Bredahl et al v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTION TO DISMISS THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND (SI, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/11/2011)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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LORRYNN BREDAHL, et al.,
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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No. C 11-1037 SI
Plaintiffs,
ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED
MOTION TO DISMISS THIRD CAUSE
OF ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO
AMEND
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.
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Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ third cause of action is scheduled for a hearing on April
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15, 2011. Plaintiffs have not filed an opposition to the motion. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the
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Court determines that the matter is appropriate for resolution without oral argument, and VACATES
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the hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the third cause
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of action without leave to amend.
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BACKGROUND
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Plaintiffs Lorrynn Bredahl and William Harwood filed this case against State Farm Mutual
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Insurance Company (“State Farm”) and Does 1 through 50. The complaint alleges that plaintiffs’
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vehicle was insured by State Farm, and that on or about May 3, 2009, while the policy was in effect,
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plaintiffs’ vehicle was stolen and never recovered. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 11. The complaint alleges that the
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insurance policy provided coverage for loss as a result of theft, and that State Farm denied the claim and
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“refused to pay Plaintiffs any sum for damages related to the auto theft.” Id. ¶ 17. The complaint
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alleges claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
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intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it
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fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
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the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires the plaintiff
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to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative
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level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.
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In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court
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must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the
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plaintiff’s favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the
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court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions
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of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).
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If the Court dismisses the complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The Ninth
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Circuit has “repeatedly held that ‘a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to
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amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the
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allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Doe v. United
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States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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DISCUSSION
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Defendants move to dismiss the third cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
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distress (“IIED”). Defendants contend that the IIED claim should be dismissed because the conduct
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alleged in the complaint – the mishandling and denial of an insurance claim – is not outrageous as a
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matter of law. Defendants also contend that the complaint does not allege that plaintiffs have suffered
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severe or extreme emotional distress.
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Under California law, “the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are
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(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard
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of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional
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distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous
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conduct . . . . The defendant must have engaged in ‘conduct intended to inflict injury or engaged in with
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the realization that injury will result.’” Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868, 903 (1991)
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(quoting Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 209-10 (1982).
The Court agrees with defendants that the complaint does not state a claim for IIED. Courts
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have dismissed IIED claims where plaintiffs alleged conduct more egregious than what is alleged here.
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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See, e.g., Schlauch v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 146 Cal. App. 3d 926, 936 (1983) (insurer
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delayed two and a half years before tendering policy limits where liability was obvious; “The failure
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to accept an offer of settlement or the violation of statutory duties under Insurance Code section 790.03
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does not in itself constitute the type of outrageous conduct which will support a cause of action for
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intentional infliction of emotional distress.”); Ricard v. Pacific Indem. Co., 132 Cal. App. 3d 886, 894
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(1982) (sustaining demurrer where plaintiff alleged insurance company’s intentional and willful refusal
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to properly investigate, process and communicate with plaintiff about his claim, and denial of claim, was
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outrageous); see also Taylor v. California State Auto. Ass’n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1214,
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1223 (1987) (holding delay in settling an insurance claim was not outrageous as a matter of law).
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Plaintiffs did not oppose defendants’ motion, and have not filed anything with the Court
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indicating that they wish to amend the IIED claim. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendants’
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motion to dismiss the third cause of action without leave to amend.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss the third cause of
action without leave to amend. (Docket No. 7).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 11, 2011
SUSAN ILLSTON
United States District Judge
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