San Juan v. Wells Fargo et al
Filing
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ORDER by Judge Charles R. Breyer granting 50 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (crblc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/11/2013)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,
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No. C 12-02529 CRB
SEGUNDINA SAN JUAN,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, ET AL.,
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Defendants.
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Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Mot. (dkt.
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50). The Court finds this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument, pursuant to
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Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), and thus VACATES the hearing scheduled for April 19, 2013 at
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10:00 a.m. Because Plaintiff twice voluntarily dismissed her complaints pursuant to Federal
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Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on
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the Pleadings and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (SAC) (dkt. 29) with
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prejudice.
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I.
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BACKGROUND
On January 18, 2012, Plaintiff filed her first complaint against Wells Fargo, alleging
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substantially the same causes of action that she alleges here. RJN (dkt. 51), Ex. H. On April
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2, 2012, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that lawsuit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 41(a)(1). Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, San Juan v. Wells Fargo, et al.,
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No. 12-0782 (Apr. 2, 2012), ECF No. 16; RJN, Ex. I.
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On August 9, 2012, David-Wynn Miller and Plaintiff filed a second complaint against
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Wachovia Mortgage again alleging substantially the same claims brought here.1 RJN, Ex. J.
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Plaintiff’s Deed of Trust was attached as evidence to the complaint. Id. On November 7,
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2012, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that lawsuit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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41(a)(1).2 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Miller, et al. v. Wachovia, et al., No. 12-4211
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(Nov. 7, 2012), ECF No. 10; RJN, Ex. K.
On September 4, 2012, Plaintiff filed a SAC in the instant case. SAC. On August 3,
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2013, Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, asserting, among other
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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things, that the “two-dismissal rule” in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) bars
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Plaintiff’s present complaint. See Mot. at 2-4.
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II.
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DISCUSSION
Defendants aver that Plaintiff’s repeated filings and voluntary dismissals have resulted
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in a determination on the merits, barring the current action. See Mot. at 2. Federal Rule of
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Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) permits a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss her complaint by
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filing a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for
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summary judgment. However, “if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or state-
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court action based on or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an
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adjudication on the merits.” F.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(B).
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Here, Plaintiff has twice filed complaints against her lender and twice dismissed those
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complaints pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). Accordingly, the Court
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finds that the second of her voluntary dismissals shall be considered an adjudication on the
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merits, thus barring her present complaint. See F.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(B). This is true
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notwithstanding Judge Armstrong’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s second case without
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World Savings Bank changed its name to Wachovia Mortgage and later merged into
Wells Fargo Bank. See RJN, Ex. A-D (evidencing name change and subsequent merger).
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Miller also filed what appears to be his own notice of voluntary dismissal on August 28,
2012. Voluntary Withdraw, Miller, et al. v. Wachovia, et al., No. 12-4211 (Aug. 28, 2012), ECF No.
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prejudice. See Dismissal Order, Miller, et al. v. Wachovia, et al., No. 12-4211 (Nov. 8,
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2012), ECF No. 11; see also Commercial Space Mgmt. Co. v. Boeing Co., 193 F.3d 1074,
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1077 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) is
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effective upon filing, at which time the district court loses jurisdiction to determine whether
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that dismissal is with or without prejudice).
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Plaintiff contends that her dismissal of the second lawsuit cannot be deemed a
voluntary dismissal because she did not authorize the lawsuit, had no knowledge of its
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existence until defense counsel brought it to her attention, and had no connection to the
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lawsuit other than her name and her attached Deed of Trust. See Opp’n (dkt. 51) at 4. While
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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the Court sympathizes with Plaintiff’s position, Rule 41(a)(1) does not require an inquiry into
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the circumstances of the two prior dismissals. See Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc.
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v. Pac. Malibu Dev. Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 727 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that courts apply the
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Rule literally in all but certain limited circumstances, none of which apply here). Because
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Plaintiff was aware of the lawsuit at the time she filled her notice of voluntary dismissal, the
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Court declines to inquire further.
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The only relevant inquiry is whether the actions are “based on or including the same
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claim.” See F.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(B). Here, all three of Plaintiff’s actions are based on her Deed
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of Trust for the property at 1074 Huron Avenue in San Francisco. While the Court finds
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Plaintiff’s second action—allegedly filed by David-Wynn Miller—to be largely nonsensical,
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it nevertheless satisfies this relatively minimal requirement.
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In Lake at Las Vegas, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that “there were alternatives to
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filing for voluntary dismissal. If [the plaintiff] had allowed the defendants to move for a
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dismissal, it would have been without prejudice under Nevada law . . . .” 933 F.2d at 727.
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Similarly here, there were alternatives to filing for voluntary dismissal of Plaintiff’s second
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lawsuit. Months before Plaintiff filed her Notice to Voluntarily Dismiss the lawsuit, Wells
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Fargo filed a motion to dismiss the action, in which it noted the “unintelligible” nature of the
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complaint. See MTD, Miller, et al. v. Wachovia, et al., No. 12-4211 (Aug. 30, 2012), ECF
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No. 5. Plaintiff could have allowed the Court to adjudicate that motion. In the alternative,
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Plaintiff could have sought a dismissal by stipulation or filed a motion for dismissal on other
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grounds. See Lake at Las Vegas, 933 F.2d at 727 (noting that voluntary dismissals by
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stipulation of both parties or dismissals by motion (i.e., dismissals falling outside of the
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language of Rule 41(a)(1)) would not be considered for purposes of the two dismissal bar).
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Instead, Plaintiff’s counsel chose to again file a notice of voluntary dismissal. Accordingly,
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the Court finds that the second of Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissals served as an adjudication
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on the merits. Thus, Plaintiff’s present action is barred by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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41(a)(1)(B).
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III.
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings, and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s SAC with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: April 11, 2013
CHARLES R. BREYER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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G:\CRBALL\2012\2529\order re MTD.wpd
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