(PC) Eastman v. State of CA et al

Filing 11

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Deborah Barnes on 5/7/2024 GRANTING plaintiff's 2 motion to proceed ifp. Plaintiff shall pay the $350.00 filing fee in accordance with the concurrent order. The Clerk shall send plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form. Within 30 days, plaintiff must file one of the following: a. An amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in this order; b. A notice of election to stand on the complaint as filed; or c. A notice of voluntary dismissal. (Yin, K)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JEFFREY TODD EASTMAN,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:23-cv-01602 TLN DB P

v.

ORDER

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff Jeffrey Todd Eastman proceeds without counsel and seeks relief under 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983. This matter was referred to the undersigned by Local Rule 302. See 28 U.S.C. §

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636(b)(1). Plaintiff’s complaint and motion to proceed in forma pauperis are before the court. For

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the reasons set forth below, the complaint fails to state a claim, but plaintiff is granted leave to

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file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.

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I.

In Forma Pauperis
Plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) The declaration makes the

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showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The motion is granted. By separate order, plaintiff will

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be assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

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1915(b)(1). The order will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee

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from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be

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obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to
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plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to

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the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00 until the filing

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fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

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II.

Screening Requirement

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis

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proceeding, and mut order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a

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claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

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immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27

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(2000). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.

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Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th

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Cir. 1984). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless

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legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

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Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a short and plain statement

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of the claim that shows the pleader is entitled to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

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544, 555 (2007). In order to state a cognizable claim, a complaint must contain more than “a

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formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations

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sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id., 550 U.S. at 555. The facts

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alleged must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it

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rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In

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reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the allegations of the

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complaint and construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id.; Scheuer

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v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

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III.

Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff is classified as “SNY” inmate with special needs for institutional protection and

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is a CCCMS participant. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) While housed at Lancaster Correctional Facility in

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May of 2022, plaintiff filed a grievance expressing concerns for his safety and security. (Id. at 3,

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16.) Plaintiff was subsequently transferred to Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”) which he was

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told would be a safer atmosphere. (Id. at 5.)
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At MCSP, plaintiff enrolled in Folsom Lake college and acquired a job. (ECF No. 1 at 5.)

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In mid-November, plaintiff began receiving rumors that gang members who had learned the full

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nature of plaintiffs’ charges were plotting to attack him. (Id.) Plaintiff advised counselor Roderick

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and no immediate action was taken. (Id.) In December, plaintiff received information that inmate

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Humphrey possessed information on his GTL tablet reflecting plaintiffs’ charges, which were

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allegations of sexual misconduct with a child, and a photo of plaintiff. (Id.) CDCR correctional

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officer/staff observed the damaging documents, and out of spite, approved the to be forwarded to

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inmate Humphrey’s GTL tablet (in the “getting out” app), thus “authorizing a hit” on plaintiff’s

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body. (Id. at 6.) Although plaintiff requested all digital documents be preserved for litigation

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purposes, Counselor Roderick stated the institution had erased the documents from inmate’s GTL

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tablet. (Id. at 7.)

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Inmate Humphrey conspired and plotted an attack on plaintiff. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) On

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December 21, 2022, staff allowed inmates Granderson and Hensley to tamper with and move

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plaintiff’s property from cell 218 to cell 225. (Id. at 7.) When plaintiff returned from work,

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inmate Granderson approached plaintiff to tell him he had been moved. (Id.) Humphrey and

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others created a perimeter around plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff retuned to cell 225 and called his mother

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and father alerting them that circumstances were becoming increasingly terrorizing and that he

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was going to Ad-Seg. (Id.) Plaintiff named inmates Humphrey, Granderson, Hensley, and Caudle

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as “enemies” in his confidential file. (Id.)

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In January 2023, plaintiff was moved from C-yard Ad-Seg to B-yard, Building 14. (ECF

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No. 1 at 7.) Lt. Maribel Saragoza conducted a “video-visit” with plaintiff as part of an Internal

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Affairs Office investigation in late January or early February 2023. (Id.) Saragoza would not

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reveal the names of the parties involved with the documents on the GTL tablet. (Id.)

