Abbyy USA Software House, Inc. v. Nuance Communications, Inc.

Filing 79

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on June 15, 2011. (jswlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/15/2011)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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NUANCE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. A
Delaware corporation,

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No. C 08-02912 JSW

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CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER
v.

For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

Plaintiff,
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ABBYY SOFTWARE HOUSE, INC., a
California corporation, and LEXMARK
INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Delaware
corporation,

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Defendants.
/

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The Court has been presented with a technology tutorial and briefing leading up to a

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hearing pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). This Order

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construes the eleven claim terms selected by the parties, which appear in several of the patents

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at issue in this case, United States Patent No. 6,038,342 (“the ’342 Patent”) called ‘Optical

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Character Recognition and Apparatus,” United States Patent No. 5,261,009 (“the ’009 Patent”)

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called ‘Means for Resolving Ambiguities in Text Passed Upon Character Context,” and United

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States Patent No. 381,489 (“the ’489 Patent”) called “Optical Recognition Method and

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Apparatus.”

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BACKGROUND
Nuance Communications, Inc. (“Nuance”) contends that the remaining defendants,

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Abbyy Software House and Abbyy USA Software House, Inc. (“Abbyy”) and Lexmark

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International, Inc. (collectively “Abbyy/Lexmark”) infringe nine of Nuance’s imaging patents.

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Of those nine, five relate directly to Optical Character Recognition (“OCR”) and are the subject

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of the present claim construction process. OCR refers to the translation of an image containing

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text to an editable format.

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The first commercially available OCR systems were “single-font” systems, capable of

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recognizing only one character font. The second class of OCR systems, referred to as omnifont

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systems, was able to recognize a much larger number of fonts in a wide range of point size and

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spacing, but performed slowly due to the unpredictability and greater variation of input.

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According to Nuance’s OmniPage series of patents, the intention was to introduce significant

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improvements to the OCR technology, thereby allowing omnifont systems to operate as quickly
as single-font counterparts, which retaining their flexibility.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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The Court shall address additional facts as necessary in the remainder of this Order.

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ANALYSIS
A.

Legal Standard.
“It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to

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which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water

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Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The interpretation of the scope and

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meaning of disputed terms in patent claims is a question of law and exclusively within the

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province of a court to decide. Markman, 517 U.S. at 372. The inquiry into the meaning of the

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claim terms is “an objective one.” Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at 1116. As a result, when a

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court construes disputed terms, it “looks to those sources available to the public that show what

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a person of skill in the art would have understood the disputed claim language to mean.” Id. In

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most cases, a court’s analysis will focus on three sources: the claims, the specification, and the

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prosecution history. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995)

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(en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). However, on occasion, it is appropriate to rely on

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extrinsic evidence regarding the relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms,

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and the state of the art at the time at the time the patent issued. Id. at 979-981.

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The starting point of the claim construction analysis is an examination of the specific

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claim language. A court’s “claim construction analysis must begin and remain centered on the

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claim language itself, for that is the language that the patentee has chosen to particularly point

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out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the patentee regards as his invention.”

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Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at 1116 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, in the

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absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a term, an inventor’s chosen language

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is given its ordinary meaning. York Prods., Inc. v. Cent. Tractor Farm & Family Center, 99

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F.3d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Thus, “[c]laim language generally carries the ordinary

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meaning of the words in their normal usage in the field of the invention.” Invitrogen Corp. v.
Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Renishaw v. Marposs

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (recognizing that “the claims define

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the scope of the right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in

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all cases with the actual words of the claim”). A court’s final construction, therefore, must

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accord with the words chosen by the patentee to mete out the boundaries of the claimed

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invention.

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The court should also look to intrinsic evidence, including the written description, the

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drawings, and the prosecution history, if included in the record, to provide context and

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clarification regarding the intended meaning of the claim terms. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am.

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Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The claims do not stand alone. Rather, “they

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are part of ‘a fully integrated written instrument.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315

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(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 978). The specification “may act as a

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sort of dictionary, which explains the invention and may define terms used in the claims.”

