Desantis et al., v. City of Santa Rosa et al.

Filing 234

ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' PRE-VERDICT MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. Signed by Judge JEFFREY S. WHITE on 9/18/12. (jjoS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/18/2012)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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PATRICIA DESANTIS, et al.,

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Plaintiffs,

No. C 07-03386 JSW

v.
CITY OF SANTA ROSA, et al.,

ORDER REGARDING
DEFENDANTS’ PRE-VERDICT
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW

Defendants.
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Now before the Court is Defendants’ pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law

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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) (“Rule 50(a)”). “Judgment as a matter of law

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is appropriate when the evidence presented at trial permits only one reasonable conclusion.”

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Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2002).

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The Court RESERVES RULING on Defendants’ motion with respect to Plaintiffs’

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Fourteenth Amendment claim against Sergeant Celli. Because the parties have stipulated to the

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dismissal of Officers Menke and Mann, Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law

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with respect to the claims against Officers Menke and Mann is DENIED as MOOT.

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With respect to Plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social

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Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), “Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable

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unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.”

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Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Thus, to establish

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that the City of Santa Rosa is liable, Plaintiffs must show that: (1) they had a constitutional right

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of which they were deprived; (2) the City had a custom created by those who may be fairly said

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to determine official policy, which amounted to, at a minimum, deliberate indifference to

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Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; and (3) the custom was the moving force behind the

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constitutional violation. See Blair v. City of Pomona, 223 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000); see

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also Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiffs had initially pursued

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three alternative theories of municipal liability: (1) that the use of deadly force against Mr.

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DeSantis was ratified by the City’s final decision maker, Chief Flint; (2) that the City failed to

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adequately train officers in responding to 5150 situations; and (3) that the City maintains a

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defacto policy of failing to discipline officers for use of excessive force that authorized,

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encouraged and condoned the use of excessive force by police officers. The Court granted
summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ ratification theory and failure to train

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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theory. Defendants now move for judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’ third and only

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remaining theory – a defacto policy of failing to discipline for excessive force. Defendants

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argue that there is no evidence in support of this theory and, thus, there is no evidence on which

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a reasonable jury could find in favor of Plaintiffs Patricia or Dani DeSantis on this claim.

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Plaintiffs do not argue that they have presented any evidence in support of their Monell claim

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based on a defacto policy of failing to discipline for excessive force. Accordingly, the Court

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GRANTS Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’ remaining Monell

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claim based on a defacto policy of failing to discipline for excessive force.

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In response to Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, Plaintiffs seek the

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Court to reconsider its prior ruling granting summary judgment on their Monell claim based on

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ratification. Under Northern District Civil Local Rule 7-9, a party may seek leave to file a

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motion for reconsideration any time before judgment. N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-9(a). A motion for

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reconsideration may be made on one of three grounds: (1) a material difference in fact or law

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exists from that which was presented to the Court, which, in the exercise of reasonable

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diligence, the party applying for reconsideration did not know at the time of the order; (2) the

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emergence of new material facts or a change of law; or (3) a manifest failure by the Court to

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consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments presented before entry of judgment. N.D.

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Civ. L.R. 7-9(b)(1)-(3). The moving party may not reargue any written or oral argument

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previously asserted to the Court. Id., 7-9(c).

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The Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Monell

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claim based on their ratification theory because Plaintiffs Patricia and Dani DeSantis failed to

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submit any evidence indicating whether Chief Flint approved of the use of deadly force against

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Richard DeSantis. Therefore, the Court found that Plaintiffs failed to establish a question of

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fact regarding whether Chief Flint made a conscious, affirmative choice to ratify the conduct in

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question and the basis for it. Plaintiffs now argue that new evidence in support of their

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ratification theory was elicited at trial. According to Plaintiffs, Chief Flint testified at trial that
he reviewed reports of the shooting of Richard DeSantis, consulted with his staff, and

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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determined that the shooting was within policy. (Plaintiffs’ Opp. to Defendants’ Rule 50(a)

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Mot. at 5.) However, this evidence is not new. Despite Plaintiffs’ failure to cite to this

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evidence in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Chief Flint testified in his

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deposition that he reviewed the report of the shooting and determined that Sergeant Celli acted

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appropriately and within Department policy. (Declaration of Benjamin Nisenbaum in Support

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of Plaintiffs’ Reply, Ex I at 58:2-17, 75:22-76:6 (Docket No. 66-9).) Therefore, the Court

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DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for leave for reconsideration on their Monell claim based on their

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theory of ratification.

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Finally, the Court reserves ruling on Defendants’ defense of qualified immunity. The

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Court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the defense of qualified immunity

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based on the existence of disputed facts. The parties still dispute the facts surrounding the

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shooting of Richard DeSantis. The determination of these facts is the province of the jury. If

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the jury finds that Plaintiffs’ version of the fact as described in their opposition to Defendants’

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motion for judgment as a matter of law is true, then qualified immunity would not be warranted.

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Therefore, the Court RESERVES RULING on Defendants’ defense of qualified immunity until

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the jury determines whether the Plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of the evidence that

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Sergeant Celli acted with a purpose to cause Richard DeSantis’ death unrelated to the legitimate

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law enforcement purposes of self-defense or the defense of others.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: September 18, 2012
JEFFREY S. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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