Brown et al v. The Hain Celestial Group, Inc.

Filing 172

ORDER by Judge Beeler denying 156 Motion for Summary Judgment (Beeler, Laurel) (Filed on 2/10/2014)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 Northern District of California 10 San Francisco Division 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 ROSMINAH BROWN and ERIC LOHELA, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, 13 No. C 11-03082 LB ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Plaintiffs, v. 14 [ECF No. 156] 15 THE HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC., a Delaware Corporation, 16 Defendant. ____________________________________ 17 18 INTRODUCTION 19 In this putative class action, Plaintiffs sued The Hain Celestial Group, alleging that it markets 20 and labels its “Avalon Organics” and “Jason” branded cosmetic products as organic when they are 21 not made predominately from organic ingredients, in violation of the California Organic Products 22 Act of 2003 (“COPA”), California Health and Safety Code Section 110810 et seq. Their claims are 23 as follows: (1) a claim for injunctive relief under COPA (claim one); (2) unlawful, fraudulent, and 24 unfair business practices under California’s Unfair Competition Law (the “UCL”), California 25 Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (claims two through four); (3) false 26 representations and false advertising in violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (the 27 “CLRA”), Cal Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq., 1770(a)(5), (7), and (9), and 1780-82 (claim five); and (5) 28 breach of express warranties in violation of California Commercial Code § 2313. C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 1 Hain moved for summary judgment on the grounds that (A) the California Department of Health 2 (“CDPH”), the agency responsible for enforcing COPA, determined in a February 2013 enforcement 3 decision that the Jason and Avalon Organics labels comply with COPA (thus “extinguishing” 4 Plaintiffs’ COPA claim), (B) Plaintiffs are estopped from arguing otherwise because they likely 5 initiated the complaint and were “deeply involved” in the CDPH’s investigation, and (C) the 6 CDPH’s determination is dispositive of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, which are predicated on a 7 COPA violation. See ECF No. 156.1 Because the record establishes only that the CDPH engaged in 8 an informal inquiry and obtained only ex parte submissions from Hain that resulted only in a 9 decision not to pursue the matter further, the court denies the motion for summary judgment. STATEMENT 10 I. THE PARTIES 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 The Hain Celestial Group, Inc. is a Delaware corporation that manufactures and distributes 13 cosmetic products (also referred to as personal care products) under the Jason and Avalon Organics 14 brands. See First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 1, 7, 13, ECF No. 68. Before 2011, with very few 15 exceptions, Hain’s Avalon Organics and Jason brand cosmetic products contained less than 70 16 percent organically-produced ingredients. Pls. JSUF # 23, ECF No. 164.2 Beginning sometime in 17 18 19 1 Record citations are to the Electronic Case File (“ECF”) with pin cites to the electronically-generated page numbers at the top of the document. 2 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Before 2011, the following Avalon Organics Products contained less than 70% organic ingredients excluding water and salt and included the phrase “organic [ingredient name]” or “with organic [ingredient name]” on the Principal Display Panel of the labels for such products: i. Avalon Organics Deodorant Spray, Grapefruit & Geranium with Organic Essential Oil; ii. Baby Avalon Organics Natural Mineral Sunscreen SPF 18; iii. Avalon Organics Shampoo, Nourishing Lavender. Pls. JSUF #25. The following Jason products included the phrase “Pure, Natural & Organic” on the Principle Display Panel of the label, but contained no organically certified ingredients: i. Jason Kiwi & Apricot Volumizing Root Boost; ii. Jason Aloe Vera & Bergamot Finishing Spray; iii. Jason Mint & Rose Intense Moisture Treatment; iv. Jason Kiwi & Apricot Volumizing Mousse; v. Jason Plumeria & Sea Kelp Leave In Conditioning Spray; vi. Jason Shea Nut Butter; C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 2 1 2011, Hain changed the formulation and labeling of substantially all of its Avalon Organics brand 2 products and changed the labeling of substantially all of its Jason brand cosmetic products (other 3 than those that had been discontinued). Pls. JSUF #18, 20. 4 On or about September 2009, Plaintiff Rosminah Brown purchased a Jason Ester-C Super-C 5 Cleanser Gentle Facial Wash (“Jason Face Wash”) at a Whole Foods Market in Roseville, 6 California. Brown Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 163-1. The front label of the Jason Face Wash, which Brown 7 reviewed before purchase, stated “Pure, Natural & Organic.” Id. At the time of her purchase, 8 Brown believed that the Jason Face Wash was either completely or at least mostly comprised of 9 certified organic ingredients. Id. 10 On or about December 2009, Plaintiff Eric Lohela purchased a number of Avalon Organics products. See Lohela Decl., ECF No. 163-2, ¶ 2. He purchased an Avalon Organics Lavender Hand 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 and Body Lotion (“Avalon Lavender Lotion”) from Vitacost.com, an online retailer. Id. ¶ 6. Before 13 purchasing the Avalon Lavender Lotion, Lohela read the name of the product and reviewed a 14 photograph of the product packaging. Id. The front label and the product name displayed the word 15 “Organics” and the front label included a pledge by Hain that the product was “Pro-Organic.” Id. 16 Around the same time, Lohela purchased a number of other Avalon Organics Products, and he 17 relied on the same representations identified with regard to the Avalon Lavender Lotion. Id. In 18 total, Lohela purchased seven Avalon Organics Products, including: (1) the Avalon Lavender 19 Lotion; (2) Avalon Organics Glycerin Liquid Hand Soap Lemon; (3) Avalon Organics Vitamin C 20 Soothing Lip Balm; (4) Avalon Organics Vitamin C Refreshing Facial Cleanser; (5) Avalon 21 Organics Botanicals Exfoliating Enzyme Scrub Lavender; (6) Avalon Organics Peppermint 22 Botanicals Shampoo; and (7) Avalon Organics Awapuhi Mango Moisturizing Conditioner. Id. 23 24 25 26 27 vii. Jason Ester-C Hydrating Mask; viii. Jason Color Treated Conditioner, Jojoba & Lemongrass; ix. Jason Plumeria & Sea Kelp Moisturizing Shampoo; x. Jason Plumeria & Sea Kelp Moisturizing Conditioner; xi. Jason Apricot & Kiwi Volumizing Shampoo; xii. Jason Red Elements Calming Facial Toner; xiii. Jason Strengthening Shampoo, Peppermint & Biotin. 28 Pls. JSUF #24. C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 3 1 (referencing allegations from the First Amended Complaint). Lohela believed that the statements on 2 the front of the Avalon Organics labels were true – that the products were either completely or at 3 least mostly comprised of organic ingredients. Id. 4 Brown and Lohela both are willing to pay more for cosmetic products that are comprised entirely 5 or predominately of organic ingredients than for similar products that contain few or no organic 6 ingredients. Brown Decl. ¶ 3; Lohela Decl. ¶ 3. 7 II. 2011 LAWSUITS AND THE SUBSEQUENT CDPH INQUIRY 8 A. 2011 Lawsuits 9 Plaintiff Rosminah Brown and former Plaintiff Center for Environmental Health (“CEH”) filed See 6/22/11 Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1; Pls. JSUF #1.3 The case was one of several filed by the 12 For the Northern District of California this class action lawsuit against Hain in Alameda County Superior Court on May 20, 2011. 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 CEH against manufacturers of personal care products for violations of COPA. See Todzo Decl. ¶ 6, 13 Exs. 3-5, ECF No. 163-3.4 On June 15, 2011, the CEH issued a press release announcing its 14 lawsuits, including this one. See Todzo Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. 4, ECF No. 163-3. Soon thereafter, Patrick 15 Kennelly, a Deputy Director5 at the CDPH, contacted Plaintiffs’ counsel and asked “for copies of 16 CEH’s COPA lawsuits.” Todzo Decl. ¶ 7. On June 20, 2011, Plaintiffs’ counsel e-mailed Mr. 17 Kennelly copies of the complaints in this and another lawsuit. See Hain JSUF #3, Ex. C. By 18 responding to the inquiry, Plaintiffs’ counsel and Plaintiffs did not intend to submit an 19 administrative complaint. Todzo Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 163-3, . 