Lopez v. Warden, San Quentin Prison et al
Filing
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ORDER of Dismissal With Leave to Amend. Signed by Judge Robert M. Illman on 10/10/2019. The clerk hereby certifies that on 10/10/2019 a copy of this Order was served by sending it via first-class mail to the address of each non-CM/ECF user listed on the docket. (rmilc1s, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/10/2019)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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EUREKA DIVISION
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GUSTAVO COLIN LOPEZ,
Plaintiff,
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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Case No. 19-cv-04108-RMI
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND
v.
WARDEN, SAN QUENTIN PRISON, et
al.,
Re: Dkt. No. 1
Defendants.
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Plaintiff, a federal prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and has consented to the jurisdiction
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of a Magistrate Judge (dkt. 5).
DISCUSSION
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Standard of Review
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Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek
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redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §
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1915A(a). In the course of this review, the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss
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any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
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or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2).
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Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696,
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699 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the
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claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While specific facts are not necessary, the
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statement should impart fair notice of the nature of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests.
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Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). While it is true that a complaint “does not need
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detailed factual allegations . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment]
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to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
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cause of action will not do . . . [the] [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
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above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations
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omitted). A complaint must therefore proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
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plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly has been
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explained as such: “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must
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be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1)
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that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and, (2) that the
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alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins,
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487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
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Legal Claims
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Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to protect him from an assault by another inmate.
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The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to
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guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In particular,
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prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Id.
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at 833; Cortez v. Skol, 776 F. 3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036,
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1040 (9th Cir. 2005). The failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by other
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inmates or from dangerous conditions at the prison violates the Eighth Amendment when two
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requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the
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prison official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S.
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at 834. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if she or he knows of and disregards an
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excessive risk to inmate health or safety by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Id. at 837.
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“In a § 1983 or a Bivens action – where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants
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– the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government
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official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556
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U.S. at 677 (finding under Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, and Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
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Procedure, that complainant-detainee in a Bivens action failed to plead sufficient facts “plausibly
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showing” that top federal officials “purposely adopted a policy of classifying post-September-11
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detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of their race, religion, or national origin” over more likely
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and non-discriminatory explanations).
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A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal
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involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the
supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991,
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012). Even if a supervisory official is not directly involved in the allegedly
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unconstitutional conduct, “[a] supervisor can be liable in this individual capacity for his own
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culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his
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acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous
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indifference to the rights of others.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation
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omitted). The claim that a supervisory official “knew of unconstitutional conditions and ‘culpable
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actions of his subordinates’ but failed to act amounts to ‘acquiescence in the unconstitutional
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conduct of his subordinates’ and is ‘sufficient to state a claim of supervisory liability.’” Keates v.
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Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208) (finding that
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conclusory allegations that supervisor promulgated unconstitutional policies and procedures which
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authorized unconstitutional conduct of subordinates do not suffice to state a claim of supervisory
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liability).
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Plaintiff argues that he was mistakenly released from federal custody and transferred to
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San Quentin State Prison (“SQSP”) while he awaited deportation by federal authorities. Compl.
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(dkt. 1) at 3. At SQSP Plaintiff was walking to his housing unit when a riot broke out on the yard,
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during which he was assaulted by an unknown individual. Id. Plaintiff states he was rendered
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unconscious and suffered serious injuries, and that while he was recovering from his injuries he
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was deported to Mexico. Id. While it is unclear, it appears that this incident may have occurred
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sometime between 2013 and 2015. See id. at 9, 11.
Accordingly, the Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend such that Plaintiff can
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provide more information. The only Defendants are the Warden of SQSP, the Sheriff of Santa
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Clara County, and the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. However, plaintiff fails
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to describe the actions of any particular Defendant, or any individual. To state an Eighth
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Amendment violation, Plaintiff must identify specific defendants, and then describe how they
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were deliberately indifferent to his safety. Simply stating that there was a riot and plaintiff was
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injured is insufficient. Plaintiff must present allegations that Defendants knew of and disregarded
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a risk to his safety and failed to take reasonable steps to protect him. That some of these
Defendants are supervisors is insufficient. Plaintiff must describe either personal involvement in
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between a supervisor’s wrongful
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conduct and the constitutional violation. Plaintiff must provide more information with respect to
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the legal standard set forth above.
CONCLUSION
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1. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance with the standards
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set forth above. The amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the date
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this order is filed and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the
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words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely
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replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See
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Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff may not incorporate material
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from the original complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the designated time will result
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in the dismissal of this case.
2. It is the plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court
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informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of
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Change of Address,” and must comply with the court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so
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may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 41(b).
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//
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 10, 2019
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ROBERT M. ILLMAN
United States Magistrate Judge
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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