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Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The specification also can indicate whether the patentee intended to

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limit the scope of a claim, despite the use of seemingly broad claim language. SciMed Life Sys.,

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Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing

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that when the specification “makes clear that the invention does not include a particular feature,

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that feature is deemed to be outside the reach of the claims of the patent, even though the

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language of the claims, read without reference to the specification, might be considered broad

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enough to encompass the feature in question”).

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Intent to limit the claims can be demonstrated in a number of ways. For example, if the

the disputed claim term in either the specification or prosecution history,” a court will defer to

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that definition. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In

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order to so limit the claims, “the patent applicant [must] set out the different meaning in the

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specification in a manner sufficient to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change

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from ordinary meaning.” Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at 1117. In addition, a court will adopt

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an alternative meaning of a term “if the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee distinguished

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For the Northern District of California

patentee “acted as his own lexicographer,” and clearly and precisely “set forth a definition of

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United States District Court

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that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject

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matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention.” CCS Fitness, 288

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F.3d at 1367. For example the presumption of ordinary meaning will give way where the

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“inventor has disavowed or disclaimed scope of coverage, by using words or expressions of

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manifest exclusion or restriction, representing clear disavowal of claim scope.” Gemstar-TV

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Guide Int’l Inc. v. ITC, 383 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Likewise, the specification may

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be used to resolve ambiguity “where the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words used in

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the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of the claim to be ascertained from the

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words alone.” Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325.

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However, limitations from the specification (such as from the preferred embodiment)

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may not be read into the claims, absent the inventor’s express intention to the contrary. Id. at

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1326; see also CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366 (“[A] patentee need not ‘describe in the

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specification every conceivable and possible future embodiment of his invention.’”) (quoting

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Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). To protect against this

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result, a court’s focus should remain on understanding how a person of ordinary skill in the art

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would understand the claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.

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If the analysis of the intrinsic evidence fails to resolve any ambiguity in the claim

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language, a court then may turn to extrinsic evidence, such as expert declarations and testimony

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from the inventors. Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 319 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

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(“When an analysis of intrinsic evidence resolves any ambiguity in a disputed claim term, it is

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improper to rely on extrinsic evidence to contradict the meaning so ascertained.”) (emphasis in

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original). When considering extrinsic evidence, a court should take care not to use it to vary or

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contradict the claim terms. Rather, extrinsic evidence is relied upon more appropriately to

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assist in determining the meaning or scope of technical terms in the claims. Vitronics Corp. v.

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Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Dictionaries also may play a role in the determination of the ordinary and customary

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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meaning of a claim term. In Phillips, the Federal Circuit reiterated that “[d]ictionaries or

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comparable sources are often useful to assist in understanding the commonly understood

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meanings of words....” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322. The Phillips court, however, also

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admonished that district courts should be careful not to allow dictionary definitions to supplant

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the inventor’s understanding of the claimed subject matter. “The main problem with elevating

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the dictionary to ... prominence is that it focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of the

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words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within in the context of the patent.” Id. at

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1321. Accordingly, dictionaries necessarily must play a role subordinate to the intrinsic

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evidence.

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In addition, a court has the discretion to rely upon prior art, whether or not cited in the

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specification or the file history, but only when the meaning of the disputed terms cannot be

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ascertained from a careful reading of the public record. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584. Referring to

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prior art may make it unnecessary to rely upon expert testimony, because prior art may be

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indicative of what those skilled in the art generally understood certain terms to mean. Id.

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B.

Claim Construction.

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1.

“Template”

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Claim 1 of the ’342 Patent recites a “method of optically recognizing characters on a

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medium and storing a template of said recognized characters in a template cache for recognition

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of subsequent characters on said medium....” (27:29-32.) The word “template” also appears in

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Claims 4, 6, 7, 13, 14, and 18.

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Abbyy/Lexmark argue that the term “template” must be construed to mean “A data

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structure comprising a header field comprising offset pointers to the original pattern of the

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character recognized through feature analysis, a ‘must-be-off’ pattern derived from said original
pattern, and a ‘must-be-on’ pattern derived from said original pattern.” (Parties’ Amended

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Final Joint Claim Construction and Pre-hearing Statement (“Statement”), Ex. 1.) Nuance, on

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the other hand, argues that only the word “template” should be construed to mean “A

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representation of the patterns, shapes, or images of a character.” (Id.)

