Serrote v. Marin County

Filing 15

ORDER by Judge Maria-Elena James granting 6 Motion to Dismiss (cdnS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/25/2011)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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Northern District of California

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ELAINA SERROTE,

No. C 11-1674 MEJ
Plaintiff,

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ORDER RE DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS [Dkt. #6]

v.
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MARIN COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the State of California

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Defendant.
_____________________________________/

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For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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I. INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is Defendant Marin County’s Motion for Judgment on the

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Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Dkt. No. 6. On May 17, 2011,

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Plaintiff filed her opposition, and Defendant filed its reply on May 23, 2011. Dkt. Nos. 13, 14.

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Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds that the Motion is appropriate for determination

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without oral argument and therefore VACATES the hearing set for June 16, 2011. After carefully

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considering the parties’ arguments, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion.

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II. BACKGROUND

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On April 6, 2011, Plaintiff Elaina Serrote (“Plaintiff”) initiated this lawsuit by filing a

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Complaint against Defendant Marin County, a political subdivision of the State of California

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(“Defendant”). Dkt. No. 1. The following facts are taken from her Complaint. Plaintiff was

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charged with driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of California Vehicle Code section

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23152, a charge which is currently pending before the California Superior Court. Id. at ¶ 4. As part

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of the plea bargain process, the Marin County District Attorney informed Plaintiff that a proffered

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plea bargain would result in a less severe penalty than she would likely receive if she went to trial

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and was convicted. Id. at ¶ 8. As part of this process, a form was provided to her that indicated the

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penalty she would receive as part of a “Standard DUI 1st Offense Offer” as well as the “Maximum

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Penalties” she would be subject to if she lost at trial and the “standard sentence after trial” of “five

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(5) days in custody in addition to the above probation conditions.” Id.

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s practice of imposing a more severe penalty upon

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defendants who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial than those who plead guilty and

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waive the right to a trial amounts to a constitutional violation. Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff brings suit under

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42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant’s policy violates the right to a jury trial and the due

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process clause in the United States Constitution. Id. Plaintiff seeks to bring this case on behalf of a

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class “for those persons similarly situated as arrested and prosecuted for crimes under California law

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in Marin County.” Compl. ¶ 1.
On May 9, 2011, Defendant filed the pending motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing

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For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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that the practice of offering plea bargains with a lighter sentence than that likely to result after a jury

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trial resulting in a conviction is entirely proper and, in fact, essential to the plea bargain process.

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Def.’s Mot. at 2:18-21, Dkt. No. 6.

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III. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within

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such time as to not delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” The legal

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standard for Rule 12(c) is virtually identical to the standard for a motion to dismiss under Rule

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12(b)(6). Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir.1989). For a motion

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under either rule, the question presented is not whether the plaintiff will prevail in the action, but

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whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of the claim. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

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U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss a

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claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A motion to dismiss under

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Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.

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2001). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim

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to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A

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the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

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––– U.S. –––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

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requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

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(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.) In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all of

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the plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at

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550; Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007). The plaintiff’s complaint need not contain

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detailed factual allegations, but it must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a

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cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

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action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. In

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reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts may also consider documents attached to the complaint.

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For the Northern District of California

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

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Additionally, courts may consider a matter that is properly the subject of judicial notice, such as

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matters of public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). If the court

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dismisses the complaint, it “should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading

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was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of

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other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).

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IV. DISCUSSION

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In its motion, Defendant argues that the practice of offering plea bargains with a lighter

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sentence than that likely to result after a jury trial resulting in a conviction is entirely proper and, in

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fact, essential to the plea bargain process. Def.’s Mot. at 2:18-21, Dkt. No. 6. Thus, Defendant

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argues that, even if all of the facts Plaintiff alleges are assumed to be true, she has not set forth a

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basis for which relief may be granted. Id. at 3:7-9. Plaintiff raises both procedural and substantive

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arguments in response, which the Court shall address below.

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A.

Timeliness of Defendant’s Motion

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First, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s motion is untimely because it was filed more than 21

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days after service of her Complaint. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5:8-15, Dkt. No. 13. However, Plaintiff appears

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to base her argument on Rule 12(b)(6) rather than 12(c). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that

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“Defendant's fail[ed] to file their Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion within 21 days of the service of the

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summons and complaint. Thus, their motion is untimely and must be dismissed with prejudice.” Id.

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at 6:13-15. Defendant plainly states that it is bringing this motion based upon Rule 12(c). Pursuant

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to Rule 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings only “[a]fter the pleadings are

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closed.” Accordingly, as Defendant filed its answer on April 29, 2011, (Dkt. No. 5), Plaintiff’s

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argument regarding the timeliness of Defendant’s motion fails.

