Collier v. Reliastar Life Insurance Company

Filing 146

ORDER by Judge Samuel Conti denying 112 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law; denying 124 Motion to Alter Judgment. (sclc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/24/2012)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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WENDY COLLIER,

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Plaintiff,

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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v.

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RELIASTAR LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,

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Defendant.
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Case No. 11-1760 SC
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS
A MATTER OF LAW AND
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND
THE JUDGMENT

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I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Wendy Collier ("Collier" or "Plaintiff") filed this

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action against Defendant ReliaStar Life Insurance Company

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("ReliaStar" or "Defendant") for failure to pay long-term

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disability benefits, asserting claims for breach of contract, bad

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faith, and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED").

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ECF No. 1 ("Compl.").

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summary judgment, arguing that Collier's entire action was barred

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by collateral estoppel due to a prior decision by the Marin County

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Employee's Retirement Association ("MCERA") and that the undisputed

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facts showed that Collier could not prevail on her claims for bad

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faith and IIED.

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On February 3, 2012, ReliaStar moved for

ECF No. 31 ("Def.'s MSJ").

The motion was granted

ECF No. 54 ("SJ Order").1

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in part and denied in part.

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dismissed Collier's bad faith and IIED claims, but rejected

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ReliaStar's collateral estoppel arguments and allowed Collier's

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breach of contract claim to proceed to trial.

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2012, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Collier.

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("Verdict").

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$106,947.68 in favor of Collier.

Id.

On April 12,
ECF No. 105

Soon thereafter, the Court entered a judgment of
ECF No. 109.

Neither party is satisfied with this outcome.

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The Court

ReliaStar has

United States District Court

filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to

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For the Northern District of California

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, asking the Court to reconsider

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its collateral estoppel determination based on the record developed

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since the Court's Summary Judgment Order.

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Mot.").

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ECF No. 124 ("Pl.'s Mot.").

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revisit its decision to dismiss her claims for bad faith and IIED

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and allow those claims to be adjudicated by a jury.

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motions are fully briefed.

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133 ("Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot."), 134 ("Reply ISO Def.'s Mot."), 140

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("Reply ISO Pl.'s Mot.").

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Court finds this matter appropriate for determination without oral

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argument.

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correct outcome in its Summary Judgment Order and DENIES both

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ReliaStar and Collier's motions.

ECF No. 112 ("Def.'s

Collier moves to alter the judgment pursuant to Rule 59.
Collier requests that the Court

Id.

Both

ECF Nos. 128 ("Opp'n to Def.'s Mot."),

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the

As detailed below, the Court finds that it reached the

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25 II.

BACKGROUND

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Collier began working for Marin County in 1991 as an

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Eligibility Worker II, administering social welfare programs.

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Collier v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 11-1760 SC, 2012 WL 850742,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33577 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012)

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RS000418.2

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a group disability income insurance policy issued by ReliaStar.

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RS000018.

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disability benefits if she is "totally disabled," which is defined

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as:

As a benefit of her employment, Collier was insured by

Under the ReliaStar policy, Collier is entitled to

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[S]ickness or accidental injury which has caused the
following:

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•

During the benefit waiting period and the first 24 months
of disability benefits, the inability to perform with
reasonable continuity all of the essential duties of your
regular occupation and as a result you are not working at
all.

•

After you have qualified for monthly income benefits for 24
months, the inability to perform with reasonable continuity
all of the essential duties of any gainful occupation and
as a result you are not working at all.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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RS000035.

Thus, in order to qualify for disability benefits for

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the first twenty-four months of disability, Collier must be unable

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to perform her "own occupation."

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months, the standard changes from "own occupation" to "any

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occupation," whereby Collier may only continue receiving benefits

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if she is unable to perform any "gainful occupation."

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defines "gainful occupation" as "any occupation that [the insured]

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could reasonably be expected to perform satisfactorily in light of

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[the insured's] age, education, training, experience, station in

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life, and physical and mental capacity."

After the first twenty-four

The policy

RS000036.

Collier ended her active employment with Marin County on June

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14, 2006 due to disability.

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ankle injury in 2001 and, in the intervening years, had developed a

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RS0000418.

