Vicari v. Astrue
Filing
52
ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 49 (Illston, Susan) (Filed on 1/23/2013)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
11
MICHAEL J. VICARI,
12
Plaintiff,
13
14
15
No. C 09-05238 SI
ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION
FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Defendant.
/
16
17
Currently before the Court is plaintiff’s application for an award of attorneys fees, following this
18
Court’s remand, a favorable determination by the Social Security Administration on remand, and an
19
award of past due benefits. Docket No. 49. Plaintiff’s counsel is seeking an award from plaintiff of
20
$13,123.50 under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), which would be reduced by $8,029.82 in fees this Court has
21
already awarded counsel under the Equal Access to Justice Act, for a net fee award of $5,093.68. The
22
government does not object to the fee request. Docket No. 51.
23
Section 406(b) of the Act provides that when a plaintiff prevails on a judgment, the Court may
24
determine a reasonable fee for the plaintiff’s counsel, which can be no more than 25 percent of the
25
plaintiff’s entitlement to the total past-due benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). The Court must review
26
counsel’s request for fees “as an independent check” to assure that the contingency fee agreement will
27
“yield reasonable results in particular cases.” See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002).
28
Section 406(b) “does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead
1
§ 406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.” Id. at 808-09.
2
The Court should consider the character of the representation and the results achieved in making its
3
determination. Id. An award of § 406 fees is offset by any award of attorney fees granted under the
4
EAJA. 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796.
The Court finds that the amount of fees sought is reasonable. As an initial matter, the Court
6
finds that the fee agreement is within the statutory ceiling: the fee agreement between plaintiff and his
7
counsel
8
provides that if plaintiff received a favorable decision, plaintiff agreed to pay counsel a fee the lesser
9
of 25 percent of the past-due benefits awarded or $6,000. The Court further finds that plaintiff’s counsel
10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
5
assumed a substantial risk of not recovering attorney’s fees because the claims had been denied after
11
exhausting administrative remedies. The work by plaintiff’s counsel was not insubstantial; plaintiff’s
12
counsel was successful in having this matter remanded back to the Social Security Agency and plaintiff
13
prevailed on remand and obtained past-due benefits as well as ongoing benefits. After review of the
14
record, the Court finds that the requested attorney’s fees are reasonable and do not constitute a windfall.
15
See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. 789; see Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1036- 37 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
16
Having considered plaintiff’s counsel’s application, the Court GRANTS the application and
17
awards plaintiff’s counsel a net fee award of $5,093.68 under § 406(b).
18
19
IT IS SO ORDERED.
20
Dated: January 23, 1013
SUSAN ILLSTON
United States District Judge
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?