King v. Governing Board of San Francisco Community College District

Filing 24

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by Judge Richard Seeborg on 6/18/12. (cl, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/18/2012)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

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Plaintiff,

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

No. C 11-06118 RS

AARON KING

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO
AMEND

v.

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SAN FRANCISCO COMMUNITY
COLLEGE DISTRICT,

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Defendants.
____________________________________/

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I. INTRODUCTION

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Defendant San Francisco Community College District (“the District”), moves to dismiss

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plaintiff Aaron King’s complaint under Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure, as barred by res judicata. King opposes the motion. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b),

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the motion is appropriate for disposition without a hearing, and is hereby granted without leave to

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amend, for the reasons set forth below.

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This Court entered judgment against King in his prior, related action, King v. San Francisco

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Community College District, et al., No. C 10-1979, on November 7, 2011, and subsequently denied

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his motion to alter or amend the judgment on January 11, 2012.1 He did not appeal. In that case,

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King alleged that he made repeated complaints that a fellow student was harassing and stalking him

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to the District administration and police department, yet they failed to take appropriate action. King

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Defendant requests judicial notice of various filings from the docket of that case. The motion will
be granted. Fed. R. Evid. 201. All filings in the prior case, though not the disputed facts therein, are
hereby judicially noticed.
NO. C 11-06118 RS
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

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maintained that the District instead retaliated against him by citing him for a criminal offense based

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on claims made by the alleged stalker, suspending him, and ultimately, refusing to allow him to re-

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register for classes. He brought suit against the District, its police department, and five of its

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employees, asserting numerous claims for relief for violations of Title IX, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983,

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1985, 1986, California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, the California’s Education Code, negligence,

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infliction of emotional distress, and fraud. He requested statutory, punitive, and actual damages,

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costs, lost income, and injunctive relief. After several successive rounds of pleadings, all of his

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claims were dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim, and the case was closed.

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On December 5, 2011, roughly one month after losing his first case, King filed this action.

For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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In these proceedings, King again claims that he reported incidents of harassment and stalking to the

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District administration and its police department, including the same individual defendants named in

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his earlier case. King alleges that the District police failed to take appropriate action, and instead

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cited him for a criminal offense. He goes on to accuse various members of the District’s

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administration, including individuals who were party to the first suit, of failing to assist him or to

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rectify the alleged retaliation. He contends the District engaged in race and sex discrimination,

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advances claims for relief for violations of Title VI, Title IX, California’s Education Code, and the

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First Amendment, and requests injunctive relief and damages.
II. DISCUSSION

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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must present “a short and plain

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statement of the claim” demonstrating that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Dismissal is appropriate

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if the claimant either does not raise a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to

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support a cognizable claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901

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F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate where the complaint

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cannot be saved by any amendment. See Gadda v. State Bar of Cal., 511 F.3d 933, 939 (9th Cir.

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2007). “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however

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inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

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lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

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(1976)).
NO. C 11-06118 RS
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

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“Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars litigation in a subsequent action of any

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claims that were raised or could have been raised in the prior action.” W. Radio Servs. Co. v.

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Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452

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U.S. 394, 398 (1981)). The doctrine may be applied to dismiss a case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if

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there is: (1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) identity or privity

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between the parties. Id.; Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir.

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2001). There is an identity of claims for purposes of preclusion if the first and second cases “arise

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out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.” Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 851

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(9th Cir. 2000) (citing Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982)).

For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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A judgment of dismissal without leave to amend for failure to state a claim constitutes a judgment

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on the merits for purposes of preclusion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d

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953, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). Privity attaches to “a person so identified in interest with a party to former

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litigation that he represents precisely the same right in respect to the subject matter involved.” In re

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Schimmels, 127 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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Defendants correctly note that the majority of King’s claims asserted in this action have

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already been litigated in King v. San Francisco Community College District, et al., No. C. 10-1979.

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In fact, many of King’s claims sound under the exact same legal authority. It is not necessary to

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review each of his individual claims, however, as it is abundantly clear from the face of his

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complaint that all of his allegations “arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.” Frank,

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216 F.3d at 713. Although King expounds at length on the law and the evidence, as he sees it, in his

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opposition to defendant’s motion, these recitations merely confirm that his newly-asserted claims

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are founded upon precisely the same factual allegations that supported his first suit. He also insists

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he has identified new evidence, consisting of correspondence to King dating from 2010 and 2011.

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Neither letter appears to be new, or for that matter, to support a cognizable claim. As defendant

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points out, King already moved to amend or alter the judgment in his prior case, and was unable to

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establish his entitlement to that relief. His collateral attempts in these proceedings are similarly

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unavailing.

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NO. C 11-06118 RS
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

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King also appears to argue that he should be permitted to assert his Title VI claim because he

Complaint that was dismissed with prejudice in King v. San Francisco Community College District,

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et al., No. C 10-1979. No evidence appears in the record to support this claim, and King has not

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identified or urged any formal exception to res judicata in support of this contention. In addition,

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plaintiff’s exhaustion of administrative remedies, for purposes of his state law claims, was litigated

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in the prior action. King allegedly perfected his right to sue several months before his case was

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dismissed and his motion to amend was denied. It was therefore incumbent upon him to raise in a

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timely fashion any Title VI claim arising from the same set of events that he wished to assert.

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For the Northern District of California

administratively exhausted that claim on September 10, 2011, after filing the Second Amended

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United States District Court

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Because he did not, he many not do so now. It is of no consequence, of course, that several of

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King’s claims, including those sounding under Title VI and the First Amendment, were not

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specifically asserted in the first action. “[R]es judicata bars not only all claims that were actually

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litigated, but also all claims that ‘could have been asserted’ in the prior action.” Int’l Union of

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Operating Eng’rs v. Karr, 994 F.2d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing McClain v. Apodaca, 793

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F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1986)). Here, all of King’s claims either were actually asserted in the

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prior action, or could and should have been. The first element of claim preclusion is therefore met.

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As noted above, the prior case was dismissed, in its entirety, without leave to amend on

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November 7, 2011. Although King moved to amend or alter the judgment, the request was denied,

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and he did not appeal. Accordingly, the prior action was subject to a final judgment on the merits.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Stewart, 297 F.3d at 957. King does not appear to debate that the prior case

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was so resolved. The second element of preclusion is therefore also met.

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Finally, the defendant in this case, the District, was also a party to the prior action. This

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satisfies the third element required to establish res judicata. Although King now requests that the

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District’s Governing Board be substituted as defendant, (see Dkt. No. 16), even if the request were

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granted, there would still be privity, if not outright identity. “Privity” arises where there is a

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“substantial identity” between the party and nonparty, or “where the interests of the nonparty and

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party are so closely aligned as to be virtually representative.” In re Schimmels, 127 F.3d at 881.

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Here, defendants assert that “[t]he Governing Board is not a separate legal entity subject to suit, and
NO. C 11-06118 RS
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

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the District acts through its governing board.” (Def.’s Mot. at 6:24-26). King apparently does not

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dispute that contention. The test for identity or privity of parties is therefore met.

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Defendant’s motion to dismiss must be granted. The motion is granted with prejudice

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because it is apparent from the face of his complaint that res judicata principles bar any further

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proceedings on his current claims, regardless of any amendments to the pleadings he might seek.

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Gadda, 511 F.3d at 939.
III. CONCLUSION

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss is granted without leave to amend.
Plaintiff’s outstanding request to proceed in forma pauperis is denied as moot. The Clerk is directed
to close the case.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: 6/18/12
RICHARD SEEBORG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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NO. C 11-06118 RS
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

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