Elledge v. County of San Joaquin, et al.,

Filing 18

ORDER signed by Senior District Judge John A. Mendez on 05/07/24 GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 11 Motion to Dismiss as follows GRANTING County's motion to dismiss Elledge's first cause of action, the 1983 Claim, with leave to ame nd; DENYING County's motion to dismiss Elledge's second cause of action, the Bane Act Claim, without prejudice; DISMISSING Elledge's fourth cause of action in its entirety with leave to amend; and DEYNING as moot County's motion t o dismiss Elledge's fourth cause of action. If Elledge elects to file an amended complaint, he must do so no later than 20 days from the date of this Order. Defendants shall file their responsive pleadings no later than twenty (20) days thereafter. (Licea Chavez, V)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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BRIAN ELLEDGE,

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2:23-CV-02288-JAM-DB

Plaintiff,

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NO.

v.
COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, ET
AL.,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT COUNTY
OF SAN JOAQUIN’S MOTION TO
DISMISS

Defendants.

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On September 12, 2023, Plaintiff Brian Elledge (“Elledge”)

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filed this action in San Joaquin County Superior Court, alleging

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four (4) causes of action against defendants County of San

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Joaquin, John Canepa, and Brian Merritt (collectively,

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“Defendants”).

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ECF No. 1.

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action to this Court on the grounds of federal question

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jurisdiction.

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2024, County filed the instant motion to dismiss (“Motion”).1

Compl., Exh. A to Notice of Removal (“Compl.”),

Defendant San Joaquin County (“County”) removed the

Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.

On February 20,

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for April 9, 2024.
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Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 11.

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first, second, and fourth causes of action do not contain

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sufficient factual matter to support a cause of relief.

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3.

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filed a reply.

Elledge filed an opposition.

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County argues Elledge’s

Opp’n, ECF No. 12.

Id. at

County

Reply, ECF No. 15.
I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The facts are taken from the Complaint and assumed to be true

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for purposes of the Motion.

In May of 2022, a San Joaquin County

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Sheriff water patrol boat (“patrol boat”) stopped Elledge’s boat

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while on the San Joaquin River.

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was operated by defendants John Canepa and Brian Merritt

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(collectively, “Deputy Sheriffs”).

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Elledge because they did not see a required registration sticker

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adhered to his boat.

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resolved, Deputy Sheriffs ordered Elledge to board the patrol

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boat to submit to a blood alcohol test.

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ordered, without any assistance from Deputy Sheriffs, to step on

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the railing of the patrol boat, then step down approximately

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three feet to the steel deck of the boat.

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down to the steel deck of the boat, Elledge landed hard on his

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right foot, resulting in an injury to his right ankle and a

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ruptured Achilles tendon.

Id.

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Compl. ¶ 11.

Id.

The patrol boat

Deputy Sheriffs stopped

After the registration issue was

Id.

Elledge was

Id.

While stepping

Id.
II.

OPINION

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A.

Legal Standard

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A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a

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complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

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granted.”

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dismiss [under 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

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“To survive a motion to

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factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief

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that is plausible on its face.”

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662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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Plausibility requires “factual content that allows the court to

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draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

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misconduct alleged.”

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are unnecessary, the complaint must allege more than

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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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supported by mere conclusory statements.”

Id.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

While “detailed factual allegations”

Id.

Conclusory

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allegations are not to be considered in the plausibility

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analysis.

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framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual

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allegations.”).

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which relief can be granted,” the Court must dismiss the claim.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

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B.

Id. at 679 (“While legal conclusions can provide the

When a plaintiff fails to “state a claim upon

Analysis
1.

First Cause of Action – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Elledge’s first cause of action is for “Unreasonable

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Detention, Custody, And Control, (42 U.S.C. § 1983)”

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(hereinafter, “1983 Claim”).

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focuses on the actions of Deputy Sheriffs.

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from the Complaint whether the claim is against all defendants,

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or only Deputy Sheriffs.

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Deputy Sheriffs were under the control of County.

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County seeks to dismiss the 1983 Claim with prejudice against

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County on the grounds that “Elledge does not set forth any facts

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that an unconstitutional County policy resulted in Elledge’s

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alleged injury.”

Id.

Mot. at 4.

Compl. at 5, 6.

The 1983 Claim

Id.

It is not clear

However, Elledge does allege that
Id. ¶ 15.

