Railroad 1900, LLC v. City of Sacramento

Filing 58

ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 11/14/23 GRANTING 47 City's Motion for Summary Judgment on its federal claims brought under Section 1983 (Claims 1-3). Claims 4-7 are DISMISSED pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), without prejudice to plaintiff's right to refile its remaining state law claims in state court. CASE CLOSED (Benson, A.)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

----oo0oo----

11
12

RAILROAD 1900, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company,

13
14
15
16
17

No. 2:21-cv-01673 WBS DB

Plaintiff,
ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
CITY OF SACRAMENTO, a municipal
entity,
Defendant.

18
19
20

----oo0oo---Plaintiff Railroad 1900, LLC (“Railroad 1900”) brings

21

this action against defendant the City of Sacramento (“City”),

22

alleging violations of due process (Claims 1-2), municipal

23

liability for unconstitutional customs and policies (Claim 3),

24

and various state law claims (Claims 4-7).

25

plaintiff’s claims challenges the City’s alleged failure to

26

enforce anti-camping and other ordinances against homeless

27

individuals in the area surrounding plaintiff’s property.

28

(Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) (Docket No. 34).)
1

The core of

The City now moves

1

for summary judgment.

2

47).)

3

I.

(Mot. for Summ. J. (“MSJ”) (Docket No.

Factual Background

4

Plaintiff owns commercial real estate at 1900, 1955,

5

and 1957 Railroad Drive in Sacramento, California, which

6

plaintiff acquired in May 2018.

7

2.)

8

property, the City opened an emergency homeless shelter on

9

Railroad Drive.

10

(Eaton Decl. (Docket No. 55-6) ¶

In December 2017, shortly before plaintiff purchased the

2019.

(Id. ¶ 3.)

The City closed it around April

(Id.)

11

At around the time the shelter closed, Railroad Drive

12

experienced a surge in homeless encampments and abandoned

13

vehicles.

14

extensive property damage and economic loss, inflicted

15

principally by the homeless population encamped in Railroad

16

Drive.

17

contacted the City hundreds of times, repeatedly requesting that

18

the City enforce its laws and ordinances on Railroad Drive.

19

¶ 10 and Ex. 4.)

20

concerned vehicles on Railroad Drive that were either wrecked or

21

being used as shelter by homeless individuals.

22

(Docket No. 47-4) Ex. C.)

(Id. ¶ 6 and Ex. 1.)

(Id. ¶ 15.)

Plaintiff has since suffered

From 2019 to the present, plaintiff has

(Id.

A significant portion of plaintiff’s requests

(Mendez Decl.

23

The City has various units and divisions that process

24

complaints and concerns about Sacramento’s homeless population.

25

One is the Sacramento Police Department’s Impact Unit.

26

Decl. (Docket No. 47-6) ¶ 2.)

27

complaints of illegal activity in and around encampments.

28

It is also responsible for enforcing Sacramento’s Critical

(Heinlein

The Impact Unit responds to

2

(Id.)

1

Infrastructure Ordinance (S.C.C. c. 8.140) and the Sidewalk

2

Obstructions and Pedestrian Interference Ordinance (id. c.

3

12.24), which prohibit camping on or otherwise obstructing

4

sidewalks and critical city infrastructure.

5

that capacity, the Impact Unit seeks voluntary removal of

6

encampments in violation of city ordinances; as a second resort,

7

it will move individuals and their possessions forcibly.

8
9

(Id. ¶¶ 3-6.)

In

(Id.)

Another City entity that interacts with the homeless
population is the Department of Community Response (“DCR”).

DCR

10

employees are trained to answer various emergency calls,

11

including those regarding homeless encampments.

12

(Docket No. 47-5) ¶ 3.)

13

homeless individuals to use.

14

to homeless individuals when they indicate they want to clean

15

their area.

16

individual water bottles to homeless individuals, but not as a

17

regular service or at large scale.

18

(Id.)

(Worrall Decl.

DCR does not provide sterile needles for
(Id. ¶ 5.)

DCR provides trash bags

During high temperatures, DCR will hand out

(Id.)

Another City entity is the Community Development

19

Department, which has a Code Compliance Division (“Code

20

Compliance”).

21

administers a vehicle abatement program.

22

tow and dispose of vehicles that are a public nuisance.

23

3.)

24

wrecked, dismantled, or otherwise illegally parked.

