Villa v. Rowe et al

Filing 149

ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS IN LIMINE by Judge Alsup terminating 102 Motion in Limine; terminating 103 Motion in Limine; terminating 105 Motion in Limine; terminating 106 Motion in Limine; terminating 107 Motion in Limine; terminating 108 Mot ion in Limine; terminating 109 Motion in Limine; terminating 110 Motion in Limine; terminating 114 Motion in Limine; terminating 115 Motion in Limine; terminating 117 Motion in Limine; terminating 120 Motion in Limine; terminating 121 Motion in Limine; terminating 122 Motion in Limine; terminating 123 Motion in Limine (whalc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/7/2011)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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JOHN DANIEL VILLA JR.,
Plaintiff,

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No. C 07-01436 WHA

v.
LINDA ROWE, JENNIFER SWINEY,
and BHAWNA JAIN,

ORDER REGARDING
MOTIONS IN LIMINE

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Defendants.
/

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This action is proceeding to trial on plaintiff’s claim against Drs. Rowe, Swiney, and Jain
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for violation of the Eighth Amendment for the medical treatment plaintiff received for high
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cholesterol. In advance of the pretrial conference on July 5, plaintiff submitted two motions in
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limine, defendants Bhawna Jain and Linda Rowe submitted six, and defendant Jennifer Swiney
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submitted seven. (Defendants Jain and Rowe are represented by one set of counsel, while
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defendant Swiney is represented by another set of counsel, and the two sets brought separate
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motions.) Any denial below does not mean that the evidence at issue in the motion is admitted
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into evidence — it must still be moved into evidence, subject to other objections, at trial. And, a
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grant of a motion in limine does not exclude the evidence under any and all circumstances; the
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beneficiary of a grant may open the door to the disputed evidence, for example.
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A.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1

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Plaintiff moved in limine to exclude expert opinion testimony from Dr. Harlan Watkins
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or for an evidentiary hearing prior to the admission of such testimony (Dkt. No. 102), “because
he is unable to [sufficiently] define ‘deliberate indifference’ or the ‘standard of care.’” Plaintiff

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argues that Dr. Watkins’ testimony should be excluded because at his deposition he did not

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define the legal terms “deliberate indifference” or “standard of care” with the rote precision that

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plaintiff’s counsel desire. As an initial matter, the deposition testimony submitted does not

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include a question and answer in which Dr. Watkins defined “standard of care.” On the other

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hand, Dr. Watkins testified that he would define “deliberate indifference” as “uncaring,

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deliberately trying to damage someone . . . deliberate intent to be uncaring.”

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Dr. Watkins will not mislead the jury in the way counsel suggests. Jury instructions will

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properly instruct the jury as to the applicable legal standard. Plaintiff’s counsel provide no

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authority for the position that an expert’s inability to testify in deposition to a specific legal

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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definition of a term — as opposed to an approximation — should preclude his testimony

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altogether. To the contrary, this order finds that Dr. Watkins’ approximation of the legal

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standard of “deliberate indifference” in his deposition testimony does not render his testimony

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unreliable or irrelevant. Plaintiff’s showing at this stage constitutes possible impeaching

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material and nothing more. The motion is therefore DENIED. Both sides are instructed to not

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sponsor direct testimony that medical treatment did or did not fall short or was or was not

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adequate for liability.

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B.

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Plaintiff moved in limine to limit evidence of the underlying facts of plaintiff’s prior

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 2

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felony conviction (Dkt. No. 103). For the reasons stated at the pretrial conference, the motion is

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GRANTED, and the fact of the prior conviction is admissible but the underlying facts shall be

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excluded.

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C.

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Defendants Jain and Rowe moved in limine to exclude reference to “the contents of

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articles, studies, court rulings, reports, legislative analyses and other hearsay relied upon by

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plaintiff during direct examination of plaintiff’s experts” (Dkt. Nos. 105, 112, and 135). Among

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the documents challenged as potentially relied on by plaintiff’s experts, plaintiff’s counsel stated

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at the pretrial conference that they would only try to get drug inserts and prison protocols for

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medical care into evidence. (The motion does not challenge documents not potentially relied on

DEFENDANTS JAIN AND ROWE’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1

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by plaintiff’s experts, such as plaintiff’s prison appeals during the time of treatment, so those are

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not at issue here, though they are still subject to trial objections if plaintiff’s counsel otherwise

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attempt to introduce them into evidence.) As to drug inserts and prison protocols for medical

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care, for the reasons stated at the pretrial conference, the motion is DENIED WITHOUT

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PREJUDICE

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foundation. As to all other documents potentially relied on by plaintiff’s experts, the motion is

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GRANTED.

to trial objections once plaintiff’s counsel have had an opportunity to attempt to lay

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D.

