Goodbar v. Astrue

Filing 24

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 22 (Illston, Susan) (Filed on 11/2/2015)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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COLLEEN M. GOODBAR,

Case No. 11-cv-04572-SI

Plaintiff,
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v.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES

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CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

Re: Dkt. No. 22

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Now before the Court is plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

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§ 406(b). Dkt. No. 22. The government does not assent nor object to the fee request. Dkt. No. 23

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at 2.

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Attorney Steven G. Rosales represented plaintiff before this Court on appeal of her

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application for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. By Order

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dated November 26, 2012, this Court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denied

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defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and remanded for further proceedings to the Social

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Security Administration. Dkt. No. 17. On February 5, 2013, pursuant to stipulation, this Court

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approved an award of $3,500.00 in attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses to plaintiff under the Equal

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Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). Dkt. No. 21. On September 26, 2014, the Administrative Law

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Judge ruled in plaintiff’s favor and awarded plaintiff past-due benefits totaling $62,694.00. Dkt.

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Nos. 22-2 at 1, 22-3 at 6. The Social Security Administration withheld $15,673.50 of the award,

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equal to twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits, in the event plaintiff’s counsel were to

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petition for attorney’s fees. Dkt. No. 22-3 at 6. Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks an award under 42

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U.S.C. § 406(b), of $15,673.50 in attorney’s fees. Dkt. No. 22.

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Section 406(b) provides that when a plaintiff prevails on a judgment, the Court may allow

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a reasonable fee for plaintiff’s counsel, which can be no more than twenty-five percent of the total

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past-due benefits awarded to plaintiff.

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counsel’s request for fees “as an independent check” to assure that the contingency fee agreement

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will “yield reasonable results in particular cases.” See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807

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(2002). The court should consider the character of the representation and the results achieved in

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making its determination. Id. at 808. An award of Section 406(b) fees is offset by any award of

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attorney’s fees granted under the EAJA: “the claimant’s attorney must refun[d] to the claimant the

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amount of the smaller fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (internal quotation

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marks and citation omitted).

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).

The court must review

In this case, the retainer agreement entitles plaintiff’s counsel to a maximum of twenty-five

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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percent of the past-due benefits for successful work performed. Dkt. No. 22-1. In support of the

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motion, plaintiff’s counsel has submitted a declaration describing time spent on the case, setting

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forth counsel’s experience, and attaching the retainer agreement. See Rosales Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5, 7.

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The fee award would require plaintiff’s counsel pay back to plaintiff the $3,500.00 already

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awarded to counsel under the EAJA. See Gisbrecht, 535 at 796; Rosales Decl. ¶ 6.

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The Court finds that the amount of fees sought is reasonable. As an initial matter, the

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Court finds that the fee agreement is within the statutory ceiling set by Section 406(b). The fee

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agreement between plaintiff and her counsel provides that if plaintiff received a favorable

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decision, plaintiff would pay counsel a fee no greater than twenty-five percent of her past-due

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benefits. Rosales Decl., Ex. 1. The Court further finds that plaintiff’s counsel achieved positive

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results in the case; plaintiff’s counsel succeeded in having this matter remanded back to the Social

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Security Administration, which then awarded plaintiff past-due as well as ongoing benefits.

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Plaintiff’s counsel and his legal staff spent 20.3 hours on the matter, for an effective hourly rate of

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$772.09. See Rosales Decl. ¶ 5. An hourly rate of $772.09 for an attorney who has been

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practicing in matters of Social Security law since 2002 is not unreasonable. See e.g. Villa v.

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Astrue, No. CIV-S-06S0846, 2010 WL 118454, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2010); see also Rosales

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Decl. ¶ 7. After review of the record, the Court finds that the requested attorney’s fees are

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reasonable and do not constitute a windfall. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. 789.
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CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees

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and awards fees in the amount of $15,673.50 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). The Court further

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ORDERS plaintiff’s counsel to reimburse plaintiff the $3,500.00 previously awarded pursuant to

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the Equal Access to Justice Act. The Commissioner shall pay the attorney’s fees to plaintiff's

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counsel out of the withheld amount within 30 days of the date of this order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Dated: November 2, 2015
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SUSAN ILLSTON
United States District Judge

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