25

Code Compliance receives a complaint about an unmoved vehicle,

26

Code Compliance tags it, then tows it 72 hours later if it

27

remains unmoved.

28

(Mendez Decl. ¶¶ 1-2.)

Code Compliance
This program seeks to
(Id. ¶

Nuisance vehicles include those vehicles are abandoned,
(Id.)

If

(Id. ¶ 4.)

In the past five years, Code Compliance has received
3

1

around 20,000 abandoned vehicle complaints per year.

2

Decl. ¶ 6.)

3

abatement.

4

enforcement officers.

5

complaints and abandoned vehicles, Code Compliance utilizes a

6

triage system that prioritizes complaints posing possible life

7

and safety concerns.

8
9

(Mendez

Around 10% of complaints ultimately ended in vehicle
(Id. ¶ 5.)

Code Compliance employs around 12 to 15
(Id. ¶ 6.)

Due to the sheer volume of

(Id. ¶ 7.)

On March 19, 2020, Sacramento County’s Public Health
Officer issued a stay-at-home order due to the arrival of the

10

COVID-19 pandemic.

(Mendez Decl. ¶ 8 and Ex. A.)

The order did

11

not prevent the performance of “Essential Governmental Functions”

12

as determined by each governmental entity.

(Id. Ex. A § 10(e).)

13

On June 1, 2021, the Public Health Officer issued

14

another order, this time advising local governments against

15

citing homeless individuals living in vehicles during community

16

spread of COVID-19, except where encampments pose a public safety

17

hazard or threaten critical infrastructure.

18

The order expired two weeks later, on June 15, 2021.

19

¶ 7.)

20

(Id. Ex. B ¶ 6.)
(Id. Ex. B

In response to these two orders, Code Compliance did

21

not tow any nuisance vehicles being used as shelter between March

22

19, 2020 and June 15, 2021, except in cases involving public

23

safety concerns.

24

Compliance responded to complaints about nuisance vehicles not

25

used for shelter.

26

responded to complaints from plaintiff about nuisance vehicles on

27

Railroad Drive on thirteen occasions between January and

(Id. ¶ 10.)

Notwithstanding the orders, Code

(Id. ¶¶ 12-13.)

28
4

Code Compliance specifically

1

September of 2021.1

2

II.

(Id. ¶ 12.)

Legal Standard

3

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that

4

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

5

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

6

P. 56(a).

7

of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

8

reasonable trier of fact to enter a verdict in the non-moving

9

party's favor.

10

Fed. R. Civ.

A material fact is one that could affect the outcome

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986).

11

The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating

12

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the basis

13

for the motion.

14

(1986).

15

evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving

16

party's case.

17

the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving party cannot

18

provide evidence to support an essential element upon which it

19

will bear the burden of proof at trial.

20

shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts to

21

show that there is a genuine issue for trial.

22

Any inferences drawn from the underlying facts must, however, be

23

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

24

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

25

587 (1986).

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

The moving party can satisfy its burden by presenting

Celotex Corp, 477 U.S. at 322–23.

Id.

Alternatively,

The burden then

See id. at 324.

See

26
27
28

What constituted a “response,” and whether it involved
towing any vehicles, is left unclear. (See Eaton Decl. ¶ 12.)
1

5

1

III. Evidentiary Objections

2

Plaintiff and the City assert various evidentiary

3

objections against each other’s statements of material facts.

4

(Docket Nos. 55-3, 56-2.)

5

As a preliminary matter, the court will disregard any

6

objections that are duplicative of the summary judgment standard.

7

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is relevant if it

8

“has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable” and that

9

fact “is of consequence in determining the action.”

Fed. R.

10

Evid. 401.

The action before the court now is a motion for

11

summary judgment.

12

whether the evidence presented, viewed in the light most

13

favorable to the non-moving party, creates a “genuine dispute as

14

to any material fact” that must be resolved at trial.

15

Civ. P. 56(a).

16

consider, evidence bearing on (1) facts that are (2) material.

17

If the evidence offered does not bear on a material fact (e.g.,

18

comprises baseless speculation, bears on a legal conclusion, or

19

bears on a fact not necessary to dispose of any claim), it is by

20

definition not relevant to the present action for summary

21

judgment.

