Cook v. Roque

Filing 13

ORDER DISMISSING CASE. Signed by Magistrate Judge Nandor Vadas on 6/18/2014. (njvlc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/18/2014)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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EUREKA DIVISION

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ERIC DARNELL COOK,
No. 1:14-CV-1234 NJV (PR)
Plaintiff,

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ORDER OF DISMISSAL
v.

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P. ROQUE,
Defendant.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Plaintiff has filed a pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court

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dismissed the original complaint with leave to amend. (Doc. 10.) Plaintiff has now filed an

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amended complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss this action in its

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entirety.

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DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review
Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners

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seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.

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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and

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dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

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be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at

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1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

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Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of

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the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary;

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the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the

omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual

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allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] to relief'

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requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

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cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

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above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

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(citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

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plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has recently explained

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the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the

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framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are

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For the Northern District of California

grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations

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United States District Court

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well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

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whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

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679 (2009).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

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elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

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violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the

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color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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B.

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Legal Claims
Plaintiff seeks to be paid for several months of working at his prison without

compensation.

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Prisoners have no constitutional right to be paid for their services. Serra v. Lappin,

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600 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Piatt v. MacDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th

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Cir. 1985) (no deprivation of liberty interest when prisoner forced to work without pay, nor

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does requiring such work subject prisoner to involuntary servitude in violation of the

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Thirteenth Amendment)). There is also no constitutional right to a job or rehabilitation in

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prison. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1982) (no right to job); Rizzo v.

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Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1985) (no right to vocational course for

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rehabilitation). Whatever liberty or property interests in prison employment are the product

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of state law. Lyon v. Farrier, 727 F.2d 766, 769 (8th Cir. 1984); cf. Sandin v. Conner, 515

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U.S. 472, 477-87 (1995) (where state statutes or regulations narrowly restrict power of

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prison officials to deprive inmates of interest that is of "real substance," deprivation of

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interest must meet requirements of procedural due process).

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Further, prisoners generally are not protected by federal or state labor laws, since

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the economic realities of prison employment seldom make them "employees" entitled to

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such protections. See Morgan v. MacDonald, 41 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1994) (prisoner

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working under state statute requiring 40 hours weekly work or training not "employee"
under FLSA); see also Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1392-98 (9th Cir.) (en banc)

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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(prisoners working under state program requiring hard labor not "employees"), cert. denied,

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510 U.S. 946 (1993); Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 908 (9th Cir. 2013) (prisoner

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working for prison contractor not employee under ADA because his labor belongs to state).

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While plaintiff has submitted a document titled, “Amended Complaint”, the document

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only contains a request for the appointment of counsel. Plaintiff has therefore failed to file

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an actual amended complaint and address the deficiencies identified by the Court. As

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noted above, plaintiff’s action that seeks pay for working at prison fails to state a claim.

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The Court will not appoint counsel. There is no constitutional right to counsel in a

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civil case, Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981), and although district

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courts may "request" that counsel represent a litigant who is proceeding in forma pauperis,

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as plaintiff is here, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), that does not give the courts the power to

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make "coercive appointments of counsel." Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S.

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296, 310 (1989).

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The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court may ask counsel to represent an

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indigent litigant only in "exceptional circumstances," the determination of which requires an

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evaluation of both (1) the likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the ability of the

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plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.

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Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). As plaintiff’s complaint fails to state

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a claim and no amount of amendment would cure the deficiencies, counsel will not be

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appointed and the case is dismissed.

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CONCLUSION

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1. The complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice for the reasons set forth above.

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2. The Clerk shall close the file.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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NANDOR J. VADAS
United States Magistrate Judge

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Dated: June 18, 2014.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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EUREKA DIVISION

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Plaintiff,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

v.

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For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

No.1:14-C-1234 NJV

ERIC DARNELL COOK,

P. ROGUE,

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Defendants.

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I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on June 18, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of
the attached by placing said copy in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) listed below,
by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail.

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Eric Darnell Cook
F-91972
Salinas Valley State Prison
C3-127
PO Box 1050
Soledad, CA 93960

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Dated: June 18, 2014

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/s/ Linn Van Meter
Linn Van Meter
Administrative Law Clerk to the
Honorable Nandor J. Vadas

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