Motorola, Inc. v. AU Optronics Corporation et al

Filing 215

ORDER DENYING PHILIPS ELECTRONICS NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION'S MOTION TO DISMISS MOTOROLA MOBILITY'S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT (SI, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/16/2011)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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IN RE: TFT-LCD (FLAT PANEL) ANTITRUST
LITIGATION
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No. M 07-1827 SI
MDL No. 1827

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This Order Relates To:

No. C 09-5840 SI

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MOTOROLA MOBILITY, INC.,

ORDER DENYING PHILIPS
ELECTRONICS NORTH AMERICA
CORPORATION’S MOTION TO
DISMISS MOTOROLA MOBILITY’S
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff,
v.

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AU OPTRONICS CORPORATION, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Now before the Court is a motion by Philips Electronics North America Corporation (“PENAC”)

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to dismiss Motorola Mobility, Inc.’s Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). Pursuant to Civil Local Rule

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7-1(b), the Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and therefore

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VACATES the hearing currently scheduled for November 18, 2011. Having considered the parties’

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papers, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby DENIES PENAC’s motion.1

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PENAC’s primary argument is that Motorola’s TAC lacks any substantive allegations that are

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specific to PENAC. Instead, the bulk of Motorola’s allegations are made against “Philips,” which the

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TAC defines as PENAC, it’s ultimate parent corporation, Royal Philips, “and their affiliates, parents,

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subsidiaries, agents and representatives.” TAC at ¶49. PENAC argues that Motorola may not “impute

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liability to PENAC by alleging conduct by ‘Philips.’” Motion at 7. Based largely on this Court’s prior

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The Court GRANTS PENAC’s unopposed request for judicial notice.

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order dismissing Nokia’s claims against PENAC, PENAC argues that Motorola’s TAC fails to

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adequately allege that it acted in violation of the antitrust laws. See Order Granting Defendants’ Joint

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Motion to Dismiss and Granting Philips Electronics North America Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss;

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Granting Plaintiffs Leave to Amend, Master Docket No. 1824, at 10 (June 29, 2010) (“[A]llegations and

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assertions about Royal Philips and LG Display are insufficient to state a claim against PENAC unless

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the complaint alleges a specific connection between PENAC and the alleged conspiracy.”).
PENAC’s reliance on this Court’s Nokia order is misplaced. Nokia’s complaint contained

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absolutely no allegations from which PENAC could have determined its connection to the conspiracy.

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The sole specific factual allegation against the Philips entities alleged only that “[Royal] Philips had

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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received a Statement of Objections from EU concerning its alleged participation in a conspiracy in

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violation of Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the Agreement on the European Economic

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Area.” Id. at 9. Other than conclusory allegations of the Philips entities’ involvement, there were no

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further allegations that any Philips entity had actually participated in the conspiracy.

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In contrast to the Nokia complaint, Motorola’s complaint contains a number of specific

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allegations that link PENAC to the conspiracy. For example, the TAC alleges that “Philips” engaged

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in illegal bilateral communications with Epson, Sharp, and Toshiba. See TAC at ¶110. It includes

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details on those discussions, such as the dates they occurred, the identities of those involved, and the

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subject matters discussed. Taken in the light most favorable to Motorola, these allegations adequately

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allege that PENAC participated in the price-fixing conspiracy.

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PENAC contends that these allegations are conspicuously made against “Philips,” and no such

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allegations are made against PENAC itself. While true, the Court believes that such matters are factual

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in nature and better reserved for summary judgment. Indeed, PENAC’s motion is accompanied by a

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factual declaration stating that the two “Philips” employees referenced in the TAC never worked for

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PENAC. See Declaration of Nancy J. Loughlin in Support of PENAC’s Motion, at ¶2. Such arguments

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are not appropriate for the pleading stage. Cf. Ferrigno v. Philips Electronics North America Corp.,

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2010 WL 2219975, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal., June 1, 2010) (dismissing complaint against Royal Philips based

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in part upon factual determination that its relationship with PENAC was insufficient to support a finding

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of personal jurisdiction).
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Accordingly, the Court finds that Motorola’s TAC adequately states a claim against PENAC

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under the federal antitrust laws and the Illinois Antitrust Act.2 The remainder of PENAC’s arguments

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have already been addressed by this Court. Thus, the Court rejects PENAC’s argument that the Foreign

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Trade Antitrust Improvements Act bars Motorola’s federal antitrust claims. See Order Denying

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Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Motorola Complaint, Master Docket

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No. 2602, at 4-10 (March 28, 2011). The Court also rejects PENAC’s motion to the extent it seeks

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dismissal of Motorola’s breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. See id. at 14; Order Denying

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Sanyo Consumer Electronics Co., Ltd.’s Motion to Dismiss Motorola Mobility, Inc.’s Third Amended

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Complaint, Master Docket No. 4145, at 2-3 (November 15, 2011).

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES PENAC’s motion to dismiss Motorola’s
complaint. Docket No. 168 in 09-5840; No. 3529 in 07-1827.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: November 16, 2011
SUSAN ILLSTON
United States District Judge

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PENAC has withdrawn its argument that Motorola’s Illinois Antitrust Claim is untimely.
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