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B.

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Whether Defendant’s Motion Argues Facts that are in Dispute
Next, Plaintiff argues that disputed facts make Defendant’s motion improper. Specifically,

compelled to make a plea due to the threat of a more severe punishment if she lost at trial. Pl.’s

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Plaintiff argues that disputes exist as to whether Defendant acted improperly or whether Plaintiff felt

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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Opp’n at 7:15-19. Plaintiff thus argues that Defendant’s motion “is tantamount to a summary

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judgment motion that considers evidence outside the pleadings.” Id. at 7:19-20. Plaintiff also

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quotes portions of Defendant’s motion, in which it argues that its pretrial offer of a lesser sentence

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“created no presumption of vindictiveness, and that its “practice must be found proper.” Def.’s Mot.

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at 5:11-14. Plaintiff’s argument is without merit.

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In its motion, Defendant sets forth the relevant facts and cites to the specific paragraphs of

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Plaintiff’s Complaint where they are set forth; nowhere does Defendant address facts that are not in

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the Complaint, nor does it contend that any of the facts in Plaintiff’s Complaint are disputed.

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Instead, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot argue that it violated her constitutional rights because

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she fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As stated above, the question presented

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in a Rule 12(c) motion is not whether Plaintiff will prevail in the action, but whether she is entitled

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to offer evidence in support of the claim. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236. Accordingly, Defendant’s

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motion is properly before the Court under Rule 12(c).

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C.

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Whether Judgment on the Pleadings is Appropriate
Turning to the merits of Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff argues that “courts may not indicate

how a case will be disposed of by inducing a plea bargain that is unconstitutionally premised with a

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threat of a more severe punishment after taking their case [t]o trial that results in a conviction.” Pl.’s

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Opp’n at 9:5-7.

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The practice of offering a criminal defendant a plea bargain resulting in a lighter sentence

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than the individual is likely to have imposed by the court is well established. Bordenkircher v.

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Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (a prosecutor may offer a “recommendation of a lenient sentence

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or a reduction of charges” as part of the plea bargaining process). Thus, “in the ‘give-and-take’ of

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plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free

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to accept or reject the prosecution's offer.” Id. “Indeed, acceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea

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bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a

plea may have been induced by promises of a recommendation of a lenient sentence or a reduction

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constitutional sense simply because it is the end result of the bargaining process. By hypothesis, the

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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of charges, and thus by fear of the possibility of a greater penalty upon conviction after a trial.” Id.

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(citations omitted).

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While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a

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“discouraging effect on the defendant’s assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult

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choices [is] an inevitable” - and permissible - “attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and

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encourages the negotiation of pleas.” Id. at 364. “It follows that, by tolerating and encouraging the

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negotiation of pleas, this Court has necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple

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reality that the prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his

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right to plead not guilty.” Id.

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Based on this standard, the Court finds that Defendant did not act unconstitutionally by

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offering her a lesser sentence and confronting her with the risk of a more severe punishment should

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she proceed to trial. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “has a policy, custom, pattern and practice in its

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prosecution of crimes alleged to have been committed in Marin County by indicating to the arrested

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citizens that they will face a much more severe penalty if they do not take the suggested plea bargain

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offered, go to a trial and lose at trial.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 3:17-20. However, as stated above, the United

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States Supreme Court has specifically recognized that confronting a defendant with the risk of

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severe punishment may have a discouraging effect on the defendant’s assertion of trial rights, yet

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held that it is a permissible part of the negotiation process.

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In her Opposition, Plaintiff cites to a number of cases that are either factually distinguishable

(recognizing a constitutional guarantee against multiple punishments for the same offense and

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requiring that punishment already exacted be fully credited in imposing a sentence upon a new

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conviction for the same offense) (overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 802-03 (1989)

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(finding no presumption of vindictiveness when a sentence imposed after trial was greater than that

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previously imposed after a guilty plea which the defendant succeeded in having vacated); People v.

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Superior Court (Felmann), 59 Cal. App. 3d 270, 276 (1976) (holding that a court (as opposed to a

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district attorney) may not offer any inducement in return for a plea of guilty. The Court finds these

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or have been overturned. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717-18 (1978)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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and the other cases cited by Plaintiff inapplicable.

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Based on this analysis, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to judgment on the
pleadings.

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V. CONCLUSION

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For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

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Because there are no allegations that Plaintiff could assert to change the Court’s rulings, any

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amendment to Plaintiff’s Complaint would be futile. Dismissal is therefore WITH PREJUDICE.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: May 25, 2011
_______________________________
Maria-Elena James
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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