Thompson v. Harris et al

Filing 43

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE re dismissal. Order to Show Cause Hearing set for 2/18/2014 10:00 AM. Pretrial conference and trial vacated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Nandor Vadas on 1/17/2014. (njvlc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/17/2014)

1
2
3
4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6

EUREKA DIVISION

7
8

MICHAEL THOMPSON,

Case No. 12-cv-06529 NJV

Plaintiff,
9
v.
10
11

RONALD J. HARRIS, et al.,

United States District Court
Northern District of California

Defendants.

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE; ORDER
VACATING PRETRIAL
CONFERENCE; ORDER VACATING
TRIAL

12
13
14

Plaintiff asserts five claims for relief in this action: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2

15

for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a; (2) a violation of California Civil Code § 51.5(a);

16

(3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and

17

(5) declaratory relief. Plaintiff asserts that this court has federal question subject matter

18

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff relies on 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3, which provides

19

for civil actions for injunctive relief based on acts prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2. Section

20

2000a-2 prohibits, in part, deprivation of, or interference with, the rights secured by Sections

21

2000a and 2000a-1.

22

42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) provides as follows:

23
24
25
26
27
28

All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) provides as follows:
Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public
accommodation within the meaning of this subchapter if its operations affect commerce, or

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action:
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests,
other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more than five
rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such
establishment as his residence;
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility
principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not
limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any
gasoline station;
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of
exhibition or entertainment; and

8
9
10

(4) any establishment (A)(i) which is physically located within the premises of any
establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which is
physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as
serving patrons of such covered establishment.

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12
13

The establishment in this case is a self storage business. Such businesses are not among
those listed under subsection (b) above as a place of public accommodation under 42 U.S.C.

14

§ 2000a. Further, it appears that the list above is exhaustive. See 110 Cong.Rec. 1520 (1964)

15

(explaining that "in addition to these enumerated establishments" the establishments described in

16

subsection (4) would also be covered); Id. at p. 1522 (explaining the provisions of Title II of the

17

Civil Rights Act of 1964, and stating that "[t]hese provisions are applicable to certain designated

18
establishments - places of lodging, eating places, gasoline stations, and places of exhibition or
19
20

entertainment"); Id. at p. 1525 (stating that the proposed legislation "would preclude

21

discrimination or segregation at any of the establishments specifically enumerated in that section

22

(e.g., hotels, motels, restaurants, and other eating facilities, gasoline stations, places of public

23

entertainment) if such discrimination or segregation 'is supported by State action'"); Id. at p. 1526

24

(proposed legislation "does not extend to all establishments in which discrimination may be

25

'supported' by the State; section 201 covers, even with regard to State action, only those

26
establishments within the specific categories defined in the section; i.e., hotels, motels, eating
27
28

places, gasoline stations, places of amusement, etc."); Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456
2

1
2
3
4
5
6

F.3d 427, 431 (4th Cir. 2006) ("The plain text of the statute demonstrates that beauty salons are
not covered by Title II. They are not mentioned in any of the numerous definitions of "place of
public accommodation." They also bear little relation to those places of entertainment that are
specifically listed, which strongly suggests that a salon would not fall within the catchall language
'other place of exhibition or entertainment.' 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3).")
It therefore appears that, as Defendants argue, Rainbow Self Storage may not be a place of
public accommodation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. If this is so, the claim on which Plaintiff relies

8

for federal subject matter jurisdiction over this action fails. Therefore, the court will require

9

Plaintiff to show cause why his claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2 should not be dismissed

10

either for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or for lack of federal subject

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

7

matter jurisdiction. See Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 686-87 (9th Cir. 1993)

12

(court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte where inadequacy is apparent as a matter of law);

13

Skranak v. Castenada, 425 F.3d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (court obliged to raise lack of subject

14

matter jurisdiction sua sponte); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83, 66 S.Ct. 773 (1946)

15

(jurisdictional dismissals are warranted "where the alleged claim under the constitution or federal

16

statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining federal

17

jurisdiction or where such claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous"); Herman Family

18

Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 2001) ("If the district court dismisses

19

all federal claims on the merits, it has discretion under § 1367(c) to adjudicate the remaining

20

claims; if the court dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it has no discretion and must

21

dismiss all claims.").

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
(1) Plaintiff is GRANTED fourteen (14) days from the date of service of this order within
which to SHOW CAUSE why this action should not be dismissed;
(2) Defendants are GRANTED seven (7) days from the date of service of Plaintiff's brief to
file a response;
(3) The matter will be heard February 18, 2014, at 10:00 am. The parties may appear
telephonically by dialing 888-684-8852 and entering access code 1868782.
3

1

(4) The Pretrial Conference set for January 22, 2014, is VACATED; and

2

(5)

The trial set for February 24, 2014, is VACATED.

3
4

IT IS SO ORDERED.

5

Dated: January 17, 2013

6
7

______________________________________
NANDOR J. VADAS
United States Magistrate Judge

8
9
10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
4