Clinton v. Grounds et al

Filing 26

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge Richard Seeborg on 9/16/11. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Certificate of Service)(cl, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/16/2011)

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*E-Filed 9/16/11*

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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MARTIN CLINTON,

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Plaintiff,

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No. C 10-4267 RS (PR)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

v.
RANDY GROUNDS, ET AL.
Defendants.

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INTRODUCTION

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Plaintiff Martin Clinton is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action

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brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which he alleges that defendants, employees of Soledad

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State Prison, were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth

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Amendment. Defendants move for summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein,

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defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to all claims against all

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defendants.

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BACKGROUND

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The facts of this case are undisputed. Plaintiff injured his left pinky finger on

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December 22, 2009 when he fell and “jammed” that finger. The next day, he was sent to the

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Triage Treatment Area, a clinic for urgent and emergency medical situations, to receive

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treatment for the injured finger. (Compl. at 7.) Defendant Elizabeth Leary, a Registered

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No. C 10-4267 RS (PR)
ORDER GRANTING MOT. FOR SUMM. J.

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Nurse, gave plaintiff an ice pack, and scheduled plaintiff for a sick call on December 28, in

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case follow-up treatment was required. The next day, December 24, plaintiff returned to the

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clinic, requesting an x-ray. Leary told him that neither a doctor nor an x-ray technician was

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available, as it was Christmas Eve. Leary observed that plaintiff’s jammed finger was

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bruised, but not excessively swollen or discolored. She concluded that plaintiff’s situation

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was not an emergency. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ J. (“MSJ”), Leary Decl. ¶ 4.)

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On December 28, as scheduled, plaintiff was seen during a sick call by Valiente, a

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nurse. She noted that there was swelling and bruising, and that plaintiff experienced

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“discomfort.” (Reply to MSJ (“Reply”), Ex. A.) Valiente requested an x-ray, which was

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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performed on December 30. It showed two fractures of the left fifth (pinky) finger. (Id.) A

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splint was applied to immobilize the finger, and plaintiff was referred to an orthopedic

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specialist for therapy. Subsequent x-rays on January 21, January 27, and February 8 revealed

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that the fractures had not healed. (Id.; Pl’s Resp. to MSJ, Ex. A.)

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By March 9, 2010, the plaintiff’s condition had not improved, and the specialist

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referred plaintiff to a hand surgeon, who recommended surgery. Plaintiff underwent hand

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surgery on April 12. The hand surgeon recommended outpatient physical therapy beginning

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April 21, which continued to be recommended in patient notes on May 19, June 7, July 19,

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and July 30. (Reply, Ex. A.)

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In a July 30 note, a doctor observed that the “fifth digit continues to be a problem.”

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Plaintiff was scheduled for another surgery to gain more mobility in the hand, which was

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performed on September 16. By November 23, plaintiff still had limited use of his left hand.

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A note dated February 7, 2011 observed that “fifth digit pain persists.” (Id.)

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DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits

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demonstrate that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

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is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those

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No. C 10-4267 RS (PR)
ORDER GRANTING MOT. FOR SUMM. J.

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which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

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248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a

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reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

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portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a

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genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where

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the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively

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demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. On an

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issue for which the opposing party by contrast will have the burden of proof at trial, as is the

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For the Northern District of California

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case here, the moving party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to

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support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325.

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Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond

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the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that

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there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The court is only concerned with

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disputes over material facts and “factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not

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be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. It is not the task of the court to scour the record in

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search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.

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1996). The nonmoving party has the burden of identifying, with reasonable particularity, the

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evidence that precludes summary judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make this

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showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at

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323.

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II.

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Claims
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth

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Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble,

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429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A determination of “deliberate indifference” involves an

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examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical needs and the nature

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of the defendant’s response to those needs. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th

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Cir. 1992) (overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

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1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)).

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A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a

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substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to

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abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 837 (1994) (equating standard with that of

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criminal recklessness). The prison official must not only “be aware of facts from which the

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inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but “must also draw

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the inference.” Id. Consequently, in order for deliberate indifference to be established, there

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must exist both a purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant and harm

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For the Northern District of California

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resulting therefrom. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

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In order to prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs, a plaintiff

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must establish that the course of treatment the doctors chose was “medically unacceptable

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under the circumstances” and that they embarked on this course in “conscious disregard of an

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excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.” See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058–60 (9th Cir.

