Righetti v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation et al
Filing
80
ORDER by Judge Edward M. Chen Granting 64 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (emcsec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/15/2012)
1
2
3
4
5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
7
8
GERALD L. RIGHETTI,
9
Plaintiff,
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
11
12
13
No. C-11-2717 EMC
v.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION,
et al.,
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
(Docket No. 64)
Defendants.
___________________________________/
14
15
16
Plaintiff Gerald S. Righetti, an inmate at California’s Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”),
17
filed this suit against, inter alia, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
18
(“CDCR”), the Warden of SVSP, other prison employees, and various medical professionals,
19
alleging that they violated both his federal and state rights by failing to provide him with appropriate
20
medical care. See Amended Complaint (Docket No. 16) (hereinafter “FAC”). Defendant Dr. Neil
21
Richman, a Orthopedic Department surgeon at Plaintiff’s treating hospital, filed a motion to dismiss
22
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Docket No. 64. For the reasons stated on the record and in
23
this order, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
24
A.
25
Section 1983 Claim
As stated more fully on the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim
26
against Dr. Richman. Section 1983 creates a civil cause of action against a “person who, under
27
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” deprives another person
28
of any of their “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. §
1
1983. In order to state a claim for damages under § 1983, a complaint must allege that (1) “the
2
conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law,” and that “ (2)
3
“this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or
4
laws of the United States.” Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) overruled on other grounds
5
by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
6
Mr. Righetti alleges that Dr. Richman’s decision to cancel a surgery to repair his broken
punishment. See FAC at 11. “The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual
9
punishment and ‘embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity,
10
and decency.’” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
11
For the Northern District of California
femur violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from the infliction of cruel and ususal
8
United States District Court
7
429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). “A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when he acts with
12
“deliberate indifference” to the serious medical needs of an inmate. Snow, 681 F.3d at 985 (quoting
13
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994)). “[D]eliberate indifference requires more than
14
ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.” Id. Rather, “[t]he state of mind for
15
deliberate indifference is [one of] subjective recklessness.” Id.
16
It is important to note that “the deliberate indifference doctrine is limited in scope.” Wilhelm
17
v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court has held that “in the medical
18
context, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an
19
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind,” and
20
thus does not rise to the level of ‘deliberate indifference.’ Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06
21
(1976). A plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint that “a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating
22
a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth
23
Amendment.” Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106. “Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional
24
violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Id.
25
“A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding
26
treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir.
27
1981); see also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (“a mere difference of
28
medical opinion is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference”) (quoting
2
1
Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir.1996) (quotation marks omitted). “Rather, to prevail
2
on a claim involving choices between alternative courses of treatment, a prisoner must show that the
3
chosen course of treatment was medically unacceptable under the circumstances, and was chosen in
4
conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d at
5
1058 (quoting Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d at 332 (quotation marks omitted)).
6
As presented in the amended complaint, Mr. Righetti’s allegations regarding Dr. Richman’s
rise beyond the level of medical negligence. His recitation of the facts merely allege that Dr.
9
Richman (1) cancelled Plaintiff’s surgery in whole or in part because Plaintiff’s disability renders
10
him unable to walk, and (2) that he never spoke to and never examined Mr. Righetti. FAC ¶ 32.
11
For the Northern District of California
treatment (prescribing pain medication and allowing his leg to heal naturally without surgery) do not
8
United States District Court
7
Plaintiff does not allege that Dr. Richman failed to review the x-ray of Plaintiff’s broken leg or that
12
he cancelled the surgery without ensuring that Plaintiff’s injury was to be treated in an alternate,
13
medically acceptable manner, and the Court is not obliged to infer such conduct absent supporting
14
factual allegations. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 opinion amended on
15
denial of reh’g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Nor is the court required to accept as true
16
allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable
17
inferences.”). The amended complaint does not allege that Dr. Richman acted because of an
18
“improper motive” (see Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d at 987), that his chosen course of treatment was
19
“medically unacceptable under the circumstances” (see Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d at 1058), or that
20
he “chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health” (see Jackson
21
v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d at 332). Rather, the amended complaint indicates that Dr. Richman made a
22
medical decision to allow Plaintiff’s leg to heal naturally, and to treat Plaintiff with narcotic
23
medications, rather than to conduct the surgery. FAC ¶ 31. Plaintiff makes no allegation in the
24
amended complaint that, in canceling the surgery and opting for an alternate method of treatment,
25
Dr. Richman prescribed a course of treatment that was “medically unacceptable under the
26
circumstances” or that he acted with “subjective recklessness,” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d at 985,
27
that is, that he “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v.
28
Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837 (stating how subjective recklessness requires that an “official must both
3
1
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
2
exists, and he must also draw the inference.”).
3
While a delay in treatment can in some cases constitute deliberate indifference where the
4
delay was harmful, see Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1094, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a
5
prison physician’s months-long delay in scheduling a medical consultation ordered by the prisoner’s
6
prior physician could constitute deliberate indifference, where the record showed that the delay was
7
harmful), the amended complaint does not allege that Dr. Richman delayed Plaintiff’s treatment -- it
8
alleges that he ordered an alternate course of treatment. As such, the Court DISMISSES without
9
prejudice Plaintiff’s §1983 claim. Plaintiff is given 60 days to file an amended complaint.
