Williams v. Yuba City et al
Filing
31
ORDER signed by Senior District Judge John A. Mendez on 06/05/2024 GRANTING 26 Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint and DISMISSES each cause of action with prejudice. (Lopez, K)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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KYLE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
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v.
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No.
2:22-cv-01750-JAM-CKD
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
YUBA CITY, et al.,
Defendants.
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This matter is before the Court on Defendants Yuba City,
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Katheryn Danisan, D. Hauck, Enrique Jurado, Nico Mitchell, and
Spencer Koski’s (collectively, “Defendants”) motion to dismiss
Plaintiff Kyle Williams’ (“Plaintiff”) second amended complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 26.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’
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motion.1
I.
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The parties are intimately familiar with the allegations and
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ALLEGATIONS AND BACKGROUND
procedural background of this case, which were included in the
Court’s previous Order on Defendant’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“FAC Order”).
Order, ECF No. 22.
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See FAC
The first and second amended complaints are
motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g).
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substantially similar.
Compare Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”), ECF
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No. 23, with First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 14.
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following material allegation was added to the SAC: “[a]t the
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preliminary hearing, Plaintiff’s lawyer failed to call either
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Jurado or Hauck as witnesses when the DA failed to call them
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because he did not want to alert the DA to the planned trial
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defense.”
However, the
SAC ¶ 8(d)(vii).
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Like the FAC, Plaintiff’s SAC asserts the following causes
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of action under federal law: (1) excessive force; (2) malicious
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prosecution; (3) right to a fair trial;2 (4) false arrest;
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(5) Equal Protection Clause violation; and (6) unconstitutional
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deprivation of familial relations.
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claim Plaintiff did not reallege in the SAC is the Monell claim
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against Yuba City regarding Plaintiff’s vehicle.
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with FAC ¶¶ 78-82.
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Plaintiff opposed, Opp’n, ECF No. 27, and Defendants replied.
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Reply, ECF No. 28.
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II.
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See generally SAC.
The only
Compare SAC,
Defendants now move to dismiss each claim.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Defendants request four matters be judicially noticed under
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Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Defs.’ Req. for
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Judicial Notice (“RJN”), ECF No. 26-2.
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took judicial notice of the first three matters in the FAC
The Court previously
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2Plaintiff’s
third cause of action is entitled “42 U.S.C. § 1983—
Sixth Amendment Right to Fair Trial; Sixth Amendment Right to
Subpoena and Produce Evidence; Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due
Process; Fourth Amendment Unreasonable Seizure for Trial without
Due Process.” SAC at 17:7-10. The Court will refer to this
cause of action as one for interference with Plaintiff’s right to
a fair trial, even though Plaintiff asserts multiple claims
within. See id.
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Order, which included (1) the Custody Order; (2) the Preliminary
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Hearing Minute Order; and (3) that August 31, 2020, was a
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Monday.
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from Plaintiff’s preliminary hearing on September 11, 2020.
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RJN, ECF No. 26-2.
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request.
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FAC Order at 2.
The fourth matter is the transcript
Plaintiff does not object to Defendants’
See generally Opp’n.
As matters of public record whose authenticity is not
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disputed, the Court takes judicial notice as requested.
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250 F.3d at 689-90; Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).
Lee,
The Court only takes
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judicial notice of the contents, or lack of contents, within the
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documents noticed and not the truth of those contents.
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F.3d at 690; see also In re Calder, 907 F.2d 953, 955 n.2 (10th
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Cir. 1990) (taking judicial notice of the contents of bankruptcy
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documents but not the truth of the content).
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Court takes judicial notice of the presence or absence of
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matters in the preliminary hearing transcript but not any
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factual matters stated therein.
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III.
Lee, 250
For example, the
OPINION
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A.
Legal Standard
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Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
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Rules of Civil Procedure when a plaintiff’s allegations fail “to
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state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
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P. 12(b)(6).
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a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
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true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
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face.”
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quotation marks and citation omitted).
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allegations” are unnecessary, the complaint must allege more
Fed. R. Civ.
“To survive a motion to dismiss [under 12(b)(6)],
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal
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While “detailed factual
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than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
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action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”
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considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
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the court generally accepts as true the allegations in the
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complaint, construes the pleading in the light most favorable to
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the party opposing the motion, and resolves all doubts in the
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pleader’s favor.
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588 (9th Cir. 2008).
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motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and
Id.
In
Lazy Y Ranch LTD. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580,
“In sum, for a complaint to survive a
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reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly
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suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.”
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v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
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B.
Analysis
1.
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Moss
Plaintiff’s Claim for Excessive Force Under 42
U.S.C. Section 1983
The Court previously dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s
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first cause of action for excessive force.
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Plaintiff asserts it was included in the SAC solely to preserve
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his right to appeal.
