(PC) Davis v. Beckham et al

Filing 9

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis M. Cota on 6/5/2024 DISMISSING 1 Complaint. Amended Complaint due by 30 days of the date of service of this order. (Kyono, V)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CHATETON D. DAVIS,

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No. 2:24-CV-0648-DMC-P

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER

I. BECKHAM, et al.,
Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1.

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was

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initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel.

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Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or

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portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can

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be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See

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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that

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complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

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entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply,
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concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice

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of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121,

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1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity

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overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail

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to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening

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required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory.

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I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

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Plaintiff initiated this action with a pro se complaint filed on February 28, 2024.

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See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Captain – Hobbs; (2) Sergeant –

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Beckham; and (3) Psychologist – Ms. Wallace. See Id. at 2. All defendants are alleged to be

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current or former prison officials at Mule Creek State Prison. See id. at 1. Plaintiff presents one

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claim for relief.
Plaintiff states that the claim relates to violations of the Eighth Amendment. See

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id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges that, in October 2023, the Program Captain on A-Yard – Hobbs – made a

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recommendation that the E.O.P. [Enhanced Outpatient] inmates that are housed in Building 5

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(E.O.P. Programing Unit) be removed to Building 2 after being placed on “C-status.” See id.

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Plaintiff claims that, after being moved to Building 2, he was heckled and intimidated by officers

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and inmates resulting in high stress situations which caused Plaintiff to have anxiety, fear, and

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paranoia. See id. Plaintiff claims that he is in need of medical professionals to “help in

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communicating feelings or needs to staff.” Plaintiff claims he was called names, such as “T-cat,

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lame, retard.” Id.

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Plaintiff asserts that he is currently housed in a unit that does not fit his enhanced

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outpatient level of care. See id. at 4 and 5. Plaintiff reiterates that the-name calling, heckling,

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stress, and threats to his safety and health were enabled by Captain Hobbs. See id. at 5.

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II. DISCUSSION

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The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint suffers a number of defects. First, as to

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Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Hobbs, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to establish a

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claim based on harassment, threat to safety, or transfer to Building 2. Second, as to the remaining

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defendants named in the complaint, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to establish a causal link to

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a violation of Plaintiff’s rights.
A.

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Defendant Hobbs
Plaintiff appears to assert three claims against Defendant Hobbs. First, Plaintiff

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alleges that Defendant Hobbs improperly transferred Plaintiff from Building 5 to Building 2.

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Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hobbs is responsible for verbal harassment Plaintiff

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experienced in Building 2. Third, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Hobbs was deliberately

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indifferent to a safety risk in Building 2. As explained below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has

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failed to state a cognizable claim under any of these theories.

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1.

Placement in Building 2

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Plaintiff generally alleges that his placement in Building 2 by Defendant Hobbs

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violated California prison regulations. This allegation fails to state a cognizable federal claim.
Prisoners have no liberty interest in their classification status or in their eligibility

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for rehabilitative programs. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); Myron v.

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Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998);

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Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 457 (9th Cir. 1996); Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318

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(9th Cir. 1987). Prisoners also have no liberty interest in avoiding being transferred to another

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prison. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,

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225-27 (1976); United States v. Brown, 59 F.3d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Johnson v.

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Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Coakley v. Murphy, 884 F.2d 1218, 1221

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(9th Cir. 1989).

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While prisoners retain a First Amendment right to be free from retaliatory

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transfers, see Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527,

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531 (9th Cir. 1985), Plaintiff has not alleged that his transfer from Building 5 to Building 2 was

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retaliatory.

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To the extent Plaintiff’s claim is based on a violation of state law, Plaintiff has not

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alleged compliance with the Government Claims Act, which is required to plead such claims. See

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State v. Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1240, 1237 (2004) (for claims against the

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State, timely presentation of a claim under the Government Claims Act is an element of the cause

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of action and must be pled in the complaint); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 900.6 (defining “State”

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as “the State and any office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, commission or agency

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of the State claims against which are paid by warrants drawn by the Controller”).

