Elfand v. Sonoma County Men's Adult Detention Facility

Filing 26

ORDER by Judge William Alsup granting in part and denying in part 25 Motion to Screen Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (dt, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/2/2011)

1
2
3
4
5
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6
7

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8
9

14

ORDER OF SERVICE; GRANTING
IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
MOTION TO SCREEN COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
v.

12
13

No. C 10-5692 WHA (PR)

JONATHAN CRAIG ELFAND,

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

COUNTY OF SONOMA; WILLIAM
COGBILL; STEVE FREITAS;
OFFICER TANNEHILL,
(Docket No. 25)
Defendant.

15

/
16
INTRODUCTION

17
18

Plaintiff, a county jail inmate who is proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint

19

under 42 U.S.C. 1983. On June 16, 2011, defendant Sonoma County Main Adult Detention

20

Facility’s (“MADF”) motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cognizable claim for

21

relief was granted, and plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint to cure several

22

deficiencies in the amended complaint. Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint that drops

23

MADF as a defendant, and names as defendants the County of Sonoma, the Sheriff-Coroner

24

Steve Freitas, the former Sheriff-Coroner William Cogbill, and the jail’s former Programs

25

Officer Tannehill. After a review the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A(a), it is

26

ordered served the new defendants. Defendants’ motion to screen the amended complaint, in

27

which they also request its dismissal, is granted in part and denied in part.

28

//

ANALYSIS

1
2

A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

3

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek

4

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

5

§ 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims

6

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek

7

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro

8

se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699

9

(9th Cir. 1990).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the

12

statement need only” give the “defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds

13

upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted).

14

Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a

15

plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than

16

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

17

do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

18

level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A

19

complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id.

20

at 1986-87.

21

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:

22

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2)

23

that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.

24

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

25

B.

26

LEGAL CLAIMS
Plaintiff alleged in original his complaint that pursuant to policies in place at MADF, he

27

had to wait for over a month after he arrived at MADF in September 2009 before he received

28

kosher meals required by his Jewish faith. The complaint was dismissed because plaintiff had
2

1

failed to allege that he held sincere beliefs in Judaism and the need to adhere to a Jewish diet,

2

and because MADF was simply a building, and not an entity or individual that could be sued.

3

Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint to allege the sincerity of his religious

4

beliefs and to name proper defendants, with instructions on how to do so. Plaintiff has filed an

5

amended complaint naming new defendants and alleging that in addition to not receiving the

6

kosher meals, plaintiff also did not receive requested Jewish headware and a Jewish prayer

7

book for over a month.

In order to establish a free exercise violation, a prisoner must show a defendant

10

burdened the practice of his religion without any justification reasonably related to legitimate

11
For the Northern District of California

1.

9

United States District Court

8

penological interests. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2008). A sincerity

12

test of whether the prisoner’s belief is "sincerely held" and "rooted in religious belief"

13

determines whether the Free Exercise Clause applies. Id. at 884-85. To satisfy this test, the

14

prisoner must show that the religious practice at issue satisfies two criteria: (1) the proffered

15

belief must be sincerely held and (2) the claim must be rooted in religious belief, not in purely

16

secular philosophical concerns. Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994) (cited with

17

approval in Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884).

“Sincerely Held” Belief

18

The amended complaint, when liberally construed, adequately alleges that plaintiff

19

sincerely believes in the Jewish faith as well as the need to adhere to a kosher diet, to wear

20

Jewish headware, and to pray from a Jewish prayer book. Consequently, when liberally

21

construed, the amended complaint states a cognizable claim for the violation of his First

22

Amendment rights, as well as for a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

23

Persons Act (RLUIPA). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1 et seq..

24
25
26

2.

Defendants
a.

Government Entity

Plaintiff names the County of Sonoma as a defendant. Local governments are "persons"

27

subject to liability under Section 1983 where official policy or custom causes a constitutional

28

tort. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To impose municipal liability
3

1

under Section 1983, plaintiff must show: (1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of

2

which he or she was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy

3

amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy

4

is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 County of

5

Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997).

6

The order granting the motion to dismiss noted that defendants had submitted for

7

judicial notice documentation showing that jail policy on religious meals requires an inmate to

8

wait three days for a decision after he requests a religious meal, and that such a policy would be

9

constitutional. See Resnick v. Adams, 348 F.3d 763, 748 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding requirement
that inmate apply for religious meal and wait for answer is reasonably related to legitimate

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

penological interests and does violate the constitution). Plaintiff has alleged in his amended

12

complaint that in his case the process took much longer than three days. Upon his arrival at the

13

jail, plaintiff made numerous efforts to request the religious meals and other items from a

14

variety of jail employees, but it took approximately one month before the jail official in charge

15

of processing such requests, the Programs Officer, responded. Once the Programs Officer

16

responded, plaintiff received the meals within 2-3 days and the other religious items ten days

17

later.

