(PS) Cody et al v. County of San Joaquin et al

Filing 42

ORDER signed by Chief District Judge Troy L. Nunley on 3/10/2025 GRANTING 30 Motion to Dismiss with respect to all claims asserted by Skylar, Plaintiff's Claim 1A with respect to Gonzalez, and Plaintiffs' third claim with leave to amend , DENYING Individual Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in all other respects, DENYING 28 Motion to Dismiss in its entirety, and GRANTING 29 Motion to Strike. Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint within 30 days from the date of this Order. D efendants shall file a responsive pleading within 21 days from the filing of the Amended Complaint. If Plaintiff opt not to file an Amended Complaint, Defendants' responsive pleadings will be due 21 days from Plaintiffs' deadline for filing an Amended Complaint. (Deputy Clerk OML)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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NICHOLAS CODY, SKYLAR CODY,
KAYCIE CODY, individually and as
guardian ad litem for her minor children
K.S.-1 and K.S.-2,

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No. 2:23-cv-02318-TLN-CSK

ORDER
Plaintiffs,

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v.

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COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, et al.,

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Defendants.

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This matter is before the Court on three separate motions: (1) Defendants Lazaro
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Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), Charlie Foo (“Foo”), and Rachel Apodaca’s (“Apodaca”) (collectively,
“Individual Defendants1”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30); (2) Defendant County of San
Joaquin’s (“County”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 28); and (3) the County and Individual
Defendants’ (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Strike (ECF No. 29). Each motion has been

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fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 33–38.)
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For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part
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Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, DENIES the County’s Motion to Dismiss, and

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The Court notes that while Defendant Claudette Butman (“Butman”) was named as a
defendant in the instant action, Butman has not been served or made an appearance in the matter
and is not a party to the instant motions.
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GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike.

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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

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On October 13, 2023, Plaintiffs Nicholas Cody (“Nicholas”), Kaycie Cody (“Kaycie”),

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and Skylar Cody (“Skylar”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) commenced the instant action pro se

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alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) against Defendants for alleged false

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statements made to San Joaquin County Dependency Court that resulted in the removal and

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detention of Nicholas’s and Kaycie’s minor children, Skylar, V.C., K.S.-1, and K.S.-2. (ECF No.

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1.) Individual Defendants were social workers who were involved in various aspects of the

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investigations into allegations against Nicholas and Kaycie. (See generally ECF No. 24.)

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On January 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 4.) On

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February 1, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for a more definite statement. (ECF No. 12.)

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Thereafter, Plaintiffs retained counsel, and on March 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the operative

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Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (ECF No. 24.) In the SAC, Plaintiffs allege the following

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§ 1983 claims:

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1. Claim One alleges violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments,

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specifically violations of the right to familial association, against Foo and Gonzalez

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and arises from the warrantless removal of V.C. (“Claim 1A”) and the detention of

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Skylar, K.S.-1 and K.S.-2 (“Claim 1B”);

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2. Claim Two alleges a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, specifically

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judicial deception, against Foo, Gonzalez, Butman and Apodaca, and arises from

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alleged falsification of evidence, misrepresentations, and omission of exculpatory

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evidence;

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3. Claim Three alleges a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against Gonzalez,

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Butman, and Apodaca, and arises from alleged failures to notify Nicholas of medical

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and dental examinations of Skylar and provide Nicholas with an opportunity to be

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present during the examinations;

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4. Claim Four alleges a violation of the First Amendment against Foo, Gonzalez,
Butman, and Apodaca and arises from actions alleged to have been taken in retaliation
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for Nicholas and Kaycie having obtained a reversal of previously substantiated

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allegations lodged against them;

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5. Claim Five alleges a violation of the Fourth Amendment against Foo, Gonzalez,

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Butman and Apodaca and arises from alleged falsification of evidence,

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misrepresentations, and omission of exculpatory evidence; and

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6. Claim Six alleges a Monell claim against the County for customs and practices that

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allegedly violate the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 24 at 52–

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85.)

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On April 20, 2024, Individual Defendants filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 30), County

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filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 28), and Defendants filed a motion to strike (ECF No. 29).

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The Court will address each motion in turn.

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II.

MOTIONS TO DISMISS
A.

Standard of Law

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.

