(PC)Roberts v. CSP-Sacramento et al

Filing 10

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis M. Cota on 11/18/2022 GRANTING plaintiff until 30 days after being served with this order to file a First Amended Complaint. (Coll, A)

Case 2:22-cv-01831-DMC Document 10 Filed 11/21/22 Page 1 of 5
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DAVID ROBERTS,

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No. 2:22-CV-1831-DMC-P

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER

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CSP – SACRAMENTO, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1.

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This

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means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d

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1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the

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complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it
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rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege

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with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the

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claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

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impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

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and conclusory.

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I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

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Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) California State Prison –

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Sacramento; (2) Sgt. Caruso; and (3) Correctional Officer Acuna. See ECF No. 1, pg. 2. In his

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first claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Caruso used excessive force on September

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13, 2022, while Defendant Acuna watched and did nothing. See id. at 3. In his second claim for

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relief, Plaintiff contends that unnamed staff denied him medical care. See id. at 4.

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II. DISCUSSION

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The Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable excessive force claim under

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the Eighth Amendment against Defendants Caruso and Acuna. Plaintiff has not, as explained

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below, stated a claim against Defendant California State Prison – Sacramento, or a claim against

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any named defendant based on denial of medical care.

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A.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Plaintiff cannot sustain any claims against Defendant California State Prison –

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Sacramento. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought

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against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v.

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Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition

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extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t

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of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

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Cir. 1989). A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a state

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agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782

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(1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
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Case 2:22-cv-01831-DMC Document 10 Filed 11/21/22 Page 3 of 5
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Because California State Prison – Sacramento is an arm of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, it is immune under the Eleventh Amendment.
B.

Medical Care
The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

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prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

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and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,

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511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts

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of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

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(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.

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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

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“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

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801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when

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two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such

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that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

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subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

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inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

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official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

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Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious

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injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105;

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see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health

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needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by

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Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). An injury or illness is sufficiently serious if the failure to

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treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the “. . . unnecessary and

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wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled

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on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); see

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also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). Factors indicating seriousness

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are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition is worthy of comment; (2)

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whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily activities; and (3) whether the
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condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,

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1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases

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than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with

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medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,

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974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to

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decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.

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1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See

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Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

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treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See

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Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate

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that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

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Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give

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rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a

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difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate

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course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,

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90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual

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connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See

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Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A

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person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of

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§ 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform

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an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”

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Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations

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concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

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Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth

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specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional

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deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
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Here, Plaintiff’s second claim for relief references unnamed prison officials.

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Because Plaintiff has not linked any individual defendant with the alleged denial of medical care,

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Plaintiff’s second claim, as currently set forth, is deficient. Plaintiff will be provided an

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opportunity to amend.

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III. CONCLUSION

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Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

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amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

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1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an

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amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

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1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the

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prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An

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amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

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If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the

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conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

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Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

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each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

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between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

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164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended

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complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and

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recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such

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further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff may file a first amended

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complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.

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Dated: November 18, 2022

____________________________________
DENNIS M. COTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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