Hall v. Hayward Police Department

Filing 29

Order by Hon. Charles R. Breyer granting 21 Motion for Summary Judgment.(crblc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/23/2013)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MARK VINCENT HALL, BBK134,

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Plaintiff,
v.

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HAYWARD POLICE DEP’T, et al.,

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Defendant(s).

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No. C 12-2340 CRB (PR)
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
(Docket # 21)

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Plaintiff Mark Vincent Hall, a prisoner at the Santa Rita County Jail

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(SRCJ), filed a first amended complaint for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

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alleging that Hayward police officers M. Troche, M. Miller, J. Faria and C.

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Norris used excessive force in the course of his arrest. The Court found the claim

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cognizable and dismissed all other claims from this action. July 26, 2012 Order

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(dkt. #7) at 2-3.

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Defendants now move for summary judgment on the ground that their

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actions do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Mot. for Summ. J.

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(dkt. #21) at 2. They also contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

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at 12-14. Hall filed an untimely opposition, (dkt. #24), and defendants filed a

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reply, (dkt. #27).

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BACKGROUND1

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On July 31, 2011, defendant officers responded to three 911 calls

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reporting domestic abuse in progress at 987 Forselles Avenue in Hayward.

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Troche Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1; Norris Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1; Miller Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1; Faria

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Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1. Dispatch advised the officers that the calls reported a male

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hitting a female and dragging her back inside an apartment; the female victim

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was pleading for her assailant to stop and for someone to help her. Id.

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According to Hall, he argued with his girlfriend Shereese and slapped her three

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times; he then “help[ed] her up off the ground” because she was sliding in her

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house slippers and then “[they] walked back into the apartment and closed the

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door.” Compl. Attach. 1.

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The apartment had a solid front door and a security screen door, both of

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which were closed. Troche Decl. ¶ 4, Exs. 2-3; Norris Decl. ¶ 4; Miller Decl. ¶ 4;

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Faria Decl. ¶ 4. There were no windows on either side of the front door. Id. The

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officers heard the following statements coming from inside the apartment when

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they arrived at the scene: “You ain’t gonna leave me!”; “I’m sorry”; and “I’m

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going to fuck you up.” The female was crying. Troche Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; Norris

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Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; Miller Decl. ¶¶ 5-7; Faria Decl. ¶ 4. Officers opened the unlocked

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screen door and knocked on the front door several times while announcing their

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presence and demanding that the door be opened. Id. During the knocking, the

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officers heard someone from inside say, “Bitch, I’m gonna fuck you up!” Id.

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Officer Troche also heard what he believed to be the sound of flesh hitting flesh.

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Troche Decl. ¶ 5. These sounds, the statements, the 911 calls, and the failure of

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the residents to open the door led the officers to believe that a battery was in

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progress. Based on the exigent circumstances and the failure of the occupants to

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The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
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open the door, Officer Troche kicked open the door.

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According to Hall, he immediately opened the door in answer to the

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knocking, but then Officer Troche looked directly at him and kicked the door into

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his face. Compl. Attach. 1. Hall claims that the force shoved him into the victim,

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causing him to headbutt her and her falling to the marble floor; he then fell on top

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of her with all of his weight. Id. However, in his interview with the police after

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the incident, Hall admitted several times that the door was kicked in before he

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was able to open it; he made no assertion that the officers were aware that he was

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about to comply. Edwards Decl., Ex. 3 at 3:14, 4:13, 4:27, 4:39.

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Hall was found in a kneeling position on the ground just left of the front

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door. Troche Decl. ¶ 6. At the time, Hall was 5'11" and 250 lbs., and his face

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was covered in blood. Id. Unknown to the officers at the time, the door struck

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Hall in the head when it was kicked open as he was attacking the victim from

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right behind the door. Troche Decl. ¶¶ 4, 8. Hall was straddling the victim’s legs

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as if he was about to strike her in the head. Troche Decl. ¶¶ 6-12; Norris Decl. ¶

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13. The victim was covered in blood, her shirt was ripped, and she was naked

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from the waist down. Troche Decl. ¶¶ 6, 18; Miller Decl. ¶ 9. According to Hall,

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the victim had pulled down her pajama bottoms to look at the bruises on her right