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Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain

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“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). Under notice pleading in

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federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

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grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal

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citation and quotations omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal

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discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose

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of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).

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On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true.

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Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every

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reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail

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Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege

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“‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to
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relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted).
Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of

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factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

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While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an

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unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A

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pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the

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elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

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(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

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statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, “[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences

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are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim. Adams v. Johnson, 355

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F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the

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plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws

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in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State

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Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

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Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough

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facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim

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has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

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reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

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680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more

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than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility

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inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

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experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or

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her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly

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dismissed. Id. at 680 (internal quotations omitted).

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If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to

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amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading

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could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,

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1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995));
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see also Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in

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denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court should

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freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), “the court’s discretion to

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deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended its complaint.”

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Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting

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Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)).

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B.

Analysis

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The two pending motions to dismiss contain distinct arguments. The Court will first

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address Defendants’ request for judicial notice and then address the arguments from each motion

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separately.

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i.

Request for Judicial Notice

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As a threshold matter, Defendants seek judicial notice of summaries of unpublished cases

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cited in Plaintiff’s SAC and three sets of documents: (1) Exhibit A, which are copies of the two

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orders and the judgment in Nastic v. County of San Joaquin, et al., No. 2:11-CV-02521-JAM-

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GGH (E.D. Cal. May 31, 2012); (2) Exhibit B, which is a copy of the docket for County of San

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Joaquin v. L.J., Third Appellate District Court of Appeal Case No. C095267; and (3) Exhibit C,

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which is a copy of the unpublished opinion of the Third Appellate District Court of Appeal in San

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Joaquin County Human Services Agency v. N.C., No. C096684 (2013). (ECF No. 27.) Plaintiffs

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did not oppose Defendants’ request for judicial notice.

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The Court may take judicial notice of facts that are “generally known within the trial

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court’s territorial jurisdiction” or can be “accurately and readily determined from sources whose

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accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). “A federal court may ‘take

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notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those

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proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Schulze v. FBI, No. 1:05–CV–0180-

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AWI-GSA, 2010 WL 2902518, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2010) (quoting United States v. Black,

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482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). However, Defendants fail to persuade the Court that their

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summaries of the unpublished cases cited in Plaintiff’s SAC or Exhibits A–C have any bearing on

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whether Plaintiffs have adequately alleged their claims, and the Court has not relied on those
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documents in its ruling.
Accordingly, Defendants’ request for judicial notice is DENIED.

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ii.

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Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

In their motion, Individual Defendants argue: (1) Plaintiffs’ first, second, fourth, and fifth

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claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) Plaintiffs’ third claim fails to allege any

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participation by Individual Defendants; and (3) Plaintiffs’ fifth claim is duplicative of Plaintiffs’

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second claim.2 (ECF No. 30 at 2.) The Court will address Individual Defendants’ arguments in

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turn.

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a.

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

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“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine forbids a losing party in state court from filing suit in

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federal district court complaining of an injury caused by a state court judgment, and seeking

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federal court review and rejection of that judgment.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th

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Cir. 2013). The doctrine only applies if an “action contains a forbidden de facto appeal of a state

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court decision.” Id. A de facto appeal exists when “a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an

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allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based

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on that decision.” Id. (quoting Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)). In contrast, if

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“a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse

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Individual Defendants also argue all claims asserted by Skylar should be dismissed
because he lacks capacity to sue. (ECF No. 30 at 14–15.) In opposition, Plaintiffs suggest Skylar
is now an adult and assert the reference to him being 10 years old in 2017 was a scrivener error.
(ECF No. 35 at 6-7.) Because the Court grants in part Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
with leave to amend, the Court finds this error can and should be amended by Plaintiffs.
Therefore, the Court GRANTS Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to all claims
asserted by Skylar with leave to amend. Should Plaintiffs not clarify that Skylar is an adult in any
amended complaint or should Plaintiff fail to file an amended complaint, all claims alleged by
Skylar will be dismissed.