22

Cir. 2021) (“[O]bjections for relevance are generally unnecessary

23

on summary judgment because they are “‘duplicative of the summary

24

judgment standard itself.’ . . . [P]arties briefing summary

25

judgment motions would be better served to ‘simply argue’ the

26

import of the facts reflected in the evidence rather than

27

expending time and resources compiling laundry lists of relevance

28

objections.”) (citing Burch v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 433 F.

On summary judgment, the court determines

Fed. R.

The court must therefore consider, and only

Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 665 (9th

6

1

Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (Shubb, J.)).

2

Additionally, “if the contents of a document can be

3

presented in a form that would be admissible at trial -- for

4

example, through live testimony by the author of the document --

5

the mere fact that the document itself might be excludable

6

hearsay provides no basis for refusing to consider it on summary

7

judgment.”

8
9

Id. at 666.

Accordingly, the court will overrule plaintiff’s
objections to portions of the City’s declarations and exhibits

10

attached to them.2

11

personal knowledge of the facts stated within their declaration

12

and that they are able to competently testify to them at trial.

13

(See Mendez Decl. ¶ 1; Worrall Decl. ¶ 1; Heinlein Decl. ¶ 1.)

14

Further, every declarant is employed in a managerial/oversight

15

capacity at their respective organizations, and on this basis

16

attests to their organization’s policies, reports, and data.

17

(Id.)

18

reliability of these declarations, the court will not exclude

19

them from its analysis of plaintiff’s claims.

20

better served if its counsel centered on meaningful problems with

21

the content of the evidence and allowed the court to focus on the

22

merits of its arguments.

23

IV.

Absent any challenges to the substantive authenticity or

26
27
28

Plaintiff would be

Discussion

24
25

Every declarant represents that they have

Plaintiff brings federal and state claims against the
City.

The federal claims (Claims 1-3) are brought under Section

The City’s evidentiary objections to plaintiff’s
declaration and exhibits bear on facts that are not material to
the court’s disposition of plaintiff’s claims.
2

7

1

1983 and allege substantive due process violations.

2

previously dismissed these claims with leave to amend because

3

plaintiff failed to allege any affirmative acts by the City that

4

could confer plaintiff with standing to sue.3

5

No. 27).)

6

A.

The court

(See Order (Docket

Due Process (Claim 1)

7

It is well established that, as a general principle,

8

plaintiffs cannot sue the government for failing to enforce its

9

laws.

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984) (“[The Supreme

10

Court] has repeatedly held that an asserted right to have the

11

Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing

12

alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court.”); see also

13

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private

14

citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution

15

or nonprosecution of another.”) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401

16

U.S. 37, 42 (1971)).

17

The court previously dismissed this claim with leave to

18

amend for lack of a cognizable judicial controversy.

19

at 2-6.)

20

still predicated on the City’s alleged failure to perform any

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

(See Order

To the extent that plaintiff’s due process claim is

Previously, the court dismissed the federal claims in
the initial complaint with leave to amend. Those federal claims
were all brought under Section 1983, alleging violations of Due
Process (Claims 1, 3), Equal Protection (Claim 2), Uncompensated
Taking (Claim 4) and Monell (Claim 5). (Docket No. 1.) The
court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
claims. (Order.) Plaintiff then amended its complaint. (Docket
No. 30.) Thereafter, the parties stipulated to a second amended
complaint, which dropped the Equal Protection and Uncompensated
Taking claims. (SAC.) The second amended complaint is the
operative complaint. The City did not move to dismiss the second
amended complaint.
3

8

1

affirmative act, the court still lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate

2

it.4

3

claim.

4

Accordingly, the court will dismiss plaintiff’s Due Process

B.

5

State-Created Danger (Claim 2)
Plaintiff also alleges that the City committed

6

affirmative acts that placed plaintiff at risk of danger, and

7

accordingly invokes the state-created danger doctrine.

8

state-created danger doctrine provides an exception to the

9

general rule denying plaintiffs standing to sue the government

The

10

for failure to act against third parties.

Specifically, it opens

11

the government to liability for a failure to act against a third

12

party if the plaintiff can show that (1) the government, by some

13

affirmative conduct, exposed the plaintiff to danger from that

14

third party, and (2) the affirmative conduct was with “deliberate

15

indifference to a known or obvious danger.”

16

61 F.4th 1096, 1111 (9th Cir. 2023); Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist.,

17

648 F.3d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2011)).

Murguia v. Langdon,

18

1.