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Defendants Jain and Rowe moved in limine to exclude evidence regarding the standard of

DEFENDANTS JAIN AND ROWE’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 2

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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care (Dkt. No. 106). For the reasons stated at the pretrial conference, the motion is DENIED, but

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a jury instruction will be given to admonish the jury that finding a violation of the standard of

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care is not enough to find liability, and subject to the caveat that this ruling may be modified if

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plaintiff’s counsel abuse their opportunity to put in evidence on the standard of care.

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E.

DEFENDANTS JAIN AND ROWE’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3

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Defendants Jain and Rowe moved in limine to preclude plaintiff’s experts from going

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beyond the scope of their expert reports on direct examination (Dkt. No. 107). For the reasons

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stated at the pretrial conference, the motion is GRANTED to the following extent: If, after an

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objection on direct examination of an expert that testimony is beyond the scope of the expert’s

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report, the Court finds that the testimony is indeed beyond the scope of the report, such

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testimony will not come into evidence. The same rule applies to both sides. On cross-

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examination, however, if examining counsel opens the door to testimony that is beyond the

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expert’s report, the expert can testify freely, without such restriction.

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F.

DEFENDANTS JAIN AND ROWE’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4

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Defendants Jain and Rowe moved in limine to exclude hearsay evidence of statements

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made by plaintiff to other physicians that he had a prior adverse reaction to statins (Dkt. No.

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108). For the reasons stated at the pretrial conference, the motion is GRANTED PROVISIONALLY

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to the following extent: A final ruling will be reserved for trial. In the meantime, plaintiff’s

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counsel shall not mention such evidence in opening statements or voir dire or allow it to come

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into plaintiff’s case without first getting permission from the judge.
DEFENDANTS JAIN AND ROWE’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 5

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G.

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Defendants Jain and Rowe moved in limine to preclude plaintiff’s experts from testifying

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that defendants were guilty of “deliberate indifference” or that their care and treatment of

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plaintiff “suggested” deliberate indifference (Dkt. Nos. 109 and 119). Plaintiff’s counsel stated

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their non-opposition to the motion and it is therefore GRANTED.

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H.

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Defendants Jain and Rowe moved in limine to preclude plaintiff’s expert, Terry E. Hill,

DEFENDANTS JAIN AND ROWE’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 6

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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M.D., from testifying regarding generalized medical practice at Pelican Bay Hospital, or

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“systematic lapses” in the medical care in general at Pelican Bay State Prison (Dkt. No. 110).

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Dr. Hill’s report is in the record. In it, Dr. Hill states his understanding that “[t]he Court

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has agreed to hear [plaintiff’s] claims specifically regarding his cholesterol treatment.”

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Nevertheless, the report reflects that Dr. Hill “ha[s] not reviewed the medical records of Mr.

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Villa and [] will not comment on the medical malpractice issues of his claim.” Instead, the

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report reviews “federal court class action cases pertinent to [Pelican Bay State Prison],” “medical

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care in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2005–2006,” and “medical

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care at Pelican Bay State Prison 2005–2006.”

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Dr. Hill’s testimony is irrelevant to the claims remaining for trial in this matter. Plaintiff

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responds that it is relevant because a claim of deliberate difference can be shown by “conduct by

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the prison medical staff” or by “proving there are such systemic and gross deficiencies in

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staffing, facilities, equipment, or procedures that the inmate population is effectively denied

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access to adequate medical care” (Opp. 2 (citing Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th

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Cir. 1983)). Regardless, the latter is not the claim brought to trial here. The order granting in

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part and denying in part defendants’ motions for summary judgment in this matter specifically

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stated:

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Summary judgment is DENIED as to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims
regarding the medical treatment he received for high cholesterol against
defendants Dr. Linda Rowe, Dr. Swine[y] and Dr. Jain. Summary judgment is
GRANTED on all other claims.
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(Dkt. No. 28 at 14). In other words, the only claim that is proceeding to trial is plaintiff’s claim

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that these three defendants were deliberately indifferent in providing medical treatment as to this

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particular issue.