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Similarly, in each motion to dismiss, Defendants argue all claims asserted by Kacie as
guardian ad litem should be dismissed because she has not been appointed as guardian ad litem.
(ECF No. 28 at 12–13; ECF No. 30 at 14–15.) On January 31, 2025, this Court ordered Plaintiffs
to file an application for Kaycie to be appointed guardian ad litem for K.S.-1 and K.S.-2. (ECF
No. 39.) On February 7, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application for appointment of Kaycie
Cody as guardian ad litem, which was granted by the Court. Accordingly, Defendants’ argument
is moot.
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party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164). “Thus,

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even if a plaintiff seeks relief from a state court judgment, such a suit is a forbidden de facto

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appeal only if the plaintiff also alleges a legal error by the state court.” Id. (emphasis in original).

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Individual Defendants argue the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this Court from

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adjudicating Plaintiffs’ first, second, fourth, and fifth claims because the claims are inextricably

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intertwined with issues already decided by the San Joaquin County Dependency Court. (ECF No.

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30 at 6–13.) Specifically, Individual Defendants assert Plaintiffs’ claims essentially seek review

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of the dependency court’s decisions by challenging the court’s jurisdictional findings and

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decisions. (Id. at 6–7.) In support of their argument, Individual Defendants cite to multiple

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district court cases where claims of judicial deception based on allegations of false evidence by

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social workers in dependency proceedings were dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

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(Id. at 7–10 (citing Thomas v. County of San Diego, No. 3:18-cv-924-BTM-DEB, 2021 WL

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8014326 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2021); Ragan v. County of Humboldt HHS, No. 16-cv-05580-RS,

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2017 WL 878083 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2017); Ismail v. County of Orange, No. SACV 10-00901

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VBF (AJW), 2012 WL 3644170 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2012)).)

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In opposition, Plaintiffs argue the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because their

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claims do not stem from a state court judgment but rather from the conduct of Individual

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Defendants, such as judicial deception and fabrication of evidence. (ECF No. 35 at 11.)

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Plaintiffs contend the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a narrow doctrine and is confined to cases

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where state court losers complain of injuries caused by state court judgments rendered before the

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district court proceedings commenced. (Id. at 22.) Plaintiffs further argue their claims are not a

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de facto appeal of a state court judgment, as there was no adverse judgment entered against them

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in the juvenile dependency proceedings, which were dismissed. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiffs argue

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Individual Defendants’ reliance on the cited cases is misplaced, as the cited cases involve claims

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stemming from adverse state court judgments. (Id. at 15, 21.)

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The Court agrees with Plaintiffs — the cases cited by Individual Defendants are

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distinguishable and unpersuasive. In Ismail, the plaintiff sought declaratory relief consisting of,

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in relevant part, an order reinstating parental rights and/or enforcing visitation rights for plaintiff
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with her son or, in the alternative, an order granting review of her consolidated appeals

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challenging the termination of her parental rights. 2012 WL 3644170, at *9. Because the court

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found that plaintiff was asking to overturn state court orders terminating her parental and

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visitation rights, it concluded plaintiff’s complaint was a de facto appeal precluded under the

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Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. Similarly, in Ragan, plaintiffs filed suit after the state court

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rendered its judgment and, in their suit, complained of injuries stemming from the judgment.

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2017 WL 878083, at *4. The court found plaintiffs’ claims — that (1) their due process rights

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were violated because they were not given a fair opportunity to retain and maintain custody of

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their child and prevented from receiving a fair and just judicial proceeding and (2) their Fourth

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Amendment rights were violated because the taking of their child caused the child to be removed

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from their legal custody — invited review of the juvenile dependency proceeding and was barred

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by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. Finally, in Thomas, plaintiffs alleged that social workers

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submitted false, fraudulent, and misleading information in support of the jurisdiction/disposition

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report which resulted in the continued detention of the children from their biological mother.

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2021 WL 8014326, at *4. The court found plaintiffs’ claims were inextricably intertwined with

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the juvenile dependency proceedings and findings as the claims were linked to the court’s adverse

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findings. Id.

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Here, unlike the plaintiffs in the cases cited by Individual Defendants, Plaintiffs are

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neither seeking relief from a state court judgment nor alleging a legal error by the state court, and

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thus, there is no de facto appeal. Bell, 709 F.3d at 897; see also Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d at 1164.

