Target Corp. et al v. AU Optronics Corporation et al
Filing
159
ORDER GRANTING SAMSUNG SDI'S AND SANYO CONSUMER ELECTRONICS' MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT(TARGET CORP.) (Illston, Susan) (Filed on 1/30/2012)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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IN RE: TFT-LCD (FLAT PANEL) ANTITRUST
LITIGATION
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No. M 07-1827 SI
MDL No. 1827
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This Order Relates To:
No. C 10-4945 SI
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TARGET CORPORATION, et al.,
ORDER GRANTING SAMSUNG SDI’S
AND SANYO CONSUMER
ELECTRONICS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Plaintiffs,
v.
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AU OPTRONICS CORPORATION, et al.,
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Defendants.
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Now before the Court is a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint (“SAC”) of plaintiffs
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Target Corporation; Sears, Roebuck and Co.; Kmart Corporation; Old Comp Inc.; Good Guys, Inc.;
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Radioshack Corporation; and Newegg Inc. (collectively, “Target”). Having considered the arguments
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presented in the moving papers, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion.
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BACKGROUND
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Target filed this antitrust action in 2010, seeking to “recover the damages [it] incurred as a result
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of a long-running conspiracy by manufacturers of liquid crystal display panels (‘LCD Panels’).” See
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SAC at ¶1. On September 7, 2011, this Court granted Target leave to file a SAC. The SAC alleges that
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“[d]efendants and their co-conspirators formed an international cartel illegally to restrict competition
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in the United States in the market for LCD Panels.” Id. at ¶3. The SAC includes claims under the
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Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and claims under the antitrust and unfair competition laws of California,
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Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska,
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Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. SAC at ¶¶231-68.
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Target’s SAC named as defendants, for the first time, Samsung SDI Co., Ltd., Samsung SDI
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America, Inc. (collectively, “SDI”), and Sanyo Consumer Electronics Co., Ltd. (“Sanyo”). On
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November 18, 2011, SDI and Sanyo filed this motion to dismiss Target’s SAC. The motion makes two
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arguments: first, that the majority of Target’s state-law claims against SDI and Sanyo are untimely; and
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second, that Target state-law claims must be dismissed to the extent they are based upon out-of-state
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purchases.
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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LEGAL STANDARD
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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint that
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fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
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the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires the plaintiff
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to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading
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of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative
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level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, 555.
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In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court
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must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the
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plaintiff’s favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the
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Court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions
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of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).
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DISCUSSION
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As mentioned above, defendants’ motion challenges only two aspects of Target’s complaint:
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(1) the timeliness of Target’s state-law claims; and (2) Target’s ability to bring state-law claims based
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upon purchases that occurred outside of that state.
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I.
Timeliness of Target’s Claims
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Defendants seek dismissal of the majority of Target’s state-law claims, specifically those claims
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brought under the laws of Arizona, California, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
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Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Tennessee. Defendants contend, and
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Target does not dispute, that these jurisdictions impose three-1 or four-2 year statutes of limitations on
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Target’s claims. Because Target first sought to file suit against SDI and Sanyo on August 5, 2011,3
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more than four years after the DOJ’s December 2006 announcement of its investigation into the antitrust
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conspiracy,4 defendants argue that these claims are untimely.
In response to defendants’ argument, Target raises two grounds on which it claims it is entitled
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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to tolling. First, in a short paragraph, it contends that “the filing of government actions by certain state
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attorneys general against Samsung SDI and Sanyo” tolled the applicable statutes of limitations. Oppo.
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at 8. Target, however, has not provided any support for this contention. It has not established that such
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actions exist, nor has it identified which state claims this tolling would affect. Accordingly, the Court
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finds that Target has not met its burden of showing that it is entitled to governmental-action tolling. See
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generally Hinton v. Pacific Enterprises, 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The burden of alleging facts
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which would give rise to tolling falls upon the plaintiff.”).
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Target’s primary argument is that it is entitled to tolling based upon defendants’ fraudulent
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concealment of the conspiracy. This Court has allowed plaintiffs in this MDL to rely on fraudulent
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concealment to toll the statute of limitations until the DOJ publicly disclosed its investigation into the
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conspiracy in December 2006. Target claims that it is entitled to additional tolling because the identities
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See Kansas Stat. Ann. § 60-512; Miss. Code § 15-1-49(1); Tenn. Code § 28-3-105.
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1410(B); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16750.1, 17208; Fla. Stat.
§ 95.11(3)(f); Iowa Code § 553.16(2); Mass. Gen. L. Ch. 260 § 5A; Minn. Stat. § 325D.64(1); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 25-206; Nevada Rev. Stat. § 598A.220(2); N.M. Stat. § 57-1-12(B); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.2.
