Poris v. Novellus Systems, Inc.

Filing 69

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on 8/3/11. (jjoS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/3/2011)

Download PDF
1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 JAIME PORIS, Plaintiff and CounterclaimDefendant, 11 No. C 10-00947 JSW CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER v. For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 NOVELLUS SYSTEMS, INC., 13 14 Defendant and Counterclaimant. / 15 16 The Court has been presented with a technology tutorial and briefing leading up to a 17 hearing pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). This Order 18 construes the ten claim terms selected by the parties, which appear in the patent at issue in this 19 case, United States Patent No. RE37,749 (“the ’749 Patent”) called “Electrodeposition 20 Apparatus with Virtual Anode.” All disputed terms appear in the only asserted claim, Claim 3 21 of the ’749 Patent. BACKGROUND 22 23 The ’749 Patent, issued on June 18, 2002, is a reissued of U.S. Patent No. 5,723,028, 24 which was issued on March 3, 1998. The patent relates to an apparatus for the processing of 25 semiconductor wafers. 26 27 28 The Court shall address additional facts as necessary in the remainder of this Order. 1 2 3 ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard. “It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The interpretation of the scope and 6 meaning of disputed terms in patent claims is a question of law and exclusively within the 7 province of a court to decide. Markman, 517 U.S. at 372. The inquiry into the meaning of the 8 claim terms is “an objective one.” Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at 1116. As a result, when a 9 court construes disputed terms, it “looks to those sources available to the public that show what 10 a person of skill in the art would have understood the disputed claim language to mean.” Id. In 11 For the Northern District of California which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water 5 United States District Court 4 most cases, a court’s analysis will focus on three sources: the claims, the specification, and the 12 prosecution history. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 13 (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). However, on occasion, it is appropriate to rely on 14 extrinsic evidence regarding the relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, 15 and the state of the art at the time at the time the patent issued. Id. at 979-981. 16 The starting point of the claim construction analysis is an examination of the specific 17 claim language. A court’s “claim construction analysis must begin and remain centered on the 18 claim language itself, for that is the language that the patentee has chosen to particularly point 19 out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the patentee regards as his invention.” 20 Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at 1116 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, in the 21 absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a term, an inventor’s chosen language 22 is given its ordinary meaning. York Prods., Inc. v. Cent. Tractor Farm & Family Center, 99 23 F.3d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Thus, “[c]laim language generally carries the ordinary 24 meaning of the words in their normal usage in the field of the invention.” Invitrogen Corp. v. 25 Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Renishaw v. Marposs 26 Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (recognizing that “the claims define 27 the scope of the right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in 28 2 1 all cases with the actual words of the claim”). A court’s final construction, therefore, must 2 accord with the words chosen by the patentee to mete out the boundaries of the claimed 3 invention. 4 The court should also look to intrinsic evidence, including the written description, the 5 drawings, and the prosecution history, if included in the record, to provide context and 6 clarification regarding the intended meaning of the claim terms. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. 7 Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The claims do not stand alone. Rather, “they 8 are part of ‘a fully integrated written instrument.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 9 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 978). The specification “may act as a sort of dictionary, which explains the invention and may define terms used in the claims.” 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The specification also can indicate whether the patentee intended to 12 limit the scope of a claim, despite the use of seemingly broad claim language. SciMed Life Sys., 13 Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing 14 that when the specification “makes clear that the invention does not include a particular feature, 15 that feature is deemed to be outside the reach of the claims of the patent, even though the 16 language of the claims, read without reference to the specification, might be considered broad 17 enough to encompass the feature in question”). 18 Intent to limit the claims can be demonstrated in a number of ways. For example, if the 19 patentee “acted as his own lexicographer,” and clearly and precisely “set forth a definition of 20 the disputed claim term in either the specification or prosecution history,” a court will defer to 21 that definition. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In 22 order to so limit the claims, “the patent applicant [must] set out the different meaning in the 23 specification in a manner sufficient to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change 24 from ordinary meaning.” Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at 1117. In addition, a court will adopt 25 an alternative meaning of a term “if the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee distinguished 26 that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject 27 matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention.” CCS Fitness, 288 28 3 1 F.3d at 1367. For example the presumption of ordinary meaning will give way where the 2 “inventor has disavowed or disclaimed scope of coverage, by using words or expressions of 3 manifest exclusion or restriction, representing clear disavowal of claim scope.” Gemstar-TV 4 Guide Int’l Inc. v. ITC, 383 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Likewise, the specification may 5 be used to resolve ambiguity “where the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words used in 6 the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of the claim to be ascertained from the 7 words alone.” Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325. 8 However, limitations from the specification (such as from the preferred embodiment) 9 may not be read into the claims, absent the inventor’s express intention to the contrary. Id. at 1326; see also CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366 (“[A] patentee need not ‘describe in the 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 specification every conceivable and possible future embodiment of his invention.’”) (quoting 12 Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). To protect against this 13 result, a court’s focus should remain on understanding how a person of ordinary skill in the art 14 would understand the claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. 15 If the analysis of the intrinsic evidence fails to resolve any ambiguity in the claim 16 language, a court then may turn to extrinsic evidence, such as expert declarations and testimony 17 from the inventors. Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 319 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 18 (“When an analysis of intrinsic evidence resolves any ambiguity in a disputed claim term, it is 19 improper to rely on extrinsic evidence to contradict the meaning so ascertained.”) (emphasis in 20 original). When considering extrinsic evidence, a court should take care not to use it to vary or 21 contradict the claim terms. Rather, extrinsic evidence is relied upon more appropriately to 22 assist in determining the meaning or scope of technical terms in the claims. Vitronics Corp. v. 23 Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 24 Dictionaries also may play a role in the determination of the ordinary and customary 25 meaning of a claim term. In Phillips, the Federal Circuit reiterated that “[d]ictionaries or 26 comparable sources are often useful to assist in understanding the commonly understood 27 meanings of words....” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322. The Phillips court, however, also 28 4 1 admonished that district courts should be careful not to allow dictionary definitions to supplant 2 the inventor’s understanding of the claimed subject matter. “The main problem with elevating 3 the dictionary to ... prominence is that it focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of the 4 words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within in the context of the patent.” Id. at 5 1321. Accordingly, dictionaries necessarily must play a role subordinate to the intrinsic 6 evidence. 7 In addition, a court has the discretion to rely upon prior art, whether or not cited in the 8 specification or the file history, but only when the meaning of the disputed terms cannot be 9 ascertained from a careful reading of the public record. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584. Referring to prior art may make it unnecessary to rely upon expert testimony, because prior art may be 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 indicative of what those skilled in the art generally understood certain terms to mean. Id. 12 B. Claim Construction. 13 1. 14 Novellus argues that the term “a cathode wire” must be construed to mean: “a wire that “a cathode wire” 15 is woven into a cathode gasket and that makes direct contact with the electrically conducting 16 layer of the seminconductor.” (Parties’ Amended, Final Joint Claim Construction and Pre- 17 hearing Statement (“Statement”), Ex. B at 1.) Poris, on the other hand, argues that the term “a 18 cathode wire” should be construed to mean: “a communicator of electricity which allows 19 electrical contact to the semiconductor.” (Id., Ex. A at 1.) At the claim construction hearing, 20 Poris conceded that “communicator of electricity” is too broad and agreed that the term “wire” 21 need not be construed. Accordingly, Poris’s proposed construction would read “a wire which 22 allows electrical contact to the semiconductor.” 