Collier had sustained an

The administrative record for this matter is attached to the
Affidavit of Mary Kay Racette ("Racette"), ECF No. 32, and has been
bates-labeled as RS000xxxx. Citations to the record follow this
format.

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number of other symptoms, including chronic pain, joint pain,

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fatigue, and dizziness.

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Collier's doctors ultimately diagnosed her with Ehlers-Danlos

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syndrome ("EDS")3 Type III, autonomic dysfunction, and Postural

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Orthostatic Tachycardia Syndrome ("POTS").4

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sought treatment through her medical insurance and on her own, but

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her medical problems persisted.

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rest improves her pain, there is no treatment for her fatigue.

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¶ 8.

See ECF No. 39 ("Collier Decl.") ¶ 4.

Id.

Id. ¶¶ 7-8.

Collier

Collier claims that while

Collier claims that the pain and fatigue significantly

United States District Court

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For the Northern District of California

Id.

affected her ability to perform her regular duties with Marin

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County.

Id. ¶ 5.

In February 2007, Collier submitted a claim to ReliaStar for

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disability benefits that was subsequently approved, effective

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September 12, 2006.

RS000850, RS000181.

ReliaStar began to re-

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Ehlers-Danlos syndrome (EDS) is a group of inherited
disorders that weaken connective tissues. Connective
tissues are proteins that support skin, bones, blood
vessels and other organs.

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ECF No. 33 ("Bromen Aff.") Ex. B.
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According to National Institute of Health ("NIH"):

According to the NIH:
Postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome (POTS) is one
of a group of disorders that have orthostatic intolerance
(OI) as their primary symptom. OI describes a condition
in which an excessively reduced volume of blood returns
to the heart after an individual stands up from a lying
down
position.
The
primary
symptom
of
OI
is
lightheadedness or fainting. In POTS, the lightheadedness
or fainting is also accompanied by a rapid increase in
heartbeat of more than 30 beats per minute, or a heart
rate that exceeds 120 beats per minute, within 10 minutes
of rising. The faintness or lightheadedness of POTS are
relieved by lying down again.

Bromen Aff. Ex. A.

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evaluate Collier's claim in 2008, when the standard for receiving

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benefits under the policy changed from "own occupation" to "any

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occupation."

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informed Collier that she did not meet the policy's definition of

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being "totally disabled" as of September 13, 2008, under the "any

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occupation" standard, and that her benefits were being terminated.

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RS0000146.

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2009, but ReliaStar upheld the denial decision on February 5, 2010.

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RS000134, RS000471.

United States District Court

On April 8, 2009, ReliaStar

Collier filed an administrative appeal on April 17,

On June 15, 2010, a hearing concerning Collier's application

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For the Northern District of California

See AR RS000179.

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for disability retirement benefits from Marin County was held

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before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") at the State of

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California's Office of Administrative Hearings on behalf of MCERA.

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Bromen Aff. Ex. F ("ALJ Decision").

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had been without benefits for almost a year.

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Collier to be represented by counsel at the hearing, Bromen Aff.

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Ex. G § 1007, but Collier claims she "could not afford to pay for

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representation on an hourly basis, and for financial and other

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reasons, [she] was refused representation by a number of

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attorneys," Collier Decl. ¶ 18.5

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the hearing, but claims that she was unable to follow all of the

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proceedings due to pain and fatigue.

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Soong ("Dr. Soong"), the County's expert and the only physician at

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the hearing, testified that Collier was able to perform the duties

By the hearing date, Collier
MCERA bylaws allowed

Collier represented herself at

Id. ¶¶ 18, 20.

Dr. James

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At the time, Collier was represented by David Linden ("Linden")
in connection with ReliaStar's denial of benefits, but Linden
claimed that the administrative hearing was outside of his field.
Collier Decl. ¶ 18. Linden unsuccessfully attempted to continue
the hearing so that Collier could find representation. Id.

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of her previous position with Marin County.

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Bromen Aff. Ex. H at

83-143.

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The ALJ was tasked with determining whether Collier was

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"permanently incapacitated" from performing the duties of an

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Eligibility Worker II.6

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that she was not.

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clearly influenced by the fact that the County's expert, Dr. Soong,

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was the only physician to testify at the hearing.