20 B. CDPH’s July 27, 2011 Letter 21 On July 27, 2011, Jane Marie Reick, the Chief of the Food Safety Inspection Unit, sent Hain a 22 letter via “Golden State Overnight – Signature Required” inquiring into Hain’s compliance with 23 24 25 3 Plaintiff Eric Lohela became a party after removal when Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on August 21, 2012. See FAC, ECF No. 68. 4 26 27 28 Because the CEH alleged no injury to itself and instead sued as a private attorney general under COPA, it lacked Article III standing to pursue the claims in federal court, and the parties stipulated to its dismissal. See ECF No. 30. 5 The Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts attached to Hain’s motion states that Mr. Kennelly was “chief of the [CDPH] Food Safety Section.” Hain JSUF #3. C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 4 1 COPA with respect to its sale of cosmetic products in California. Hain JSUF #4 & Ex. D.; Pls. 2 JSUF #5. She sent similar letters to at least eight other companies on that same date. See Todzo 3 Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 7. 4 The letter to Hain, which was cc’d to Mr. Kennelly, said that the CDPH Food and Drug Branch manufacture and/or sale of cosmetic products identified as organic in California” and informed Hain 7 that it “recently received a complaint alleging that cosmetics sold by your company do not comply 8 with the COPA” in that the cosmetics products were “identified as organic” and “failed to meet the 9 legal requirements to be identified as organic.” Hain JSUF Ex. D. The letter set forth the relevant 10 portions of California Health and Safety Code sections 110838 (cosmetic products labeled and sold 11 as organic must contain at least 70 percent organically-produced ingredients) and 110839 12 For the Northern District of California “is the state agency with primary responsibility and jurisdiction to enforce the [COPA] related to the 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 (requirements for how multi-ingredient cosmetic products with less than 70% percent organically- 13 produced ingredients may identify the organically-produced ingredients on ingredient lists). Id. The 14 letter to Hain did not include any reference to section 110815(k), which defines the term “sold as 15 organic.” The eight other letters sent to other companies that day did reference section 110815 in 16 the following context: 17 18 In addition to the issues identified above, a review of our licensing database indicates that your company does not possess a valid Organic Processed Product Registration (OPPR) issued by FDB [Food and Drug Branch]. For your convenience, an OPPR application form has been enclosed. 19 20 21 22 H&SC Section 110875(a) requires every person engaged in this state in the processing or handling of processed products sold as organic, including cosmetics, to register with FDB. H&SC Section 110815(k) defines “sold as organic” to mean any use of the terms “organic”, “organically grown”, or grammatical variations of those terms, whether orally or in writing, in connection with any product grown, handled, processed, sold, or offered for sale in this state, including but not limited to, any use of these terms in labeling or advertising of any product and any ingredient in a multi-ingredient product.” 23 Todzo Decl. Ex. 7, ECF No. 163-10. 24 The CDPH asked Hain to submit a written response directed to Ms. Reick’s attention by August 25 8, 2011 regarding the following: 26 27 1. A list of all cosmetic products sold by your company that use the terms “organic”, “organically grown”, “made with” organic ingredients or food groups, or any grammatical variations of those terms, to identify the product. 28 2. One complete and legible label for each product identified in #1, above. C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 5 1 2 3. The formulation for each product identified in #1, above. The formulation must identify all of the ingredients in each product and must clearly show the amount of each ingredient in the product by weight or fluid volume. Please be sure to mark each formulation as “Confidential”. 3 4 5 Hain JSUF Ex. D. The CDPH also noted the following: 7 COPA applies to all products sold as organic within the state, wherever produced, handled, or processed. Furthermore, it is unlawful for any person to sell, offer for sale, advertise, or label any product in violation of the COPA. 8 Finally, the letter advised Hain of the following: 9 10 Failure to respond to the letter and/or to correct the identified violations will result in further enforcement action which may include, but is not limited to, embargo, assessment of civil penalty, and/or referral to a prosecuting attorney for civil and/or criminal prosecution. 11 Plaintiffs say that they did not lodge a complaint with the CDPH or any other government 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 4. Evidence of organic certification by an approved third party organic-certifying organization for every ingredient identified on product labels as organic. agency regarding the Products. Brown Decl. ¶ 4; Lohela Decl. ¶ 4. The first time Plaintiffs’ counsel 13 learned of the CDPH inquiry was on February 21, 2013, when Hain’s counsel provided him with the 14 CDPH’s February 19, 2013 Notice of Resolution (discussed below). See Todzo Decl. ¶ 9. Plaintiffs 15 learned of the CDPH inquiry around February 25, 2013, when Mr. Todzo informed them of the 16 Notice of Resolution. Brown Decl. ¶ 5; Lohela Decl. ¶ 5. 17 C. Hain’s September 20, 2011 Response to the CDPH’s July 2011 Letter 18 On September 20, 2011, Hain’s counsel Simon Frankel sent Hain’s response to Ms. Reick with a 19 cover letter forwarding three charts listing products and 332 pages of documents consisting of 20 product labels, product formulations, and organic certificates for products. Frankel Decl. ¶ 2, Exs. 21 1-17, ECF No. 158. The body of the letter is as follows: 22 As we have discussed, I am writing on behalf of The Hain Celestial Group, Inc. (“Hain Celestial”) in response to your letter of July 27, 2011. 23 24 25 26 Your letter requested certain information about products currently sold by Hain Celestial in California that “use the terms ‘organic,’ ‘organically grown,’ ‘made with’ organic ingredients or food groups, or any grammatical variation of those terms, to identify the product.” As an initial matter, Hain Celestial does not concede that a product meeting any part of this description would necessarily be one that is “sold, labeled, or represented as organic or made with organic ingredients,” within the scope of the California Organic Products Act (“COPA”). We also have uncertainty about the validity and enforceability of COPA in light of existing federal legislation. 27 28 Without waiver of these issues, however, Hain Celestial has worked diligently to collect all of the information requested by your July 27 letter. Accordingly, I am attaching three charts that list products currently (or very recently) sold by Hain Celestial that use the term “organic” (or some C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 variation) to identify the product in any way. These charts, which are for the Avalon Organics®, Earth’s Best®, and Jason® brands sold by Hain Celestial, indicate the organic certification status for each of the listed products and provide other information on the current status of each product. In addition, I enclose documents numbered HC00000l-000332, which are copies of (a) the labels for each of the products in the three charts (in a few instances, we could not locate high quality artwork), and (b) the formulations for each of these products. (As you instructed, the formulations are labeled as “Confidential-Trade Secret,” and we understand they will be treated accordingly by the Department of Public Health.) Finally, I enclose the organic certificates for the products listed on these charts, with the exception of products for which certification is currently pending (and expected shortly), as indicated on the charts. As I discussed with you when we spoke on August 4, 2011, Hain Celestial has been working in a focused manner over the past two years to ensure that all of its products comply in all respects with COPA. As reflected in the enclosed materials, other than discontinued products, we believe that Hain Celestial products currently being sold in California are certified (or in the process of being certified) by third parties as organic consistent with COPA. Once you have had a chance to review these materials, please let me know if you have any additional questions or need additional information. 