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The key distinction between the two proffered constructions is whether the embodiment

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of the “must-be-on” and “must-be-off” patterns should be read into the construction of the claim

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term. In fact, in Claim 2, 3, 8, and 15, the patent actually reserves the dependent claims to

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cover the specific embodiment in which the template may consist of the “must-be-on” and

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“must-be-off” patterns. Abbyy/Lexmark’s proposed construction would render the dependent

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claims superfluous.

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In general, the doctrine of claim differentiation recognizes “that different words or

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phrases used in separate claims are presumed to indicate that the claims have different meanings

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and scope.” Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007)

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(quoting Karlin Tech. Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 971-72 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).

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Thus, there is a presumption that “[t]o the extent the absence of such difference in meaning and

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scope would make a claim superfluous, ... the difference between claims is significant.” Id.

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(quoting Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).

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That presumption may be overcome, however, by the written description of the patent or its

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prosecution history. Id.

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The Court finds that the general term “template” should be construed using the broad

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construction proffered by Nuance, in which any particular template may – or may not – include

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the “must-be-on” and “must-be-off” patterns. The Court finds no reason to overcome the

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presumption of claim differentiation or to render the dependent claims in the patents entirely

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superfluous or redundant. The specification permits for an allowance that characters may be

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within predetermined tolerances, but does not require that they be either in the must-be-off or

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must-be-on patterns.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Accordingly, the Court construes the term “template” to mean: “A representation of the
patterns, shapes, or images of a character.”

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2.

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Claim 1 of the ’342 Patent recites a “method for optically recognizing characters on a

“Character”

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medium and storing a template of said recognized characters in a template cache for recognition

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of subsequent characters on said medium....” (27:29-32.) The word “character” also appears in

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Claims 4, 6, 7, 13, 14 (as dependent on 13), and 18. The word “character” also appears in

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Claim 7 of the ’489 Patent and Claim 22 of the ’009 Patent.

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Abbyy/Lexmark argue that the term “character” should be construed to mean “A

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character is a single, individual symbol from a known set of symbols, not joined with any other

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symbol, identifiable as such by a segmentation process. Examples of characters are letters,

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numerals and special numbers such as commas, quotation marks and semicolons.” (Statement,

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Ex. 1.) Nuance, on the other hand, argues that the term “character” should be construed to

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mean “One or a group of adjacent letters, digits, or other symbols.” (Id.)

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The key distinction between the two proffered constructions is that Abbyy/Lexmark

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attempts to narrow the construction to refer to only a single, identified letter, not, as Nuance

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proffers, a possible multiple symbol character. Nuance contends that a term singular may be

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construed to connote both a singular and plural form of the word. See Baldwin Graphic Sys.,

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Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“That ‘a’ or ‘an’ can mean ‘one

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or more’ is best described as a rule, rather than merely a presumption or even a convention.

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The exceptions to this rule are extremely limited: a patentee must ‘evince[] a clear intent’ to

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limit ‘a’ or ‘an’ to ‘one.’”); KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir.

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2000) (“Unless the claim is specific as to the number of elements, the article ‘a’ receives a

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singular interpretation only in rare circumstances when the patentee evinces a clear intent to so

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limit the article.”). Further, Nuance argues, the inventors recognized that the segmentation

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process may sometimes yield a multi-symbol character, such as ‘ite’ and explicitly accounts for

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this situation in the patent. (See ’342 Patent at 24:62-67.)
Abbyy/Lexmark argues that the ’342 and ’489 Patents compel the construction of the

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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term ‘character’ to indicate a single, individual symbol or letter because the patents explicitly

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describe the parsing process to render segments of a line of text into individual characters,

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which are meant to be both individual and isolated. (See ’342 Patent at 4:25-27; 15:61-62; ’489

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Patent at 4:27-29, 16:31-32.) Further, Abbyy/Lexmark contends that in the section of the ’342

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Patent addressing the instance in which the invention mistakenly grabs the term ‘ite’ instead of

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its composite letters, the patent describes the use of templates of single, individual characters to

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identify single characters by parsing the segment into the characters ‘i’ and then ‘t’ and

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following. (See ’342 Patent at 24:29-49.)

