M. et al v. Lafayette School District et al

Filing 105

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD (SI, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/25/2011)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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M.M. & E.M.,

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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No. C 09-04624 SI
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

v.
LAFAYETTE SCHOOL DISTRICT,

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Defendant.

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Defendants moved to introduce additional evidence to supplement the administrative record.

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The motion is scheduled for hearing on October 28, 2011, at 9:00 a.m. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule

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7-1(b), the Court finds the matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument and therefore

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VACATES

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the hearing. For the reasons below, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion to supplement the

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administrative record.

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BACKGROUND

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C.M. is a minor and is eligible for special education and related services from defendant

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Lafayette School District (“District”). Plaintiffs are C.M.’s parents, who filed suit on C.M.’s behalf,

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challenging the administrative order issued by the California Department of General Services, Office

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of Administrative Hearings, Special Education Division (“OAH”).

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Plaintiffs sought an administrative hearing with OAH claiming that (1) the District’s initial

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evaluation of C.M. was defective and violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)

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and corresponding California law because it understated his intellectual ability and (2) the District failed

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to adhere to required procedures when plaintiffs requested an Independent Education Evaluation (“IEE”)

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of C.M. The hearing officer issued a decision holding, inter alia, that (1) the District did not follow

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the required procedures under IDEA and therefore is liable to reimburse parents for one-half of the cost

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of obtaining of an IEE and (2) the District was entitled to reassess C.M. Plaintiffs now appeal the

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decision, claiming, inter alia, that the hearing officer erred (1) by not reimbursing them for the entire

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IEE cost and (2) by allowing the District to reassess C.M.
Before the Court is defendants’ motion to supplement the administrative record. Defendants

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wish to introduce two items of evidence: (1) evidence that the District sent plaintiffs a check for the

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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entire cost of the IEE and (2) the fact that the District has conducted a reassessment of C.M. Defendants

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argue that these items are relevant to the appeal because they make plaintiffs’ claims moot.

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LEGAL STANDARD

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Congress created the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act to meet the unique needs of

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disabled children by making available a free and appropriate public education. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick

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Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982); Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d

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1467, 1469 (9th Cir.1993). The IDEA contains numerous procedural safeguards to assure that schools

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meet these unique needs. Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1469. Parents may file a complaint with the school district

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regarding the services provided under their child's individual education plan (“IEP”), and may pursue

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an administrative hearing if the complaint is unresolved. Id. If unhappy with the result of the hearing,

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parents may appeal the results through a civil action in state or federal court. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 176.

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When a party appeals the administrative hearing result, the provisions of the IDEA place the

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court in a unique position. The IDEA provides, in pertinent part, that “the court shall receive the records

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of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing

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its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is

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appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii). As a result, the court may give less than the usual

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deference to the administrative hearing officer's findings of fact. Ms. S. v. Vashon Island Sch. Dist., 337

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F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir.2003), superseded by statute in non-relevant part, M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist.,
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394 F.3d 634 (9th Cir.2005). Complete de novo review, however, is inappropriate, because this would

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negate the administrative hearing process. See id. Due weight must be accorded to the administrative

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findings, and the court determines how much weight to give to these findings and to any additional

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evidence it deems appropriate to admit. See Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1473; see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206;

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Vashon, 337 F.3d at 1127.
The IDEA allows a party to request that the court hear “additional evidence.” 20 U.S.C. §

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1415(i)(2)(C)(ii). The Ninth Circuit has construed “additional” evidence to mean “supplemental”

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information. Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1472. “Reasons for supplementation will vary; they might include gaps

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in the administrative transcript owing to mechanical failure, unavailability of a witness, an improper

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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exclusion of evidence by the administrative agency, and evidence concerning relevant events occurring

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subsequent to the administrative hearing.” Id. at 1472-73 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206).

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DISCUSSION
I.

Defendants’ Check to Plaintiffs for the Cost of the IEE

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At the administrative hearing, the hearing officer found that the total cost of the IEE was $4,800,

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and ordered the District to pay one-half of this cost to plaintiffs. The District sent plaintiffs a check for

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$2,400. Egnor Decl., Ex. A. On September 2, 2011, the District sent plaintiffs another check for

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$2,400, thus paying for the full cost of the IEE. Egnor Decl., ¶ 5. Plaintiffs argue that evidence that

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defendants paid for the entire cost of the IEE is not relevant to this appeal, because “they do not make

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the error in the ALJ’s order, that required CM’s parents to pay half of cost [sic] for Dr. Guterman’s

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testing and the report and the cost for her to explain the results to CM’s IEP team, more or less probable.

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Nor does the Defendants’ partial payment negate Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief,” because, they

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state in a footnote, CM remains a student in the LSD and the ALJ’s error is capable of repetition “but

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evades review.” Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Supp. the Admin. Record at 3. The Court disagrees. One of

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plaintiffs’ claims is that the hearing officer erred in not awarding them the entire cost of the IEE. That

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defendants have since paid the entire cost is relevant to the determination of whether plaintiffs’ claim

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pertaining to this issue is moot.

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Admission of this evidence is not a determination that plaintiffs’ claim is in fact moot, as the
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parties have yet to fully brief the Court on this issue. The defendants simply seek to introduce the fact

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of the payment. Because the District’s payment of the entire cost of the IEE is a relevant event

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occurring subsequent to the administrative hearing, the Court will grant defendants’ request for this

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evidence to be admitted. See Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1473.

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II.

Assessment of C.M.
Defendants also seek to supplement the administrative record with the fact that they conducted

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a reassessment of C.M. pursuant to the hearing officer’s order. Def.’s Mot. to Supp. Administrative

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Record at 3. Plaintiffs argue that the assessment that defendants conducted was based upon an entirely

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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different assessment plan, not the one ordered by the hearing officer. Pl.’s Opp. at 3. Plaintiffs also

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contend that Mr. Egnor, whom the defendant offers to authenticate the report, has only been in his

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position with the District for one month and therefore cannot properly authenticate documents created

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before his employment.

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Under Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 901(b)(1), a witness with knowledge of a document

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can authenticate it by testifying that it is “what it is claimed to be.” “A party need only make a showing

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of authenticity so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or identification.” U.S. v.

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Estrada-Eliverio, 583 F.3d 669, 673 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). In contrast to plaintiffs’

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contention, “FRE 901 does not require personal knowledge of a document’s creation.” Id. It is enough

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that the person authenticating the document has personal knowledge that the document was part of an

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official file. Id. Here, Mr. Egnor is the Director of Student Services and has attested to the document

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as being what it claims to be, the District’s August 18, 2010 Multidisciplinary Assessment Report of

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C.M. Egnor Decl., ¶ 6. The Court accepts his authentication.

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As with the payment above, admission of the fact that the District conducted an assessment of

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C.M. on August 18, 2010 does not prevent plaintiffs from arguing that this assessment does not fulfill

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the requirement of the assessment ordered by the OAH. At this stage, the Court only determines that

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the evidence here is admissible because it is relevant and concerns events that occurred subsequent to

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the administrative hearing. See Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1473.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion
to supplement the record.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: October 25, 2011
SUSAN ILLSTON
United States District Judge

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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