10 ECF No. 158-1. The charts list product name, size, whether the product has an organic claim on the 11 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT label, its organic certification status, and whether it is being reformulated, re-labeled, or 12 discontinued. See ECF No. 158-1 at 4-13. They indicate that all but 4 of the 98 Avalon Organics 13 products were being reformulated for “Oct/Nov 2011 Start Ship.” See id. All but five Avalon 14 Organics products were being re-labeled for “Oct/Nov 2011 Start Ship.” Id. The chart also shows 15 that Hain was discontinuing all but two Jason brand products. Id. 16 Hain submitted copies of the revised labels and the revised formulations for each product 17 identified. Id. Exs. 1-17. Hain provided the pre-2011 labels and formulations for just four Avalon 18 Organics products. See Pls. JSUF #19. Three of the four products were certified to USDA organic 19 standards and are not part of this suit, and the fourth product was being discontinued. See id. 20 D. Relevant Events Between September 20, 2011 and the CDPH’s February 2013 Notice 21 On March 2, 2012, Hain moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the federal Organic Foods 22 Production Act of 1990 (“OFPA”), 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-24, expressly preempted COPA. See Mot. to 23 Dismiss, ECF No. 27 at 10 (also arguing that all remaining claims should be dismissed because they 24 were predicated on a COPA violation). Hain did not mention the CDPH inquiry in its motion, the 25 parties’ December 2011 joint case management statement,6 or its discovery responses (including its 26 27 28 6 In their initial case management conference statement, the parties must include information about “[a]ny related cases or proceedings pending before another judge of this court, or before another court or administrative body.” See N.D. Cal. “Standing Order For All Judges,” ECF No. 3-1. C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 7 1 March 2012 response to Plaintiffs’ December 2011 request for production of documents concerning 2 Hain’s compliance with COPA). Pls. JSUF # 6-13 & Exs. 3 (RFP 9), 4-10. In its motion to dismiss, 3 Hain also argued that “The California Organic Products Act was enacted in 2003 and has largely 4 been ignored because non-federal organic product standards have been preempted since the 5 enactment of the OFPA.” Motion to Dismiss at 3. 6 On March 7, 2012, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent an e-mail to Pat Kennelly at CDPH, attached Hain’s 7 motion to dismiss, and asked whether Mr. Kennelly had “any additional thoughts regarding Hain’s 8 arguments.” Hain JSUF #5, Ex. E. 9 On August 1, 2012, the court denied Hain’s motion to dismiss, rejecting Hain’s OFPA preemption argument and its later-raised argument that the USDA had primary jurisdiction over the 11 labeling claims. See ECF No. 58. 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 Other relevant case events after the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss in August 2012 13 include the court’s rulings against Hain in the parties’ discovery disputes. See, e.g., 8/10/12 Order, 14 ECF No. 64; 9/6/12 Order, ECF No. 75; 12/11/12 Order, ECF No. 102; see 10/28/13 Order, ECF 15 No. 155 at 2-9 (recounting case chronology). In September 2012, the court also certified for appeal 16 its August 2012 order denying the motion to dismiss, but the Ninth Circuit denied the petition to 17 appeal in December 2012. 9/24/12 Order, ECF No. 79; Docket, No. 12-80186 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 18 2012). The court denied Hain’s motion to dismiss the FAC for Plaintiffs’ alleged lack of standing 19 on December 22, 2012. See ECF No. 104. 20 E. Hain’s January and February 2013 Communications with the CDPH 21 Between September 21, 2011 and January 28, 2013, there were no communications between 22 Hain and CDPH regarding CDPH’s inquiry into Hain’s compliance with COPA. Pls. JSUF #14. On 23 January 28, 2013, Hain’s counsel, William Friedman, sent an email message to Ms. Reick saying 24 that Hain had responded in September 2011 to her July 2011 letter, noting that Hain had not 25 received any response, and asking to speak with her about the matter. See Friedman Decl. Ex. 2, 26 ECF No. 157-2 at 2. On February 4, 2013, Ms. Reick sent a reply email saying that the Hain 27 Celestial file was forwarded to Regional Administrator Mary Kate Miller for review and that Ms. 28 Miller would contact Mr. Friedman within 10 working days. Id. C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 8 1 On February 7, 2013, Mr. Friedman sent an email to Ms. Miller asking whether she had a 2 moment to speak that day and saying that he had reviewed Hain’s previous submission and “wanted 3 to provide some additional information to you.” See Todzo Decl. Ex. 9, ECF No. 163-12. Ms. 4 Miller responded that same day, saying that she would pull the notes and call him shortly. Id. Mr. 5 Friedman emailed back with his availability that afternoon and attached the two COPA provisions 6 cited in CDPH’s July 2011 letter, California Health and Safety Code sections 110839 (cosmetic 7 products labeled and sold as organic must contain at least 70 percent organically-produced 8 ingredients) and 11039 (cosmetic products with less than 70% percent organically-produced 9 ingredients may identify organically-produced ingredients only on ingredient lists and only in 10 On February 8, 2013, Mr. Friedman sent Ms. Miller a letter to supplement Hain’s September 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 certain defined ways). See id. 2011 letter and included several samples of the revised Jason labels. See Friedman Decl. Exs. 1-2, 13 ECF No. 157-1, 157-2. He first characterized the CDPH’s July 2011 letter as (A) referencing 14 COPA, California Health & Safety Code §§ 110838 and 110839, and (B) inquiring about whether 15 “cosmetic products marketed under Hain-Celestial’s three product brands, Avalon Organics, Jason 16 and Earth’s Best, may be non compliant with COPA’s requirements.” He next said that in 17 September 2011, Hain “replied that the products complied with COPA’s labeling requirements.” He 18 then argued the following: 19 Prior Labels 20 The September 2011 submission demonstrated that: 21 1. The Avalon Organics branded products did not use the word “organic” on the principle [sic] display panel at all, but instead used the word “organics” in its brand name on the principal display panel. 22 23 2. Jason products used the tagline “pure, natural, organic” in very small font on the principal display panel and Earth’s Best products used the word “organic” on the principal display panel. 24 25 26 27 28 Each product contained certified organic ingredients. None of these products, however, used the word “organic” to modify the common name of the product (e.g. “organic shampoo”) and none of the products used the word “organic” to identify any agricultural ingredients or product content on the product’s principal display panel (e.g. “made with organic ingredients” or “organic lavender”). Because the products typically contained organic ingredients that totaled less than 70%, each product restricted reference to the certified organic ingredients to the ingredient panel only. See COPA, § 110839 (limiting reference to “organic content” in products with less than 70% content to the ingredient panel). C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 9 6 Because no Avalon Organics, Jason or Earth’s Best product declared a percentage of organic content, or modified the common name of the product by placing the word “organic” in front of the product’s common name, on the product’s principal display panel, none of the products was identified as a product containing 70% organically produced ingredients under§ 110838. More importantly, as the quotation from § 110839 in the Department’s July letter states, COPA expressly authorizes cosmetic products with less than 70% organic content to be sold in California provided that the “organic content” is identified only on the ingredient panel. The organic content of the cosmetic products of each of Hain Celestial’s three brands was less than 70%, and that content was identified solely on the ingredient panel as required under Section 110839. Accordingly, each brand’s products were not misleadingly labeled under COPA, and in fact complied with the plain meaning of both §§’s 110838 and 110839 of COPA. 7 He concluded with the following paragraph about the prior labels: 8 Based on the foregoing, the prior product labels of all three brands (the subjects of the complaint) complied with COPA’s requirements because COPA does not prohibit the use of the word “organic” on the principal display panel of cosmetic products with less than 70% organic content as long as its use does not suggest an ingredient is organic that is not organic, or that the product contains 70% organic content when it does not. Here, the company’s products were not misleadingly labeled under Sec. 110838 or 110839 because not a single product referred to organic content, the percentage or organic ingredients, or declared the common name of the product to be an “organic” product on the front display panel. 