Emma C., et al v. Eastin, et al

Filing 1982

ORDER Denying State Defendants' Motion to Stay July 2, 2014 Order by Judge Thelton E. Henderson 1980 (tehlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/25/2014)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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EMMA C., et al.,
Plaintiffs,

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Case No. 96-cv-04179-TEH
ORDER DENYING STATE
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY
JULY 2, 2014 ORDER

v.
DELAINE EASTIN, et al.,
Defendants.

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Defendants California Department of Education (“CDE”), State Board of

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Education, and Delaine Eastin (“State Defendants”) have moved to stay, pending appeal,

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the Court’s July 2, 2014 order denying their motion to set aside the Court Monitor’s

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January 9, 2014 Report. After carefully considering the State Defendants’ moving papers,

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the Court finds further briefing and argument to be unnecessary and now DENIES the

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motion to stay for the reasons set forth below.

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BACKGROUND
The parties are familiar with the long history of this case, and the Court therefore
only briefly describes the facts underlying the motion to stay.
On January 9, 2014, the Monitor issued a report concerning the state-level system

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for monitoring the provision of a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) in

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Ravenswood City School District. Jan. 9, 2014 Monitor’s Report (Docket No. 1890). This

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report included 42 determinations regarding existing disputes and recommended that CDE

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undertake a corrective action plan (“CAP”). The Monitor further recommended that an

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outside consultant be retained by the Monitor to assist in the development of the CAP if

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the parties were unable to resolve their disputes concerning any of the Monitor’s

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determinations.

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On April 16, 2014, the State Defendants brought a motion objecting to, and seeking

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to set aside, the Monitor’s January 9, 2014 Report. The Court denied the motion and

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ordered that:

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The parties are to proceed with the corrective action steps as
outlined in the Monitor’s January 9, 2014 determinations
report. The Monitor is directed to hire consultants as
necessary to ensure the timely development and effective
implementation of a corrective action plan in order to achieve
the outcomes set forth in the determinations. As recommended
by the Monitor, CDE shall be responsible for the costs
associated with the development and oversight of the
corrective action plan, including any consultants hired by
the Monitor.
July 2, 2014 Order at 13 (emphasis added) (Docket No. 1958).
On July 4, 2014, the Monitor informed the parties by e-mail that he intended to hire

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Pingora Consulting to assist him in developing the CAP. Ex. A to Aug. 20, 2014 Tillman

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Decl. (Docket No. 1980-1). The Monitor further instructed the State Defendants to deposit

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with the Court $50,000 in payment of Pingora Consulting’s services and the costs of

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monitoring implementation of the CAP by August 15, 2014. Id. On July 8, 2014, the State

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Defendants acknowledged this request by e-mail. Ex. B to Aug. 20, 2014 Tillman Decl.

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The Court received a check for $50,000 on August 18, 2014, one business day after the

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deadline imposed by the Monitor.

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On July 31, 2014, the State Defendants appealed the Court’s July 2, 2014 Order, but

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they did not move for a stay until August 20, 2014. They now request a stay on the

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following terms:

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(1) The clerk of the Court may not disburse the deposited
$50,000 to Pingora Consulting or any other consultant retained
in this matter, and such funds must be maintained by the Clerk
of the Court for this action in accordance with the Court’s
procedures pending resolution of the State Defendants’ appeal;
(2) Pingora Consulting may not develop any corrective action
plans or otherwise conduct an evaluation of the CDE’s statelevel monitoring system;
(3) The State Defendants will not be subject to any direction by
the Monitor or this Court to implement any of the
determinations or corrective actions indicated in the Monitor’s
January 9, 2014 report pending resolution of the State
Defendants’ appeal.
Mot. at 4 (Docket No. 1980).
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LEGAL STANDARD
The State Defendants correctly identify the factors this Court should consider in
weighing a requested stay pending appeal:

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(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that
he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant
will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance
of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested
in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.

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Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). A stay is “an exercise of judicial

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discretion. . . . The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the

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circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,

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433-34 (2009) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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DISCUSSION
The Court addresses each of the stay factors in turn below and concludes that the
State Defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing that a stay is justified.

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A.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

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First, the Court finds unpersuasive the State Defendants’ arguments that they are

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likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal, let alone that they have made a strong

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showing of such likelihood of success. The State Defendants contend that they were

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denied due process to address the use of Pingora Consulting because “the Monitor’s

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January 9, 2014 report did not discuss or recommend the delegation of authority to Pingora

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Consulting.” Mot. at 6. However, this claim is factually incorrect. The Monitor’s report

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explicitly recommended “that the court direct the Monitor to develop the CAP with the

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assistance of outside consultants. . . . [and] that funding for any needed consultants be

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provided by CDE.” Jan. 9, 2014 Monitor’s Report at 87. Thus, the State Defendants were

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on clear notice that the Monitor recommended the use of outside consultants. The Court is

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further informed by the Monitor that the State Defendants have raised no specific

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objections to the selection of Pingora Consulting since the Monitor indicated his intent to
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hire them nearly two months ago. The Court therefore finds it unlikely that the appellate

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court will find any violation of the State Defendants’ due process rights.