Assuming the 1983 Claim is against
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both Deputy Sheriffs and County, the Court agrees.

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To establish liability for governmental entities under

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Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove the entity had “a policy,

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practice, or custom” that was the “moving force” behind the

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constitutional violation.

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892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing

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of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).

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policy includes a formal policy, such as a rule or regulation,

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adopted by the entity that directly results in the

Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
An official

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constitutional violation in question.

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Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986).

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by contrast, includes repeated, widespread, and consistent

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actions that constitute the standard operating procedure of the

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entity.

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Cir. 2002).

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Pembaur v. City of
A practice or custom,

Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th

Upon review of Elledge’s 1983 Claim, the only mention of

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County includes the following allegation:“[t]he conduct of

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[Deputy Sheriffs] was done under the [instruction, orders, and

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control] of command level officers and managers of [County’s]

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Sheriff’s Office.”

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focuses on the actions of Deputy Sheriffs.

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Elledge does not provide sufficient facts in his first cause of

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action to allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that a

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policy, practice, or custom of County’s led to Elledge’s alleged

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constitutional violation.

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///

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///

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///

Id. ¶ 15.

The bulk of the 1983 Claim
Id. ¶¶ 13-15, 17.

Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900.

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Looking beyond the 1983 Claim and to the Complaint as a
whole, Elledge’s “Introduction” alleges:

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The policies and customs behind the detention and

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taking into custody and control of boat operators on

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the San Joaquin River in the County of San Joaquin

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without probable cause to believe said boat operators

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were under the influence of alcohol are fundamentally

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unconstitutional and constitute a menace of major

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proportions to the public. . . .

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Compl. ¶ 2.

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County has an unconstitutional policy and custom of detaining

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boat operators on the San Joaquin River and accusing them,

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without probable cause, of operating under the influence.

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conclusory allegation does not pass muster under the Twombly

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plausibility standard.

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Albeit confusing, Elledge appears to contend that

This

Elledge does not allege any specific facts that there is a

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formal policy of County’s, such as a rule or regulation, that led

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to any alleged constitutional violation.

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483-84.

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there is a widespread practice or custom that led to any alleged

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constitutional violation.

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U.S. 397, 404 (1997).

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make a conclusory statement that there was a policy and custom in

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place that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

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or sporadic incidents alone cannot form the basis of a 1983 Claim

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against government entities.

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Dist., 44 F.4th 867, 884 (9th Cir. 2022).

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sufficient factual allegations regarding the key elements of a

Pembaur, 475 U.S. at

Elledge also does not allege any specific facts that

Bd. of the Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520

Elledge takes a single, isolated event and

Isolated

Sabra v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll.

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The Complaint lacks

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possible 1983 Claim against County and therefore Elledge’s first

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cause of action against County is dismissed with leave to amend.

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2.

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Second Cause of Action – California Civil Code
§ 52.1

Elledge’s second cause of action is for “Violation of

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California Civil Rights Act – Civil Code §52.1” (hereinafter,

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“Bane Act Claim”) against all defendants.

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Compl. at 6.

County seeks to dismiss the Bane Act Claim with prejudice
because “there are no facts that the individual defendants

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engaged in egregious activity and intended to cause Elledge’s

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alleged injury.”

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its Bane Act argument and focuses solely on the actions of

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Deputy Sheriffs.

Mot. at 3.

County does not mention itself in

Id. at 5.

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To the extent County seeks to make arguments on behalf of

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Deputy Sheriffs, the Court declines to address such arguments.

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Haley v. Ornelas, No. CV 16-3177-AG(E), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

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202077, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2016).

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behalf of County alone.

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Deputy Sheriffs have been served yet.

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limited exception, a party must assert their own legal rights or

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interests, not those of third parties.

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U.S. 125, 129-30 (2004) (discussing the limited exception as

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“(1) the party asserting the right has a close relationship with

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the person who possesses that right and (2) whether there is a

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hindrance to the possessor’s ability to protect their own

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interests.”).

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support for its belief that it can assert the rights of Deputy

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Sheriffs in this motion.

See Mot.

The Motion is filed on

County admits neither of the
Id. at 1.

Subject to a

Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543

County does not provide any legal analysis or

County “may not properly act as a
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surrogate” for Deputy Sheriffs.

Ornelas, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

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202077, at *6.