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Instead, Plaintiffs are seeking monetary damages for the constitutional violation of removing

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Nicholas’s minor child V.C. without a warrant and Individual Defendants’ wrongful acts of

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omitting and fabricating evidence in a juvenile dependency petition, subsequent reports, and in

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court proceedings. (ECF No. 35 at 11, 16.) Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims are based on Individual

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Defendants’ unlawful conduct, separate and apart from any actions taken in the juvenile

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dependency proceedings, and are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

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Therefore, the Court DENIES Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs

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first, second, fourth, and fifth claims.3

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b.

Lack of Personal Participation

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Individual Defendants argue the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ third claim for alleged

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failure to notify Nicholas of medical examinations of Skyler because Plaintiffs fail to allege the

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Individual Defendants had any personal participation in or even knew about the medical

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examinations. (ECF No. 30 at 14–15.) Individual Defendants contend the total sum of Plaintiffs’

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allegations with respect to Plaintiffs’ third claim is that Skylar was subjected to medical testing at

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Mary Graham Children’s Shelter, Individual Defendants did not notify Nicholas about the testing,

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and unidentified “other” County employees performed medical procedures on Skylar. (Id. at 14.)

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Plaintiffs’ opposition is limited to one paragraph in their introduction, in which Plaintiffs appear

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to argue because Individual Defendants were named as defendants, it is implicit that they knew

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about the examinations. (ECF No. 35 at 5.) Plaintiffs’ opposition is otherwise devoid of

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meaningful analysis on this issue.

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The Court agrees with Individual Defendants. Plaintiffs must allege facts to support their

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claims. See Andreyev v. Van, No. 2:23-cv-01403-DJC-CKD, 2024 WL 71695, *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan.

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5, 2024) (speculation is “insufficient to state a claim”). Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts to

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support the claim that Individual Defendants knew of or participated in the medical examinations

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of Skylar such that Individual Defendants could be liable for failing to notify Nicholas. Jones v.

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Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[i]n order for a person acting under color of state

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law to be liable under [§] 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged

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rights deprivation: there is no respondeat superior liability”); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045

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(9th Cir. 1989) (same); Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1996) (defendant cannot

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be liable merely because he is in a group without a showing of individual participation in alleged

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unlawful act.).

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Individual Defendants also argue the Court should dismiss Gonzalez from Claim 1A
because it is based on warrantless removal of V.C., but Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges only Foo
removed V.C. (ECF No. 30 at 13 (citing ECF No. 24 at 18.)) For the same reasons as discussed
in § (B)(ii)(b), infra, the Court agrees with Individual Defendants. Accordingly, the Court
GRANTS Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ Claim 1A with respect to
Gonzalez.
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Therefore, the Court GRANTS Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs’

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third claim with leave to amend.

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c.

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Duplicative Claim

Individual Defendants argue the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ fifth claim for judicial

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deception because it is duplicative of Plaintiffs’ second claim for judicial deception. (ECF No. 30

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at 15.) In opposition, Plaintiffs argue the claims are not duplicative — Plaintiffs’ second claim is

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by all Plaintiffs against Individual Defendants for violations of their substantive due process

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rights under the Fourteenth Amendment based on alleged falsification of evidence,

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misrepresentations, and omission of exculpatory evidence (ECF No. 24 at 65–68), while

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Plaintiffs’ fifth claim is by Skylar, K.S.-1 and K.S.-2 against Individual Defendants for violations

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of their Fourth Amendment rights based on actions which resulted in the alleged unreasonable

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seizure of Skylar, K.S.-1 and K.S.-2 (id. at 70–71). (ECF No. 35 at 23–24.)

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The Court finds the briefing on this issue to be underdeveloped. Defendants state in

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conclusory fashion that Plaintiffs’ claims are duplicative without meaningful discussion or

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analysis. Absent more, the Court DENIES Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to

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Plaintiffs’ fifth claim.

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In sum, the Court GRANTS Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as follows:

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All claims asserted by Skylar are DISMISSED with leave to amend;

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Plaintiffs’ Claim 1A with respect to Gonzalez is DISMISSED with leave to

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amend;
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Plaintiffs’ third claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

The Court DENIES Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in all other respects.
iii.

County’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs allege the County has multiple constitutionally deficient customs and practices
which cause harm to the constitutional rights of many families. (ECF No. 24 at 71–85.)