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The State Defendants further claim that the Court “lacks a proper legal basis for

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putting Pingora Consulting in such an oversight role vis-à-vis the State Defendants,” and

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that such a delegation constitutes “new and unexplored ground” subject to appellate

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review. Mot. at 6. However, the State Defendants mischaracterize the scope of the

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authority of Pingora Consulting in this case. The consultants have been enlisted to assist

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the Monitor in the execution of his duties; they have not themselves been delegated any

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oversight authority. To the contrary, their draft CAP will be reviewed and, if necessary,
modified by the Monitor before its implementation, and the Monitor will oversee all

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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aspects of the final CAP’s implementation. At all times, the Monitor will maintain the

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authority vested in him by this Court, and Pingora Consulting will merely provide support

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to the Monitor to expedite the process. Such assistance is not “new and unexplored

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ground,” as the State Defendants contend, Mot. at 6; indeed, one of Pingora Consulting’s

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members has assisted the Monitor as a consultant in the “oversight of CDE’s resolution of

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complaints concerning Ravenswood” for the past four years. Ex. A to Aug. 20, 2014

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Tillman Decl. Further, the First Amended Consent Decree (“FACD”) has explicitly

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authorized the Monitor to retain the assistance of consultants in other aspects of this case.

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FACD § 6.1.5.

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Finally, even if the State Defendants had correctly characterized the history of this

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case and the role of Pingora Consulting, the level of deference afforded to district courts in

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institutional reform cases would weigh against a finding of likelihood of success on appeal.

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The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that, “[o]ver time, the district court gains an intimate

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understanding of the workings of an institution and learns what specific changes are

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needed within that institution in order to achieve the goals of the consent decree.”

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Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 564 F.3d 1115, 1121

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(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Devel., 404 F.3d 821,

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827 (4th Cir. 2005)) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Based on its “extensive
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oversight” of a matter, the district court is “armed with a decade of knowledge about the

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case” – or, in this case, eighteen years of knowledge – that makes it “uniquely positioned”

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to evaluate defendants’ efforts to comply with a consent decree. Id. at 1119, 1121. Here,

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it was precisely such intimate experience with this case that led to the Court’s conclusions

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that a CAP was necessary and that use of consultants by the Monitor would avoid undue

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delay without resulting in any significant increase in costs. July 2, 2014 Order at 12.

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These determinations will likely be afforded deference on appeal, and the Court finds no

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likelihood that the State Defendants will prevail.

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B.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Irreparable Injury Absent Stay

The Court is similarly unpersuaded by the State Defendants’ claim that they will

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suffer irreparable injury absent a stay. First, the State Defendants argue that the absence of

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a stay might moot their appeal. However, the State Defendants have not explained how

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continued action by Pingora Consulting or the Monitor will render its appeal moot. To the

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contrary, the Court’s enforcement of its July 2, 2014 order will not “materially alter the

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status of the case on appeal” because it maintains the status quo that existed “at the time of

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the . . . appeal.” Mayweathers v. Newland, 258 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2001). While it

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would be impermissible for the Court to attempt to “adjudicate anew the merits of the

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case,” id. (internal citations and quotations omitted), the Court has no intention of doing

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so. Thus, the Court does not find any risk that denying a stay would moot the State

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Defendants’ appeal, and the State Defendants therefore will not suffer any injury on that

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basis.

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Second, the State Defendants claim they will expend “scarce resources” responding

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to the consultants’ CAP while also prosecuting an appeal concerning their appointment.

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Mot. at 6. However, the State Defendants themselves recognize that “monetary harm does

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not constitute irreparable injury,” id. at 7 (citing Cal. Pharamcists Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly,

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563 F.3d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 2009)), and this therefore does not constitute irreparable injury

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absent a stay.
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Finally, the State Defendants warn of the danger of a “multiplicity of actions and

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inconsistent court judgments if a stay is not issued” because plaintiffs in another case

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might seek appointment of their own consultant to examine CDE’s state-level monitoring

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system. Mot. at 6. Such speculation – both that a consultant might be appointed in another

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case and that any such consultant’s conclusions would conflict with the CAP developed in

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this case – is insufficient to constitute irreparable injury.

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In short, the Court finds no risk of irreparable harm to the State Defendants if their
request for a stay is denied.

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C.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Substantial Injury to Plaintiffs

The State Defendants next contend that Plaintiffs will not be substantially injured if

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the Court stays its July 2, 2014 order. This Court disagrees. Resistance to, and failure to

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comply with, the orders of this Court has served to delay the necessary institutional

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reforms long identified and thereby deny the rights of Ravenswood students to receive the

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education they are entitled to by law. While the State Defendants are correct that some

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progress could continue even if a stay were granted, that does not mean that Plaintiffs

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would suffer no injury. A stay would unnecessarily prolong the development of a CAP to

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address the deficiencies identified in the Monitor’s January 9, 2014 report – in direct

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contravention of the expediency the Court determined was warranted when it directed the

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engagement of consultants to assist the Monitor. The Court finds that such undue delay in

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effective CDE general supervision and oversight would result in substantial injury to

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Plaintiffs.

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D.

Public Interest

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Finally, the State Defendants argue that “the public interest of judicial economy will

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suffer without a stay” because the Court would be acting on matters over which it has been

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divested of jurisdiction. Mot. at 7-8. However, as discussed above, any enforcement

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orders of the Court’s July 2, 2014 order would serve only to maintain the status quo at the
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time of the appeal. This Court retains such jurisdiction, Natural Res. Def. Council v. Sw.

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Marine Inc., 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001), and the State Defendants’ judicial

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economy argument therefore fails. Moreover, the Court finds the public interest to weigh

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in favor of enforcing Plaintiffs’ rights under federal law.

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CONCLUSION

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For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES the State Defendants’ motion

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to stay the Court’s July 2, 2014 order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall

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deposit the $50,000 payment received from CDE on August 18, 2014, into the Court
registry. Disbursement of these funds will be delayed for one week from the filing of this

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Order to allow the State Defendants time to seek a stay from the Ninth Circuit Court of

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Appeals. After that time, the disbursement of these funds will be addressed in a

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subsequent order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: 8/25/14

_____________________________________
THELTON E. HENDERSON
United States District Judge

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