B.
Qualified Immunity
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
Dr. Richman argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity for his alleged § 1983 liability.
12
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Ninth Circuit
13
implemented a two-step analysis for determining whether a defendant may avail himself of qualified
14
immunity. First, a court must consider whether the facts in a case show that a defendant’s conduct
15
violated a constitutional right. Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (9th Cir.
16
2002). If the facts show a violation of such a right, the court must then consider “whether the
17
constitutional right . . . violated was clearly established” at the time the violation took place. Estate
18
of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050. This second step contains its own “two-part inquiry,” asking both “(1)
19
[w]as the law governing the state official’s conduct clearly established” at the time of the alleged
20
wrongdoing, and “(2) [u]nder that law could a reasonable state official have believed his conduct
21
was lawful?” Id. at 1050 (quoting Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001)).
22
Having found that Plaintiff failed to state a § 1983 claim against Dr. Richman in the
23
amended complaint, the Court need not decide whether Dr. Richman enjoys the benefits afforded by
24
qualified immunity. The Court does note, however, that a finding of deliberate indifference in the
25
Eighth Amendment context may very well preclude the finding of good faith necessary to avail
26
oneself of qualified immunity. See Albers v. Whitley, 743 F.2d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir. 1984) rev’d on
27
other grounds, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (noting that “[t]he two findings are mutually exclusive”).
28
4
1
2
C.
Statute of Limitations
Finally, Dr. Richman argues that Mr. Righetti’s state law medical negligence claim is
3
untimely under California’s applicable statute of limitations. As Plaintiff acknowledged in his
4
papers and at oral argument, the Court has already found Mr. Righetti’s negligence claim to be time-
5
barred against Dr. Richman’s co-Defendants. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
6
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docket No. 71) at pgs. 8-12. For the reasons stated on the record
7
and in this Court’s prior order, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s medical negligence claim against Dr.
8
Richman is also untimely under California law.
9
Mr. Righetti has offered no argument, nor cited any authority, that would cause this Court to
alter or amend its earlier ruling on the timeliness of his claim. Plaintiff cites several federal cases for
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
the proposition that equitable tolling is available to claims made by prisoners who face
12
‘extraordinary circumstances.’ See Pl’s Response Br. (Docket No. 72) at 12. However, Plaintiff’s
13
cited authorities on this point all involve grants of equitable tolling with regard to limitations periods
14
created under federal statutes. See Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 2012); Leon v.
15
Hedgpeth, 467 F. App’x 665 (9th Cir. 2012); and Ontiveros v. Subia, 365 F. App’x 848 (9th Cir.
16
2010). These cases address the availability of equitable tolling under the Antiterrorism and
17
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, et. seq.). As Plaintiff’s medical
18
negligence claim against Dr. Richman is based on California state law, federal standards for granting
19
equitable tolling do not apply. See Yeager v. Bowlin, 10-15297, 2012 WL 3900671 at *1 (9th Cir.
20
Sept. 10, 2012) (“Federal courts must abide by a state’s tolling rules, which are integrally related to
21
statues of limitations.”) (citing Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship, 634 F.3d 524, 530 (9th
22
Cir.2011)).
23
California state law permits equitable tolling “[w]hen an injured person has several legal
24
remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one.” Elkins v. Derby, 12 Cal.3d 410, 414
25
(1974). The California Supreme Court has articulated a multi-faceted standard for deciding whether
26
to apply equitable tolling to a particular claim that is otherwise time-barred. The three “core
27
elements” of that standard are: “(1) timely notice to the defendant in filing the first claim; (2) lack of
28
prejudice to defendant in gathering evidence to defend against the second claim; and, (3) good faith
5
1
and reasonable conduct by the plaintiff in filing the second claim.” Collier v. City of Pasadena, 142
2
Cal. App. 3d 917, 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Addison v. State of California, 21 Cal. 3d 313
3
(1978)).
4
Here any equitable tolling under this California law would not save Mr. Righetti’s claim.
5
Even if the pendency of his administrative claim equitably tolled the limitations period, his lawsuit
6
still was not filed within the limitations period. See Collier v. City of Pasadena, 142 Cal. App. 3d
7
917, 926 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (“if a plaintiff delayed filing the second claim until the statute on that
8
claim had nearly run, even after crediting the tolled period, his conduct might be considered
9
unreasonable”). See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
(Docket No. 71); FAC ¶ 41.
Mr. Righetti does not cite any authority for any other basis for equitably tolling under
12
California law. As such, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument of entitlement to equitable tolling,
13
and DISMISSES with prejudice the medical negligence claim against Dr. Richman.
14
This order disposes of Docket No. 64.
15
16
IT IS SO ORDERED.
17
18
Dated: November 15, 2012
19
_________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?