Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Duran

Filing 12

ORDER REMANDING ACTION. Signed by Judge Maxine M. Chesney on April 5, 2006. (mmclc1, COURT STAFF) Additional attachment(s) added on 4/6/2006 (tl, COURT STAFF).

Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Duran

Doc. 12

Case 3:06-cv-02258-MMC

Document 12

Filed 04/05/2006

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

United States District Court

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For the Northern District of California

CHASE BANK USA, N.A., v. Plaintiff,

No. C-06-2258 MMC ORDER REMANDING ACTION

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LEANDRO H. DURAN, Defendant ___________________________________ AND RELATED CROSS-ACTION / Before the Court is cross-defendant Arrow Financial Services LLC's ("Arrow") Notice of Removal, filed March 29, 2006. Arrow asserts the district court has federal question jurisdiction over the action because a cross-complaint filed by Leandro H. Duran ("Duran") against plaintiff Chase Bank USA, N.A. and third parties, including Arrow, purportedly contains a federal question. A third-party defendant, such as Arrow, has no right to remove a case to federal court. See First Nat'l Bank v. Curry, 301 F. 3d 456, 461 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing cases and treatises so holding). As a result, a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action removed by a third- party defendant. See id. at 467. Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the above-titled action, the action must be remanded. See

Dockets.Justia.com

Case 3:06-cv-02258-MMC

Document 12

Filed 04/05/2006

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28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ("If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded."). Further, even assuming Arrow could have removed the instant case, the grounds asserted by Arrow do not support removal jurisdiction. Each claim alleged by Duran arises under state law. Although Arrow asserts that Duran's state law claims are completely preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), specifically, by 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F), and thus are removable, Arrow cites no authority to support such assertion. Indeed, those courts that have examined the issue have found FCRA preemption does not support removal. See, e.g., King v. Retailers Nat'l Bank, 388 F. Supp. 2d 913, 916 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (holding FCRA does not "completely preempt" state law claims for purposes of removal jurisdiction); Watkins v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 118 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1220-23 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (holding "complete preemption doctrine" inapplicable to FCRA; finding "Congress did not intend to make state law causes of action defensively preempted by the FCRA removable to federal court"); see also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) ("[I]t is now settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of preemption.") (emphasis in original).1 Accordingly, the Court hereby REMANDS the above-titled action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), to the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the County of Alameda. The Clerk shall close the file. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: April 5, 2006

MAXINE M. CHESNEY United States District Judge

Arrow cites two cases in its Notice of Removal. Neither involves a complaint removed under a theory of complete preemption, nor is the subject of complete, as opposed to defensive, preemption addressed. See Howard v. Blue Ridge Bank, 371 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143-44 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Davis v. Maryland Bank, 2002 WL 32713429, *11-14 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 2

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