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unnecessary.
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been modified.
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extent Plaintiff is attempting to reassert this claim, it is
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once again dismissed with prejudice.
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2.
FAC Order at 9.
Opp’n at 2; SAC at 14:7-11.
This was
The Court also notes, however, that this claim has
Compare SAC ¶¶ 25-30, with FAC ¶¶ 25-29.
To the
Plaintiff is Collaterally Estopped from
Relitigating the Issue of Probable Cause
Plaintiff’s second, third, and fourth causes of action are
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for false arrest or malicious prosecution.
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Order at 10-11; SAC at 17:7-10 (listing claims asserted within
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SAC ¶¶ 31-67; FAC
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the third cause of action); Opp’n at 8.
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properly allege the absence of probable cause.
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Cnty. of S.F., 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001) (false arrest);
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Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)
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(malicious prosecution).
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and fourth causes of action fail because Plaintiff is
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collaterally estopped from arguing the lack of probable cause in
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this suit.
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Defendants are correct.
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Thus, Plaintiff must
Dubner v. City &
Defendants argue the second, third,
Memo. of P. & A. (“Mot.”), ECF No. 26-1 at 6.
“[A] decision by a judge or magistrate to hold a defendant
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to answer after a preliminary hearing constitutes prima facie—
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but not conclusive—evidence of probable cause.”
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of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004).
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rule, each of [the] requirements [for collateral estoppel] will
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be met when courts are asked to give preclusive effect to
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preliminary hearing probable cause findings in subsequent civil
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actions for false arrest and malicious prosecution.”
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City of Los Angeles, 713 F.3d 1183, 1185 (9th Cir. 2013).
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finding of probable cause to stand trial is also a finding of
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probable cause to arrest.
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Cal. App. 4th 1138, 1145 (1999) (citing Haupt v. Dillard, 17
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F.3d 285, 289 (1994)).
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cause may be rebutted when a tactical reason prevents a criminal
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defendant from having a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate
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the issue at the preliminary hearing.
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4th at 1147; Haupt, 17 F.3d at 289; see also FAC Order at 12-13.
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Awabdy v. City
“As a general
Wige v.
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McCutchen v. City of Montclair, 73
The prima facie finding of probable
McCutchen, 73 Cal. App.
The Sutter County Superior Court found probable cause for
Plaintiff to stand trial during the preliminary hearing in
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Plaintiff’s prior criminal prosecution.
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Order, Exh. B to RJN, ECF No. 26-3 at 11-12.
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and since no exception to rebut the finding of probable cause
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was alleged in the FAC, the Court previously dismissed
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Plaintiff’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.
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Order at 9-14.
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Prelim. Hr’g Min.
For this reason,
FAC
Plaintiff contends the following allegation in the SAC
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sufficiently pleads a “tactical reason” exception to collateral
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estoppel: “[a]t the preliminary hearing, Plaintiff’s lawyer
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failed to call either Jurado or Hauck as witnesses when the DA
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failed to call them because he did not want to alert the DA to
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the planned trial defense.”
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The Court disagrees.
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demonstrate Plaintiff lacked a “full and fair opportunity” to
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litigate the issue of probable cause.
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ultimately benefited from his failure is insufficient.
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Plaintiff need not have litigated every issue affecting probable
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cause for this Court to find he had a full and fair opportunity
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to do so.
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obligated to call every witness, and Plaintiff does not contend
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he was prevented from calling witnesses and offering evidence
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himself.
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of the opportunity to litigate an issue will not preclude
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collateral estoppel,” Hoffman v. Gibson, No. 3:17-CV-00618-H-
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BLM, 2017 WL 3457525, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2017), Plaintiff
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has not alleged an exception.
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issue of probable cause at the preliminary hearing when his
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criminal defense counsel cross-examined all six of the
SAC ¶ 8(d)(vii); Opp’n at 9-12.
A failure to call two witnesses does not
That Plaintiff may have
As stated in the FAC Order, a state prosecutor is not
FAC Order at 13.
Since “a failure to take advantage
Indeed, Plaintiff contested the
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government’s witnesses.
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No. 26-3 at 15.
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Prelim. Hr’g Tr., Exh. C to RJN, ECF
Plaintiff offers several other reasons to support his
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argument that he is not estopped from arguing the lack of
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probable cause in this suit.
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arguments were previously rejected by the Court and are not
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readdressed here.
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arguments are unpersuasive and unsupported by legal authority.
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Opp’n at 9-13.
See FAC Order at 13-14.
Some of these
The remaining
First, Plaintiff argues he cannot be collaterally estopped
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because the term “probable cause” was not used during the
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preliminary hearing.
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with legal authority that this specific phrase must be used to
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create preclusive effect.