1 2 3 4 5 9 10 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 13 The letter also made representations about the current labels and included revised label proofs 14 for six Jason products showing that the “pure, natural and organic” tagline had been removed and 15 certificates showing that Avalon and Earth’s Best products were now certified to ANSI/NSF-305 16 organic standards. Id. As to the current labels, he concluded: 19 [T]he current labels of all three brands comply with COPA’s requirements. The Avalon Organics and Earth’s Best product principal display panels now state the products contain 70% or more organic content and that they are certified to the ANSI/NSF-305 cosmetic standard. Jason brand products continue to contain less than 70% organic content and refer to the certified organic ingredients solely on the ingredient panel as directed by Section 110839. 20 F. The Notice of Resolution 21 On February 19, 2013, the CDPH sent Hain a short “Notice of Resolution.” Hain JSUF #6, Ex. 22 F; Pls. JSUF #6, Ex. F. The notice begins with the acknowledgment that the CDPH “reviewed the 23 documentation you submitted in response to the CDPH letter sent to Hain Celestial Group on July 24 21, 2011. You provided labels for various Avalon Organics®, Earth’s Best and Jason brands 25 personal products for review to ensure compliance with the California Organics Products Act 26 (COPA), including sections 110838 and 110839.” The notice then says the following: 17 18 27 28 The Avalon Organics® and Earth’s Best and Jason brands were not found to represent the products as “organic”, or to use the word “organic” to identify ingredients or modify content on the Principle Display Panel (PDP). However, it is noted that Hain Celestial Group has taken the following voluntarily [sic] actions to meet buyer and labeling specifications. C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 10 • The Avalon Organics® and Earth’s Best products were tested for the percentage of organically produced ingredients as evidence that they contain 70% or more organically produced ingredients. You provided certification from Quality Assurance International (QAI) as documentation that specific Avalon Organics® and Earth’s Best products comply with ANSI/NSF 305 specifications as containing not less than 70% organic ingredients. • 1 Jason product labels originally contained a tag line that included the words, “pure – natural – organic” on the PDP. You removed these words from the labels and provided a copy of the revised labels as verification. 2 3 4 5 6 7 The ingredient panel on the Information Panel (IP) of Avalon Organics®, Earth’s Best and Jason product labels listed organic ingredients, as permitted under COPA. 8 We appreciate the efforts you have taken to address this inquiry and consider the matter resolved. 9 G. Plaintiffs’ Post-Notice of Resolution Correspondence with the CDPH 11 As discussed above, Plaintiffs’ counsel Mark Todzo learned about the CDPH inquiry on 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 February 21, 2013, when Hain’s counsel gave him a copy in connection with the parties’ mediation 13 efforts. See Todzo Decl. ¶ 9. That day, he sent Ms. Miller an email forwarding two orders: (A) 14 Judge Brick’s order in Alameda County Superior Court interpreting COPA as prohibiting any use of 15 the term “organic” or its grammatical variants on the principal display panel of cosmetic products 16 that contain less than 70% organic ingredients and (B) this court’s order reaching the same 17 conclusion. See Hain JSUF #7, Ex. G. An email from Mr. Todzo to Mr. Kennelly says that Mr. 18 Todzo left messages for Mr. Kennelly, who responded by email on March 5, 2013 that he was not 19 dealing directly with organic issues and typically did not discuss letters issued to another firm with 20 counsel not representing the firm that received the letter. See Hain JSUF #8-12, Exs. H-K. Mr. 21 Todzo responded that the CDPH seemed to be treating CEH’s lawsuits as administrative complaints, 22 and “[i]f so, the Department should be able to discuss the letters with me as the attorney for the 23 complainant.” Id. Ex. H. Mr. Kennelly responded that “CEH opted to file these lawsuits instead of 24 referring the alleged violators to CDPH for investigation.” Id. Ex. L. Mr. Todzo responded, “I 25 agree that CEH did not intend to initiate an administrative complaint with the Department.” Id. Ex. 26 K. He explained that if the CDPH treated him, the CEH, or Ms. Brown as complainants, then he 27 was entitled to information regarding how they were handled. Alternatively, “[i]f the complaints 28 referenced in the Department’s letters are not based on the complaints I sent you in June 2011[], C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 11 1 2 3 4 please so state.” Id. Mr. Kennelly responded the next day by e-mail. See Hain JSUF #13, Ex. M. With regard to the impetus for the CDPH inquiry, Mr. Kennelly stated the following: 7 We initiated a follow-up investigation after hearing about the alleged violations of COPA in the media. We likely used “receipt of complaint” language in the letters to the companies as that is the standard language in our letters that are generated when we have not conducted an investigation. If you recall, CEH publicized its lawsuits in the media via a press release before you ever provided a copy of the complaint. I had to actually call CEH and ask for a copy of the complaint which you ultimately provided at a later time. These facts make it very difficult to argue that you are a complainant. 8 ANALYSIS 5 6 9 I. LEGAL STANDARDS The court should grant a summary judgment motion if there is no genuine issue of material fact 12 For the Northern District of California A. Summary Judgment 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. 13 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Material facts are those that may affect the case’s 14 outcome. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient 15 evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248-49. 16 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the 17 basis for the motion, and identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to 18 interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material 19 fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet its burden, “the moving party 20 must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or 21 defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to 22 carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz 23 Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000); see Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 24 (9th Cir. 2001) (“When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need 25 only point out ‘that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’”) 26 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). 27 28 If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence supporting its claims or defenses. Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103. The non-moving party C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 12 1 may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s evidence but instead must 2 produce admissible evidence that shows there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See 3 Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. If the non-moving party does not produce evidence to show a genuine 4 issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 5 In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, inferences drawn from the underlying facts are 6 viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 7 Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The California Organic Products Act is set forth in California Health & Safety Code sections 10 110810 et seq. and is part of the larger Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law. See Cal. Health & 11 Safety Code § 110810 (“This article shall be known, and may be cited, as COPA.”) COPA regulates 12 For the Northern District of California B. COPA’s Labeling Requirements For Cosmetic Products 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 the requirements for products sold as organic in California. See, e.g., id. §§ 110820 (“no product 13 shall be sold as organic pursuant to this article unless it is produced according to regulations 14 promulgated by the NOP [National Organics Products Act]” except for identified exceptions), 15 110880 (“This article shall apply to all products sold as organic within the state”). “‘Sold as 16 organic’ means any use of the terms ‘organic,’ ‘organically grown,’ or grammatical variations of 17 those terms, whether orally or in writing, in connection with any product grown, handled, processed, 18 sold, or offered for sale in this state, including, but not limited to, any use of these terms in labeling 19 or advertising of any product and any ingredient in a multi-ingredient product.” Id. § 110815(k). 20 Two other provisions are relevant to the cosmetic products at issue in the litigation: section 21 110838, which sets forth the compositional requirements for products sold or labeled as organic, and 22 section 110839, which sets forth the labeling requirements for multi-ingredient cosmetic products 23 with less than 70% organically-produced ingredients. 24 First, section 110838(a) requires that “[c]osmetic products sold, labeled, or represented as 25 organic or made with organic ingredients shall contain, at least 70 percent organically produced 26 ingredients.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 110838(a).7 27 28 7 Section 110838(b) sets forth the methods for calculating the percentage “of all organically produced ingredients in an agricultural product sold or labeled as ‘organic’ or “100 percent organic,’ C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Second, section 110839 applies to cosmetic products with less than 70 percent organicallyproduced ingredients: Multi-ingredient cosmetic products sold as organic in California with less than 70 percent organically produced ingredients, by weight or by fluid volume, excluding water and salt, may only identify the organic content as follows: (a) By identifying each organically produced ingredient in the ingredient statement with the word “organic” or with an asterisk or other reference mark that is defined below the ingredient statement to indicate the ingredient is organically produced. (b) If the organically produced ingredients are identified in the ingredient statement, by displaying the product’s percentage of organic contents on the information panel. 8 9 Id. at § 110839. C. Enforcement of COPA 11 It is unlawful to sell, offer for sale, advertise, or label any product in violation of COPA. 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 Id. § 110890. COPA sets forth mechanisms for addressing and punishing violations of COPA. This 13 section reviews them in the order in which they occur in the statute. 14 Section 110915 provides that “in lieu of prosecution,” the Director may levy certain civil 15 penalties or issue a notice of violation for first offenses in lieu of a civil penalty. Id. § 110915(a)- 16 (c). If a civil penalty is levied, then the person against whom the penalty is levied may ask for, and 17 then must be given, an administrative hearing. Id. § 110915(d). At the hearing, the person has the 18 right to review the evidence of the violation and “the right to present evidence on his own behalf.” 19 Id. If the person does not request a hearing, the civil penalty is a final, non-removable order. Id. “If 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 or sold, labeled, or represented as being made with organic ingredients or food groups, or as inclusive of organic ingredients.” The method depends on whether the product has organicallyproduced products in solid form, liquid form, or both. See id. § 110838(b). For products containing organically-produced ingredients in solid form, the percentage of organic ingredients is calculated by dividing the weight of the organic ingredients (excluding water and salt) by the total weight of the finished product (excluding water and salt). Id. For products containing organically-produced ingredients in liquid form, the percentage of organic ingredients is calculated by dividing the fluid volume of the organic ingredients (excluding water and salt) by the fluid volume of the finished product (excluding water and salt). Id. For products containing organically-produced ingredients in both solid and liquid form, one divides the combined weight of the solid ingredients and the weight of the liquid ingredients (excluding water and salt) by the total weight of the finished product (excluding water and salt). Id. C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 14 1 a hearing is held, review of the decision of the director may be sought by any person within 30 days 2 of the date of the final order of the director pursuant to” California Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5. 3 Any civil penalty levied under section 110915 “may be recovered in a civil action brought in the 4 name of the state.” Id. § 110915(f). 5 Section 110930 addresses CDPH’s enforcement authority: 6 The director shall, to the extent funds are available, enforce this article applicable to all processors and handlers of processed products sold as organic.” 7 Organic Program (“NOP”)), 110815(b) (“Director” means the Director of the Department of Health 10 Services), (c) (“enforcement authority” means the governmental unit (now, the CDPH) with primary 11 enforcement jurisdiction under section 110930), (e) (“handle” means to sell, process, or package 12 For the Northern District of California Id. § 110930; see also id. §§ 110812 (director shall enforce regulations promulgated by the National 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 agricultural products). 13 Section 110940 provides a process for filing complaints about COPA violations and responding 14 to them. Section 110940(a) provides that any person may complain to the director about suspected 15 COPA violations by “a person over whom the director has responsibility as provided in this article 16 or regulations adopted by the NOP.” Section 110940(b) addresses the procedures for addressing 17 complaints: 18 19 20 The director shall, to the extent funds are available, establish a procedure for handling complaints, including, provision of a written complaint form, and procedures for commencing an investigation within three working days of receiving a written complaint regarding fresh food, and within seven working days for other products, and completing an investigation and reporting findings and any enforcement action taken, if any, to the complaint within 90 days thereafter. 21 Id. § 110940(b). Section 110940 has three more sections. Section (c) allows the director to 22 establish minimum information requirements to determine the verifiability of a complaint and may 23 provide for rejection of a complaint that does not meet the requirements (but must provide written 24 reasons for rejection of the complaint to the complainant). Section (d) reiterates that the director’s 25 responsibilities under section 110940 “shall be carried out to the extent funds are available.” 26 Section (e) requires that California’s complaint process must meet the complaint processes outlined 27 in the NOP regulations. 28 Section 110950 allows the director to “adopt any regulations as are reasonably necessary to C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 15 1 2 assist in the implementation of, or to make more specific, the provisions of, this article.” The Sherman Law has other enforcement mechanisms to address COPA violations. Under 3 section 111840, “[t]he Attorney General, any district attorney, or any city attorney to whom the 4 department reports any violation of this part [meaning, the Sherman Law] may begin appropriate 5 proceedings in the proper court.” Under section 111900, “[t]he Attorney General or any district 6 attorney, on behalf of the department [the CDPH], may bring an action in superior court . . . to grant 7 a temporary or permanent injunction restraining any person from violating any provision of this 8 part.” Id. § 111900. Section 111910 allows a private right to sue for injunctive relief: 9 10 (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 111900 or any other provision of law, any person may bring an action in superior court pursuant to this section and the court shall have jurisdiction upon hearing and for cause shown, to grant a temporary or permanent injunction restraining any person from violating any provision of [COPA]. 