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However, in order to provide a consistent construction of the term, the Court would be

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remiss to limit the construction to a single, individual symbol or letter, where the patent clearly

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and specifically discloses multi-symbol characters such as “ite” and “ff” and “ffi.” (See ’342

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Patent at 24:34-36, 26:59-64; ’009 Patent at 23:4-9.)

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Accordingly, the Court construes the term “character” to mean: “One or a group of
adjacent letters, digits, or other symbols.”

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3.

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The word “identifying” appears in Claims 1,4, 6, and 18 of the ’342 Patent and also

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“Identifying”

appears in Claim 7 (as dependent on Claim 2) of the ’489 Patent.

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Nuance asserts that this term does not require construction, while Abbyy/Lexmark

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asserts that it does. However, Abbyy/Lexmark actually includes the term identifying in its

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construction of the term itself and tries to read into the term the methods of feature analysis and

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template matching.

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Abbyy/Lexmark argues the term “identifying” should be construed to mean

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“Determining the identity of an unknown character through feature analysis or template

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matching or both.” (Statement, Ex. 1.) Nuance asserts that this term is a simple word used in

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its every day, commonly understood way and should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.

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See, e.g., Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“General descriptive terms will ordinarily be given their full meaning; modifiers will not be

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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added to broad terms standing alone.”) In addition, the term identifying appears throughout

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portions of the patents that do not allude to the specific processing and may be analyzed

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according to any one of a number of techniques. Therefore, the Court does not find it

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persuasive to limit the construction of the term to only either feature analysis of template

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analysis.

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Accordingly, the Court construes the term “identifying” to mean: “ identifying.”

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4.

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The word “shape characteristics” appears in Claim 1 of the ’342 Patent. This is the only

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“Shape characteristics”

place this term appears.
Again, Nuance asserts that this term does not require construction, while

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Abbyy/Lexmark asserts that it does. “Victory in an infringement suit requires a finding that the

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patent claim covers the alleged infringer’s product or processes, which in turn necessitates a

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determination of what the claim terms mean.” Markman, 517 U.S. at 374. Thus, this Court will

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construe the term “shape characteristics.”

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Abbyy/Lexmark argues the term “shape characteristics” should be construed to mean

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“Statistical information derived from a horizontal window and a vertical window comprising

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profile data, polygonal representations, phase change information, and counts of the number of

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on pixels in each row of the character.” (Statement, Ex. 1.) Nuance again asserts that this term

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should be given its plain and ordinary meaning without importing numerous limitations from

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the specifications as attempted by Abbyy/Lexmark in its proposed construction.

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Abbyy/Lexmark’s proposed construction clearly attempts to import the limitations of a shape

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characteristic analyzing process disclosed in one specific embodiment into the construction of

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the otherwise generic term. (See ’342 Patent at 20:45-50.) In that instance, the shape

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characteristics are extracted from the feature analysis program disclosed in the patent, but it

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does not allow the Court to import the limitations into the construction of the term. In its

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argument, Abbyy/Lexmark contends that the shape characteristics are extracted from the feature
analysis process in the form of statistical information such as profile data, polygon

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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representations of the characters, phase change information, and counts of the numbers of on

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pixels in each row of the character. (See ’342 Patent at 20:47-50.) However, these are

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limitations of this specific embodiment. “Limitations from the specification (such as from the

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preferred embodiment) may not be read into the claims, absent the inventor’s express intention

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to the contrary.” Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1326 ; see also CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366.

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Unlike the holding in ICU Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368,

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1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009), the Court finds that there is sufficient intrinsic evidence that the term

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would not include the limitations Abbyy/Lexmark seeks to impose. The patent describes a

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number of processes and does not restrict the meaning of the term “shape characteristics” to the

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single description outlined by Abbyy/Lexmarks’ proposal. However, the Court finds that the

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description of the term in its responsive brief is more explicative than the term itself and adopts

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the construction “features of characters” which are extracted using several different means, as

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described in the patent.

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Accordingly, the Court construes the term “shape characteristics” to mean: “features of
characters.”

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5.

“Feature analysis”

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The phrase “feature analysis” appears in Claims 4, 6, 14, and 18 of the ’342 Patent.