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“A person deprives another ‘of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983,

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if he . . . causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].’ The inquiry into causation

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must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant

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whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v.

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Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted; emphasis in original). Applying

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these guiding principles here, plaintiff’s proffered evidence of general alleged shortcomings at

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Pelican Bay via Dr. Hill is not relevant to the issue at hand — namely, the alleged liability of the

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three defendants for deliberately indifferent medical treatment.

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Plaintiff is not proceeding to trial against the State or against the prison system for

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general deliberate indifference at Pelican Bay. Plaintiff provides no other basis for the

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admissibility of Dr. Hill’s testimony. Therefore, the motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Hill

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is GRANTED with the following caveat: As stated at the pretrial conference, if defense counsel

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opens the door to Dr. Hill’s testimony and other evidence regarding general medical conditions

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at the prison, the Court may allow plaintiff to present such evidence. Defense counsel would

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open the door, for example, by representing to the jury that plaintiff was provided the same good

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medical care as other prisoners at Pelican Bay.
DEFENDANT SWINEY’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1

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I.

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Defendant Swiney moved in limine to exclude mention of defendant’s insurance

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coverage (Dkt. Nos. 114 and 119). Plaintiff’s counsel stated their non-opposition to the motion

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and it is therefore GRANTED.
DEFENDANT SWINEY’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 2

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J.

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Defendant Swiney moved in limine to exclude witnesses from the courtroom while not

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under examination (Dkt. Nos. 115 and 119). Plaintiff’s counsel stated their non-opposition to

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the motion and it is therefore GRANTED.

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K.

DEFENDANT SWINEY’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3

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Defendant Swiney moved in limine to exclude evidence relating to prior settlement

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discussions (Dkt. Nos. 117 and 119). Plaintiff’s counsel stated their non-opposition to the

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motion and it is therefore GRANTED.

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L.

DEFENDANT SWINEY’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4

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Defendant Swiney moved in limine to exclude expert opinions not expressed at
deposition or in the expert’s Rule 26 reports (Dkt. No. 120). For the reasons stated at the pretrial

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conference, the motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART to the extent stated above

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regarding defendants Jain and Rowe’s motion in limine number three, except that experts are not

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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under a burden to volunteer information at deposition and thus their testimony will not be limited

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on that basis.

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M.

DEFENDANT SWINEY’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 5

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Defendant Swiney moved in limine to exclude the expert opinion of Dr. Terry Eli Hill as

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not relevant (Dkt. No. 121). For the reasons stated above regarding defendants Jain and Rowe’s

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motion in limine number six, and at the pretrial conference, the motion is GRANTED with the

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same caveat.

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N.

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Defendant Swiney moved in limine to strike plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages or, in

DEFENDANT SWINEY’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 6

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the alternative, to bifurcate liability and punitive damages phases of trial (Dkt. No. 122). For the

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reasons stated at the pretrial conference, the motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART

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to the following extent: Evidence during the main proceeding shall not concern the amount of

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punitive damages, but plaintiff’s counsel may tell the jury they are seeking punitive damages.

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The jury will be asked on the verdict form if they find liability whether punitive damages should

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also be awarded but not the amount. If the jury answers on the verdict form that punitive

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damages should be awarded, there will be a second phase of proceedings during which either

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side may present evidence concerning the financial condition and worth of defendants and

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during which counsel for both sides will be allowed a short time to argue the issue of the amount

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of punitive damages to the jury. Then, the jury will return to deliberations concerning the

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amount of punitive damages.
DEFENDANT SWINEY’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 7

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O.

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Defendant Swiney moved in limine to exclude expert opinion testimony by plaintiff (Dkt.

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No. 123). For the reasons stated at the pretrial conference, the motion is GRANTED IN PART AND

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DENIED IN PART to the following extent: As a general matter, plaintiff may testify, for example,

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“I took a pill, and then I got sick” but not that “the pill made me sick,” i.e., not about cause and

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effect. Given this general guidance, specific testimony may be objected to and ruled upon on a

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case-by-case basis.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: July 7, 2011.

WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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