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 Id. § 111910(a). A private party seeking injunctive relief need not “allege facts necessary to show, 13 or tending to show, lack of adequate remedy at law, or to show, or tending to show, irreparable 14 damage or loss, or to show, or tending to show, unique or special individual injury or damages.” Id. 15 In addition to injunctive relief, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees. Id. § 111910(b). 16 The private right of action, however, “shall not be construed to limit or alter the powers of the 17 department [meaning, the CDPH] and its authorized agents to bring an action to enforce this chapter 18 pursuant to Section 111910 or any other provision of law.” Id. § 111910(c). 19 II. CDPH’S INFORMAL INQUIRY DID NOT DECIDE THE COPA CLAIM 20 The main issue is whether in its February 19, 2013 Notice of Resolution, the CDPH decided that 21 Hain’s labels did not violate COPA and, if it did, whether that decision precludes Plaintiffs’ COPA 22 claims in this litigation. Hain’s argument is that the CDPH process was an “enforcement 23 proceeding” that “extinguished” Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief under COPA for the alleged 24 violations of Section 110839. Motion, ECF No. 156 at 13, 19-20. The basis for this argument is that 25 COPA permits both CDPH and Plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief. Id. at 19. Plaintiffs thus are 26 acting as private attorneys general and are bringing an enforcement action to protect the public (and 27 not to benefit themselves as private parties). Id. The CDPH is the statute’s primary enforcer, and 28 the CDPH “has determined that Avalon Organics products are now each certified as containing 70% C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 16 1 minimum organic content and that Jason products no longer bear the tagline “pure, natural & 2 organic.” Id. at 20. “This moots the allegations by Plaintiffs–the statute’s secondary enforcer–with 3 regard to the front panel use of the word ‘organic’ or ‘organics’ for each brand.” Id. Accordingly, 4 Hain concludes, “there is no COPA violation to prospectively enjoin and no public interest to be 5 achieved in this court by maintaining this claim.” Id. 6 On this record, the court concludes that the CDPH’s Notice (A) was only an informal “notice” – 7 issued at the end of CDPH’s informal inquiry about a possible COPA violation – of the agency’s 8 decision not to pursue further action, and (B) does not preclude Plaintiffs’ COPA claim in this 9 lawsuit. This conclusion is supported by several factors. “recently received a complaint” that Hain’s cosmetics did not comply with COPA’s requirements 12 For the Northern District of California First, the inquiry was informal on its face. CDPH’s July 2011 letter said only that CDPH 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 regarding the identification of cosmetic products as organic, identified the two statutes (California 13 Health and Safety Code §§ 111038 and 111039) that address compositional and labeling 14 requirements for cosmetic products sold as organic, and asked Hain to provide a list of products that 15 use the term “organic” (or variations of organic), the labels for those products, the formulations (or 16 recipes) for the products, and evidence of organic certification for organic ingredients. Hain JSUF 17 Ex. D. The context of the July 2011 letter supports its informality: the letter was one of nine similar 18 letters sent that day. See Todzo Decl. Ex. 7. The letters referred generically to receipt of complaints 19 (and did not identify them). As discussed above, the agency appears to have initiated its inquiries 20 after the Center for Environmental Health’s June 15, 2011 press releases about its lawsuits 21 (including this one). See supra STATEMENT (II)(A)-(G) (the chief of the CDPH Food Safety 22 Section heard about the alleged violations in the media). 23 Second, the process that followed was informal too. Hain’s September 2011 submission was ex 24 parte. Frankel Decl., Ex. 1, ECF No. 151-1. Eighteen months went by with no response from the 25 CDPH. Then, on January 28, 2013, Hain’s counsel sent an email to the head of CDPH’s Food 26 Safety Inspection Unit (the person who sent the July 2011 inquiry), asked about the status, and asked 27 to speak to her. Friedman Decl., Ex. 2, ECF No. 157-2. On February 4, 2013, she replied, saying 28 that the Hain Celestial file had been sent to the Regional Administrator for review and to expect a C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 17 1 response within ten working days. Id. On February 7, 2013, Hain’s counsel and the Regional 2 Administrator exchanged emails arranging to speak later that day, and on February 8, 2013, Hain’s 3 counsel sent a letter to supplement Hain’s September 2011 submission. Id.; Friedman Decl., Ex. 1, 4 ECF No. 157-1. Eleven days later, on February 19, 2013, the CDPH issued its Notice of Resolution. 5 Hain JSUF #6, Ex. F. 6 Third, the process’s informality also is shown by the fact that the agency considered only Hain’s 7 ex parte submissions. That fact is established by the first paragraph of the notice, which begins by 8 acknowledging that the CDPH reviewed Hain’s “documentation submitted in response to the CDPH 9 letter sent to Hain Celestial Group on July 27, 2011,” including the labels. Id. The only September 2011 submission mostly was about products being reformulated for shipment in October 12 For the Northern District of California documentation is Hain’s two ex parte submissions in September 2011 and February 2013. The 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 or November 2011 or discontinued. See Frankel Decl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 151-1 (September 2011 13 submission provided information regarding “products currently (or very recently) sold by Hain 14 Celestial” that use the term “organic” (or variants such as organically-grown);8 ECF No. 158-1 at 4- 15 13 (attached charts show that for the Avalon products, all but 4 of the 98 products were products 16 being reformulated for an “Oct/Nov 2011 Start Ship” and all but 5 were being relabeled; all but two 17 Jason products were being discontinued); Pls. JSUF # 19 & Exs. 1-17 (Hain submitted pre-2011 18 labels for just four Avalon products, three of which were certified to USDA organic standards and 19 are not part of this lawsuit, and one that was being discontinued); Friedman Decl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 20 157-1 (attachments were revised label proofs for several Jason products showing that the “pure, 21 natural, and organic” tagline had been removed).9 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 The submissions regarding Hain’s October/November 2011 new products are for products that purport to meet COPA’s 70-percent compositional standards (as opposed to the old products, which undisputedly – with very few exceptions – contained less than 70 percent organicallyproduced ingredients). See Pls. JSUF # 23. 9 In addition to the ex parte process showing the informality of the inquiry, this record refutes Hain’s argument at the hearing that one cannot conclude necessarily that the CDPH did not consider all labels at issue in this litigation. The letter’s first paragraph – acknowledging review of Hain’s documentation – suggests that it considered nothing more. In its second ex parte submission C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 18 1 In sum, the entire inquiry was a letter, an ex parte submission in 2011, an 18-month hiatus, a 2 second ex parte submission following some informal emails and possibly a conversation, and a short 3 notice. The process suggests only an informal inquiry and a decision not to proceed further, a 4 conclusion bolstered by the agency’s post-notice communications to Plaintiffs’ attorney that he was 5 not a complainant and was not entitled to know the details of a response made to Hain. See supra 6 STATEMENT (II)(G). 