23 The key distinction between the two proffered constructions is that Novellus’s proposed 24 construction imports the limitation to require that the wire be sown into the cathode gasket and 25 that it makes direct contact with the semiconductor. With regard to the wire being sown, 26 Novellus’s proposed construction clearly attempts to import the limitations disclosed in one 27 specific embodiment into the construction of the term. However, the limitation disclosed in the 28 5 1 specifications of this specific embodiment should not be read into the claims. “Limitations 2 from the specification (such as from the preferred embodiment) may not be read into the claims, 3 absent the inventor’s express intention to the contrary.” Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1326; see also 4 CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366. It is only when the preferred embodiment is described in the 5 specification as the invention itself that the construction may be so limited. See Edwards 6 Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Because the figure 7 indicating the wire sown into the cathode gasket is merely demonstrative of a preferred 8 embodiment and not explicitly identified as the invention itself, the Court does not adopt the 9 sown requirement into its construction. However, from the specifically disclosed features of the invention, it appears that the wire must be in direct contact with the semiconductor. (See ’749 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 Patent at 9:13-17.) 12 13 Accordingly, the Court construes the term “a cathode wire” to mean: “a wire which allows direct electrical contact to the semiconductor.” 14 2. 15 Novellus argues that the term “a cell body” should be construed to mean: “the side wall 16 sections of the container that holds the electrolyte during electrodeposition.” (Statement, Ex. B 17 at 1.) Poris, on the other hand, argues that the term “a cell body” should be construed to mean: 18 “a part of the electrodeposition apparatus where the electrodeposition occurs.” (Id., Ex. A at 2- 19 3.) 20 “a cell body” The key distinction between the two proffered constructions is whether the term refers 21 specifically to the side walls, as pictured in Figure 9 of the patent, or to the whole container 22 within which the electrodeposition occurs. Although the figure depicts the cross-sectional view 23 of the apparatus as a stacked series of elements, it is not clear that the term “cell body” refers 24 only and exclusively to the side wall portions identified as element 10. The apparatus could be 25 viewed from various other angles and the term cell body indicates the boundary walls, but not 26 necessarily exclusively the side walls. However, the Court finds that Poris’s proposal is too 27 28 6 1 broad as it would include all of the various parts identified in the apparatus and not just the 2 boundary parts. 3 4 Accordingly, the Court construes the term “a cell body” to mean: “the boundary walls of the electrodeposition apparatus container where the electrodeposition occurs.” 5 3. 6 Novellus argues the term “gasket” should be construed to mean: “inert, compressible “gasket” to prevent leakage of liquid between the two surfaces.” (Statement, Ex. B at 1.) Poris argues 9 that the term “gasket” should be construed to mean: “inert item which provides for a fluid-tight 10 sealing relationship between two surfaces.” (Id., Ex. A at 4.) Both parties agree that the gasket 11 For the Northern District of California material that seals the junction between a first stationary surface and a second stationary surface 8 United States District Court 7 has to be inert, but Novellus adds the further limitation that it must also be compressible and 12 also that it seals a junction between two stationary surfaces. Nothing in the intrinsic record – 13 neither the claims nor the specifications – address whether the gasket material must be 14 compressible nor whether the surfaces it seals must be stationary. 15 Novellus argues these limitations are appropriately drawn from two extrinsic sources, an 16 unidentified booklet entitled “An Introduction to Seals and Gaskets” as well as the McGraw- 17 Hill Dictionary of Engineering. (See Opp. Br. at 19.) Technical dictionaries may help “to 18 better understand the underlying technology and the way in which one of skill in the art might 19 use the claim terms.” See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6 (extrinsic evidence of technical 20 treatises or dictionaries may be relied upon to assist in determining the meaning or scope of 21 technical terms in the claims); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (citing Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 22 1325 (“Because dictionaries, and especially technical dictionaries, endeavor to collect the 23 accepted meanings of terms used in various fields of science and technology, those resources 24 have been properly recognized as among the many tools that can assist the court in determining 25 the meaning of particular terminology to those of skill in the art of the invention.”)). Although 26 the proffered construction from Poris derives from a regular dictionary and the stationary 27 limitation from an engineering dictionary, Novellus has failed to demonstrate that the particular 28 7 1 engineering dictionary it draws from is pertinent to the art or would be known to a person of 2 ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. 3 4 5 6 Accordingly, the Court construes the term “gasket” to mean: “an inert item which provides for a fluid-tight sealing relationship between two surfaces.” 