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The Ninth Circuit recognizes four theories for establishing municipal liability under

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Monell: “(1) an official policy; (2) a pervasive practice or custom; (3) a failure to train, supervise,

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or discipline; or (4) a decision or act by a final policymaker.” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa
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Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602–03 (9th Cir. 2019). To state a Monell claim against a municipality

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under a pervasive practice or custom theory, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating “that an

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‘official policy, custom, or pattern’ on the part of [the municipality] was ‘the actionable cause of

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the claimed injury.’” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harper

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v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also Mendiola-Martinez v.

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Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that to establish municipal liability under

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§ 1983, a plaintiff must show a direct causal link between the municipal policy or custom and the

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alleged constitutional violation). A “custom” for purposes of municipal liability is a “widespread

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practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent

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and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” St. Louis v. Praprotnik,

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458 U.S. 112, 127 (1988).

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The County argues Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the customs and practices of the

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County are conclusory, boilerplate, and lack the factual support required to survive a motion to

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dismiss.4 (ECF No. 28 at 7.) The County specifically argues Plaintiffs fail to identify anyone

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other than themselves who have experienced the same or similar circumstances. (Id. at 8.) The

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County contends Plaintiffs’ only effort in this regard is their citation to seven prior lawsuits filed

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over the course of the last 18 years to support their claim that County employees regularly engage

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in judicial deception and warrantless removals. (Id.) The County argues the seven prior lawsuits

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are unhelpful because each lawsuit was either settled or dismissed with no admission of

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wrongdoing by the County. (Id. (citing Bagley v. City of Sunnyvale, No. 16-CV-02250-LHK,

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2017 WL 344998, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2017)).)

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In opposition, Plaintiffs argue they have sufficiently specified the deficient and

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constitutionally violative practices of the County. (ECF No. 34 at 5.) As an example, Plaintiffs

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provide they allege that County social workers had a practice of misquoting or fabricating

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statements by witness and parents. (Id.) Plaintiffs also contend that they allege specifically how

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The County also argues Plaintiffs cannot proceed on the three other Monell theories of
liability. (ECF No. 28.) In opposition, Plaintiffs only addressed the County’s arguments as to the
pervasive customs or practices theory of liability. (ECF No. 34.) Therefore, the Court only
addresses the parties’ arguments regarding that theory.
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County social works go about removing children without warrants and exigency and allege how

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those social workers lie and omit exculpatory information. (Id. at 6.) Finally, Plaintiffs argue

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they allege reoccurring conduct by County social workers by referring to multiple other lawsuits

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filed against the County and note that the reference to the previously filed lawsuits were not

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intended to prove that the County had constitutionally deficient practices but rather, as evidence

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that the County plausibly has unconstitutional practices. (Id. at 8.)

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Here, the Court finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged constitutionally deficient customs

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and practices to plausibly state a claim for relief against the County. Although Plaintiffs’ SAC is

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at times difficult to follow, it does include enough factual allegations that make it plausible that

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the County did indeed have constitutionally deficient policies that were the proximate cause of

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Plaintiffs’ injuries. (ECF No. 24 at 73–85.)

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First, Plaintiffs detail a series of actions taken against them by the County, including (1)

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engaging in warrantless removals without exigency as exemplified when County officials “took

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V.C. without a warrant” and “did not inquire about a less intrusive means” (ECF No. 24 ¶

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319(a)); (2) not notifying Skylar’s parents of Skylar’s medical appointments on numerous

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occasions while she was in the custody or care of the County (id. at ¶ 319(b)); and (3) County

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officials lying and misrepresenting facts to the juvenile court on multiple occasions (id. at ¶

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319(c)).

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In addition, Plaintiff allege actions taken against them by the County are part of

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specifically identified customs and practices of the County. (See, e.g., ECF No. 24 at 73–75

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(alleging the County had a custom or practice of (1) removing children from their families

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without a warrant, (2) providing false, inaccurate, exaggerated, misleading, and/or untrue factual

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statements in court documents, and (3) suppressing and/or omitting known exculpatory evidence

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from court-filed documents)). Thus, the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint are distinct from

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those in Bagley, where the court found plaintiff did not demonstrate that the alleged customs or

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practices extended beyond their personal situation where the allegations were limited to plaintiff’s

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individual experience. Bagley, 2017 WL 344998, at *15.