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On April 1, 2023, inmate Gilbert was housed with plaintiff in Building 9 of B-yard in unit

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237. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Inmate Gilbert said inmate Humphrey was his “homey”, that he

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remembered plaintiff’s face, and that was there to harm someone. (Id.) The next day inmate

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Gilbert was swapped for inmate Foster who exhibited wild and erratic behavior and used

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narcotics in plaintiff’s presence. (Id.) Fearing the worst was yet to come, plaintiff placed inmate
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Foster’s unpacked property outside of the cell and CDCR correctional staff Gaetano issued

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plaintiff a CDCR RVR 115 for refusing housing. (Id. at 8-9.) This occurred after plaintiff had

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informed staff of his safety concerns. (Id. at 9.)

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On April 3, CDCR staff, intending to cause harm and injury to plaintiff, moved inmate

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Granderson from C-yard to B-yard where plaintiff was housed and assigned him to house with

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plaintiff in unit 237. (ECF No. 1 at 9.) This occurred even though plaintiff named Granderson as

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an “enemy” and a suspect and thief. (Id.) Because plaintiff had received an RVR 115 for

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allegedly refusing housing the previous day, plaintiff did not refuse housing again. (Id.) Plaintiff

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refused to engage in physical combat with Granderson while being forced to house with him. (Id.)

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On Thursday, April 20, 2023, Sgt. E. Romero called plaintiff into B-yard program office

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and stated he had been alerted by staff that an ongoing Internal Affairs Investigation had

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confirmed inmate Granderson was a “suspect” against plaintiff and was supposed to be listed as

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an “enemy” in plaintiff’s confidential file. (ECF No. 1 at 9.) However, Sgt. Romero stated he

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would not move inmate Granderson to another unit until the following Saturday. (Id. at 9-10.)

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On April 21, 2023, inmate Harrison—an inmate who was formerly an associate of inmate

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Humphrey— began to conspire with inmate Granderson and inmate Nichols to have plaintiff

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harmed and removed. (ECF No. 1 at 10.) Harrison and Nichols stated they were going to attack

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plaintiff when Granderson came out of the cell. (Id.) Harrison stated further, “I’m that same nigga

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that got you off of C-yard,” confirming he was involved in the groups of inmates plotting to

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attack plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff received a “lock-up order” to return to C-yard Ad-Seg. (Id.) Sgt. E.

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Romero authored a confidential memorandum dated 4/21/23 documenting these events. (Id.)

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Plaintiff was transferred to California Men’s Colony State Prison, where, on May 15,

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2023, Lt. R. Viles conducted an RVR hearing regarding the charge of plaintiff “refusing housing”

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to inmate Foster on April 2, 2023. (ECF No. 1 at 10.) Lt. Viles stated “none of what you’re

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presenting [for a defense] exists in my computer” and found plaintiff guilty of disobeying a direct

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order. (Id.) Lt. Viles imposed a loss of 30 days credit and placed plaintiff on C-status (loss of

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canteen, phone, and other privileges) for 90 days. (Id.)

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Plaintiff alleges his constitutional rights to engage in recovery and therapeutic/

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rehabilitative programs have been disrupted several times (ECF No. 1 at 11.) He alleges CDCR

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staff has repeatedly placed him in dangerous and untenable situations and engaged in “terror,

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plotting, scheming, corruption, threats, and retaliation[.]” (Id. at 10.)

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The defendants named in the complaint are Warden Covello, City of Ione, County of

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Amador, and State of California. (ECF No. 1 at 1-2.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and

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injunctive relief. (Id. 1 at 3.)

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IV.

Discussion

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Below, the court first sets forth applicable legal standards for constitutional deprivations

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plaintiff may be attempting to allege in the complaint. The court then addresses the deficiencies

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of the complaint as to the named defendants.

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A plaintiff may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress violations of “rights,

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privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws” by a person or entity,

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including a municipality, acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) the defendant committed the alleged conduct

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while acting under color of state law; and (2) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right as

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a result of the defendant’s conduct. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

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1988).

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A.

Failure to Protect

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In a “failure-to-protect” Eighth Amendment violation claim, an inmate must show that a

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prison official’s act or omission (1) was objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the official was

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deliberately indifferent to inmate’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

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(1994); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005). The failure of prison officials to

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protect inmates from attacks by other inmates may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

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violation where prison officials know of and disregard a substantial risk of serious harm to the

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plaintiff. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040.

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B.

First Amendment Retaliation

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“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five

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basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)

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because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s

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exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate

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correctional goal.” See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote

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omitted); see also Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d

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1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).

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C.