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Abbyy/Lexmark argues that the term “feature analysis” should be construed to mean

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“An analysis of statistical information derived from a horizontal window and a vertical window

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consisting of profile data, polygonal representations, phase change information, and counts of

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the number of on pixels in each row of the character.” (Statement, Ex. 1.) Nuance, on the other

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hand, argues that the term “feature analysis” should be construed to mean “Recognizing a

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character in an image by routines that extract features of the character and analyze the features.”

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(Id.)

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In the specification, in a heading entitled “FEATURE ANALYSIS,” the patent sets out
that “[t]he preferred embodiment of the present invention discloses a plurality of routines for
analyzing the features of images passed as input to the feature analysis process,” with each

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For the Northern District of California

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routine called an “isit ... (e.g., ‘is it’ an a).” (’342 Patent at 19:37-45.) As isit can be

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implemented in a variety of ways, not just using the polygon fitting and the delineated statistical

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information in Abbyy/Lexmark’s restrictive construction. (See id. at 23:18-30.)

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Accordingly, the Court construes the term “feature analysis” to mean: “Recognizing a
character in an image by routines that extract features of the character and analyze the features.”

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6.

“Template matching”

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The phrase “template matching” appears in Claims 7, 14, and 18 of the ’342 Patent.

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Abbyy/Lexmark argues that the term “template matching” should be construed to mean

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“A character recognition process that compares an unknown character (an image in a window)

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to each template in a template cache until a match occurs or the cache is exhausted by

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constructing must-be-on and must-be-off arrays from the unidentified image, making a

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dimension check, and comparing must-be-on and must-be-off pixel information.” (Statement,

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Ex. 1.) Nuance, on the other hand, argues that the term “template matching” should be

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construed to mean “A character recognition process in which representations of the patterns,

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shapes, or images of an unknown character are compared with previously generated

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representations of the patterns, shapes, or images of known characters.” (Id.)

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Here, again, Abbyy/Lexmark tries to import a limitation from the specification for the

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term template to necessarily include the ‘must-be-on’ or ‘must-be-off’ feature. This

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construction has already been rejected by the Court. Secondly, Abbyy/Lexmark seeks to have

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the “until a match occurs or the cache is exhausted” become part of the construction of the term

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template matching. The Court does not find an explicit or express intent to add in a limitation

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that the template comparison stops once a match is found. Rather, the patent appears to indicate

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that the matching continues to occur within the library cache regardless of whether a single

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match is found. There is no indication in the intrinsic evidence that the inventors expressed a

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clear intent to restrict or exclude template matching only until a match is found. See LiebelFlarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Absent a clear disclaimer

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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of particular subject matter, the fact that the inventor may have anticipated that the invention

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would be used in a particular way does not mean that the scope of the invention is limited to

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that context.” ) (internal quotation omitted). The Court declines to limit the claim to the

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preferred embodiment disclosed in the specification.
Accordingly, the Court construes the term “template analysis” to mean: “A character

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recognition process in which representations of the patterns, shapes, or images of an unknown

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character are compared with previously generated representations of the patterns, shapes, or

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images of known characters.”

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7.

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The phrase “second character recognition process” appears in Claim 7 of the ’342

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“Second character recognition process”

Patent.

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Abbyy/Lexmark argues that the term “second character recognition process” should be

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construed to mean “feature analysis process.” (Statement, Ex. 1.) Nuance, on the other hand,

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argues that the term “second character recognition process” should be construed to mean “A

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process for recognizing a character that is different than the first character recognition process.”

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(Id.)

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The key difference in the parties’ proposals is that Abbyy/Lexmark attempts to limit the

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construction of the term to be only feature analysis and not any other possible recognition

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process. However, this construction would render meaningless the independent claims 7 and 13

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(as opposed to claim 18). Accordingly, under the theory of claim differentiation, the Court

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declines to adopt Abbyy/Lexmark’s restrictive construction. See Andersen, 474 F.3d at 1369.

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Accordingly, the Court construes the term “second character recognition process” to

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mean: “A process for recognizing a character that is different than the first character recognition

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process.”

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8.