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leg. Compl. Attach. 2. There were knives and a pair of kitchen scissors within

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Hall’s reach. Troche Decl. ¶¶ 7, 12, 20; Miller Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11; Norris Decl. ¶ 8;

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Faria Decl. ¶ 9. Officer Troche pulled Hall off the victim and onto the ground,

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landing him on the threshold of the doorway where Officers Troche and Miller

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handcuffed him. Troche Decl. ¶¶ 8-12; Miller Decl. ¶¶ 8-12; Norris Decl. ¶¶ 6-8;

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Faria Decl. ¶¶ 6-9. Officers had not yet made a full entry into the apartment.

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According to Hall, Officers Troche and Norris came into the apartment and

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“grabbed” him, after which Officer Norris put Hall’s left wrist into an “elongated

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wrist lock” and then handcuffed him. Compl. Attach. 2.
Due to Hall’s position in the threshold of the doorway, he was preventing

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access to the victim. The victim was vomiting large amounts of blood and

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required immediate medical aid. Additionally, officers could not effectively

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search Hall due to the narrow nature of the entry way, nor could they conduct a

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protective sweep because of Hall’s presence in the doorway. These factors, the

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close proximity of the knives, and the officers’ training in the “fatal funnel,”

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required them to move Hall out of the doorway quickly. Troche Decl. ¶¶ 8-12;

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Miller Decl. ¶¶ 8-12; Norris Decl. ¶¶ 6-9; Faria Decl. ¶¶ 6-9.

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Hall was pulled a body length, just outside the door. Because Hall was

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handcuffed, he was unable to get to his feet unassisted. According to defendants,

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the process of pulling Hall off the victim, handcuffing him, and pulling him out

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of the doorway was a fluid process which took approximately fifteen (15)

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seconds. Id. According to the Computer Aided Dispatch (“CAD”) logs, it was

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less than three minutes from the time the last of the four officers appeared on the

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scene until the protective sweep was performed, which included time to remove

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Hall from the apartment. Troche Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1.

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During the protective sweep, Officer Faria was left alone with Hall. Hall

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was placed in “figure 4 leg control hold” to prevent him from moving and to

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ensure that Officer Faria could control Hall. Once the sweep was conducted,

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Officers Miller and Faria helped Hall to his feet and put him into the patrol car.

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Faria Decl. ¶¶ 10-11.

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According to Hall, Officers Faria and Miller joined Officers Troche and

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Norris when he was taken outdoors. All four officers picked Hall up from his

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right side, “off of [his] feet and slammed [him] onto the ground, head first,

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striking [his] face.” The officers then dragged Hall on the ground, while he was

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screaming because the skin on his left side from his face, arm and hand was

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scraped. Hall claims that he was dragged through the driveway in front of two

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apartments along Forselles Way. Hall also claims that Officers Miller and Faria

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picked him up and slammed his head on to the trunk of the neighbor’s car, and

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then dragged him along the passenger side windows and doors. They also

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slammed Hall head first onto the driver’s side hood of another car. Compl.

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Attach. 2. Defendants deny that they used any force on Hall beyond pulling him

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off of the victim, handcuffing him, and constraining him until the protective

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sweep was completed.

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Hall claims that he sustained migraine headaches “to this day from being

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hit with the door and also from being slammed, head first.” He continues to

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experience ringing in his ears, “blurred vision, blocked nasal passages from

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injury to [his] nose, pain in [his] wrist which pops unexpectantly [sic] and the

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hardening of [his] tongue” due to the “brutality” by the officers. Id.

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Hall was taken to the hospital where he was given tramadol for headache

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and pain. Id. The victim was also rushed to the hospital where she was found to

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have severe injuries to her face and body. Her face was severely swollen and

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there was minor bleeding in the posterior part of her brain. Due to the severity of

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the victim’s injuries, Hall is currently awaiting trial on charges of attempted

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murder, domestic violence, false imprisonment, and assault with a deadly weapon

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(knife).

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DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review

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Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and

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affidavits demonstrate that there is “[n]o genuine dispute as to any material fact

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and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

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Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v.

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Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of material fact is

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genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for

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the nonmoving party. Id.

