Wright v. Dept. of Correction

Filing 23

Certificate of Appealability Denied, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. Signed by Judge William Alsup on 3/14/14. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(dt, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/14/2014)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 RICKY WRIGHT, 12 13 14 No. C 11-5123 WHA (PR) Petitioner, 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. / 15 16 17 INTRODUCTION Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas 18 corpus challenging his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. Respondent was ordered to 19 show cause why the writ should not be granted based upon petitioner’s claim. Respondent has 20 filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and petitioner filed 21 a traverse. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is DENIED. 22 23 STATEMENT On March 3, 2009, Anthony Latona was visiting the home of David Gearhart when 24 petitioner knocked on the door. Gearhart answered the door and found petitioner with a 25 machete about 18" long stuffed up his shirt sleeve so that only the end of the handle was 26 showing (Resp. Ex. 3 at 3). Petitioner was upset about some phone calls he had received late 27 the night before and asked to speak to Latona (ibid.). Latona told petitioner that he knew 28 nothing about the calls and asked petitioner to leave (id. 4). About five minutes later, Latona 1 went outside and found petitioner standing with the machete either up his sleeve or in his hand 2 (ibid.). Latona noticed that the passenger’s window on the driver’s side of his Ford SUV was 3 broken (ibid.). Petitioner began chasing Latona around the car while slightly waving the 4 machete and demanding money from Latona (Resp. Ex. 1 at 9). Petitioner started banging on 5 another window of Latona’s car with the handle of the machete (Resp. Ex. 3 at 4). At about this 6 time, a police officer drove by, observed petitioner’s behavior, and approached (ibid.). 7 Petitioner hid the machete in a nearby bush before being arrested (Resp. Ex. 4 at 2). 8 9 Petitioner was charged in Santa Clara County Superior Court of one count of attempted second-degree robbery, carrying a concealed dirk or dagger, and vandalism in the amount of less than four hundred dollars. See Cal. Pen. Code § 211-212.5(c), 12020(a)(4), 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 594(a)(b)(2)(A). The concealed weapon charge was dismissed and petitioner pled no contest to 12 the second-degree robbery and vandalism charges. 13 Petitioner was found to have two prior convictions that qualified as “strikes” under 14 California’s “Three Strikes” Law. on his record. He was convicted of first-degree burglary in 15 1988, when he broke into an apartment unit and woke up the occupant. He told the occupant 16 that he was borrowing a videocassette recorder from the occupant’s roommate. A bicycle was 17 also taken. He was again convicted of first-degree burglary in 1993. The victim came home to 18 find that her bedroom window had been broken. She heard noises inside the house and yelled 19 that she was going to call the police. There was then a loud crash from a television set being 20 dropped, and the intruder fled. Petitioner was subsequently arrested and found to be in 21 possession of a radio and roll of pennies that belonged to the victim. 22 Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 36 years to life in state prison. The California 23 Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and the California Supreme Court denied a petition for 24 review. The instant federal petition followed. 25 26 27 28 ANALYSIS I. STANDARD OF REVIEW A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s 2 1 adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 2 unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 3 Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 4 determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 5 U.S.C. 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law 6 and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong 7 applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 8 (2003). 9 Under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322 at 340; see also 12 Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). 13 When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the 14 petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 15 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000). In 16 this case, the last reasoned opinion to address petitioner’s claim is that of the California Court 17 of Appeal. 18 II. PETITIONER’S CLAIM 19 As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner claims that the trial court’s failure to 20 strike one of his prior convictions violated due process. California authorizes a sentencing 21 court to strike a prior “strike” conviction “in furtherance of justice.” People v. Superior Court, 22 13 Cal.4th 497, 530 (1996). This limited discretion is subject to appellate review for abuse of 23 discretion. Ibid. The California Court of Appeal found that the trial court did not abuse its 24 discretion in denying petitioner’s Romero motion, and that petitioner did not fall outside the 25 letter and spirit of the “Three Strikes” sentencing scheme (Resp. Ex. 6 at 12). The Court found 26 that petitioner’s current and prior offenses each involved an element of violence, and noted that 27 petitioner’s criminal record, including eight felony and 12 misdemeanor convictions, was 28 extensive (id. 10). Based on these findings, together with the petitioner’s background, character 3 1 and prospects, the court found that the petitioner’s circumstances were not extraordinary and 2 that he squarely fell within the “Three Strikes” scheme (id. 11). 