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2004). A claim of mere negligence related to medical problems, or a difference of opinion

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between a prisoner patient and a medical doctor, is not enough to make out a violation of the

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Eighth Amendment. Id.; Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).

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A.

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Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The undisputed

Leary

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record shows that plaintiff received appropriate and reasonably timely medical treatment. On

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December 23, the day after plaintiff was injured, Leary gave him an ice pack, Motrin, and

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scheduled him for a follow-up exam. Plaintiff received a follow-up exam on December 28,

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the first day after the Christmas holidays that the patient could have been seen for a non-

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emergency. (December 24, 2009 was a Thursday, and December 25 a Friday. December 28,

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a Monday, was the next business day.) Over the next eight months, plaintiff received four x-

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rays, saw an orthopedic specialist on numerous occasions, and underwent two surgeries to

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regain mobility in his left hand. These actions show that defendants were aware of plaintiff’s

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condition, and sought to treat it, rather than reflecting deliberate indifference.

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The sole evidence plaintiff provides, in addition to his own declaration, is an affidavit

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from his mother, in which she states that plaintiff’s left hand was discolored when she visited

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him at the beginning of December. (Pl.’s Opp. to MSJ at 4.) This evidence does not support

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his claims. Not only does it represent duplicative information, it fails to indicate that the

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medical treatment was constitutionally inadequate.

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Plaintiff contends that, had his finger been x-rayed earlier, it would be in better

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condition than it is now. (Compl. at 26–28.) That officials did not act as quickly as plaintiff

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desired is not sufficient to demonstrate deliberate indifference. Walker v. Benjamin, 293

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For the Northern District of California

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F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002) (a delay in treatment that is not within the doctor’s control

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does not constitute deliberate indifference). When plaintiff returned the next day requesting

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an x-ray, Leary concluded that the condition of plaintiff’s finger was not an emergency and

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did not require calling a doctor and x-ray technician. A disagreement between the patient

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and a physician over treatment options does not approach deliberate indifference unless the

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plaintiff can show that the physician’s treatment was “medically unacceptable under the

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circumstances” and was chosen “in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the

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prisoner's] health.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058. Not providing an x-ray was medically

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acceptable under the circumstances, especially given that it was Christmas Eve, when staff

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would reasonably be in short supply. The fact that plaintiff as opposed to Leary believed his

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injured finger to be an emergency does not show that the latter acted with conscious

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disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health, particularly given that plaintiff received an

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x-ray and follow-up treatment within a few days.

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Plaintiff also claims he was “denied proper therapy” after his first surgery (Compl. at

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7), but defendants have demonstrated that there is sufficient evidence to show plaintiff did in

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fact receive significant post-operative outpatient physical therapy (see Reply, Ex. A). This

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situation, again, shows nothing more than a disagreement over a particular choice of

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treatment and does not demonstrate deliberate indifference. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058.

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No. C 10-4267 RS (PR)
ORDER GRANTING MOT. FOR SUMM. J.

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Plaintiff has therefore failed to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

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for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment as to Leary

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is GRANTED.

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B.

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Plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Chudy, who never treated plaintiff, are based on Dr.

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Chudy’s status as Leary’s supervisor. As plaintiff has not shown that Leary violated his

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Eighth Amendment rights, his claims against Dr. Chudy necessarily fail. Accordingly, the

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motion for summary judgment as to Dr. Chudy is GRANTED.

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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C.

Dr. Chudy

Randy Grounds

Plaintiff’s allegations against Grounds appear to rest on a theory similar to those

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against Dr. Chudy; that is, that Grounds is Leary’s supervisor. As plaintiff has not shown

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that Leary violated his Eighth Amendment rights, his claims against Grounds necessarily fail.

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Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment as to Grounds is GRANTED.

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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff having failed to show that there are triable issues of material fact as to any of

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his claims, defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 17) is GRANTED as to

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all claims against defendants Elizabeth Leary, J. Chudy, and Randy Grounds. Plaintiff’s

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claims against RN Carlos, J. Walker, and Dr. Pompan are DISMISSED WITHOUT

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PREJUDICE, as service was not effected upon them. The Clerk shall enter judgment in

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favor of all defendants as to all claims, terminate Docket No. 17, and close the file.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: September 16, 2011

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RICHARD SEEBORG
United States District Judge

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No. C 10-4267 RS (PR)
ORDER GRANTING MOT. FOR SUMM. J.