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the ALJ concluded:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Cal. Gov't Code § 31724.

ALJ Decision at 6.

He concluded

The ALJ's findings were

Specifically,

[Collier]'s medical records are voluminous.
She relies
on various documents from [her treating physicians] to
assert that she has [EDS] and POTS and that she is
incapacitated from her job duties.
While [Collier's]
medical records are extensive, and although [she] saw
many physicians, . . . [t]here was no opportunity to
examine or cross-examine her physicians.
Notably, her
physicians did not appear to be familiar with the duties
of an Eligibility Worker II. Id. at 5.

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Dr. Soong [the County's expert] was the only physician to
testify at hearing [sic]. He was subject to direct and
cross-examination. He was unequivocal in his conclusion
that [Collier] did not have [EDS] and that she was not
incapacitated from performance of the duties of the
Eligibility Worker II position.

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Id. at 5-6.

On January 12, 2011, MCERA's Board of Retirement

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unanimously approved the ALJ's findings and denied Collier's

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request for disability retirement benefits.

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Collier did not seek judicial review of the decision in California

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state court.

Bromen Aff. Ex. J.

Collier filed the instant action against ReliaStar on April

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11, 2011, asserting claims for breach of contract, bad faith, and

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Under section 31724 of the California Government Code, "[i]f the
proof received, including any medical examination, shows to the
satisfaction of the board that the member is permanently
incapacitated physically or mentally for the performance of his
duties in the service, it shall retire him . . . ."

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IIED.

ReliaStar moved for summary judgment on February 3, 2012,

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and the motion was granted in part and denied in part on March 13,

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2012.

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collaterally estopped from bringing the instant action due to the

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outcome of the MCERA hearing.

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that Collier did not have an adequate opportunity to litigate her

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claims before MCERA because she represented herself pro se and

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because she claimed she was distracted by fatigue and pain

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throughout the proceedings.

The Court rejected ReliaStar's argument that Collier was

SJ Order at 2.

Id. at 11.

The Court reasoned

The court dismissed

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Collier's bad faith claim, finding that the undisputed evidence

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showed that ReliaStar met its duty to investigate Collier's claim.

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Id. at 14.

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physicians, reviewed the records of Collier's own physicians, and

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repeatedly asked Collier to submit additional documents that might

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support her claim.

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Collier's claims for IIED, reasoning that the standard for IIED "is

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at least as difficult to meet as that for insurance bad faith, if

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not more so."

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Fed. Appx. 222, 224 (9th Cir. 2002)).

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The Court reasoned that ReliaStar consulted a number of

Id. at 14-15.

The Court also dismissed

Id. at 20-21 (quoting Ayers v. Std. Ins. Co., 51

On April 9, 2012, the case proceeded to trial.

This time,

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Collier was represented by counsel.

The jury heard testimony from

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not only Dr. Soong but also Collier's treating physicians, Dr.

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Karen Friday ("Dr. Friday"), Dr. Kamer Tezcan ("Dr. Tezcan"), Dr.

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Kathreen Johnston ("Dr. Johnston"), Dr. Edward Pinner ("Dr.

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Pinner"), and Dr. Michael Mason ("Dr. Mason").

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ReliaStar's expert, Dr. Asim Khan ("Dr. Khan"), also testified.

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ECF No. 104.

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judgment as a matter of law on the basis of collateral estoppel for

ECF Nos. 101-104.

Before the close of evidence, ReliaStar moved for

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the reasons stated in its summary judgment motion as supplemented

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by the testimony at trial.

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denied.

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given to the jury, which was asked to determine whether Collier was

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"totally disabled" as of April 9, 2009.7

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Instructions") at 3.

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Collier later that day.

Id.

ECF No. 106 at 4.

The motion was

On the afternoon of April 12, 2012, the case was

ECF No. 107 ("Jury

The jury returned a verdict in favor of

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III. DISCUSSION

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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A.

ReliaStar's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

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ReliaStar now renews its motion for judgment as a matter of

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law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50.

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requires a court to render a judgment as a matter of law where "a

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party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the

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court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally

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sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue .

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. . ."