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See Notice of Motion and Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint, Master Docket
No. 3233 (August 5, 2011).
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Based on allegations of fraudulent concealment, this Court has treated the December 2006
disclosure of the DOJ’s investigation into the antitrust conspiracy as the date the relevant statutes of
limitations began to run. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss Complaints, Master Docket No. 666, at 27-28 (August 25, 2008).
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of all conspiracy participants were never disclosed. For example, Target contends that “the 2006 public
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announcement concerning government investigations into anticompetitive activity of other co-
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conspirators – not SDI or Sanyo – was not sufficient to put Plaintiffs on notice, nor to lead the Plaintiffs
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to discover, the existence of Plaintiffs’ claims against these Defendants.” Oppo. at 3-4. It asserts that
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the laws of each of the above states permit further tolling until it learned of SDI’s and Sanyo’s role in
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the conspiracy.
The Court has reviewed the cases cited in Target’s opposition brief. None of those cases clearly
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supports the proposition that fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of limitations until the identity of
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the wrongdoer is known. Instead, they generally stand for the proposition that fraudulent concealment
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff is put on notice of his claim. See, e.g. Estate of
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Kirschenbaum v. Kirschenbaum, 793 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ariz. App.1989) (holding that inquiry notice of
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cause of action is sufficient to defeat fraudulent concealment); Snapp & Assocs. Ins. Servs., Inc. v.
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Malcolm Bruce Burlingame Robertson, 96 Cal. App.4th 884, 891 (2002) (“A plaintiff is under a duty
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to reasonably investigate, and a suspicion of wrongdoing, coupled with a knowledge of the harm and
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its cause, commences the limitations period.”).
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It is conceivable, however, that a defendant’s efforts to conceal its identity as the source of a
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plaintiff’s injury would, in some circumstances, warrant tolling based upon fraudulent concealment.
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Even assuming this to be the case, fraudulent concealment would still not apply here. Target’s
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fraudulent concealment allegations are based on the theory that defendants concealed the existence of
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the conspiracy. It has not alleged fraudulent concealment on the theory that defendants concealed their
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identities. Thus, when the conspiracy became publicly known in December 2006, any wrongful conduct
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on the part of the defendants stopped having its effect, removing the basis for plaintiff’s tolling. To the
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extent Target could not determine SDI and Sanyo’s role in the conspiracy after December 2006, it was
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not attributable to their fraud.5 See, e.g., Vasek v. Warren Grain & Seed Co., 353 N.W.2d 175, 177
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It is difficult to accept Target’s contention that it could not have learned of SDI’s and Sanyo’s
alleged roles in the conspiracy within the relevant limitations periods. Sanyo was first named as a
defendant in the third amended direct-purchaser plaintiff complaint, which was filed on December 2,
2009. SDI was named as a defendant in the Nokia direct-action case on July 23, 2010. Yet Target did
not attempt to add these defendants until August 5, 2011, more than a year later.
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(Minn. App. 1984) (“Even if fraudulent concealment continues to toll the statute . . . , it only does so
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during the time that the defendant by its fraud prevents the plaintiff from discovering his cause of
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action.”).
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Target’s SAC includes no allegations that SDI or Sanyo took any affirmative steps to conceal
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their role in the conspiracy after the conspiracy became publicly known. Accordingly, the Court holds
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that fraudulent concealment does not toll the statute of limitations past December 2006. If Target seeks
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tolling based upon fraudulent concealment after that date, it must allege specific acts of concealment
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by each individual defendant.
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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II.
State-Law Claims
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Defendants also move to dismiss Target’s SAC to the extent its state-law claims are based upon
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out-of-state purchases. The parties appear to be in agreement on this point; with the exception of its
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California claims, Target represents that its state-law claims are not based upon purchases made outside
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of the relevant state. Although Target seeks to recover for all of its purchases under California law, it
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recognizes this Court’s holdings that only the place of purchase may be used. See, e.g., Order Granting
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Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss and Granting Plaintiffs Leave to Amend, Master Docket No. 1823,
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at 4-5 (June 28, 2010). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss on this issue.
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III.
Leave to Amend
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Target has requested that this Court allow it to amend its complaint so it can cure any
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deficiencies in its SAC. Target has not, however, made any showing to the Court that there is any basis
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for amendment. In the absence of such a showing, Target’s request for leave to amend is DENIED.
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CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’
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motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. Docket No. 103 in 10-4945; Docket No. 4162
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in 07-1827.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: January 30, 2012
SUSAN ILLSTON
United States District Judge
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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