Sandoval et al v. County of Sonoma et al

Filing 215

ORDER by Judge Thelton E. Henderson denying 211 Motion for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal. (tehlc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/10/2014)

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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 RAFAEL MATEOS SANDOVAL, et al., Plaintiffs, 5 6 7 8 v. COUNTY OF SONOMA, et al., Defendants. Case No. 11-cv-05817-TEH ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO CERTIFY COURT’S ORDER FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 9 10 Defendants City of Santa Rosa, the Santa Rosa Police Department, and Santa Rosa United States District Court Northern District of California 11 Police Chief Tom Schwedhelm (“the City Defendants”) brought this motion for 12 administrative relief to certify for interlocutory appeal the Court’s Order granting partial 13 summary judgment to Plaintiff Simeon Avendano Ruiz (“Ruiz”) on the question of 14 whether the thirty-day impoundment of his vehicle was unconstitutional under the Fourth 15 Amendment. After carefully considering the arguments of the parties in the papers 16 submitted, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion, for the reasons set forth below. 17 18 19 BACKGROUND This case concerns the warrantless impoundment of drivers’ vehicles for driving 20 without ever having been issued a license under California Vehicle Code section 14602.6, 21 where the drivers were previously licensed in Mexico but never in California. On October 22 29, 2014, the Court granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, 23 holding that the thirty-day impoundment of Plaintiff Ruiz’s vehicle without a warrant was 24 unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Oct. 29, 2014 Order at 19 (Docket No. 205). 25 The Court found that the City Defendants’ justifications, including the authority of the 26 statute, the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, and the 27 circumstances of the seizure, were not sufficient to render the thirty-day impoundment of 28 Ruiz’s vehicle reasonable. Id. 1 The City Defendants now seek an interlocutory appeal from the portion of the 2 Court’s Order granting partial summary judgment to Plaintiff Ruiz on this issue. Mot. at 1 3 (Docket No. 211). 4 5 6 LEGAL STANDARD A party may bring an interlocutory appeal of a district court’s order where the order 7 “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for 8 difference of opinion and [] an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance 9 the ultimate termination of the litigation . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). “[T]his section [is] to be used only in exceptional situations in which allowing an interlocutory appeal would 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 avoid protracted and expensive litigation.” In re Cement Antitrust Litig. (MDL No. 296), 12 673 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982). 13 14 DISCUSSION 15 I. The Court’s Order Involved a Controlling Question of Law 16 Under § 1292(b), the first factor the Court must consider is whether the order to be 17 appealed involves “a controlling question of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). “[A]ll that must 18 be shown in order for a question to be ‘controlling’ is that resolution of the issue on appeal 19 could materially affect the outcome of litigation in the district court.” In re Cement 20 Antitrust Litig., 673 F.3d at 1026. 21 There is no dispute that the question at issue here is a controlling question of law; 22 indeed, Ruiz does not argue against this factor. The question is whether the warrantless 23 thirty-day impoundment of Ruiz’s vehicle was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 24 Amendment. This is one of Plaintiffs’ theories of liability, and it is also relevant to the 25 scope of their putative class. In their stipulated request to set the briefing schedule for the 26 cross-motions for partial summary judgment that led to the Order at issue here, the parties 27 identified this as “a key legal question” that “will significantly and materially affect the 28 resolution of Fourth Amendment claims in the case.” Aug. 22 Stipulation and Order at 2 2 1 (Docket No. 178). The Court agrees, and finds that this is a controlling question of law for 2 the purposes of § 1292(b). 3 4 5 II. There are Substantial Grounds for Difference of Opinion on this Question The Court also finds that there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion 6 here. Even where a question is one of first impression, such that courts have not yet 7 answered it in conflicting ways, there can nonetheless be substantial grounds for difference 8 of opinion where the answer could fairly come out the other way. Reese v. BP Exploration 9 (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 688 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen novel legal issues are presented, on which fair-minded jurists might reach contradictory conclusions, a novel issue may be 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 certified for interlocutory appeal . . . .”). 