Loynachan et al v. Smiley
Filing
46
ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 02/06/2024 DENYING 39 Motion for Summary Judgment as to Claim 1 and GRANTING 39 Motion for Summary Judgment as to Claims 2 & 3.(Lopez, K)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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KEVIN LOYNACHAN and JANICE
LOYNACHAN, individually and as
successors-in-interest to
Decedent CHAD LOYNACHAN,
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ORDER
Plaintiffs,
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No. 2:22-cv-00841 WBS JDP
v.
DARLENE SMILEY, in her
individual capacity as a law
enforcement officer for SISKIYOU
COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; and
DOES 1-50, inclusive,
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Defendant.
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Plaintiffs Kevin and Janice Loynachan bring claims
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, both individually and
as successors-in-interest of their deceased son Chad Loynachan,
against defendant Darlene Smiley.
judgment on all claims.
Defendant moves for summary
(Mot. (Docket No. 39).)
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I.
Factual Background
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Defendant Darlene Smiley is, and was at all relevant
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times, a transport officer with the Siskiyou County Jail.
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responsibilities included transporting inmates to and from places
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such as hospitals and courts.
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4) at 5.)
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Her
(Smiley Deposition (Docket No. 39-
On February 5, 2021, Chad Loynachan was stopped for
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speeding and then arrested for possession of a stolen firearm and
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drugs for distribution.
(Internal Investigation I1 (Docket No.
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39-6) at 6-8.)
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as a pretrial detainee the same day.
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Loynachan was taken to the Siskiyou County Jail
(Id. at 10.)
Shortly before noon on February 19, Loynachan
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approached a custodial officer and said that he swallowed a
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razor.
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Loynachan medically evaluated at the Fairchild Medical Center.
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(Id.)
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was placed in belly chains, leg shackles, and handcuffs tethered
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to the belly chains.
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shackles were around 14 inches in length; Loynachan’s handcuffed
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hands could reach out approximately a foot from the belly chains.
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(Id. at 13-14.)
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according to protocol.
(Id. at 11.)
Arrangements were promptly made to have
Prior to transport and according to protocol, Loynachan
(Smiley Deposition at 12-13.)
The leg
Loynachan was searched for weapons, also
None were found.
(Id. at 15.)
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Defendant, as the on-duty transport officer,
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transported Loynachan in a Ford Expedition SUV to the Fairchild
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Medical Center.
(Internal Investigation II (Docket No. 40-1) at
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The parties submitted different excerpted portions from
the same Siskiyou County Sheriff Department’s Internal
Investigation of Loynachan’s death.
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3.)
Defendant was equipped with a duty belt, which contained her
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duty gun secured to her right hip in a holster with a safety
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release.
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taser holstered to her left thigh.
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transport officers accompanied Loynachan.
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Loynachan to the hospital and parked the car outside the hospital
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entrance.
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footage shows Loynachan and defendant walking into the hospital
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around five minutes before noon.
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(Smiley Deposition at 30, 43.)
Defendant also had a
(Id. at 50.)
(Smiley Deposition at 10.)
(Id.)
No other
Defendant drove
Hospital security camera
(Docket No. 39-7 at 2.)
Loynachan and defendant left the hospital about an hour
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later.
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driver’s side, with Loynachan in front.
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19.)
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driver’s side while defendant entered a code on the driver’s door
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to unlock it.
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unlocked the rest of the car, shut the driver’s door, and opened
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the passenger door on the driver’s side.
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(Id. at 3.)
They walked around the Expedition to the
(Smiley Deposition at
Loynachan stopped and stood by the rear tire on the
(Id.)
Defendant then opened the driver’s door,
A struggle ensued.
(Id.)
(Id. at 23-51.)
Defendant alleges
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that Loynachan, after initially entering the vehicle, lunged at
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her and grabbed her duty belt, repeatedly headbutted and bit her
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fingers and ear, and attempted to reach for her holstered taser.
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(Id.)
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into Loynachan’s right mid abdomen.
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40-9) at 2.)
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than an inch away from Loynachan’s abdomen.
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(Docket No. 39-5) at 11.)
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downwards, and front to back, eventually lodging in the left side
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of Loynachan’s lower back bone.
The struggle ended with defendant firing a single shot
(Autopsy Report (Docket No.
Based on autopsy reports, the shot was fired less
(Olson Deposition
The bullet traveled right to left,
(Id. at 12-15.)
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Loynachan fell
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and lay supine and unresponsive with his head near the
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Expedition’s rear left tire and his feet near the front left
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tire.
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emergency operating room; however, he suffered “devastating”
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damage from the bullet wound and was pronounced dead after over
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two hours of surgery.
(Docket No. 39-12 at 5.)
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Loynachan was taken to an
(Nelson Decl. (Docket No. 39-8) ¶¶ 2-4.)
Loynachan’s body showed fresh abrasions on his scalp,
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nose, and lips, and a laceration of his eyelid.
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Deposition at 15-17.)
(Olson
There are no records indicating that
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Loynachan entered the hospital for his earlier evaluation with
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any of these injuries.