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The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of

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identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits which

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demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

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Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden

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of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable

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trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party. But on an issue for which the

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nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial, as here, the moving party

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need only point out “[t]hat there is an absence of evidence to support the

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nonmoving party’s case.” Id.
Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must

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go beyond the pleadings to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of

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material fact by “[c]iting to specific parts of materials in the record” or

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“[s]howing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a

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genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A triable dispute of material fact exists

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only if there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party to allow a jury

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to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. If the nonmoving

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party fails to make this showing, “[t]he moving party is entitled to judgment as a

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matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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B.

Claims and Analysis

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Excessive force claims which arise in the context of an arrest or

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investigatory stop of a free citizen are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment

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reasonableness standard. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989);

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Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,

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513 U.S. 1152 (1995). “To determine whether officers used excessive force

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during an arrest, courts balance ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the

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individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental

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interests at stake.’” Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2010)

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(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Relevant factors for consideration in this

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case-by-case inquiry include “‘the severity of the of the crime at issue, whether

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the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

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whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Id

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at 980 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). These factors are not exclusive.

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Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2011). The “most

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important” factor is whether the individual posed an immediate threat to the

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safety of officers or others. Id. Courts also consider, under the totality of the

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circumstances, the “quantum of force used to arrest the plaintiff, [citation], the

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availability of alternative methods of capturing or detaining the suspect,

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[citation], and the plaintiff’s mental and emotional state [citation].” Luchtel, 623

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F.3d at 980.

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The reasonableness inquiry in excessive force cases is an objective one,

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the question being whether the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable in

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light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their

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underlying intent or motivation, and without the “20/20 vision of hindsight.”

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Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97; Luchtel, 623 F.3d at 980. Police officers are not

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required to use the least intrusive degree of force possible; they are required only

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to act within a reasonable range of conduct. See Forrester, 25 F.3d at 806-07 (use

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of minimal and controlled force in manner designed to limit injuries reasonable);

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see also Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring officers to

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find and choose least intrusive alternative would require them to exercise

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superhuman judgment), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1159 (1995).

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Defendants argue that the force used was justified and reasonable

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considering the relevant factors, i.e., severity of the crime, immediacy of threat to

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the safety of officers and others, resistance to arrest, the quantum of force used,

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and their efforts to temper the use of force, and that their actions were

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objectionably reasonable under the totality of circumstances . Mot. for Summ. J.

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at 6, 12.

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With respect to the first factor, defendants were aware that at a minimum

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they were confronting an ongoing battery. They were advised by dispatch that

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several 911 calls reported a male hitting a female and dragging her back into the

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apartment. The calls also reported that the woman was screaming for help. Hall

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admitted that he struck the victim three times outside the apartment. At the

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scene, defendants heard statements and sounds consistent with an ongoing battery

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taking place within the apartment, including that sound of flesh striking flesh.

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Once the door was breached, the defendants saw Hall on top of the victim who

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was covered in blood and her face swollen. She was also naked from the waste

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down which indicated that she may have been raped.

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Secondly, the immediacy of the threat to defendants and the victim – the

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“most important factor” – was extremely high. Glenn v. Washington County,

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673 F.3d at 872. The 911 calls indicated that the victim was being beaten and

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that she feared for her safety. Once they arrived at the scene, officers heard

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someone inside the apartment say, “Bitch, I’m gonna fuck you up!” and the

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sound of flesh hitting flesh. Furthermore, the occupants were unresponsive to the

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defendants’ knocks and demands for the door to be opened. It was reasonable for

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the defendants to believe that the battery was ongoing and escalating. Finally,

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once the defendants managed to open the door, they saw Hall bending over the

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bloody victim in a position where he could continue his assault and that there

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were several knives within his reach. Their observations made it imperative to

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get Hall off the victim and away from the weapons as quickly as possible.

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It also appeared that Hall was resisting arrest. As mentioned above, Hall

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was unresponsive to the defendants’ knocks and instructions to open the door.

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Hall claims that he opened the door and that defendant Troche then kicked it into

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his face. However, this claim is contradicted by Hall’s own statements to the

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police that the officers kicked open the door before he was able to open it

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himself. See supra at 3. The police report and the declarations of all four officers

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corroborate this fact.

