Milyakov et al v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al

Filing 134

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER GRANTING IN PART SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Judge William Alsup [denying 105 Motion for Leave to File]. (whasec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/15/2012)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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EMIL P. MILYAKOV;
MAGDALENA A. APOSTOLOVA
No. C 11-02066 WHA
Plaintiffs,

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v.
JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A.; HSBC BANK USA,
N.A.; CALIFORNIA RECONVEYANCE CO.;
PAUL FINANCIAL, LLC; MORTGAGE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS,
INC.; FOUNDATION CONVEYANCING, LLC;
and DOES 1–100,

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO FILE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
OF ORDER GRANTING
IN PART SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

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Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se in this foreclosure action, have filed a motion for leave to

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file a motion for reconsideration of an order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment

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as to the claims for cancellation of deed of trust and wrongful foreclosure. Civil Local Rule

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7-9(b) provides that a party moving for reconsideration must show:

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(1) That at the time of a motion for leave [to file a motion for
reconsideration], a material difference in fact or law exists from
that which was presented to the Court before entry of the
interlocutory order for which reconsideration is sought. The party
also must show that in the exercise of reasonable diligence the
party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or law at
the time of the interlocutory order; or (2) The emergence of new
material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such

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order; or (3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material
facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the
Court before such interlocutory order.
Plaintiffs do not allege a material difference in law from that which was previously

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presented, nor do they allege that any new facts have arisen. Plaintiffs argue only that the order

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granting in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment failed to consider material facts.

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Plaintiffs contend that the order failed to consider that Ms. Colleen Irby may not have had the

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authority to sign both the deed of trust as an assistant secretary of defendant MERS and the

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substitution of trustee as an officer of defendant JP Morgan Chase.

those documents were notarized and included a statement by the notary that Ms. Irby personally

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For the Northern District of California

As stated in the order granting in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment, both of

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United States District Court

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appeared before the notary and “proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the

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person whose name is/are subscribed to be within this instrument.” The order found that

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plaintiffs failed to make a showing as to why the notarized signatures should not be enough

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to accept the documents as authentic. The order further held: “Blanket assertions that the

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signatures on these documents are not authentic does not create a genuine issue of material fact.”

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Plaintiffs have still not shown any reason why the documents are not authentic. Thus, the order

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took full account of the material facts surrounding the claims for cancellation of deed of trust and

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wrongful foreclosure before granting summary judgment.

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Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration is therefore DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: March 15, 2012.

WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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