Clark v. Alameda County Jail

Filing 4

ORDER Of Dismissal with Leave to Amend. Signed by Judge Edward M. Chen on 2/16/2012. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service). (emcsec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/16/2012)

1
2
3
4
5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

7
8

ERNEST J. CLARK,

9

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

No. C-11-3187 EMC (pr)

ALAMEDA COUNTY JAIL, et al.,

12

Defendants.
___________________________________/

13
14

I.

INTRODUCTION

15

Ernest J. Clark, an inmate at the Alameda County Santa Rita Jail in Dublin, filed this pro se

16

civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint is now before the Court for review under

17

28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

18

II.

BACKGROUND

19

In his complaint, Clark alleges that he fell while descending from the top bunk in his cell at

20

about 6:50 a.m. on April 4, 2011. He hit his head and hurt his neck, head, and back. Clark alleges

21

that there are "foot posts" (apparently meaning steps) on the side of the bed but he believes there

22

should be more steps or differently placed steps to facilitate safe entry and exit from the top bunk.

23

Docket # 1, p. 7. The day he fell, Clark had stepped onto a slippery table and a stool as he climbed

24

down from the top bunk of the bunk bed.

25

After Clark fell, he asked his cell-mate to summon help. A deputy came and inquired about

26

Clark's condition, and then summoned a nurse. The nurse evaluated him, and Clark told her that it

27

was painful to move his neck. The nurse determined that he should remain in his cell. Clark was

28

told by an unidentified person to lay on a mattress on the floor in the cell and that he would see a

1

doctor some time that morning. Clark did not see a doctor, although at about 12:30, another deputy

2

and nurse came to Clark's cell and told him they would give him Motrin for pain for a few days. The

3

next day, Clark filled out a medical request form, asking to see a doctor. X-rays were taken; an x-

4

ray technician told him he had some kind of neck injury, but the report stated that, after exam, there

5

were no signs of injury to back or head. Clark continued to get headaches "every so often." Id. at 7.

6
7

At the time of the incident, Clark was in jail serving an eight-month sentence on a parole
violation. See id. at 7.

8

III.

9

DISCUSSION

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

§ 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims

12

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek

13

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b). Pro se

14

pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699

15

(9th Cir. 1990).

16

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right

17

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the violation was

18

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

19

(1988).

20

A.

21

Bunk Bed Claim
The Eighth Amendment is the applicable constitutional provision for conditions of

22

confinement claims from this plaintiff who was a convict serving a parole violation term at the time

23

of the events and omissions giving rise to the complaint. See generally Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

24

520, 535 n.16 (1979). The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment

25

requires that prison officials take reasonable measures for the safety of inmates. See Farmer v.

26

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when

27

two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the

28

official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to the inmate's safety. See id. at 834. "[O]nly those

2

1

deprivations denying 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,' are sufficiently grave to

2

form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)

3

(citation omitted).

4

The bunk bed as described in the complaint does not satisfy the objective prong for an Eighth

5

Amendment violation. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment

6

"imposes a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement and to take

7

reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. However, every injury suffered by an

8

inmate does not necessarily translate into constitutional liability for prison officials." Osolinski v.

9

Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936-37 (9th Cir. 1996).
Requiring an able-bodied inmate to use bunk beds with foot posts but without a ladder,

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

handrails, or more steps does not deny him the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. See

12

Connolly v. County of Suffolk, 533 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D. Mass. 2008) (summary judgment granted for

13

defendants because ladderless bunk beds did not meet objective component of Eighth Amendment in

14

light of evidence that "[t]housands of . . . inmates access bunk beds daily without the aid of a ladder

15

and without incident" and only about a dozen injuries had been reported).1 See generally Osolinski

16

v. Kane, 92 F.3d at 938 (defendants entitled to qualified immunity against prisoner's Eighth

17

Amendment claim stemming from second degree burns suffered when oven door fell off its hinges

18

and burned his arms); Jackson v. State of Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989) (slippery

19

floors, by themselves, do not amount to cruel and unusual punishment).

