of his state-law

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claims required interpretation of the CBA and thus were not

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preempted under the second part of Burnside.

434 F.Supp.3d at 810.

Wilson-Davis involved a

The Wilson-Davis plaintiff moved

Id. at 813-818.

In

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granting the motion to remand, the Wilson-Davis court explained:

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““[i]t is not enough for Defendants to provide a laundry list of

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provisions that they allege the Court must interpret to resolve

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Plaintiff’s claims; Defendants must explain why interpretation,

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as opposed to mere reference to the CBA, is necessary.”

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813.

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not meet their burden under the second part of Burnside by simply

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providing a “laundry list of provisions” they allege this Court

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must interpret.

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the present case from Wilson-Davis, see Opp’n at 10-12, are of no

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avail.

Id. at

That reasoning applies with equal force here: Defendants do

Therefore, Defendants’ attempts to distinguish

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Because Defendants have shown only a “hypothetical

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connection” between the claims and the terms of the CBA, the

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Court finds they have not made the requisite showing to trigger

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preemption under the second part of Burnside.

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at 691.

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Section 301 of the LMRA preemption therefore fails and this case

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must be remanded to the Sacramento County Superior Court.

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///

Cramer, 255 F.3d

Defendants’ argument for removal jurisdiction based on

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C.

Plaintiff’s Request for Fees and Costs

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Plaintiff additionally requests the Court order Defendants

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to pay attorney’s fees and costs incurred as result of the

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removal.

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should award fees and costs associated with this Motion because

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“even a cursory review of the claims alleged, and the governing

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CBA, would have revealed that Plaintiff’s claims do not implicate

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the CBA.”

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as demonstrated by the extensive caselaw cited to in their

Mot. at 13; Reply at 5.

Mot. at 15.

She argues that the Court

The Court does not agree and finds that,

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opposition brief, Defendants had a good faith basis for removal.

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Opp’n at 14.

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denied.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for fees is

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III.

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS

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Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand this case to the Sacramento County

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Superior Court, but DENIES Plaintiff’s request for fees and costs

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associated with the Motion.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: April 23, 2021

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