12 Here, the question presented to the Court was one of first impression. Although the 13 parties cited case law in support of their positions, there was no binding precedent on the 14 precise question at issue. The question called for judgment as to whether the warrantless 15 seizure of Ruiz’s vehicle for thirty days was reasonable, under the circumstances of his 16 case, assuming that the initial seizure of his vehicle was permissible. Oct. 29, 2014 Order 17 at 3. Given the uncertainty of the law on this question, and the competing individual and 18 public safety concerns, this is a question on which fair-minded jurists could disagree. 19 Moreover, as the City Defendants point out, other courts have upheld similar 20 seizures in similar circumstances, although under different legal theories. Most relevantly, 21 in Alviso v. Sonoma Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 186 Cal. App. 4th 198 (2010), the court upheld 22 the thirty-day impoundments of vehicles for drivers with a revoked or suspended license 23 under the same statute against equal protection and due process challenges, holding that 24 the statute was rationally related to public safety concerns and that the Sheriff’s 25 administrative hearings adequately protected the competing interests involved. 186 Cal. 26 App. 4th at 206, 214. Similarly, in the unpublished decision of Salazar v. City of 27 Maywood, 414 F. App’x 73 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit upheld the statute against a 28 due process challenge brought by drivers whose vehicles had been impounded for thirty 3 1 days. Id. at 74-75. Again, while these cases did not answer the precise legal question 2 presented here, they nonetheless show that there are grounds for disagreement regarding 3 the constitutionality and reasonableness of such seizures. 4 5 6 III. An Interlocutory Appeal Will Not Materially Advance the Litigation The final factor that the Court must consider is whether “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1292(b). Although “neither § 1292(b)’s literal text nor controlling precedent requires 9 that the interlocutory appeal have a final, dispositive effect on the litigation,” Reese, 643 10 F.3d at 688, the Court nevertheless concludes that an interlocutory appeal now would not 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 7 materially advance the litigation. 12 The City Defendants’ primary argument for material advancement is that immediate 13 appellate review will provide certainty on a “key issue in determining liability [and] the 14 breadth of a potential class of plaintiffs to proceed in this action.” Mot. at 5. The City 15 Defendants ignore the fact that an appeal now would almost certainly add multiple years of 16 delay before the Court’s resolution of these issues. Notably, the appeal of the County 17 Defendants’ claim of sovereign immunity has been pending since February 8, 2013, and 18 that appeal is scheduled for oral argument on February 12, 2015 – a delay of over two 19 years. Notice of Appeal at 1 (Docket No. 70); Oral Argument Notice for 9th Cir. No. 13- 20 15250, available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/calendar/view.php?caseno=13-15250. 21 The City Defendants provide no reason to think an interlocutory appeal of the Order at 22 issue here would be addressed more quickly. 23 The City Defendants also argue that the resolution of this issue on appeal would 24 better enable the parties to “explore settlement and resume mediation knowing better the 25 nature and extent of their legal obligations and the strength and weaknesses of their 26 respective positions.” Mot. at 5. While the Court understands that such certainty could 27 benefit these negotiations, any such benefit is outweighed by the delay in the remaining 28 proceedings that would result from an appeal now. 4 1 Because the Court resolved the question at issue in this motion, the litigation is now 2 moving forward. The individual Defendants have indicated that they plan to file motions 3 for partial summary judgment based on their qualified immunity, after the resolution of 4 which Plaintiffs will move for class certification. Nov. 17, 2014 Stipulation and Order at 5 3-4 (Docket No. 209). With this plan in place for these remaining matters, the Court 6 concludes that an interlocutory appeal of the Court’s Order, with what is likely to be a 7 multiple-year delay, would not materially advance the ultimate termination of this 8 litigation. 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the City Defendants’ motion to certify the Court’s October 29, 2014 Order for interlocutory appeal is DENIED. 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 16 17 Dated: 12/10/14 _____________________________________ THELTON E. HENDERSON United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5

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