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Defendants also argue that the amount of force they used was de minimus

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in light of the deadly force used on the victim by Hall at the time of his arrest.

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The use of deadly force is reasonable only if the police officer has probable cause

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to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical

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injury to the officer or others. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).

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“Non-lethal, however, is not synonymous with non-excessive; all force – lethal

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and non-lethal – must be justified by the need for the specific level of force

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employed.” Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 825 (9th Cir. 2010). See, e.g.,

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Marquez, 693 F.3d 1167, 1177 (9th Cir. 2012) (officers reasonably can take into

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account that the volatility of domestic violence situations makes them particularly

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dangerous). Here, the victim was being severely beaten by Hall, and possibly

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raped and stabbed. It was also possible that Hall would turn on the officers and

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use deadly force on them. However, the force used against Hall consisted merely

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of pulling him off the victim, handcuffing him, and pulling him out of the

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doorway which is far less than deadly force. Furthermore, defendants used the

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least amount of force necessary to neutralize Hall; although defendant Miller had

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a taser drawn and pointed at Hall, he never used it. With respect to Hall’s

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allegation that the officers dragged him along the pavement and then slammed

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him into two cars, there is simply no evidence to support this claim. During his

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extensive interview with the police, which was full of inconsistent statements,

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Hall failed to mention that he was slammed into any cars.

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Hall filed an opposition which defendants argue is untimely because it was

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filed over a month after the due date. Reply at 4. Nevertheless, Hall’s opposition

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fails to address the reasonableness of defendants’ actions under the factors

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discussed above. He asserts that defendants and witnesses are lying, but provides

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no evidence to support his blanket assertions. In light of the facts and

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circumstances before them, the defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable.

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Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97; Luchtel, 623 F.3d at 980. Considering the severity

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of Hall’s attack on the victim, the immediacy of the threat to the defendants and

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the victim, Hall’s resistance to arrest, and the quantum of force used, defendants

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acted within a reasonable range of conduct. See Forrester, 25 F.3d at 806-07.

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Because Hall has failed to show that there is genuine dispute of material fact,

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defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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C

Qualified Immunity

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Under Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the court must undertake a

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two-step analysis when a defendant asserts qualified immunity in a motion for

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summary judgment. The court first faces “this threshold question: Taken in the

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light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show

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the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” 533 U.S. at 201. If the

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court determines that the conduct did not violate a constitutional right, the inquiry

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is over and the officer is entitled to qualified immunity.

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If the court determines that the conduct did violate a constitutional right, it

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then moves to the second step and asks “whether the right was clearly

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established” such that “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct

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was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 201-02. Even if the violated

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right was clearly established, qualified immunity shields an officer from suit

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when he makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably

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misapprehends the law governing the circumstances he confronted. Brosseau v.

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Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205-06. If “the officer’s

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mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable . . . the officer is entitled to the

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immunity defense.” Id. at 205.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity

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grounds. Even if the Court assumes arguendo that the defendants’ conduct was

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unconstitutional under the first prong, it cannot be said that reasonable officers in

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defendants’ position would have believed that they were acting unlawfully during

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the course of arresting Hall. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02. Or, put differently,

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it would not have been clear to reasonable officers in defendants’ position that

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kicking the door open, pulling Hall off a bloody victim whom he had been

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severely beating, handcuffing him and restraining him would amount to excessive

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force. See id.

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The undisputed facts show that defendants responded to several 911 calls

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of domestic violence, and that when they arrived at the scene, the battery was

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ongoing and escalating from within the apartment. The door was locked and the

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occupants were unresponsive to defendants’ knocks and demands to open the

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door. When the door was finally breached, Hall was on top of the bloody victim

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and there were knives within his reach. No reasonable juror could find that

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defendants were objectively unreasonable in their conduct. Defendants are

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entitled to qualified immunity. See Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198.

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CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, defendants Miller, Troche, Faria and Norris’

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motion for summary judgment (docket # 21) is GRANTED. The remaining

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defendants are DISMISSED from this action as the claims against them were

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dismissed in the court’s Order of Service.

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The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants and close the file.
SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 23, 2013
CHARLES R. BREYER
United States District Judge

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