Applicability of State-Created Danger Doctrine

19

Before challenging the merits of plaintiff’s state-

20

created danger argument, the City argues that there is no triable

21

issue as to a state-created danger because neither party is an

22

individual.

23

corporation has rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and may

24

bring § 1983 claims when its rights are violated.”

(MSJ at 9.)

This argument lacks merit.

First, “[a]

SOC, Inc. v.

25
26
27
28

Any allegations of affirmative acts or concerted
policies of inaction are properly raised under plaintiff’s statecreated danger and Monell claims, respectively, and are addressed
below.
4

9

1

Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 319 F. App’x 488, 489–90 (9th Cir.

2

2009) (recognizing corporate right to occupational liberty).

3

also Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (“[A]

4

corporation is a ‘person’ within the meaning of the equal

5

protection and due process of law clauses [of the Fourteenth

6

Amendment] . . . .”).

7

fails to provide, any authority that suspends these rights upon

8

invocation of the state-created danger doctrine.

9

See

The court is not aware of, and the City

Second, “municipalities and other local government

10

units . . . [are] among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.”

11

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); see

12

also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997);

13

Hyun Ju Park v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1141

14

(9th Cir. 2020) (“A municipality may be held liable as a ‘person’

15

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when it maintains a policy or custom that

16

causes the deprivation of a plaintiff’s federally protected

17

rights.”).

18

the state-created danger doctrine exempts state entities from the

19

class of persons to whom § 1983 applies.

20

City of Seattle, 61 F.4th 674 (9th Cir. 2023) (affirming

21

recognition and denial on merits of plaintiff’s claim against

22

city under state-created danger doctrine); Reed v. City of

23

Emeryville, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (recognizing

24

and denying on merits the same).

25
26

The City offers no arguments why an application of

See also Sinclair v.

Accordingly, the court will proceed to the merits of
plaintiff’s state-created danger claim.

27

2.

Affirmative Acts

28

Plaintiff alleges that the City placed plaintiff in a
10

1

more dangerous position than it otherwise would have faced by the

2

following affirmative acts: (1) opening and then closing a

3

homeless shelter along Railroad Drive; (2) providing sustenance

4

and support to homeless individuals residing near Railroad Drive;

5

and (3) affirmatively refusing to enforce laws along Railroad

6

Drive, essentially designating it a “containment zone.”

7

generally Opp’n (Docket No. 5).)

8

turn.

9

i.

(See

The court addresses each in

Homeless Shelter

10

Plaintiff fails to show that there is a triable issue

11

on whether the City closed the homeless shelter with deliberate

12

indifference to a known or obvious danger to plaintiff.

13

Deliberate indifference is “a stringent standard of fault,

14

requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or

15

obvious consequence of his action.”

16

U.S. 397, 410 (1997).

17

F.3d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2011) (“deliberate indifference requires

18

a culpable mental state.”) (citing L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894,

19

898–900 (9th Cir. 1996)).

20

] to expose the plaintiff to such risks without regard to the

21

consequences to the plaintiff.”

22

quotation marks omitted).

23

Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520

See also Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648

The state actor must “actually intend[

Grubbs, 92 F.3d at 899 (internal

In this case, even assuming the City’s actual knowledge

24

of the condition that would befall Railroad Drive upon the

25

shelter’s closure, plaintiff fails to establish a genuine issue

26

of deliberate indifference because it introduces no evidence

27

probative of the City’s “culpable mental state” regarding the

28

shelter’s closure.

See Patel, 638 F.3d at 974.
11

In fact,

1

plaintiff offers no evidence at all even bearing on the question

2

of why the City closed the shelter.

3

City of Seattle, 650 F. Supp. 3d 1187 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (granting

4

summary judgment in part because “Plaintiffs have presented no

5

evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the

6

City acted with deliberate indifference to expose Plaintiffs to

7

certain unreasonable risks, and actually intended to expose them

8

to such risks, without regard to the consequences to them.”).

9

See Hunters Cap., LLC v.

Accordingly, the City’s closing of the shelter cannot

10

serve as the factual predicate for plaintiff’s state-created

11

danger claim.

12

ii.

13

Sustenance/Support

No reasonable trier of fact could conclude that DCR’s

14

provision of trash bags and water bottles to the homeless placed

15

plaintiff in greater danger.