3 The constitutional guarantee of due process is fully applicable at sentencing. See 4 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). A federal court may vacate a state sentence 5 imposed in violation of due process in certain narrowly defined circumstances; for example, if a 6 state trial judge imposed a sentence in excess of state law, or enhanced a sentence based on 7 materially false or unreliable information or based on a conviction infected by constitutional 8 error. See Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 476-477 (9th Cir. 1987). 9 First, petitioner was not sentenced in excess of state law. Under California’s “Three Strikes” law, defendants previously convicted of certain serious or violent felonies (“strikes”) re 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 sentenced to increased terms of imprisonment. Cal. Pen. Code § 667(d). A defendant who 12 suffers a third “strike” receives an indeterminate term of life imprisonment, with a minimum 13 term that is the greatest of (1) “[t]hree times the term otherwise provided as punishment for 14 each current felony conviction,” (2) 25 years, or (3) the term determined by the court, including 15 enhancements, under Section 1170 of the California Penal Code. Cal. Pen. Code § 667(e)(1). 16 Petitioner was convicted of two prior strikes for burglaries of dwellings, making the instant 17 offense his third strike. Cal. Pen. Code § 1192.7(c)(18). He was sentenced pursuant to the 18 “Three Strikes” law to a term of 25 years to life, plus enhancements for his use of a dangerous 19 weapon and prior prison terms, for a total sentence of 36 years to life in prison. This sentence 20 did not exceed what was authorized by state law. 21 Petitioner’s sentence was also not enhanced based on materially false and unreliable 22 information. See Walker, 850 F.2d 476-477. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that the 23 sentencing judge relied on court records to determine his prior criminal history (Resp. Ex. 2 at 24 21-22), and there is no assertion or indication that this evidence was false or unreliable. Lastly, 25 petitioner does not argue, nor is there any indication, that his sentence was based on a 26 conviction infected by constitutional error. See Walker, 850 F.2d 476-477. 27 Petitioner argues that the trial judge misapplied the “Three Strikes” law in failing to 28 strike a prior “strike” conviction. A misapplication of a state’s sentencing law violates due 4 1 process only if the misapplication was arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. See Christian v. 2 Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). That standard was not met here. In denying the 3 motion to strike a strike, the judge articulated the legal standard for sentencing pursuant to 4 California’s “Three Strikes” law and made findings based upon it (Resp. Ex. 2 at 21-23). 5 Specifically, the trial court found that while petitioner’s underlying strike offenses were old, 6 petitioner’s subsequent criminal record was extensive (ibid.). Since his first strike in 1988, 7 petitioner was continuously in and out of prison (id. 21). Notably, in 2000, the District 8 Attorney’s Office dismissed one of petitioner’s prior strikes and sentenced him as a two striker 9 on charges of forgery (id. 22). Petitioner was released from prison in 2002, and spent the next four years in and out of prison on six separate parole violations until he was ultimately 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 discharged four years later in 2006 (ibid.). Petitioner contends that the trial court failed to 12 adequately consider his history of mental illness as a reason to strike one of his prior “strikes.” 13 See People v. Williams, 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 (1998). However, the sentencing transcript 14 indicates that the judge considered petitioner’s mental health history as well as numerous 15 aggravating circumstances such as petitioner’s criminal record and the violent nature of the 16 instant crime (Resp. Ex. 2 at 23). After considering the entire record, including petitioner’s 17 current offense, the strike offenses, and his background and social history, the trial court 18 determined that petitioner fell within the area governed by the “Three Strikes” law, and 19 sentenced him accordingly. This does not appear to be a misapplication of the state sentencing 20 laws, and certainly was not arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. 21 Petitioner’s sentence and the trial court’s decision not to strike one of his prior “strike” 22 convictions did not violate his constitutional right to due process. Accordingly, the state courts’ 23 denial of petitioner’s claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 24 controlling federal law, and petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. 25 CONCLUSION 26 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 27 A certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). This is not a case 28 in which “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 5 1 claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 2 The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 5 6 Dated: March 14 , 2014. WILLIAM ALSUP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6

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