4. “a [sic] anode gasket for sealing said anode to said cell body adapted to prevent leakage of an electrolyte” Novellus argues the term “anode gasket for sealing said anode to said cell body adapted 7 to prevent leakage of an electrolyte” should be construed to mean: “an inert, compressible 8 material that seals the junction between a first stationary surface that is the cell body and a 9 second stationary surface that is the anode to prevent leakage of the electrolyte between the two surfaces to the environment external to the container that holds the electrolyte during 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 electrodeposition.” (Statement, Ex. B at 2.) Poris argues the term should be construed to mean: 12 “an anode gasket for securing the anode to the cell body and providing a seal to prevent leakage 13 of an electrolyte.” (Id., Ex. A at 5.) 14 The Court refers to its construction of the term “gasket” and incorporates it herein. The 15 second difference between the parties’ proffered constructions is the type of leakage that is 16 described, whether it is intended to connote leakage to the external environment or merely 17 general leakage of the electrolyte. Novellus cites the section of the patent entitled “Features of 18 the Present Invention” for the proposition the leakage must be from or to the external 19 environment because the patent features include that the “system is sealed and minimizes 20 external contamination electrolyte [sic] and evaporation.” (’749 Patent at 12:36-37.) Poris 21 contends that the term itself does not refer to leakage outside of the container for 22 electrodeposition, but only to leakage of electrolyte in general. The patent specification only 23 indicates that “[t]he anode gasket seals to the cell body preventing leakage of the electrolyte.” 24 (’749 Patent at 8:52-53.) There is no indication from either the specification or from the claim 25 language alone that the term refers to the prevention of electrolyte to the external environment, 26 rather than within the apparatus. 27 28 8 1 Accordingly, the Court construes the term “anode gasket for sealing said anode to said 2 cell body adapted to prevent leakage of an electrolyte” to mean: “an anode gasket for securing 3 the anode to the cell body and providing a seal to prevent leakage of an electrolyte.” 4 5. 5 “a cathode gasket for sealing said semiconductor to said cell body adapted to prevent leakage of said electrolyte and providing contact between said cathode wire and said electrically conducting layer” 6 Novellus argues that the term “a cathode gasket for sealing said semiconductor to said 7 cell body adapted to prevent leakage of said electrolyte and providing contact between said 8 cathode wire and said electrically conducting layer” should be construed to mean: “an inert, 9 compressible material that seals the junction between a first stationary surface that is the cell body and a second stationary surface that is the semiconductor to prevent leakage of the 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 electrolyte between the two surfaces to the environment external to the container that hold the 12 electrolyte during electrodeposition.” (Statement, Ex. B at 2.) Poris, on the other hand, argues 13 that the term “a cathode gasket for sealing said semiconductor to said cell body adapted to 14 prevent leakage of said electrolyte and providing contact between said cathode wire and said 15 electrically conducting layer” should be construed to mean: “a cathode gasket (1) for securing 16 the semiconductor to the cell body; (2) providing a seal to prevent leakage of the electrolyte; 17 and (3) facilitating electrical contact between the cathode wire and the electrically conducting 18 layer.” (Id., Ex. A at 5-7.) 19 20 For the same reasons, the Court adopts Poris’s proposed construction for gasket, leakage, and with direct electrical contact. 21 Accordingly, the Court construes the term “a cathode gasket for sealing said 22 semiconductor to said cell body adapted to prevent leakage of said electrolyte and providing 23 contact between said cathode wire and said electrically conducting layer” to mean: “a cathode 24 gasket (1) for securing the semiconductor to the cell body; (2) providing a seal to prevent 25 leakage of the electrolyte; and (3) facilitating direct electrical contact between the cathode wire 26 and the electrically conducting layer.” 27 28 9 1 6. “means for securing said semiconductor to said cathode gasket to exclude said electrolyte from contacting said cathode wire” 2 The parties agree that this term is a means-plus-function term that must be construed 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, which permits a patentee to define a particular function in the claim 4 and a corresponding structure in the specification. See Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 5 208 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Construction of a means-plus-function claim involves a 6 two-step process. Medical Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elektra AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 7 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In the first step, the Court must identify the particular claimed function. 8 Id. In the second step, the Court looks to the specification and identifies the structure that 9 corresponds to that function. Id. A structure is a “corresponding structure” only if that element 10 the disclosure in the specification. Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Empak, Inc., 268 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. For the Northern District of California United States District Court is necessary to perform the function recited in the claim and is clearly linked to that function by 11 12 Cir. 2001). The patentee’s “duty to clearly link or associate structure to the claimed function” 13 represents the fair exchange for the convenience of employing means-plus-function claim 14 limitations. Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 250 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 15 Novellus argues that the term “means for securing said semiconductor to said cathode 16 gasket to exclude said electrolyte from contacting said cathode wire” should be construed to 17 mean: “a semiconductor wafer clamp that applies a uniform pressure to the entire back surface 18 of the semiconductor, for securing the semiconductor to the cathode gasket to exclude the 19 electrolyte from contacting the cathode wire.” (Statement, Ex. B at 2-3.) Poris, on the other 20 hand, argues that the term “means for securing said semiconductor to said cathode gasket to 21 exclude said electrolyte from contacting said cathode wire” should be construed to mean: “a 22 wafer clamp which secures the semiconductor to the cathode gasket by applying pressure to the 23 backside of the semiconductor to exclude the electrolyte from contracting the cathode wire.” 24 (Id., Ex. A at 8-9.) 25 The differences between the parties’ proposed constructions is (1) the addition of the 26 redundant word semiconductor, which Novellus agrees to eliminate from its proposal; (2) the 27 addition of the descriptive term “uniform” to the pressure applied; and (3) the addition of the 28 10 1 descriptive term “entire” to back surface of the semiconductor. Poris agreed that the 2 specifications require the addition of “uniform.” (See ’749 Patent at 9:51-56.) However, the 3 Court finds no support in the patent for the proposition that the “entire” back surface of the 4 wafer must be included. 5 Accordingly, the Court construes the term “means for securing said semiconductor to 6 said cathode gasket to exclude said electrolyte from contacting said cathode wire” to mean: “a 7 wafer clamp which secures the semiconductor to the cathode gasket by applying uniform 8 pressure to the backside of the semiconductor to exclude the electrolyte from contracting the 9 cathode wire.” 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 7. “means for exposing a selected area of said semiconductor to said electrolyte” Again, the parties agree that this term is a means-plus-function term that must be construed under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Novellus argues that the term “means for exposing a selected area of said semiconductor to said electrolyte” should be construed to mean: “a photoresist pattern that covers the nucleating layer/diffusion barrier of the semiconductor, for exposing a selected area of the semiconductor to the electrolyte.” (Statement, Ex. B at 3.) Poris, on the other hand, argues that the term “means for exposing a selected area of said semiconductor to said electrolyte” should be construed to mean: “an active side of the semiconductor having a selected area which is bounded by the cathode gasket when the semiconductor is secured against the cathode gasket for exposing the selected area of the semiconductor to the electrolyte.” (Id., Ex. A at 10.) The parties agree that this means-plus-function claim has the function “for exposing the selected area of the semiconductor to the electrolyte.” The difference between the parties is found in their proposed structures corresponding to that function. Novellus advocates including the single embodiment of a photoresist pattern that covers the nucleating layer/diffusion barrier of the semiconductor. Poris, on the other hand, proposes merely that the construction should include the active side of the wafer encircled by the cathode gasket that is exposed to the 27 28 11 1 electrolyte. The active side being defined as the side to be plated that faces the gasket and is 2 exposed to the electrolyte. (See ’749 Patent at 9:32-38.) 3 Although the patent describes an embodiment that includes the area on the active side of 4 the semiconductor to be selectively bounded by the pattern of photoresist on the nucleating 5 layer/diffusion barrier of the semiconductor, there is no indication that this preferred 6 embodiment must always define the selected area. Within the area prescribed by the cathode 7 gasket, a pattern of photoresist may further select the area actually plated, or potentially may 8 not be present at all. 9 Accordingly, the Court construes the term “means for securing said semiconductor to said cathode gasket to exclude said electrolyte from contacting said cathode wire” to mean: “an 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 active side of the semiconductor exposed to the electrolyte and having a selected area which is 12 bounded by the cathode gasket when the semiconductor is secured against the cathode gasket 13 for exposing the selected area of the semiconductor to the electrolyte.” 14 8. 15 Novellus argues that the term “virtual anode” should be construed in conjunction with 16 term 9 to mean: “a metal plate having an aperture.” (Statement, Ex. B at 3.) Poris argues that 17 the term “virtual anode” should be construed to mean: “a structure configured to manipulate the 18 current distribution between the anode and the semiconductor.” (Id., Ex. A at 10-11.) 