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Finally, the Court finds that while Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding previously filed
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lawsuits against the County is not conclusive, the allegations of prior incidents help illuminate the

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plausibility of the continued existence of the alleged unconstitutional customs or practices. See

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Bagos v. Vallejo, No. 2:20-cv-00185-KJM-AC, 2020 WL 6043949, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13,

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2020) (“Prior incidents involving lawsuits alone, even those which do not result in a finding or

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admission of wrongdoing, can be sufficient for Monell liability purposes in the face of a motion to

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dismiss.”); see also McCoy v. City of Vallejo, No. 2:19-cv-001191-JAM-CKD, 2020 WL 374356,

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at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2020)) (finding unsubstantiated allegations in lawsuits were sufficient to

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establish pattern of failure to discipline and ratification at the motion to dismiss stage.) Plaintiffs’

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allegations regarding previously filed lawsuits sufficiently advance Plaintiffs’ claims beyond the

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threshold of “possibility” to “plausibility,” demonstrating that these customs and practices are not

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isolated incidents, but rather part of a longstanding pattern of behavior. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

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678.

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES County’s motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 28.)

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III.

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MOTION TO STRIKE
A.

Standard of Law

Rule 12(f) provides that a court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any

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redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). A court will

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only consider striking a defense or allegation if it fits within one of these five categories. Yursik

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v. Inland Crop Dusters Inc., No. CV-F-11-01602-LJO-JLT, 2011 WL 5592888, at *3 (E.D. Cal.

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Nov. 16, 2011) (citing Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973–74 (9th Cir.

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2010)). The term “scandalous” within the meaning of Rule 12(f) refers to “matter [that]

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improperly casts a derogatory light on someone, usually a party,” and it “may be stricken if it

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‘bears no possible relation to the controversy or may cause the objecting party prejudice.’”

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American River AG, Inc. v. Vestis Group, No. 2:19-cv-02203-TLN-DB, 2021 WL 3857796, at *4

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(E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2021) (citations omitted); see Schultz v. Braga, 290 F. Supp. 2d 637, 655 (D.

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Md. 2003) (striking allegations that contained improper “inflammatory language”).

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B.

Analysis

Defendants move to strike the phrase, “by FOO ling the Superior Court,” in paragraph 316
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of Plaintiffs’ SAC. (ECF No. 29.) Defendant argues the quoted languages seeks to make fun of

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Foo based on his race. (Id. at 4.) In opposition, Plaintiffs deny the quoted language was intended

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to disparage Foo’s Asian heritage but rather, was meant to be a private pun between Kaycie and

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Plaintiffs’ counsel that was inadvertently left in the pleading. (ECF No. 33 at 2.)
As Plaintiffs acknowledge, a pun made upon a party’s name does not belong in a publicly

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filed pleading. (Id.) Plaintiffs’ ill-received “joke” has no relevance to the issues at hand and is

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insulting to Defendant Foo. The Court finds the quoted language to be scandalous under Rule

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12(f). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f); see also American River AG, Inc., 2021 WL 3857796, at *4 (striking

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allegation that contained improper “inflammatory language”).
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike and strikes paragraph 316

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from the SAC.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
•

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The Court GRANTS Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30) with

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respect to all claims asserted by Skylar with leave to amend, Plaintiffs’ Claim 1A

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with respect to Gonzalez with leave to amend, and Plaintiffs’ third claim with

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leave to amend. The Court DENIES Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in

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all other respects;
•

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The Court DENIES the County’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.28) in its entirety;
and

•

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The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike (ECF No. 29) and strikes
paragraph 316 from the Second Amended Complaint.

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///

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///

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///

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///

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///

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///
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Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint — only to cure the deficiencies addressed herein

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— not later than thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. Defendants shall file a responsive

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pleading not later than twenty-one (21) days from the filing of the amended complaint. If

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Plaintiffs opt not to file an amended complaint, the case will proceed on the remaining claims in

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the Second Amended Complaint, and Defendants’ responsive pleading will be due not later than

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twenty-one (21) days from Plaintiffs’ deadline for filing an amended complaint.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: March 10, 2025

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___________________________________
TROY L. NUNLEY
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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