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(See generally Docket No. 39-11.)
An officer who arrived on the scene shortly after the
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gunshot reported that defendant was “very obviously upset and was
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crying,” and had blood on her hands and forehead.
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40-8 at 5.)
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hour of the shooting, which documented fresh human bite marks and
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broken skin on her left hand fingers and her right ear, and a
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“goose egg” lump on the back of her head.
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No. 39-9.)
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II.
(Docket No.
Defendant received a medical evaluation within an
(See generally Docket
Legal Standard
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Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that
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there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
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P. 56(a).
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of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a
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reasonable trier of fact to enter a verdict in the non-moving
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party's favor.
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248 (1986).
Fed. R. Civ.
A material fact is one that could affect the outcome
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
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The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating
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the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the basis
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for the motion.
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(1986).
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evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving
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party's case.
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the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving party cannot
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provide evidence to support an essential element upon which it
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will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
The moving party can satisfy its burden by presenting
Celotex Corp, 477 U.S. at 322–23.
Id.
Alternatively,
The burden then
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shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts to
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show that there is a genuine issue for trial.
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Any inferences drawn from the underlying facts must, however, be
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viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
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587 (1986).
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III. Discussion
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See id. at 324.
See
Plaintiffs bring three Section 1983 claims against
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defendant: Fourth Amendment excessive force (Claim 1); Fourth
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Amendment failure to provide reasonable post-arrest care (Claim
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2); and Fourteenth Amendment familial loss (Claim 3).
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generally First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket No. 33).)
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A.
(See
Excessive Force (Claim 1)
Defendant asserts qualified immunity against
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plaintiffs’ excessive force claim.
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question of law to be decided by the court.
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Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (2009) (“Immunity ordinarily should be
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decided by the court long before trial.”).
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entitled to qualified immunity if a plaintiff (1) has not
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Qualified immunity is a
See Hunter v.
A defendant is
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“alleged” or “shown” facts that would make out a constitutional
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violation, or (2) fails to show that an alleged constitutional
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violation
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defendant’s alleged misconduct.”
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712 F.3d 446, 453–54 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Pearson v. Callahan,
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555 U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009)).
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judgment, the court first determines “whether the evidence viewed
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in the light most favorable to the plaintiff is sufficient to
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show a violation of a constitutional right.”
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was not “‘clearly established’ at the time of
A.D. v. Cal. Highway Patrol,
On a motion for summary
Sandoval v. County
of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 671 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
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1.
Constitutional Violation
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“[A]pprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure
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subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
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Amendment.”
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Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor set forth a non-exhaustive list
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of factors for evaluating an officer’s reasonability: (1) the
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severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect posed an
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immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3)
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whether the suspect actively resisted arrest or attempted to
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escape.
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(citing Graham, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)).
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Garner, the Supreme Court analyzed the application of deadly
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force by weighing (1) the immediacy of the threat, (2) whether
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force was necessary to safeguard officers or the public, and (3)
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whether officers administered a warning, assuming it was
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practicable.
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U.S. at 11-12).
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Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
The
See George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 837 (9th Cir. 2013)
And in Tennessee v.
See George, 736 F.3d 829, 837 (citing Garner, 471
“In cases where the best (and usually only) witness who
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could offer direct testimony for the plaintiff about what
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happened before a shooting has died, our precedent permits the
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decedent's version of events to be constructed circumstantially
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from competent expert and physical evidence, as well as from
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inconsistencies in the testimony of law enforcement.”
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736 F.3d at 834 (9th Cir. 2013).
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George,
It is undisputed that some kind of violent altercation
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ensued between Loynachan and defendant -- their respective wounds
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beyond Loynachan’s gunshot wound attest to that.
However, the
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present record leaves some room, however slight, for a genuine
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dispute as to whether Loynachan, in the moments before the fatal
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shot, ceased his attack on defendant and was turning to flee.
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Roger Clark, plaintiffs’ expert witness, opines that “it is
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likely that Loynachan was turning away or turned away in some
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manner of escape when Deputy Smiley shot him” based on the
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trajectory of the bullet.
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7-8.)
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right after the shot was “in a position more consistent with
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Loynachan trying to escape . . . .”
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(Clark Report2 (Docket No. 40-10) at
Clark also states that the position of Loynachan’s body
(Id. at 8.)
Clark’s report also leaves room for genuine dispute on
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Defendant objects to the expert reports of Roger Clark
(Docket No. 40-10) and Leonard J. Romero (Docket No. 40-6):
Clark’s, on hearsay grounds because Clark “is not a medical
doctor and [] cannot and has not, analyzed the path of the bullet
he uses to claim the decedent was ‘trying to flee’ at the moment
he was wounded;” and Romero’s, because it was not made under
penalty of perjury. (Reply at 3.) These are no grounds to
ignore the reports. “At the summary judgment stage, we do not
focus on the admissibility of the evidence’s form. We instead
focus on the admissibility of its contents.” Fraser v. Goodale,
342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003); see Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(2).