16

individuals who express a desire to clean up after themselves in

17

fact implies the mitigation of the precise kind of danger for

18

which plaintiff seeks to hold the City accountable.

19

Providing trash bags to homeless

Even if the court were to construe this form of aid as

20

a danger to plaintiff, plaintiff submits no evidence that the

21

City’s policy of providing trash bags and water bottles and

22

allowing non-profit private entities to give homeless individuals

23

food and other comfort is anything other than a generalized

24

policy applicable across Sacramento, as opposed to applicable

25

specifically to the homeless population around plaintiff’s

26

property.

27

(9th Cir. 2023) (“[A]ny danger the City created or contributed to

28

. . . affected all [] visitors [to city precinct] equally; the

See Sinclair v. City of Seattle, 61 F.4th 674, 682

12

1

danger was not specifically directed at [plaintiffs]” and claim

2

therefore dismissed).

3

Accordingly, there is no genuine issue as to whether

4

such generalized, rudimentary aid can ground a successful state-

5

created danger claim.

6

iii. Affirmative Non-Enforcement

7

As the court previously explained in its order

8

dismissing the original complaint, “[i]nserting the word

9

‘refusal’ . . . does not transform an omission into an

10

affirmative act.”

11

MMM (RCx), 2006 WL 4959780, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2006).

12

Ninth Circuit precedent recognizing claims for state-created

13

danger makes clear that the official conduct in question must be

14

affirmative in a more literal sense.

15

City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1133-35 (9th Cir. 2018)

16

(directing rally attendees toward violent crowd and then

17

physically blocking them).

18

instances of the City refusing or failing to respond to its

19

requests for code enforcement, they cannot support a state-

20

created danger claim as a matter of law.5

21

Such a showing would also preclude standing to sue, as
discussed in the standing analysis regarding plaintiff’s first
claim, supra, at § IV.A. However, a concerted policy or custom
of inaction may be an affirmative act for which the City may be
liable. See Brown v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“A ‘policy’ is a deliberate choice to follow a course of action
. . . . A plaintiff can prevail by pointing to both policies of
‘action’ and of ‘inaction.’”) (citations omitted); Horton by
Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 604 (9th Cir. 2019)
(“[C]onstitutional deprivations may occur not . . . as a result
of actions of the individual officers, but as a result of the
collective inaction of the municipal defendant.”) (citations
omitted). To the extent that plaintiff alleges a sustained,
13

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

5

Estate of Gonzales v. Hickman, ED 05-cv-660

See, e.g., Hernandez v.

To the extent that plaintiff shows

1

Accordingly, the court will grant summary judgment on

2

this claim.

3

C.

4

Municipal Liability for Custom or Practice (Claim 3)
“In order to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff

5

must show that a ‘policy or custom’ led to the plaintiff’s

6

injury.”

7

(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

8

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).

9

Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2021) (“An unconstitutional

Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073

See also Gordon v. Cnty. of

10

policy need not be formal or written to create municipal

11

liability under Section 1983; however, it must be so permanent

12

and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the

13

force of law.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

14

Plaintiff alleges that the City adopted a policy of

15

non-enforcement around plaintiff’s property, compelled by the

16

City’s interpretation of the Ninth Circuit case Martin v. City of

17

Boise, 902 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2018), opinion amended and

18

superseded on denial of reh'g, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019).6

19

(Opp’n at 8.)

20

reasonable factfinder to conclude that the City adopted a policy

21

to categorically “preclude[] it from prosecuting any homeless

22

persons or even being able to relocate the homeless persons

However, the undisputed facts do not permit a

23
24
25
26
27
28

affirmative policy or custom of inaction, the court addresses it
in its discussion of plaintiff’s Monell claim below.
The Ninth Circuit in Martin held, in relevant part,
that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal
penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public
property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter.”
Id. at 1048.
6

14

1

outside of the area surrounding Railroad Drive or to clean up the

2

debris, including abandoned and burned vehicles, left in their

3

wake.”7

4

doing as much as plaintiff would reasonably expect it to do in

5

prosecuting crimes committed by homeless persons, the undisputed

6

facts show that the City has in place official policies for

7

triaging and prioritizing the countless complaints it receives

8

from its citizens stemming from the homelessness crisis, with

9

resolutions up to and including clearing encampments and towing

10

(See Eaton Decl. ¶ 8.)