7 Hain’s arguments do not alter this conclusion. 8 First, Hain argues that Plaintiffs’ inability to present evidence, participate in the process, or 9 cross-examine witnesses does not mean that the agency’s decision does not preclude Plaintiffs’ participate in proceedings such as a district attorney’s decision not to prosecute, the State Bar’s 12 For the Northern District of California claims. Motion, ECF No. 156 at 22. Hain analogizes to a private plaintiff’s lack of right to 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 decision not to revoke a lawyer’s license, a zoning board’s decision not to grant a conditional use 13 permit, and other public matters where “no single member of the public has a right to participate or 14 direct outcomes, yet everyone is bound.” Id. In support of this argument, Hain cites California law 15 regarding claim preclusion, arguing that it applies because the CDPH and Plaintiffs seek to advance 16 the same “primary right” to be free of products that do not comply with COPA. Id. at n.9. Because 17 this action addresses the same primary right “adjudicated” by the CDPH, Hain argues that the two 18 proceedings (the federal case and the CDPH’s “decision to take up the cause”) involve a single 19 cause of action for purposes of claim preclusion. See id. 20 21 The problem is that this argument is predicated on the CDPH’s “decision to take up the cause” of action and its “adjudication” of it. As discussed above, the informality of the process belies this 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 in February 2013, Hain argued forcibly that the September 2011 submissions demonstrated that “the prior product labels” complied with COPA’s requirements. Friedman Decl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 157-1. An argument that the September 2011 submissions demonstrated something about the prior product labels does not alter the record about what Hain actually submitted and what the CDPH actually considered: current or anticipated Avalon products (except for four), information showing Jason products that were discontinued, and several revised Jason labels. Moreover, in conclusion, the CDPH said, “[w]e appreciate the efforts that you have taken to address this inquiry and consider the matter resolved,” again leading to the conclusion that it considered only Hain’s submissions. Pls. JSUF #6, Ex. F. C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 19 1 2 predicate. It was not a formal adjudication.10 Hain counters in its reply brief that the CDPH adjudication was an enforcement matter, not an 3 adjudication in the sense of a judicial proceeding that requires a trial-like process. Reply, ECF No. 4 167 at 15. Trial-like procedures might be required for administrative proceedings to take away 5 Plaintiffs’ liberty or property rights (and Hain gives examples such as imprisonment, deportation, or 6 loss of a job, license, or public benefit). But – Hain argues – this situation is different because the 7 CDPH is the state agency charged with enforcing COPA and its Notice is an enforcement decision 8 that precludes Plaintiffs’ private-attorney-general lawsuit for the same relief “adjudicated” in the 9 enforcement proceeding. Motion, ECF No. 156 at 21-22; Reply, ECF No. 167 at 15. proceeding (by an agency with authority) that addressed conclusively an injunctive relief claim 12 For the Northern District of California Plaintiffs acknowledged at the hearing on this motion that an administrative enforcement 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 conceivably could preclude private persons (acting as private attorneys general) from pursuing a 13 claim for injunctive relief in a separate civil action. And administrative enforcement proceedings 14 that “get it wrong”11 (as Hain characterized the issue at the hearing) still might preclude a civil 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10 Plaintiffs point out that federal courts accord preclusive effect to the adjudicative determinations of a California administrative agency only where the state proceeding satisfies the fairness requirements set out in United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966). Opposition, ECF No. 163 at 23 (citing Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 103233 (9th Cir. 1994) and Olson v. Morris, 188 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999). Those factors are that (1) the administrative agency acted in a judicial capacity, (2) the agency resolved disputed issues of fact properly before it, and (3) the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate. Miller, 39 F.3d at 1032-33. “The threshold inquiry . . . is whether a state administrative proceeding was conducted with sufficient safeguards to be equated with a state court judgment.’ Miller, 39 F.3d at 1033 (internal quotation omitted). 11 As for mistakes, Plaintiffs point out that the CDPH’s statement that the labels “were not found to use the word ‘organic’ to identify ingredients or modify content on the Principle Display Panel (PDP)” is wrong in that “even Hain’s limited production of labels to CDPH included both labels that explicitly identified organic ingredients and ones that identified some organic content on the PDP. For example, as Hain concedes, a number of labels submitted to CDPH included claims that the products are made with ‘Organic Oils.’” See Opposition, ECF No. 163 at 32-33. In the context of this informal inquiry, the mistakes bolster the conclusion that the process was not an enforcement action and instead was an informal inquiry that relied only on Hain’s arguments (including, for example, its February 2013 argument that the September 2011 submissions C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 20 1 action for injunctive relief so long at the proceedings had the requisite procedural safeguards. But 2 here, as Plaintiffs argue, the agency process and resulting notice did not have the procedural 3 safeguards and formality of an agency decision. This process involved only consideration of Hain’s 4 informal, ex parte submissions mostly about reformulated and relabeled products and 5 representations about them, and it did not include any consideration of additional information or any 6 independent evaluation about the products or their ingredients.12 7 Hain cites no cases where any court has found binding an agency’s decision in a process like the 8 CDPH’s process to support a conclusion that the undersigned ought to construe the CDPH’s notice 9 as precluding Plaintiffs’ COPA claim here. 10 For example, its res judicata and collateral estoppel cases all involve prior judicial actions that 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 established that the prior Avalon labels did not violate COPA (even though Hain submitted only four pre-2011 Avalon labels, three of which were USDA Certified Organic and thus are not part of this litigation). A related point about the reliability of the CDPH process is that Plaintiffs say that they have begun receiving Hain’s document production and have identified numerous examples of pre-2011 Avalon Organics and Jason product labels that include references to specific organic ingredients (for example, “made with organic ingredients”). Opposition, ECF No. 163 at 33 n.17; Pls. JSUF #25, Ex. 13. Plaintiffs also acknowledge Hain’s efforts since 2011 to bring its products into compliance with COPA’s 70-percent compositional requirements but have identified some examples where they do not. Todzo Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. 