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whether lethal force was truly necessary to safeguard defendant’s
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safety.
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create some space between herself and Loynachan during the
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altercation.
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from him, and at one point I do know -- remember either pushing
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or hitting the side of his head.
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my right side, and he is biting my ear.” ).)
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concludes that defendant could have, and should have, “simply
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stepped away, created distance and used a less lethal force
Defendant testified that she, at some point, was able to
(Smiley Deposition at 31 (“I am trying to push away
I get away enough and am now to
From this Clark
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option.”
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genuine disputes of material fact on whether lethal force was
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proportionate to the danger that Loynachan posed, or to the
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severity of defendant’s injuries, at least because no testimony
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from Loynachan is available to counter defendant’s testimony on
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the precise nature and severity of Loynachan’s assault or whether
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he was in fact attempting to reach defendant’s taser to disarm
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her immediately before the shot.
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(Clark Report (Docket No. 40-10) at 7.)
There are also
“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the
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evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts
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are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on
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a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict.
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evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable
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inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”
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Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S. H.
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Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)).
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of the issues raised by Clark’s report and the absence of
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countervailing testimony from Loynachan, for purposes of ruling
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on this motion the court is compelled to accept the inferences
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The
Anderson v. Liberty
Accordingly, in light
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opined in Clark’s report and conclude therefrom that defendant
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violated Loynachan’s constitutional right to be free from
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unreasonable seizure by fatally shooting him.
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2.
Clearly Established Right
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Still, qualified immunity applies if the violated
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constitutional right was not clearly established.
“A right is
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clearly established when it is ‘sufficiently clear that every
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reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing
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violates that right.’”
Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1,
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5-6 (2021) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)).
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When determining whether a right is clearly established, the
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court may not “define clearly established law at a high level of
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generality.”
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(quoting Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)).
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“[t]his inquiry ‘must be undertaken in light of the specific
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context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’”
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Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5-6 (citation omitted); see White v.
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Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (“[T]he clearly established law at
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issue must be particularized to the facts of the case.”).
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Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)
Rather,
Tailoring the court’s inquiry closely to the specific
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contours of the present record, the court defines the relevant
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question thusly: Would a reasonable officer understand that it
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was unlawful to use lethal force against a detainee when the
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detainee is no longer resisting, but is instead in the process of
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fleeing from the officer?
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The balance of precedent suggests that the answer is
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yes.
See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)
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(“[T]he use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect who
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did not appear to be armed or otherwise dangerous violated the
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suspect’s constitutional rights, notwithstanding the existence of
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probable cause to arrest.”) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.
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1, 5 (1985)); Foster v. City of Indio, 908 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th
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Cir. 2018) (“It is clearly established law that shooting a
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fleeing suspect in the back violates the suspect's Fourth
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Amendment rights.”); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1203 (9th
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Cir. 1997) (“Graham’s totality of the circumstances test does not
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permit the use of deadly force to kill a suspect who is running
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back to a cabin where he is temporarily staying . . . .”); Tan
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Lam v. City of Los Banos, 976 F.3d 986, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 2020)
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(“The law was also clearly established at the time of the
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incident that firing a second shot at a person who had previously
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been aggressive, but posed no threat to the officer at the time
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of the second shot, would violate the victim's rights.”); Curnow
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By and Through Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 324-25
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(9th Cir. 1991) (shooting suspect in the back who was armed with
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a rifle but not facing the officer or pointing the rifle at the
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officer at the time of the shot, was unreasonable and a violation
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of a clearly established right).
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Defendant cites no countervailing cases, either in
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their motion or in reply, that suggest a different definition of
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the clearly defined right, or a different conclusion under the
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court’s definition.
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Permitting the inference, without so finding, that
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Loynachan ceased his assault and was turning to flee in the
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moments before defendant shot him, the case law establishes that
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defendant had “fair warning” that using deadly force would
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violate Loynachan’s Fourth Amendment right.
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536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)
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See Hope v. Pelzer,
Accordingly, because defendant’s entitlement to
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qualified immunity ultimately turns on disputed issues of fact,
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summary judgment is not presently appropriate for this claim.
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See Liston v. Cty. of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir.
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1997) (“While we have held that qualified immunity is to be
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determined at the earliest possible point in the litigation, we
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have also held that summary judgment in favor of moving
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defendants is inappropriate where a genuine issue of material
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fact prevents a determination of qualified immunity until after
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trial on the merits.”).
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B.
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Failure to Provide Reasonable Post-Arrest Care and
Familial Loss Claims (Claims 2-3)
In their opposition, plaintiffs state that they “do not
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oppose dismissal of their failure to provide medical care claim
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or 14th Amendment familial loss claim.”
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Plaintiffs also did not assert any arguments opposing summary
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judgment on those claims.
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defendant’s summary judgment motion as to Claims 2 and 3.
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(Opp’n at 17 n.2.)
Accordingly, the court will grant
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion for
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summary judgment (Docket No. 39) be, and the same hereby is,
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DENIED as to Claim 1, and GRANTED as to Claims 2 and 3.
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Dated:
February 6, 2024
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