18

According to plaintiff, the jail does not provide temporary religious meals or other

19

accommodations during the time an inmate’s request is trying to submit a request to the

20

Programs Officer but there are delays in responding to such a request for a variety of possible

21

reasons, such as the Programs Officer is not available or not performing his duties properly, or

22

because other jail officials do not pass the request on to him. These allegations, when liberally

23

construed, are sufficient to state a claim that the County has a practice or policy of not

24

providing for temporary religious meals while an inmate is attempting to request them, and that

25

such a practice or policy caused plaintiff not to receive religious meals for approximately one

26

month, in violation of the First Amendment and RLUIPA. In order to allow factual

27

development and briefing on these issues, defendants’ request to dismiss the claims against the

28

County at this stage is denied.
4

1

In addition, plaintiff alleges that the process takes longer than three days because jail

2

policy also requires the inmate supply verification from his institution of worship in order to

3

obtain religious meals. It is clear from plaintiff’s allegations Assuming this is true, as is

4

required at this stage of the litigation, it is unclear whether such a policy, to the extent it

5

necessitates a longer wait, would be permissible.

6
7

b.

Individual Defendants

Plaintiff also names three individuals as defendants. Plaintiff was cautioned that he may

8

only name individuals whose actions or omissions proximately caused the delay in his meals.

9

See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). He “must allege facts, not simply
conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). If he names any

12

supervisors as defendants, he may not do so simply because they are the employers or

13

supervisors of other individuals who caused the delays in the meals because there is no

14

respondeat superior liability under Section 1983. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

15

Cir. 1989). Rather, plaintiff must allege that the supervisor’s actions or omissions, like that of

16

any other individual defendant, proximately caused the delay in his receiving the meals.

17

Plaintiff names the jail’s former Programs Officer Tannehill as a defendant on the theory

18

that Tannehill was responsible for all or part of the delay in authorizing plaintiff to receive

19

kosher meals and the Jewish headware and prayer book. These allegations are sufficient to state

20

cognizable claims against Tannehill. Plaintiff also names the current and former Sonoma

21

County Sheriff-Coroners who run the jail. He alleges that they created the jail’s policies and

22

procedures, and in doing so failed to create either an alternative procedure for requesting

23

religious meals and other items or temporary accommodations when an inmate experiences a

24

delay in obtaining a response to such a request from the Programs Officer. According to

25

plaintiff, the Sheriff-Coroner’s failure to do so caused him to suffer the month-long delay in

26

obtaining kosher meals and other religious items. These allegations, when liberally construed,

27

are sufficient to state cognizable claims against current and former Sheriff-Coroners Cogbill

28

and Freitas.
5

1
2

CONCLUSION
1. Defendants’ motion to screen the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(a) is

3

GRANTED, but the request in that motion to dismiss the claims in the amended complaint is

4

DENIED.

5

2. The clerk shall issue summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without

6

prepayment of fees, a copy of the amended complaint in this matter and copies of this order

7

upon: defendants former Sheriff-Coroner William Cogbill, current Sheriff-Coroner Steve

8

Freitas, and former Programs Officer Tannehill at the Sonoma County Sheriff’s

9

Department, and upon the County of Sonoma. A copy of this order shall also be mailed to
the County Counsel for the County of Sonoma specially appearing in this matter.

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, it is ordered as follows:

12

a. No later than ninety days from the date this order is filed, defendants shall file

13

a motion for summary judgment. If defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be

14

resolved by summary judgment, they shall so inform the court prior to the date the summary

15

judgment motion is due. All papers filed with the court shall be promptly served on the

16

plaintiff.

17

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion, if any, shall be filed with the

18

court and served upon defendants no later than thirty days from the date of service of the

19

motion. Plaintiff must read the attached page headed “NOTICE -- WARNING,” which is

20

provided to him pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc),

21

and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988).

22

If defendants file argue that plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative

23

remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), plaintiff should take note of the attached page

24

headed “NOTICE -- WARNING (EXHAUSTION),” which is provided to him as required by

25

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, Alameida v. Wyatt, 124 S.Ct

26

50 (2003).

27
28

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen days after the date of
service of the opposition.
6

1
2
3

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due.
No hearing will be held on the motion unless the court so orders at a later date.
4. All communications by the plaintiff with the court must be served on defendant, or

4

defendant’s counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document

5

to defendant or defendant’s counsel.

6

5. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court

Change of Address.” Papers intended to be filed in this case should be addressed to the clerk

9

and not to the undersigned. Plaintiff also must comply with the court's orders in a timely

10

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute

11
For the Northern District of California

informed of any change of address by filing with the clerk a separate paper headed “Notice of

8

United States District Court

7

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

12

IT IS SO ORDERED.

13
Dated: August

29

, 2011.

14

WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

G:\PRO-SE\WHA\CR.10\ELFAND5692.SRV2.wpd

7