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matter of law under Rule 50 mirrors the standard for summary

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judgment under Rule 56."

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Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000).

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of the evidence in the record, drawing all reasonable inferences in

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favor of the nonmoving party, but making no credibility

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).

Rule 50

"The standard for judgment as a

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
"Thus, the court must review all

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The jury was further instructed that, under the terms of
Collier's ReliaStar insurance policy, Collier was totally disabled
"if she had a disability that rendered her unable to perform with
reasonable continuity the substantial and material acts necessary
to pursue her usual occupation in the usual or customary way or to
engage with reasonable continuity in another occupation in which
she could reasonably be expected to perform satisfactorily in light
of her age, education, training, experience, station in life, and
physical and mental capacity." Jury Instructions at 3.

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determinations or weighing any evidence."

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omitted).

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Id. (internal citations

ReliaStar argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter

instant action due to MCERA's prior determination on Collier's

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claim for disability retirement benefits.

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Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, applies where:

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(1) the issue to be precluded is identical to that decided in a

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prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior

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United States District Court

of law because Collier was collaterally estopped from bringing the

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For the Northern District of California

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proceeding; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision

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in the prior proceeding was "final and on the merits"; and (5) the

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party against whom preclusion is sought is identical to or in

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privity with the party to the former proceeding.

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39 Cal. 4th 1070, 1077 (Cal. 2006).

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applied to decisions made by administrative agencies when an

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administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves

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disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have

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had an adequate opportunity to litigate."

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3d 468, 479 (Cal. 1982) (internal quotations omitted).

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Def.'s Mot. at 6.

People v. Garcia,

"Collateral estoppel may be

People v. Sims, 32 Cal.

In its Summary Judgment Order, the Court found that collateral

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estoppel did not bar Collier's claims because she did not have an

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adequate opportunity to litigate her claims before MCERA.

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at 11.

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set forth in Collier's declaration.

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declared that she was forced to represent herself pro se because,

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"for financial and other reasons, [she] was refused representation

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by a number of attorneys."

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declared that she was unable to follow the administrative

SJ Order

In making this determination, the Court relied on the facts
Id. at 11-12.

Collier Decl. ¶ 18.

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Collier

Collier also

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proceedings due to pain and fatigue, that one of her physicians

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declined to testify at the hearing, and that she did not know the

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procedure to arrange for his testimony.

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disputed some of these facts, but, because this issue came on a

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motion for a summary judgment, the Court viewed the facts in the

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light most favorable to Collier, the non-moving party.

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Order at 13 n.5.

Id. ¶¶ 18-20.

ReliaStar

See SJ

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ReliaStar now argues that Collier had a full and fair

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opportunity to litigate before MCERA because: (1) Collier could

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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have sought judicial review of the ALJ's decision with the help of

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counsel, (2) case law shows that pro se status alone does not

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shield a party from collateral estoppel, (3) Collier was competent

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to represent herself at the MCERA hearing despite her alleged pain

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and fatigue, (4) Collier received some assistance from counsel in

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preparing for the MCERA hearing, and (5) Dr. Mason, Collier's

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primary care physician, testified at trial that he would have

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testified before MCERA had Collier asked.
The Court is not persuaded.

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Def.'s Mot. at 8-11.

As an initial matter, ReliaStar's

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first four arguments should have been raised in its summary

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judgment briefing.

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evidence raised at trial.

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theories and new authority which were not raised before.

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Def.'s Mot. 8-11 with ECF No. 41 ("Def.'s MSJ Reply") at 5-6, ECF

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No. 51 ("Def.'s Response to MSJ Surreply").

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had a full and fair opportunity to present its arguments on this

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issue.

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post-judgment.8

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These new arguments do not depend on any new
Rather, they merely offer new legal
Compare

ReliaStar previously

The Court declines to give it a second bite at the apple
Only ReliaStar's fifth argument -- that Dr. Mason

Further, these four arguments would not alter the Court's
analysis. As to ReliaStar's first argument, an appeal of MCERA's

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indicated that he would have testified at the MCERA hearing had he

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been asked -- is predicated on new information that came to light

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at trial.

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physician at Kaiser Permanente ("Kaiser"), was willing to testify

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does not mean that Collier could have secured his appearance at the

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hearing.