“Portion of said image”

The phrase “portion of said image” appears in Claim 18 of the ’342 Patent.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Abbyy/Lexmark argues that the term “portion of said image” should be construed to

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mean “A representation of a character.” (Statement, Ex. 1.) Nuance asserts that the term is

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simple and additional construction would amount to meaningless verbiage. The figures of the

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patent set illustrate a “portion of a page” and “the same portion of a page.” (’342 Patent at Figs.

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3(a) and 3(b).) (See ’342 Patent at 6:10-18.) The figures include parts of a letter and parts of a

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drawing. In addition, Claim 18 provides that “a portion of said image, said portion including a

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representation of said character.” (Id. at 30:28-31.) With the word ‘including’ in the same

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phrase of the claim, it appears that the definition of a portion of said image would include more

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than simply the representation of a character.

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Accordingly, the Court construes the term “a portion of said image” to mean: “a portion
of said image.”

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9.

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The phrase “determining a value related to the probability of occurrence” appears in

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“Determining a value related to the probability of occurrence”

Claim 22 (as dependent on Claims 1 and 21) of the ’009 Patent.
Abbyy/Lexmark argues that the term “determining a value related to the probability of

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occurrence” should be construed to mean “Computation through modeling language as a second

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order Markov process.” (Statement, Ex. 1.) Nuance, on the other hand, argues that the term

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“determining a value related to the probability of occurrence” should be construed to mean

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“Computing a value related to the chance of occurrence within a reference sequence.” (Id.)

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Abbyy/Lexmark, during oral argument before the Court, contended that the construction should

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allude to the purpose of the patent and should reflect that the computation is dependent on

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probabilities. However, its proposed construction improperly imports limitations from the

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specifications and there is no principal of construction which requires that the Court delineate

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the alleged purpose of the patent within its construction of any particular term.

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Accordingly, the Court construes the term “Determining a value related to the

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probability of occurrence” to mean: “Computing a value related to the chance of occurrence
within a reference sequence.”

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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10.

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The phrase “input window” also appears in Claim 22 (as dependent on Claims 1 and 21)

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“Input window”

of the ’009 Patent.
Abbyy/Lexmark argues that the term “input window” should be construed to mean “A

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fixed-length portion of a string of characters that is shifted to the right by one character from the

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beginning of the string to the end of the string.” (Statement, Ex. 1.) Nuance, on the other hand,

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argues that the term “input window” should be construed to mean “A plurality of adjacent

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character candidates being processed.” (Id.)

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Again, Abbyy/Lexmark’s proposed construction improperly seeks to import limitations

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from the specifications. The patent does not require shifting and specifically permits the

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window to be any length. (See ’009 Patent at 23:12-18.)

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Accordingly, the Court construes the term “input window” to mean: “A plurality of
adjacent character candidates being processed.”

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11.

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The phrase “groups of elements” also appears in Claim 22 (as dependent on Claims 1

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“Groups of Elements”

and 21) of the ’009 Patent.

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1

Abbyy/Lexmark argues that the term “groups of elements” should be construed to mean

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“Groups of characters that facilitate the generation of statistics for computing ngram

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probabilities.” (Statement, Ex. 1.) Nuance asserts that this term should be construed to mean

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“groups of characters.” (Id.)

limitations from the specifications. During oral argument, Abbyy/Lexmark agreed to Nuance’s

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proposed construction but requested, without legal authority, that the Court also incorporate the

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probability statistics contained in the table of column seven of the ’009 Patent. There is no

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reasoned basis upon which the Court can incorporate into the construction of a claim term an

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illustrative example set out in the specifications. Nuance, on the other hand, proposes a clear

11
For the Northern District of California

Again, Abbyy/Lexmark, without reasoning, attempts to have the Court adopt the

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United States District Court

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construction that reflects the scope of the patent. (See, e.g., ’009 Patent at 6:6-9.)

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Accordingly, the Court construes the term “groups of elements” to mean: “groups of
characters.”
CONCLUSION

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Based on the analysis set forth above, the Court adopts the foregoing constructions of

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the disputed terms. The parties are ordered to submit a further joint case management report

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pursuant to Patent Standing Order ¶ 13 by no later than July 6, 2011.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: June 15, 2011
JEFFREY S. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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