Brasure v. Ayers

Filing 49

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge Richard Seeborg on 9/13/11. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Certificate of Service)(cl, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/13/2011)

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*E-Filed 9/13/11*

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

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No. C 08-1943 RS (PR)

SPENCER RAWLINS BRASURE,
Plaintiff,

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

v.

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ROBERT AYERS, et al.,

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Defendants.
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INTRODUCTION
This is a federal civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a pro se state

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prisoner. For the reasons stated herein, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

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GRANTED as to all claims against all defendants.

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BACKGROUND
The undisputed facts are as follows: A 2007 search of plaintiff’s cell by defendants,

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employees of San Quentin State Prison, yielded drug paraphernalia, documents related to

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gambling and gang activity, and weapons. Consequently, the contraband was seized for

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inventorying, plaintiff was placed on a temporary property control restriction, and a hearing

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was subsequently held. Plaintiff was found guilty of possessing a weapon and lost ten days

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No. C 08-1943 RS (PR)
ORDER GRANTING MOT. FOR SUMM. J.

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of yard privileges. Ninety days after the seizure, the property restriction was terminated and

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plaintiff’s authorized property was returned to him.1 Plaintiff’s specific claims are that

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defendants violated his (1) First Amendment rights by placing him on property and

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correspondence restrictions; and (2) due process rights by the loss of property taken because

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of the restrictions.2

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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits

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demonstrate that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are

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those which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

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242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a

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reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

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The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

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portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a

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genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On an

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issue for which the non-moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, as is the case

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here, the moving party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support

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the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325.

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Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond

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the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, show that a material fact is genuinely

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disputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court is only concerned with disputes over material

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facts and “factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson,

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After his property was returned, plaintiff filed an inmate grievance in which he alleged
that some items had not been returned. Plaintiff withdrew this grievance ten days later, stating
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Plaintiff’s third claim — that his rights were violated when defendants promulgated the
rules under which he was deprived of his property — is duplicative of the issues raised in the
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No. C 08-1943 RS (PR)
ORDER GRANTING MOT. FOR SUMM. J.

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477 U.S. at 248. It is not the task of the court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue

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of triable fact. Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party

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has the burden of identifying, with reasonable particularity, the evidence that precludes

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summary judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving

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party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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II.

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Claims
Plaintiff claims that his due process rights were violated when defendants

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(A) deprived him of his property; (B) deprived him of his mail; and (C) destroyed his

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property. As set forth below, none of these claims present a viable basis on which to

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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proceed.

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A.

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Plaintiff claims that his 90-day placement on property restrictions violated his First

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Amendment rights. In essence, plaintiff’s claim is that defendants violated his right to due

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process by depriving him of his property for 7 days prior to his hearing, and for 90 days

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thereafter.

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Property Deprivations

When state officials deprive an inmate of his property pursuant to state regulations

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and statutes, due process mandates a meaningful hearing on the matter. See Logan v.

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Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982); Armendariz v. Penman, 31 F.3d 860, 866

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(9th Cir. 1994), aff’d in part on relevant grounds and vacated in part on other grounds on

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reh’g en banc, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff

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was provided with a meaningful hearing and an opportunity to express his views with respect

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to the property’s confiscation. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the hearing need not always

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be prior to deprivation, as “the necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticability

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of any pre-deprivation process” are important considerations. See Logan, 455 U.S. at 436

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(quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981)); Armendariz, 31 F.3d at 866.

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Furthermore, the non-contraband property was returned to plaintiff. Therefore, he has not

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shown that defendants violated his right to due process. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for

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No. C 08-1943 RS (PR)
ORDER GRANTING MOT. FOR SUMM. J.

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summary judgment as to his property restrictions and deprivations is GRANTED.

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B.

Mail Deprivation

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Plaintiff alleges that defendants placed him on mail restrictions contemporaneous with

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his property restrictions, and that he lost his subscription publications and a personal letter as

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a result. Defendants deny that he was placed on mail restrictions. Other than plaintiff’s

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assertions, there is no evidence in support of his claim.

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Plaintiff has not shown that his due process rights were violated. He simply assumes

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that he failed to receive his mail because of a mail restriction. The undisputed fact that only

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a small amount of mail went missing, and that there is no record plaintiff was placed on mail

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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restriction, undermine this assumption. Even viewing the allegations in the light most

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favorable to plaintiff, the missing mail appears to be the result at most of negligence, rather

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than any intentional acts by defendants. Liability for negligently inflicted harm is

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categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process. See County of Sacramento

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v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998). As a claim of negligence is insufficient to show a

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violation of due process, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to this claim is

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GRANTED.

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C.

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Plaintiff claims that defendants destroyed his property without affording him due

Loss of Property

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process. According to defendants, plaintiff complained to prison staff that some boxes

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containing his legal materials were missing. Plaintiff was told that the boxes were not

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missing, but that the contents had been condensed into fewer boxes.

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Plaintiff has not shown a basis for relief, even if his property was destroyed. Neither

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the negligent nor intentional deprivation of property states a due process claim under § 1983

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if the deprivation was random and unauthorized. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535–44 (1981),

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overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1986);

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Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The availability of an adequate state

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post-deprivation remedy, e.g., a state tort action, precludes relief because it provides

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No. C 08-1943 RS (PR)
ORDER GRANTING MOT. FOR SUMM. J.

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sufficient procedural due process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990).

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California law provides such an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Barnett v. Centoni,

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31 F.3d 813, 816–17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810–895). Accordingly,

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defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to this claim is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION

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Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 33) is GRANTED.

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Plaintiff’s motions for sanctions, entry of default judgment, and hearings3 (Docket Nos. 32,

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35, 36, 43 & 47) are DENIED. The Clerks shall terminate Docket Nos. 32, 33, 35, 36, 43 &

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47, enter judgment in favor of defendants as to all claims, and close the file.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: September 13, 2011
RICHARD SEEBORG
United States District Judge

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Though some are titled as motions for summary judgment, they are in fact motions for
sanctions.
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No. C 08-1943 RS (PR)
ORDER GRANTING MOT. FOR SUMM. J.