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medical-legal unit at Kaiser to arrange for Dr. Mason's appearance.

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ECF No. 129 ("Phillips Decl.") ¶ 3; ECF No. 130 ("Padway Decl.") ¶

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8.

This argument is unavailing.

The fact that Dr. Mason, a

Collier would have had to negotiate with a separate

This unit frequently requires the personal service of subpoenas

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

and the pre-payment of physician fees.

Phillips Decl. ¶ 3.

It is

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unclear that Collier could have negotiated the Kaiser system on her

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own.

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this case.

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five physicians -- four from Kaiser and one from Stanford

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University.

Further, ReliaStar's focus on Dr. Mason distorts the scope of
At trial, Collier's counsel presented the testimony of

ECF Nos. 101-104.

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decision through a writ of mandate to a California state court
would likely have been futile. The state court would not have
reviewed Collier's case de novo. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §
1094.5. Accordingly, Collier would not have had an opportunity to
introduce testimony from her treating physicians on appeal. With
respect to ReliaStar's second argument, the MCERA proceedings were
not unfair merely because Collier represented herself pro se. As
explained in the Court's Summary Judgment Order, Collier was
incapable of adequately representing herself because of her chronic
pain and fatigue. See SJ Order at 11. In its third argument,
ReliaStar contends that Collier could not have been suffering from
disabling pain and fatigue through the MCERA hearing because MCERA
found her disability claim was meritless. Def.'s Mot. at 12. This
argument is circular. If Collier's condition rendered her unable
to present a competent case at the hearing, then the MCERA's
determination as to Collier's condition is far from reliable.
ReliaStar's fourth argument is predicated on the fact that Linden
assisted Collier in attempting to obtain a continuance of the
administrative hearing and entered an appearance after the hearing
was concluded. Id. at 8. However, ReliaStar does not dispute that
Collier was unrepresented during the substantive portion of the
hearing.

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Even if Collier did have a full and fair opportunity to

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litigate her case before MCERA, she is not collaterally estopped

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from bringing the instant action because the MCERA hearing involved

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different issues.

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at the MCERA hearing.

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by the preponderance of the evidence.

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contrast, at the MCERA hearing, Collier needed to submit proof to

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"the satisfaction of the [MCERA] board."

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Thus, the board had the discretion to reject Collier's claim, even

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

First, Collier's burden of proof was different
At trial, Collier needed to prove her claim
Jury Instructions at 6.

In

Cal. Gov't Code § 31724.

if she proved her case by the preponderance of the evidence.
Further, at the MCERA hearing, Collier needed to show that she

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was "permanently incapacitated."

Cal. Gov't Code § 31724.

At

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trial, the jury was not concerned with the duration of Collier's

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disability.

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disabled" under the terms of the ReliaStar policy on April 9, 2009.

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ReliaStar argues that MCERA's decision did not turn on a finding of

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permanence.

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that MCERA "concluded that Collier was in fact able to perform the

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duties of her county position . . . ."

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The ALJ at the MCERA hearing merely found that Collier did not meet

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her burden.

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Collier's physicians since there was no opportunity to examine or

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cross-examine those physicians and because they "did not appear to

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be familiar with the duties of an Eligibility Worker II."

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Decision at 5.

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Dr. Soong, Marin County's expert, to be "credible and persuasive."

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Id.

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that: "[Collier] did not establish that she is substantially unable

They only needed to decide whether she was "totally

Def.'s Reply at 7.

Specifically, Reliastar argues

Id.

The Court disagrees.

He gave little weight to the documents authored by

ALJ

On the other hand, the ALJ found the testimony of

Based on this evidence, the ALJ reached the legal conclusion

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to perform the usual duties of the Eligibility Worker II position."

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ALJ Decision at 6.

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Decision and made no factual findings of its own.

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Ex. J.

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The MCERA Board merely adopted the ALJ's
See Bromen Aff.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Collier is not

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collaterally estopped from bringing the instant action and

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therefore DENIES ReliaStar's renewed motion for judgment as a

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matter of law.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

B.

Collier's Motion to Amend the Judgment

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, Collier moves

11

for an order vacating the portion of the Court's Summary Judgment

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Order which dismissed her claims for bad faith and IIED.