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Plaintiff asserts a violation of California regulatory law related to his transfer to

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Building 2 but fails to plead compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff is

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informed that before he may proceed on a claim arising under California law in this Court he

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must comply with the terms of the California Tort Claims Act, and then plead compliance. See

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Cal. Gov’t Code § 910 et seq.; Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d. 1470, 1477 (9th

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Cir. 1995). Complaints must present facts demonstrating compliance, rather than simply state

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conclusions suggesting as much. Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist., 42 Cal.4th 201, 209 (2007).

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Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend consistent with the principles
outlined above.

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2.

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Plaintiff alleges that name-calling, threats, and harassment were “enabled” by

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Harassment

Defendant Hobbs.
While “the Ninth Circuit has recognized that sexual harassment may constitute a

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cognizable claim for an Eighth Amendment violation, the court has specifically differentiated

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between sexual harassment that involves verbal abuse and that which involves allegations of

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physical assault, finding the later to be in violation of the [C]onstitution.” Minifield v. Butikofer,

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298 F. Supp. 2d 900, 904 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1198 (9th
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Cir. 2000). Likewise, allegations of verbal harassment generally do not state a claim under the

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Eighth Amendment. See Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987). However,

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“[v]erbal harassment may violate the Constitution when it is ‘unusually gross even for a prison

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setting and [is] calculated to and [does] cause [plaintiff] psychological damage.’” Cox v. Kernan,

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2019 WL 6840136, *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2019) (quoting Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092

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(9th Cir. 1996)). Allegations of name-calling, verbal abuse, or threats generally are not

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considered unusually gross for a prison setting. See Carpenter v. Molina, 2021 WL 2226635, at

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*3 (E.D. Cal. June 2, 2021). Thus, a defendant’s threats to kill or harm a plaintiff are

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insufficient, without more, to give rise to a cognizable verbal harassment claim. See Bailey v.

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Soto, 2019 WL 4452970, at *7-9 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2019).
Here, without knowing the nature of the alleged harassment, specifically what was

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said to Plaintiff and by whom, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim

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against Defendant Hobbs. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend.

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3.

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Plaintiff claims that Defendant Hobbs’ conduct resulted in a risk to Plaintiff’s

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Safety

safety.
The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

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prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

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and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,

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511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts

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of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

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(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.

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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

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“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

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801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when

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two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such

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that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

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subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of
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inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

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official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

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Under these principles, prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to

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protect inmates from physical abuse. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir.

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1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Liability exists only when two requirements are met: (1)

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objectively, the prisoner was incarcerated under conditions presenting a substantial risk of serious

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harm; and (2) subjectively, prison officials knew of and disregarded the risk. See Farmer, 511

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U.S. at 837. The very obviousness of the risk may suffice to establish the knowledge element.

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See Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison officials are not liable,

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however, if evidence is presented that they lacked knowledge of a safety risk. See Farmer, 511

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U.S. at 844. The knowledge element does not require that the plaintiff prove that prison officials

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know for a certainty that the inmate’s safety is in danger, but it requires proof of more than a

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mere suspicion of danger. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Finally, the

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plaintiff must show that prison officials disregarded a risk. Thus, where prison officials actually

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knew of a substantial risk, they are not liable if they took reasonable steps to respond to the risk,

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even if harm ultimately was not averted. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to show how being housed in Building 2

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resulted in an objective risk of harm to Plaintiff of which Defendant Hobbs was aware. Again,

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Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend.

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B.

Remaining Defendants
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual

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connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See

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Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A

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person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of

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§ 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform

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an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”

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Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations

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concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See
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Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth

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specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional

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deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

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Defendant Hobbs is the only of the four named defendants who is mentioned in the

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summary of facts contained within the complaint. Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend to

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allege facts specific to the remaining named defendants and how each caused or contributed to a

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violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or statutory rights.

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III. CONCLUSION

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Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

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amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire

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action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is

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informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

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Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to

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amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended

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complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if

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Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make

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Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be

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complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

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If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the

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conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

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Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

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each named defendant is involved and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between

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each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167

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(9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

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time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

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1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply

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with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).

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See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

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1.

Plaintiff’s original complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.

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2.

Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

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service of this order.

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Dated: June 5, 2024

____________________________________
DENNIS M. COTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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