19 “virtual anode” In the ’749 Patent, Poris did elect to be his own lexicographer by clearly setting out the 20 definition of this term. See Abbott Labs. v. Novopharm Ltd., 323 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 21 2003). In the abstract, the patent reads, in pertinent part, “A more uniform metal disposition is 22 created by a virtual anode, i.e., a metal plate having an aperture and being located between the 23 anode and the cathode.” (’749 Patent at Abstract.) The use of “i.e.,” signals the patentee’s 24 “intent to define the word to which it refers.” Edwards Lifesciences, 582 F.3d at 1334. 25 26 Accordingly, the Court construes the term “virtual anode” to mean: “a metal plate having an aperture and that is located between the anode and the semiconductor.” 27 28 12 1 9. 2 3 “a virtual anode located between said anode and said electrically conducting layer for creating a more uniform current distribution to said electrically conducting layer” Novellus argues that the term “a virtual anode located between said anode and said conducting layer” should be construed to mean: “A metal plate having an aperture that is 6 located between the anode and the semiconductor. The virtual anode creates a more uniform 7 primary current distribution to the electrically conducting layer of the semiconductor.” 8 (Statement, Ex. B at 3.) Poris, on the other hand, argues that the term “a virtual anode located 9 between said anode and said electrically conducting layer for creating a more uniform current 10 distribution to said electrically conducting layer” should be construed to include his definition 11 For the Northern District of California electrically conducting layer for creating a more uniform current distribution to said electrically 5 United States District Court 4 of virtual anode and that the rest of the term requires no additional construction. Accordingly, 12 Poris contends the term should be construed to mean: “a structure configured to manipulate the 13 current distribution between the anode and the semiconductor located between said anode and 14 said electrically conducting layer for creating a more uniform current distribution to said 15 electrically conducting layer.” (Id., Ex. A at 12-13.) 16 The Court adopts its construction of the term “virtual anode” and incorporates it within 17 the construction of this term. The description of the function follows the language of the claim 18 term, without the additional restriction proposed by Novellus that the current be primary, as 19 such a restriction does not appear in the patent. 20 Accordingly, the Court construes the term “a virtual anode located between said anode 21 and said electrically conducting layer for creating a more uniform current distribution to said 22 electrically conducting layer” to mean: “a metal plate having an aperture and that is located 23 between the anode and the semiconductor. The virtual anode creates a more uniform current 24 distribution to the electrically conducting layer of the semiconductor.” 25 26 27 10. “a virtual anode gasket for sealing said virtual anode to said cell body to [sic] adapted to prevent leakage of said electrolyte” Novellus argues that the term “a virtual anode gasket for sealing said virtual anode to said cell body to [sic] adapted to prevent leakage of said electrolyte” should be construed to 28 13 1 mean: “an inert, compressible material that seals the junction between a first stationary surface 2 that is the cell body and a second stationary surface that is the virtual anode to prevent leakage 3 of the electrolyte between the two surfaces to the environment external to the container that 4 holds the electrolyte during electrodeposition.” (Statement, Ex. B at 4.) Poris, on the other 5 hand, argues that the term “a virtual anode gasket for sealing said virtual anode to said cell body 6 to [sic] adapted to prevent leakage of said electrolyte” should be construed to mean: “a gasket 7 for securing the virtual anode to the cell body and providing a seal which prevents the 8 electrolyte between the two surfaces to the environment external to the container that holds the 9 electrolyte during electrodeposition.” (Id., Ex. A at 13-14.) The Court adopts its previous constructions and incorporates those within the 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 construction of this term. Again, there is no indication from either the specification or from the 12 claim language alone that the term refers to the prevention of electrolyte to the external 13 environment, rather than within the apparatus. 14 Accordingly, the Court construes the term “a virtual anode gasket for sealing said virtual 15 anode to said cell body to [sic] adapted to prevent leakage of said electrolyte” to mean: “a 16 gasket for securing the virtual anode to the cell body and providing a fluid-tight sealing 17 relationship between the two surfaces to prevent leakage of the electrolyte.” CONCLUSION 18 19 Based on the analysis set forth above, the Court adopts the foregoing constructions of 20 the disputed terms. The parties are ordered to submit a further joint case management report 21 pursuant to Patent Standing Order ¶ 13 by no later than August 29, 2011. 22 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: August 3, 2011 JEFFREY S. WHITE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28 14

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?