11. There also may be an issue about the organic certification standards and how Hain calculates the organic content. See Opposition, ECF No. 163 at 13 n.2. Plaintiffs point out that these are fact issues, discovery is ongoing, and summary judgment is premature. Id. 22 12 23 24 25 26 27 28 The notice has only two short substantive parts. The first substantive sentence says the following: “The Avalon Organics®, Earth’s Best and Jason brands were not found to represent the products as ‘organic’, or to use the word ‘organic’ to identify ingredients or modify content on the Principle Display Panel (PDP).” Hain JSUF Ex. F. This sentence is read in the context of the sentences that follow, which refer to Hain’s “voluntarily [taking] actions to meet buyer and labeling specifications” by testing the Avalon products to show that they contained 70% or more organicallyproduced ingredients, by providing certifications, and by discontinuing the words “pure – natural – organic” from the Jason products. Id. As discussed above, the Jason brands were discontinued, and the new Avalon products – unlike the ones at issue in this litigation – purport to meet COPA’s 70percent compositional requirements. Whether that is true was not tested in the agency’s process. See supra n.11 (discussing mistakes). C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 21 1 bar subsequent actions regarding the same issues (and not agency administrative actions,13 let alone 2 informal proceedings like this one). See Motion, ECF No. 156 at 21-22; see, e.g., Alvarez v. May 3 Dept. Stores Co., 143 Cal. App. 4th 1223, 1233-40 (2006) (order denying class certification in prior 4 case precluded other putative class members from litigating identical claims in subsequent suit in 5 part because class member were adequately represented); Citizens for Open Access to Sand & Tide, 6 Inc. v. Seadrift Ass’n, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 1072-73 (1998) (settlement and judgment in 7 representative lawsuit between authorized government agencies and landowner barred private group 8 from asserting the same claims in subsequent suit); Rynsburger v. Dairymen’s Fertilizer Coop., Inc., 9 266 Cal. App. 2d 269 (1968) (affirming post-judgment injunction barring homeowners from governments in public nuisance action, and governments and homeowners were in privity); Smith v. 12 For the Northern District of California pursuing a private nuisance action against dairy cooperative after dairy prevailed against local 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 City of Los Angeles, 190 Cal. App. 2d 112, 128 (1961) (affirming grant of summary judgment on res 13 judicata grounds against plaintiff based on judgment in previous representative suit); Price v. Sixth 14 Dist. Agric. Ass’n, 201 Cal. 502, 514-15 (1927) (prior mandamus action by city and county, and 15 subsequent judgment against the government, bars subsequent suit by taxpayers). 16 Hain also cites cases to support the conclusion that taking away benefits require more process 17 than licensing (for example), but those cases involved an opportunity for public participation. See, 18 e.g., California Radioactive Mat’ls. Mgt. Forum v. Department of Health Servs., 19 Cal. App. 4th 19 841, 856-68 (3rd Dist. 1993). Hain also analogizes to USDA pre-market approval of labels, a 20 process that results in preemption. See Motion, ECF No. 156 at 26-27; Reply, ECF No. 167 at 24; 21 see, e.g., Meunrit v. ConAgra Foods Inc., No. 09-0220 CRB, 2010 WL 2867393, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. 22 July 20, 2010) (UCL, CLRA, and breach of warranty claims for ConAgra’s alleged improper 23 production practices and misleading labeling of its pies preempted by FDA’s inspection of facility 24 (when Plaintiff did not allege a violation of federal regulations) and the USDA’s and FSIS’s pre- 25 approval of ConAgra’s labeling); Barnes v. Campbell Soup Co., No. C 12-05185 JSW, 2013 WL 26 5530017, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2013) (collecting cases and holding that pre-approval of labels by 27 28 13 See supra n.10 (discussing standards that apply to agency adjudicative actions, which the CDPH process is not). C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 22 1 the USDA and FSIS precludes state law claims alleging false or misleading labeling). But those 2 cases involve an elaborate statutory and regulatory scheme and regularly-followed administrative 3 procedures. Regulatory schemes and regularly-followed administrative procedures also are 4 characteristics of the other examples that Hain cited at the hearing or in its motion: certification of 5 elevators, certifications of gas pumps, and zoning conditional use permits. 6 There are no cases construing an administrative inquiry like this – triggered by a “complaint” 7 and involving only an informal ex parte submission of information by the alleged wrongdoer and no 8 apparent investigation – as a binding agency decision. It is not an enforcement decision and instead 9 was only a notice that the CDPH considered its informal inquiry resolved and was not pursuing 10 Hain also argued that an agency’s decision not to refer the case for investigation or prosecution 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 further action. is a decision that has preclusive effect on Plaintiffs’ claims because it is a “no violation” 13 determination. It is not so here given (A) a statute (California Health & Safety Code § 111910(a)) 14 that permits a private right of action for injunctive relief “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of 15 Section 111900” (the provision that allows the California Attorney General or a district attorney to 16 bring an injunctive-relief action),14 and (B) a record that establishes only an informal determination 17 by the agency (based only on Hain’s ex parte submissions) not to pursue further enforcement action. 18 As Plaintiffs pointed out at the hearing, there are many reasons why the CDPH’s decision not to 19 continue its inquiry was not a decision that precludes private litigation under a statutory scheme that 20 allows it. Lack of resources, lack of information, and the ongoing lawsuits in state and federal court 21 are a few possible reasons. 22 23 The court denies Hain’s motion for summary judgment on this ground. II. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ESTOPPED FROM CONTESTING THE NOTICE 24 Hain also argues that Plaintiffs are judicially estopped from contesting the Notice because they 25 triggered the CDPH’s inquiry. The record does not support the conclusion that Plaintiffs triggered 26 27 28 14 Conversely, the private right of action “shall not be construed to limit or alter the powers of the department [meaning, the CDPH] and its authorized agents to bring an action to enforce this chapter pursuant to section 111910 or any other provision of law.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111910(c). C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 23 1 the inquiry and instead supports the conclusion that the CDPH asked for the complaint from this 2 lawsuit (and others) and did not thereafter include Plaintiffs’ counsel’s in its inquiry. See supra 3 STATEMENT (II)(G). Indeed, Plaintiffs’ counsel did not learn about the inquiry until Hain’s 4 counsel told him about the notice in February 2013, and Plaintiffs learned about it thereafter.15 Even 5 if Plaintiffs had provided information at the CDPH’s request (or otherwise), Hain did not explain 6 why allowing this lawsuit is unfair or inconsistent with the agency’s complaint process. The 7 doctrine of judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that in the court’s discretion may be invoked to 8 prevent a party from benefitting by taking one position and later benefitting by taking an 9 inconsistent position. See Hamilton v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2001). Those factors are not present here.16 11 III. THE CDPH NOTICE DID NOT RESOLVE THE REMAINING CLAIMS 12 For the Northern District of California UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 Hain’s final argument – that the CDPH’s notice also precludes Plaintiffs’ other state claims 13 because they are all predicated on the COPA violation – fails based on the court’s holding that the 14 CDPH’s notice did not decide and does not preclude the COPA claim. Also, as the court decided 15 previously and as Plaintiffs argued at the hearing, on this record it is not obvious that Plaintiffs’ 16 UCL, CLRA, and breach of warranty claims are predicated necessarily on the alleged COPA 17 violation. 18 CONCLUSION 19 The court DENIES Hain’s motion for summary judgment. This disposes of ECF No. 156. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: February 10, 2014 22 _______________________________ LAUREL BEELER United States Magistrate Judge 23 24 25 15 26 27 28 At the hearing, Hain’s counsel – when asked – did not dispute Mr. Todzo’s account in his declaration about his learning of the CDPH inquiry when Hain’s counsel told him in February 2013. 16 Plaintiffs also argue that Hain ought to be precluded from relying on the CDPH’s notice because it failed to disclose the CDPH’s inquiry earlier. In light of its decisions about the nature of the administrative process, the court does not need to address the issue. C 11-03082 LB (ORDER) 24

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