Procknow v. Wabash Metal Products, Inc. et al

Filing 36

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND AND VACATING HEARING by Judge William Alsup [denying 27 Motion to Remand]. (whasec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/6/2011)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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GARRETT PROCKNOW,

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Plaintiff,

No. C 11-03589 WHA

v.

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WABASH METAL PRODUCTS, INC.,
ACS GROUP, INC. and DOES 1
through 20, inclusive,

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Defendants.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO REMAND AND
VACATING HEARING

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INTRODUCTION

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In this personal injury action, plaintiff moves to remand this action to state court to be

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joined with a similar action regarding the same events. For the following reasons, plaintiff’s

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motion to remand is DENIED.

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STATEMENT
In May 2011, plaintiff was allegedly injured while operating a machine manufactured

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by defendant Wabash Metal Products, Inc. Plaintiff was working when the machine allegedly

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malfunctioned and resulted in plaintiff’s arm being amputated below the elbow (Br. 2).

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Plaintiff commenced this action in June 2011 against defendants Wabash and ACS

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Group, Inc. in state court. Plaintiff alleged the following causes of action: (1) negligence;

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(2) product liability: failure to warn; (3) product liability: defective design; and (4) product

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liability: strict product liability (Dkt. No. 1, Exh. A). Wabash then removed here on the basis of

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diversity jurisdiction. In its notice of removal, Wabash asserted (Dkt. No. 1, at 2):

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Complete diversity of citizenship exists in that:
Plaintiff . . . is a citizen of the State of California, and
Defendant, Wabash Metal Products, Inc. was and is a
corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of
Wisconsin with its principal place of business in Wabash,
Indiana, and is the only defendant that has been served with
a summons and complaint in this action.

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Then, Travelers Property Casualty Company of America commenced an action in state

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court against Wabash for subrogation related to the same injuries sustained by plaintiff (Br.

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Exh. A). Specifically, Travelers asserted four causes of action against Wabash: (1) subrogation;
(2) subrogation: strict product liability; (3) subrogation: breach of express and implied

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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warranties; and (4) subrogation: negligence (Br. Exh. A).

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Plaintiff now seeks to remand the present action pursuant to Section 1447 and Colorado

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River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), to state court in

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San Francisco so that it can be joined with Travelers’ subrogation action against Wabash,

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also in that court. Wabash opposes. No other defendant has responded. This order follows

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full briefing.

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ANALYSIS

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As a preliminary matter, plaintiff does not question whether federal jurisdiction was

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properly conferred over the subject matter of the complaint after removal. Defendant correctly

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notes that subject-matter jurisdiction exists here based on diversity of citizenship (Opp. 3–4).

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Plaintiff states in one sentence that this motion is made pursuant to Section 1447, but fails to

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elaborate (Br. 1). Section 1447(c) provides for the remand of actions where the court lacks

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subject-matter jurisdiction or “on the basis of any defect.” Because plaintiff does not challenge

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the validity of subject-matter jurisdiction nor does he allege any other defect in the removal

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process, this order finds that this motion is not properly brought under Section 1447.

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Colorado River abstention is therefore the only basis for remand considered by this order.

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Plaintiff’s claims are for money damages, which presents a problem for the application of

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abstention principles. While the Supreme Court has held that “federal courts may stay actions
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for damages based on abstention principles,” it has not held that “those principles support the

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outright dismissal or remand of damages actions.” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S.

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706, 721 (1996). The Court held, “[u]nder our precedents, federal courts have the power to

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dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only where the relief sought is equitable

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or otherwise discretionary.” Id. at 731 (emphasis added). Plaintiff made no attempts to

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distinguish Quackenbush and in fact did not even cite to it. Quackenbush states that an action

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for money damages cannot be remanded.

abstention. Because this order agrees with defendant that this action should not be remanded to

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state court under Colorado River, it does not reach defendant’s other theory that plaintiff waived

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For the Northern District of California

Even if the Colorado River factors were considered, they would hardly warrant

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United States District Court

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his right to seek remand. Plaintiff’s motion to remand is therefore DENIED.
CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to remand is DENIED. The hearing set for
December 8 is VACATED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: December 6, 2011.

WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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