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the Bane Act Claim on behalf of Deputy Sheriffs, this request is

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denied without prejudice.

To the extent County is attempting to dismiss

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If County is attempting to dismiss the Bane Act Claim

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against itself, without even mentioning itself, County has

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failed to provide any factual or legal grounds to support its

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dismissal motion.

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particularity the grounds for seeking the order.). County’s

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motion to dismiss the Bane Act Claim against itself is also

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denied without prejudice.

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3.

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Fed. R. Civ. 7(b) (a motion must state with

Fourth Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of
Injury

Elledge’s fourth cause of action is labeled as a claim for

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“Intentional Infliction of Injury” against Deputy Sheriffs.

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Compl. at 9.

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appears to be a battery claim against Deputy Sheriffs.

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the cause of action includes the following allegations:

Based on the header alone, this cause of action
However,

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[County’s] Sheriff’s Office, and its management and

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command officers, “deliberately and purposely

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neglected and failed to instruct, to so train and

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teach all deputy sheriffs, at all levels of the

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[County’s] Sheriff’s Office. . . .

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[Defendants] and each of them . . . knew, [sic] were

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subject to a duty of care to know and to train and

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teach all deputy sheriffs . . . what acts and conduct

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that violated the law . . .

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[Defendants] knew they were . . . to train and teach
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all deputy sheriffs, at all levels to determine if any

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laws were broken by [Elledge] before detaining

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[Elledge] . . .

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[Deputy Sheriffs] knew . . . what acts and conduct

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violated the laws . . . detained [Elledge] . . .

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without any probable cause . . .

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The conduct of [Deputy Sheriffs] . . . was in total

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and utter disregard of the rights of [Elledge] and

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with the knowledge that [Elledge] would be subject to

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a dangerous condition . . . Said conduct was

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malicious, wanton, oppressive, and fraudulent.

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conduct was extreme and outrageous . . . [Elledge]

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suffered severe personal injuries, pain and suffering,

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medical and incidental expenses, loss of income and

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extreme mental and emotional distress and

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consequential damages. . . .

Said

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See Compl. ¶¶ 29-33.

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cause of action appears to not only be a battery claim against

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Deputy Sheriffs, but also a failure to train claim against

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County, a deliberate indifference claim against Deputy Sheriffs,

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and an emotional distress claim against Deputy Sheriffs or

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County or both.

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an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (“IIED”)

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against Deputy Sheriffs.

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Based on these allegations, the fourth

County interprets this cause of action as only

Mot. at 5-7.

Elledge’s opposition to the County’s motion fails to

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provide any clarity.

The opposition focuses only on the acts of

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Deputy Sheriffs, includes an irrelevant discussion on peace

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officers’ standards and trainings, and concludes that Deputy
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Sheriffs were in violation of Elledge’s constitutional rights to

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be “free from search and seizure” which was “extreme and

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outrageous.”

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inconsistent with the multiple legal theories discussed in the

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Complaint, but it also mirrors Elledge’s first cause of action

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for “Unreasonable Detention, Custody, And Control.”

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¶¶ 12-17.

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Opp’n at 11-12.

Not only is the opposition

Compl.

What is unambiguously clear to the Court is that this cause
of action, as currently pled, cannot go forward.

Elledge fails

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to present a cognizable claim and put the defendants or the

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Court on fair notice of the grounds entitling him to relief.

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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8,

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10. “The Court should not be required to ascertain what are or

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will be the litigable issues of fact and law by a process of

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speculation or surmise.”

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287 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).

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Elledge’s fourth cause of action in its entirety with leave to

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amend.

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DENIED as moot.

Weiss v. Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283,

Therefore, the Court sua sponte DISMISSES

County’s motion to dismiss the fourth cause of action is

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III.

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS County’s

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motion to dismiss Elledge’s first cause of action, the 1983

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Claim, with leave to amend.

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dismiss Elledge’s second cause of action, the Bane Act Claim,

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without prejudice.

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Elledge’s fourth cause of action in its entirety with leave to

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amend.

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action is DENIED as moot.

The Court DENIES County’s motion to

The Court, on its own motion, DISMISSES

County’s motion to dismiss Elledge’s fourth cause of

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If Elledge elects to file an amended complaint, he must do so

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no later than twenty days from the date of this Order.

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Defendants shall file their responsive pleadings no later than

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twenty (20) days thereafter.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 7, 2024

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