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59(e), which permits a court to alter or amend a previous order,

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"offers an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the

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interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources."

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Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir.

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2000) (internal quotations omitted).

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reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual

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circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly

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discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an

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intervening change in the controlling law."

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Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999).

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not newly discovered within the meaning of Rule 59 if it was in the

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moving party's possession at the time of the prior hearing date or

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could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

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Indus., Inc. v. Research Instrumental Corp., 324 F.2d 347, 352 (9th

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Cir. 1963).

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Rule

"[A] motion for

389 Orange St.
Evidence is

Engelhard

In opposition to ReliaStar's prior motion for summary

1
2

judgment, Collier asserted at least fifteen arguments as to why her

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bad faith claim should not be dismissed.

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MSJ Opp'n") at 8-16.

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these arguments.

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the judgment raises many of these same arguments, as well as

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arguments that could have been made before.

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suggest that there has been an intervening change in controlling

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law.

See ECF No. 37 ("Pl.'s

The Court addressed and rejected each of

See SJ Order at 15-20.

Collier's motion to alter

Collier does not

Further, the newly discovered evidence cited in Collier's

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

10

motion does not indicate that the Court reached the wrong

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conclusion in dismissing Collier's bad faith and IIED claims in its

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Summary Judgment Order.

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amending the judgment is inappropriate here.

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As such, the extraordinary remedy of

Collier first argues that ReliaStar ignored its continuing

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duty to evaluate her claim, a duty which Collier claims extended

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beyond ReliaStar's decision to terminate her benefits through the

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trial on her breach of contract claim.

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that ReliaStar breached this duty because, at trial, no one ever

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testified that ReliaStar ever looked at any "new information" to

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decide whether to reevaluate ReliaStar's position on the case.

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at 4-5.

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interpretation of an insurer's continuing duty to investigate is

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correct, ReliaStar was not required to present any evidence

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concerning its evaluation of Collier's claim at trial.

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time, Collier's bad faith claim had already been dismissed.

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ReliaStar cannot be faulted for failing to present evidence on an

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issue which was irrelevant to its case.

This argument lacks merit.

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Id. at 4.

Collier suggests

Id.

Even if Collier's

By that

Next, Collier challenges the manner in which ReliaStar decided

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to terminate her claim in April 2009.

Pl.'s Mot. at 5-10.

Missing

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from this discussion is any reference to new evidence that could

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not have been discovered through reasonable diligence prior to

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summary judgment.

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the claims administrator who approved Collier's claim in 2007,

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ReliaStar's April 2009 letter to Collier informing her that her

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benefits were being terminated, and ReliaStar's purported failure

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to produce Karla Wagner ("Wagner"), the author of that termination

Collier's arguments are predicated on notes from

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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letter.

This is not new evidence.

Further, the Court previously

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addressed Collier's arguments regarding Wagner when it ruled on her

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motions in limine.

See ECF Nos. 83, 99.

Collier also takes issue with ReliaStar's decision to

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dismiss the medical opinions of Dr. Higiuio Ortega, one of

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Collier's treating physicians.

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this argument does not rest on any new evidence.

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arguments were addressed in the Court's prior Summary Judgment

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Order, see SJ Order at 4-6, 16-17, 19-20, and the Court will not

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revisit them here.

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issue of how ReliaStar weighed the statements of its experts, Drs.

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Soong, Kahn, and Anderson, against the statements of Collier's

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treating physicians, Drs. Mason, Pinner, and Johnson.

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Pl.'s Mot. at 13-17 with Pl.'s MSJ Opp'n at 10-13; see SJ Order at

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14-15, 17-18.

Pl.'s Mot. at 11-13.

Once again,

These facts and

Likewise, the Court declines to revisit the

Compare

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Collier's motion to amend the

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judgment.

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///

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///

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IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendant

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ReliaStar Life Insurance Company's renewed motion for judgment as a

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matter of law and Plaintiff Wendy Collier's motion to amend the

5

judgment.

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Verdict shall remain undisturbed.

The Court's Summary Judgment Order and the jury's

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8

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Dated:

July 24, 2012
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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