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criminal defense attorney “had been denied access to significant
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relevant police reports” at the preliminary hearing.
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¶ 8(d)(vi).
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transcript does not support this allegation.
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Prelim. Hr’g Tr., Exh. C to RJN, ECF No. 26-3 at 17:15-26).
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Nevertheless, this is not a recognized exception to collateral
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estoppel.
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the applicability of McCutchen given the conflicting holding in
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Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto, 157 Cal.App.4th 728 (2007),
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which found preliminary hearing findings do not create
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collateral estoppel effect for subsequent civil suits.
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Overwhelming authority in the Ninth Circuit, however, has
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followed McCutchen rather than Schmidlin.
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City of Yuba City (“Patterson II”), 748 F. App'x 120, 121 (9th
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Cir. 2018); Wige, 713 F.3d 1183.
Opp’n at 9.
Id.
Plaintiff does not support
Second, Plaintiff alleges his
SAC
Plaintiff’s citation to the preliminary hearing
See FAC Order at 12-13.
Id. (citing
Lastly, Plaintiff disputes
E.g., Patterson v.
The California Supreme Court
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also cited McCutchen in denying the Ninth Circuit’s
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certification request to resolve this divergence between the
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appellate courts.
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the Ninth Circuit “rel[ied] on McCutchen as a guide for how the
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California Supreme Court would decide this case, rather than
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Schmidlin . . . .”
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Patterson II, 748 F. App’x at 121 n.1.
Id.
Thus,
This Court must too.
In sum, because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged an
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exception, the Court finds Plaintiff is collaterally estopped
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from relitigating the issue of probable cause in this suit.
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Plaintiff’s second, third, and fourth causes of action thus fail
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to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and are once
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again dismissed.
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3.
Whether Defendant Koski is Insulated by the
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Presumption of Prosecutorial Independence is Moot
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Defendant Koski moves to dismiss the second cause of action
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for malicious prosecution on the ground that he is protected by
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the presumption of prosecutorial independence.
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argument is moot given the preceding findings by the Court.
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4.
Mot. at 10.
This
Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action Under the
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
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Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be
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Granted
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Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action alleges race-gender
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discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
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Clause.
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several reasons, FAC Order at 16-17, and Plaintiff has not cured
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those defects in the SAC.
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statistical disparities alleged in the SAC are sufficient to
SAC ¶¶ 68-82.
This claim was previously dismissed for
Instead, Plaintiff argues the
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maintain this claim.
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notes statistical disparities are relevant, Vill. of Arlington
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Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977),
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“racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required . . . .”
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Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
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disparities in the SAC, taken as true, do not equate to “an
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intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based
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upon membership in a protected class.”
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F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Opp’n at 15-17.
While Plaintiff correctly
The allegations and statistical
Barren v. Harrington, 152
Therefore, this claim fails for the same reasons identified
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in the FAC Order and is once again dismissed.
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has failed to allege an underlying constitutional violation
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against an individual defendant, Defendant Yuba City cannot be
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held liable for this claim as a matter of law.
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Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).
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5.
Since Plaintiff
City of Los
Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action Under the
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Right to Familial Relations
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is Duplicative
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Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action alleges Defendants
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unconstitutionally interfered with his Fourteenth Amendment
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right to familial relations.
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this claim should be dismissed because it is duplicative of
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Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim.
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agrees.
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unequal enforcement of Plaintiff’s rights to his children in
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comparison with Ms. Adam’s rights.
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defendants acted with knowledge that by not enforcing the law
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equally against Adams . . . .”); Opp’n at 18.
SAC ¶¶ 83-91.
Defendants argue
Mot. at 11-12.
The Court
Despite the title, this claim is based on the allegedly
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See SAC ¶¶ 87-89 (“These
Because this
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cause of action is duplicative of Plaintiff’s Equal Protection
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claim, it is dismissed.
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whether Plaintiff failed to allege conduct that “shocks the
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conscience.”
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6.
Accordingly, the Court need not address
Mot. at 12.
Plaintiff’s Claims are Dismissed With Prejudice
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Because Leave to Amend Would be Futile
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Granting or denying leave to amend is within the discretion
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of District Courts.
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
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While leave to amend should be freely given, id., “[l]eave need
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not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . .
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constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”
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Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989)
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(citing Foman, 371 U.S. 178).
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to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has
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previously amended the complaint.”
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Ascon Properties,
“The district court's discretion
Ascon, 866 F.2d at 1160.
Despite having the opportunity to correct the defects
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identified in the FAC, the claims in the SAC fail for
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substantially similar reasons.
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further amendment would be an exercise in futility.
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IV.
Therefore, the Court finds
ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS
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Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC and DISMISSES each
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cause of action WITH PREJUDICE.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
Dated:
June 5, 2024
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