Transbay Auto Service, Inc. v. Chevron Corporation

Filing 156

ORDER CONTINUING HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' AND EXPERT FEES AND REQUIRING SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING (Illston, Susan) (Filed on 2/7/2013)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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TRANSBAY AUTO SERVICE, INC.,

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Plaintiff,

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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No. C 09-04932 SI
ORDER CONTINUING HEARING ON
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS’ AND EXPERT FEES AND
REQUIRING SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEFING

v.

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CHEVRON U.S.A., INC.,

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Defendant.

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Currently before the Court is plaintiff Transbay Auto Service, Inc.’s (“Transbay”) motion for

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an award of exemplary damages, an award of reasonable attorneys’ and expert fees and costs, and

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determination of the appropriate pre-judgement interest rate. Defendant has filed an opposition to which

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Transbay has replied. The matter is currently set for a hearing on February 8, 2013. The Court hereby

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CONTINUES the hearing and ORDERS plaintiff to provide the Court with additional information in

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support of its motion as detailed below.

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Section 2805(d) of the PMPA provides that a prevailing franchisee shall be entitled to

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“reasonable attorney and expert witness fees to be paid by the franchisor.” 15 U.S.C. § 2805(d)(1)(C).

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Here there is no dispute that Transbay is a prevailing franchisee – having obtained a favorable jury

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verdict – as envisioned by the PMPA.

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Having determined that Transbay is a prevailing party, the Court must next determine what fees

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are reasonable. A district court begins its calculation of fees by multiplying the number of hours

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reasonably spent on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 436. The

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resulting number is frequently called the “lodestar” amount. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561,

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568 (1986). The party seeking the award should provide documentary evidence to the court concerning

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(1) the number of hours spent, and (2) how it determined the hourly rate(s) requested. Id. at 433.

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Hours: “It is plaintiffs’ burden to ‘document the appropriate hours expended in the litigation by

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submitting evidence in support of those hours worked.’” Lucas v. White, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1057

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(N.D. Cal. 1999) (quoting Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992)). The appropriate

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number of hours includes all time “reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved, in

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the same manner that an attorney traditionally is compensated by a fee-paying client for all time

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reasonably expended on a matter.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 431. Fee applicants, and the Court, should

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exclude hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Id. at 434.
Rate: “The fee applicant has the burden of producing satisfactory evidence, in addition to the

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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affidavits of its counsel, that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for

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similar services of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill and reputation.” Id. at 1263. In establishing

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the reasonable hourly rate, the court may take into account: (1) the novelty and complexity of the issues;

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(2) the special skill and experience of counsel; (3) the quality of representation; and (4) the results

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obtained. See Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th Cir.1988). Other factors

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that can be considered are (1) the time and labor required; (2) the preclusion of employment by the

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attorney due to acceptance of the case; (3) time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (4)

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the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the “undesirability” of the case; and (6) awards in

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similar cases. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3. These factors are subsumed in the initial lodestar

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calculation, and should not serve as independent bases for adjusting fee awards. Morales v. City of San

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Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1996).

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Here, plaintiff’s submissions to the Court are wanting in both respects – number of hours

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reasonably expended, and reasonable rate for those hours. Plaintiff submits thirty-eight pages of blanket

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billing statements with no analysis or summary whatsoever of the hours. See Fox Decl., Ex. A (Dkt.

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138-2). Without a detailed breakdown, the Court is left only to guess how plaintiff arrived at the

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Lodestar figure of $201,977 through September 13, 2012, and either $207,227 or $213,477 – plaintiff’s

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brief is inconsistent on this figure – through hearing on this motion. For example, plaintiff does not list

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the total number of hours spent by junior attorneys and senior attorneys working on this matter. Based

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on the Court’s analysis of the billing records, attorneys fees account for $193,016.75, expenses account
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for $33,992.46, including $13,875 in expert fees billed as expenses, for a total of $227,009.21. These

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figure does not square with any of the figures provided by plaintiff.

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In addition, plaintiff submitted a second declaration from Mr. Fox in connection with their reply

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brief, which responds to many of the objections raised by defendant’s opposition to plaintiff’s fees and

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damages motions. See Fox Decl. II (Dkt. 150-1). Therein Mr. Fox states that he is “informed of the

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rates that our competitors charge for similar work which are in the range of $375-$450 per hour,” and

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cites a “recent class action matter in the Los Angeles Superior Court” where the Court accepted as a

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reasonable similar hourly rates. Id. ¶ 9. This is not enough to explain whether these rates are

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reasonable. A more industrious plaintiff would have provided the Court with the name of the recent

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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class action or actual evidence as to the billing rates of competitors doing similar work.

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Accordingly, the Court hereby orders plaintiff to submit a detailed, organized statement of the

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work done on this case, including what work/projects were done, by whom, how much time was spent

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on each area of work or project (e.g., interrogatories, depositions, other research, work with experts, trial

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preparation, witness interviews, trial, etc.), and what hourly rates were charged for all such work for

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each timekeeper and in total.

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In addition, plaintiff must submit “satisfactory evidence, in addition to the affidavits of its

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counsel, that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services

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of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill and reputation.”

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This additional information should be consistent with what plaintiff has already provided and

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should explain how plaintiff arrived at the Lodestar figure(s) listed in their moving papers. Plaintiff

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shall provide this information to the Court no later than February 15, 2013. Defendant may file a

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short reply noting any objections no later than February 22, 2013. The February 8, 2013 hearing on

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plaintiff’s motions is hereby CONTINUED to March 1, 2013 at 9:00 a.m.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: February 7, 2013
SUSAN ILLSTON
United States District Judge

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