Allen et al v. United States of America et al

Filing 49

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND VACATING HEARING re 44 MOTION from Judgment re 40 Order on Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, 41 Judgment filed by Gwen Jackson-Loss, Michael Tooley, Venus Hoaglen, Barbara Crabtree, Donald Allen, Daniel Jackson, Clarence Wright, Jessica Jackson, Lucille Silva, Martha Knight. Signed by Judge Alsup on July 9, 2012. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/9/2012)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 13 DONALD ALLEN, BARBARA CRABTREE, LYNN CRABTREE, VENUS HOAGLEN, DANIEL JACKSON, GWEN JACKSON-LOSS, JESSICA JACKSON, MARTHA KNIGHT, LUCILLE SILVA, MICHAEL TOOLEY, and CLARENCE WRIGHT, 14 15 16 17 18 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND VACATING HEARING v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and KENNETH SALAZAR, as Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior, Defendants. / 19 20 21 No. C 11-05069 WHA INTRODUCTION In this Indian tribal rights action, plaintiffs move for relief from the May 15 judgment, 22 which followed an order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter 23 jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 40). The dismissal order held that plaintiffs could not invoke the Indian 24 Reorganization Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity because they did not satisfy the IRA’s 25 statutory definition of “tribe.” The factual background was described in the prior order (Dkt. 26 No. 40). For the reasons stated below, plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED. The hearing scheduled for 27 July 12 is VACATED. 28 1 2 ANALYSIS Rule 60(b) provides: 3 On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b). 4 5 6 7 Plaintiffs move for relief from the judgment on the grounds that (1) they were surprised by the 8 Court’s interpretation of the IRA, and (2) there is newly discovered evidence that plaintiffs are 9 a “tribe.” 10 SURPRISE. As a threshold matter, plaintiffs do not argue that the dismissal order’s interpretation of For the Northern District of California United States District Court 1. 11 12 the statutory term, “tribe,” to mean “all or close to all of the Indians residing on one reservation,” 13 was incorrect (Dkt. No. 40 at 14). Instead, plaintiffs argue that they were surprised by the 14 Court’s definition because it was not espoused in either parties’ motion briefs. Plaintiffs’ 15 argument is unpersuasive. 16 The very heart of plaintiffs’ case was whether the Secretary of the Interior correctly 17 interpreted the term “tribe,” as used in Section 476 and defined in Section 479 of the IRA 18 (Compl. ¶¶ 9–14; Dkt. No. 33 at 8). It was not a surprise, within the meaning of Rule 60, for the 19 Court to adjudicate the legal question before it: the statutory definition of “tribe.” See Yapp v. 20 Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[A] party who simply misunderstands or 21 fails to predict the legal consequences of his deliberate acts cannot later, once the lesson is 22 learned, turn back the clock to undo those mistakes.”). Moreover, the government did argue that 23 plaintiffs were not a tribe under IRA because they were only a subset of the reservation (Dkt. 24 No. 32 at 25 n.7) (defendants’ opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment) 25 (emphasis added): 26 27 28 While the record indicates that the petitioners are included among the people for whom the Pinoleville Reservation was established, it is incontrovertible that petitioners are at best just a subset of the people for whom the reservation was 2 1 established. As such they meet neither the statutory requirement, because they are not “the” Indians residing on a reservation, nor the more specific regulatory requirements that the be the Indians “for whom a reservation is established.” 2 3 4 To which, plaintiffs responded, without appending any supporting evidence, that “[d]efendants’s 5 [sic] assertion that there is a factual issue as to whether the Indians are actually eligible to 6 organize as a half-blood community under the IRA is absurd” (Dkt. No. 36 at 8). 7 8 9 or the other but is free to state his or her own reading of the term. 2. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. To justify relief from judgment, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the newly discovered 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 In construing a statutory term in dispute, a judge is not bound to accept one party’s view evidence: (1) existed at the time the district court entered judgment; (2) could not have been 12 discovered through due diligence; and (3) was of such magnitude that production of it earlier 13 would have been likely to change the disposition of the case. Jones v. Aero/Chem Corp., 921 14 F.2d 875, 878 (9th Cir. 1990) (quotations omitted). 15 Plaintiffs argue that there is “newly discovered evidence” that they are a “tribe” under the 16 Court’s interpretation of the IRA. Specifically, plaintiffs append a declaration from one of the 17 plaintiffs, Jessica Jackson, who testifies that she recently conducted a “survey” of all homes on 18 the Pinoleville Indian Reservation to find out how many Indians currently reside on the 19 reservation (Jackson Decl. ¶¶ 4–5). Based on her survey, Ms. Jackson testifies that (1) there are 20 thirty Native Americans (as distinguished from the definition of “Indian” under the IRA) living 21 on the reservation; (2) of those thirty Native Americans, four are members of a tribe other than 22 the Pinoleville Pomo Nation, (3) six others do not possess one-half or more Indian blood, and (4) 23 of the remaining twenty Native Americans who possess one-half or more Indian blood, sixteen 24 signed the 2008 petition requesting an IRA election that gave rise to this action. 25 Ms. Jackson’s declaration fails as “newly discovered evidence” for a few reasons. First, 26 Ms. Jackson’s statements about the blood quantum of individuals residing on the reservation is 27 inadmissible hearsay. CIV. LOCAL RULE 7-5 (“An affidavit or declarations may contain only 28 facts [and] must conform as much as possible to the requirements of FRCivP 56(e)”). Ms. 3 1 Jackson conducted a door-to-door survey and does not have personal knowledge of the residents’ 2 blood quantum. Moreover, she is not qualified to verify genealogy. Second, evidence about the 3 blood quantum of individuals residing on the reservation should have been discoverable with due 4 diligence. As discussed, one pivotal issue in this action was whether plaintiffs constituted a tribe 5 under the IRA. Third, Ms. Jackson’s declaration would not change the outcome of the dismissal 6 order. Even assuming that her survey is accurate, which defendants strongly argue against, the 7 named plaintiffs in this action are only eleven of the twenty Indians (blood quantum of at least 8 one-half degree of Indian blood) living on the reservation. This does not meet the requirement of 9 “close to all of the Indians residing on one reservation.” 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs’ motion for relief from the judgment is DENIED. The hearing scheduled for July 12 is VACATED. 13 14 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 17 Dated: July 9, 2012. WILLIAM ALSUP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4

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