Right to Education or Rehabilitation \ Due Process

A due process claim requires deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property

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interest. See Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 530. A protected liberty interest may arise either from the Due

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Process Clause itself, or from the laws of the states. Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson,

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490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). However, prisoners do not have a liberty interest in education or

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rehabilitation under the Due Process Clause, and there is no constitutional right to education or

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rehabilitation in prison. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (deprivation of

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rehabilitation and educational programs does not violate Eighth Amendment); Rizzo v. Dawson,

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778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985) (prisoners do not have a liberty interest in education or

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rehabilitation under the Due Process Clause).

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D.

State of California

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The Eleventh Amendment bars any suit against a state or state agency absent a valid

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waiver or abrogation of its sovereign immunity. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S.

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44, 54 (1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890). This immunity applies regardless of

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whether a state or state agency is sued for damages or injunctive relief, Alabama v. Pugh, 438

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U.S. 731, 732 (1978), and regardless of whether the plaintiff’s claim arises under federal or state

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law, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984).

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While Congress may validly abrogate a state's sovereign immunity by statute, the

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Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that Ҥ 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State's

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Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n.17 (1985); accord
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Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979). The “State of California has not waived its Eleventh

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Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court.” Dittman v.

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California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,

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473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985), superseded on other grounds by statute, Rehabilitation Act

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Amendments of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–7 (observing that the California Constitution does not

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waive the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity).

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Accordingly, plaintiff does not state a claim against the State of California.

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E.

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A local government entity can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when execution of a

County of Amador and City of Ione

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policy or custom inflicts the plaintiff’s injury. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social

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Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 689-91 (1977). In order to state a claim against a local government unit

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under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing a constitutional deprivation was caused

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by a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by

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the local government unit or by the local government’s final decision maker. Id. at 690; Board of

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the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402-04 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d

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712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, the complaint contains no such allegations against the City of Ione

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or the County of Amador.

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Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim against either local government unit. See

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Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Iqbal’s pleading

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standards to Monell claims).

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F.

Warden Covello

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The only individual defendant is Warden Covello, and there are no specific factual

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allegations against Warden Covello. Under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate each named

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defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

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676-77 (2009); Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v.

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City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009). Liability may not be imposed on

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supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77.

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Supervisory personnel may only be held liable if they “participated in or directed the violations,
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or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them,” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045

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(9th Cir. 1989) accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.

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Ct. 2101 (2012).

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Plaintiff does not state a claim against Warden Covello because the complaint does not

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plead facts showing that Warden Covello personally participated in any deprivation of plaintiff’s

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rights.
Plaintiff’s Pending Motion (ECF No. 8)

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G.

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Subsequent to the initial complaint, plaintiff filed a document titled “Motion to Provide

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Additional Evidence” with an additional document (grievance response) to be attached to the

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complaint. (ECF No. 8.) In this instance, the motion is granted, but plaintiff is cautioned that the

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court generally does not allow piecemeal amendment or supplements to complaints. Any

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amended complaint plaintiff files should be complete in itself, without reference to the prior or

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superseded pleading, and without need for supplements or amendments. See E.D. Cal. Local

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Rule 220.

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V.

Conclusion and Order
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s complaint does not state any cognizable claims,

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but plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446,

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1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). This opportunity to amend is not for the purposes of adding new and

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unrelated claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, plaintiff

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should focus on the curing the deficiencies in the claims already presented. Plaintiff may,

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however, name additional defendants related to the claims already set forth.

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If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, it should be titled “first amended

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complaint” and must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of

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constitutional rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009).

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In the alternative, plaintiff may notify the court he wishes to stand on the complaint as it is

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currently pleaded. See Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2004). If

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plaintiff chooses this option, the undersigned will issue findings and recommendations to dismiss

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the complaint without further leave to amend, after which plaintiff will be granted an opportunity
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to file objections, and a district judge will assigned to the case to determine whether the complaint

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states a cognizable claim. In the further alternative, if plaintiff does not wish to pursue his claims

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further, plaintiff may file a notice of voluntary dismissal, which will terminate this action by

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operation of law.

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VI.

Order

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In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

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1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED.

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2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action as set forth

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by separate order.

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3. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form.

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4. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must file one of the

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following:

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a. An amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in this order;

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b. A notice of election to stand on the complaint as filed; or

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c. A notice of voluntary dismissal.

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5. Failure to respond to this order will result in a recommendation that this action be

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dismissed for failure to obey a court order and failure to prosecute.

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Dated: May 7, 2024

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