Stewart v. SEIU United Healthcare Workers-West (SEIU Local 2005) et al

Filing 45

ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on 7/19/12. (jjoS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/19/2012)

1
2
3
4
5
6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8
9

SARAH STEWART,

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

12

Plaintiff,

No. C 11-04438 JSW

v.
SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERSWEST, et al.,

ORDER REGARDING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS

13
Defendants.
14

/

15
16

Now before the Court is the motion by defendants SEI United Heathcare Worker-West

17

(“UHW”) and Rosa Vanegas (collectively, “Defendants”) to dismiss Plaintiff Sarah Stewart’s

18

first, second, and fifth claims in her first amended complaint (“FAC”). The Court has

19

considered the parties’ papers, relevant legal authority, and it finds these matters suitable for

20

disposition without oral argument. See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Accordingly, the hearing set for

21

July 27, 2012 is VACATED. The Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

22
23

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was employed by UHW. Vanegas was one of Plaintiff’s supervisors at UHW.

24

Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled because she has diabetes and that UHW failed to provide

25

her with reasonable accommodations. She further alleges that UHW retaliated against her and

26

that UHW discriminated against her based on her age. Plaintiff bring claims against UHW

27

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), California’s Fair Housing and

28

Employment Act (“FEHA”), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”).

1

Plaintiff also brings a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against Vanegas. The

2

Court shall address specific additional facts in the remainder of this Order.

3
4
5

ANALYSIS
A.

Applicable Legal Standards.
A motion to dismiss is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where the

the light most favorable to the non-moving party and all material allegations in the complaint

8

are taken to be true. Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1986). The Court may

9

consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents

10

relied upon but not attached to the complaint, when the authenticity of those documents is not

11
For the Northern District of California

pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The complaint is construed in

7

United States District Court

6

questioned, and other matters of which the Court can take judicial notice. Zucco Partners LLC

12

v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009).

13

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires only “a short and plain statement of the

14

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Even under Rule 8(a)’s liberal pleading

15

standard, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’

16

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

17

of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing

18

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Pursuant to Twombly, a plaintiff must not merely

19

allege conduct that is conceivable but must instead allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief

20

that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

21

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

22

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing

23

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement,

24

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. ... When a

25

complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of

26

the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

27

U.S. at 556-57) (internal quotation marks omitted).

28
2

1

B.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

under the ADA and FEHA for failure to state a claim. In the Order dismissing Plaintiff’s initial

4

complaint, the Court held that, based on the filing of the Intake Questionnaire on June 19, 2008,

5

all conduct prior to August 24, 2007 was not actionable under the ADA as time-barred and all

6

conduct before June 19, 2007 was time-barred under FEHA. The Court informed Plaintiff that

7

she needed to make clear what conduct, other than her termination, happened during this brief

8

period before she was terminated on August 27, 2007. Specifically, Plaintiff had not alleged

9

that she made any requests for accommodations during this period. Merely alleging continued

10

effects from prior refusals to accommodate was insufficient to state a claim that was not time-

11
For the Northern District of California

UHW moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for failure to accommodate and for retaliation

3

United States District Court

2

barred. Additionally, Plaintiff had not alleged facts that were sufficient to show that she was

12

disabled under the ADA. With respect to her claim for retaliation, the Court found that Plaintiff

13

had not clearly alleged from what protected activity she alleged her termination, or any other

14

timely adverse employment actions, were in retaliation.

15

In her FAC, although Plaintiff still appears to rely heavily on conduct that occurred

16

before the actionable time period, she does allege, albeit barely, sufficient facts to state a claim.

17

Plaintiff alleges that she suffers from “brittle” diabetes and that the stress of working so many

18

hours had a negative impact on the control of her diabetes. (FAC, ¶¶ 8, 14, 18.) Plaintiff

19

alleges that on August 23 and 24, 2007, she requested accommodations in her emails. (Id., ¶

20

35.) Moreover, Plaintiff now alleges that she was terminated in retaliation for a complaint she

21

filed with the EEOC in March 2007. (FAC, ¶ 27.) Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’

22

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first and second claims against the UHW.

23

Vanegas moves to dismiss the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In

24

response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss her initial complaint, Plaintiff conceded that the only

25

incident in support of her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against

26

Vanegas which is not time-barred was her allegation that Vanegas falsely testified to an EEOC

27

investigator that Plaintiff’s work performance was deficient. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s

28

claim based on her failure to allege that she suffered severe emotional distress. Plaintiff cured
3

1

this defect in her FAC. Without knowing the specific content of Vanegas’s alleged false

2

testimony to the EEOC investigator and what was told to Plaintiff, the Court cannot determine

3

whether Venegas breached any duty owed to Plaintiff and whether Plaintiff may succeed on her

4

claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, the Court cannot find, at this

5

procedural stage, that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

6

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against Vanegas.

7

CONCLUSION

8

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

9

IT IS SO ORDERED.

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10
Dated: July 19, 2012
JEFFREY S. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
4