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

1

Several unpublished cases also have given short shrift to the ladderless bunk bed claims
from inmates. See Brown v. Anderson, 2010 WL 199692, *2 (D. S.C. 2010) (allegations that
"defendants failed to provide a safe way for Plaintiff to get into the top bunk of a six foot high bunk
bed, which caused him to fall and sustain a head injury . . . . at most, present a claim based on state
law for negligence"); id. at *3 (even if it could be inferred "that the defendants had general
knowledge that an inmate could possibly slip and fall in attempting to get into a bunk bed, that is not
deliberate indifference to a specific risk to Plaintiff that rises to the level of a constitutional
violation"); Jones v. La. Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections, 2009 WL 1310940, *2 (W. D. La.
2009) (dismissing on initial review an Eighth Amendment claim from prisoner injured when his foot
slipped on cell bars he had to climb on to reach his upper bunk because it didn't have a ladder –
condition did not satisfy objective prong of Eighth Amendment test); id. at *4 (summarily
dismissing request for injunction compelling prison officials to install ladders on bunk beds);
Marino v. United States, 978 F.2d 1263, 1992 WL 315229 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming summary
judgment for defendants on FTCA claim from prisoner who fell while descending from ladderless
upper bunk).

3

1

Clark has not shown that the bunk bed provided presented an objectively serious risk to

2

inmate safety. The fact that Clark fell as he descended by stepping on the table and stool in the cell

3

does not show that the fall is more likely the result of a dangerous condition than not. Even with

4

liberal construction, the complaint does not allege facts that would allow one to determine that the

5

bunk bed posed a serious risk to Clark's safety. The facts alleged are, at most, suggestive of

6

negligence, but neither negligence nor gross negligence is actionable under § 1983 in the prison

7

context. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-36 & n.4.

8

The complaint also does not satisfy the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim

to Clark's safety. Any risk posed by bunk beds without ladders, handrails or additional steps is not

11
For the Northern District of California

because it does not allege facts suggestive of deliberate indifference by jail officials to a known risk

10

United States District Court

9

obvious enough to lead to an inference of subjective awareness of a substantial risk of harm to the

12

inmate required to use it.

13

B.

Medical Care Claim

14

When an inmate alleges that his medical care has been constitutionally inadequate, he must

15

allege two things to state a claim: (1) a serious medical need and (2) deliberate indifference to that

16

need by prison officials. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled

17

on other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

18

Clark's complaint fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

19

His complaint shows that he was evaluated by a nurse shortly after the fall. The nurse had been

20

summoned by a deputy after the deputy was alerted to the situation. The nurse determined that

21

Clark did not need further care at the moment, and another nurse who evaluated him later provided

22

him with medicine for his complaints of pain. Clark filled out a medical care request form and x-

23

rays were taken the day after the fall. The medical report stated that he was determined to have no

24

acute injury. Clark apparently felt short-changed in not being allowed to see a doctor, but has failed

25

to allege anything suggesting the care that he did receive from the nurses amounted to deliberate

26

indifference to a serious medical need.

27

///

28

///

4

1

Leave to amend will be granted so that Clark may attempt to allege an Eighth Amendment

2

claim based on the response to his medical needs. He must allege facts suggestive of both a serious

3

medical need and deliberate indifference to it by defendants.

for each defendant. He should not refer to them as a group (e.g., "the defendants"); rather, he should

6

identify each involved defendant by name (or by a Doe defendant designation) and link each of them

7

to his claim by explaining what each involved defendant did or failed to do that caused a violation of

8

his rights. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). The defendant Alameda County

9

Jail is a place, and a place is not a proper defendant. If Clark wants to sue the municipality, he may

10

name that as a defendant, but is cautioned that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983,

11
For the Northern District of California

In an amended complaint, Clark must be careful to allege facts showing the basis for liability

5

United States District Court

4

i.e. no liability just because an entity employs a person who has violated his rights. See Board of

12

County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Local governments

13

are “persons” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where official policy or custom causes a

14

constitutional tort, see Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To impose

15

municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show:

16

(1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which he or she was deprived; (2) that the

17

municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's

18

constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

19

See Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997).

20

IV.

21

CONCLUSION

The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Leave to amend will

22

be granted so that Clark may attempt to state a claim. The amended complaint must be filed no later

23

than March 16, 2012, and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the

24

words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Clark is cautioned that his amended complaint

25

///

26

///

27

///

28

///

5

1

must be a complete statement of his claims and will supersede existing pleadings. See London v.

2

Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981) ("a plaintiff waives all causes of action

3

alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended complaint."). Failure to file

4

the amended complaint by the deadline will result in the dismissal of the action.

5
6

IT IS SO ORDERED.

7
8

Dated: February 16, 2012

9
_________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

6