While the City might not be

vehicles deemed to be a nuisance.8

(See Worrall Decl. ¶¶ 7-8 and

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Plaintiff also cites to its correspondence with
Sacramento Police Sergeant William Wann for the proposition that
the City, pursuant to Martin, directed all of its enforcement
agencies “to stop policing and enforcing the laws around
Plaintiff’s Property.” (Opp’n at 15 (Wann writing “Soon, I think
we will be sending social workers out to try to connect the
campers with services and my team will only be needed when there
is a nexus to some criminal activity. We are pretty much there
now.”).) In context, Wann merely informs plaintiff of the Police
Department’s shrinking purview (“Code Enforcement, Parking
Enforcement, Animal Control, Arson Investigations and probably
more stuff is not part of the Police Department”) and explains
that “I think the days are gone in which we consider tents to be
a police problem if they are only an eye sore.” (Eaton Decl. Ex.
4, 1900RR_000900 (emphasis added).) He further explains that if
tents are on plaintiff’s private property, then the Police
Department will help remove them. (Id.)
7

At best, plaintiff’s evidence shows that Sacramento
politicians use Martin to deflect complaints from its
constituents about inadequate code enforcement. (See Eaton Decl.
Ex. 2, RR1900_000184 (email from mayor’s office stating “Martin
V. Boise[] places restrictions on moving people experiencing
homelessness, which includes people living in their vehicles,
unless there is adequate shelter space available . . . . There
are exceptions to this which include updates to essential
infrastructure as well as public safety concerns.”),
RR1900_000186 (email from councilmember’s office stating “we are
still subject to the Martin v. Boise decision, which limits our
ability to enforce anticamping ordinances without providing
15
8

1

Exs. B, C.)

2

Neither do the undisputed facts permit the conclusion

3

that the City maintained a municipal custom of inaction that

4

rises to the level of a constitutional violation.

5

record shows the City taking at least some affirmative actions to

6

respond to plaintiff’s complaints.

7

responded to complaints from plaintiff about Railroad Drive on 13

8

occasions in 2021.

9

shows, for instance, that the City conducted a vehicle sweep of

Instead, the

For example, Code Compliance

(See Mendez Decl. ¶¶ 12-13.)

The record also

10

Railroad Drive on January 2021, during which several vehicles

11

were either towed, marked for tow, or voluntarily removed (see

12

Eaton Decl. Ex. 4, 1900RR_000420); removed an abandoned vehicle

13

from the Railroad Drive cul-de-sac on December 2020 (see id.,

14

1900RR_000490); and had Jose Mendez, Code Enforcement Manager for

15

the City of Sacramento, respond personally to plaintiff’s

16

complaints and promise to send code enforcement officers out to

17

Railroad Drive (see id., 1900RR_000545; see also Mendez Decl. ¶

18

13).

19

These responses may be far from what plaintiff had a

20

right to expect from the City for its tax dollars, but they

21

negate any contention that the City was accustomed to inaction

22

“so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage

23

with the force of law.”

24

there is no triable issue on whether the City implemented an

25

unconstitutional policy or custom of non-enforcement pursuant to

26

Monell, and the court will grant summary judgment on this claim.

27

Gordon, 6 F.4th at 974.

shelter options for the unhoused population.”).)

28
16

Accordingly,

1

D.

2

State Law Claims (Claims 4-7)
After initially dismissing plaintiff’s federal claims,

3

the court concluded that the balance of judicial economy,

4

convenience, fairness, and comity factors weighed strongly in

5

favor of declining supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

6

state law claims.

7

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).)

8

has changed significantly to disturb this analysis, including the

9

still-predominant comity interest in referring decisions on

(See Order at 14-15; see also Carnegie-Mellon
Nothing since

10

complex questions of California statutory and constitutional law

11

to California courts.9

12

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims

13

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

14

Accordingly, the court will again decline

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the City’s motion for

15

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED on its

16

federal claims brought under Section 1983 (Claims 1-3).

17

4-7 are DISMISSED pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

18

1367(c), without prejudice to plaintiff’s right to refile its

19

remaining state law claims in state court.

20

Dated:

Claims

November 14, 2023

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

See also California v. Sacramento, No. 23-cv-8658
(Sacramento Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2023), filed by the Sacramento
County District Attorney against the City and bringing similar
state law claims in response to Sacramento’s homelessness crisis.
9

17