Morganti v. Astrue

Filing 31

ORDER by Judge Charles R. Breyer granting 29 Motion for Attorney Fees. (crblc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/2/2014)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES

Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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No. C 12-03511 CRB

DOUGLAS MORANTI,

/

Counsel for Plaintiff Douglas Moranti moves for $9,375.001 in attorney’s fees for her
representation of Plaintiff before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 406(b). Mot. (dkt.
29).2 Because counsel requests an amount less than 25% of Plaintiffs’ total past-due benefits,
as provided for in the contingency fee agreement and authorized by section 406(b), the Court
grants this motion.
Section 406(b) authorizes a district court to award attorney’s fees where, as here, the
district court remands the case to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings

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Counsel’s motion states that it requests $9,750, but otherwise requests fees for 18.75 hours
of work at $500 per hour, totaling $9,375.00. See Affidavit (dkt. 28-1) at 2; Itemization of Services
(dkt. 28-4). The Court construes the motion as requesting $9,375.
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The Commissioner does not oppose the motion. See Defendant’s Statement of Non-Opposition
(dkt. 30).
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and, following the remand, the claimant is subsequently awarded past-due benefits. See

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Garcia v. Astrue, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1243 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Order Remanding (dkt. 26).

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The Supreme Court has recognized that, on motions for fees under section 406(b),

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counsel can either request fees calculated by the lodestar method, or request an award

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consistent with a valid contingent fee agreement between claimant and counsel. Gisbrecht v.

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Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). Since Gisbrecht was decided, “district courts generally

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have been deferential to the terms of contingency-fee contracts in § 406(b) cases, accepting

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that the resulting de facto hourly rates may exceed those for non contingency-fee

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arrangements.” Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003). In

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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reviewing fee requests with an accompanying contingency fee agreement, courts must ensure

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that the contingency fee agreement yields “reasonable results” under the circumstances.

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Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. Factors relevant to the reasonableness determination include the

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character of the representation and the results achieved. Id. at 808. If the attorney causes

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delay, a court can reduce the award to prevent the attorney from profiting from the

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accumulation of past-due benefits while the case sits in court. Id. Courts can also reduce

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awards where, because of a large award of past-due benefits, a contingency-fee agreement

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would disproportionately reward an attorney who spent little time on the case. Id.

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Here, counsel achieved considerable success in representing Plaintiff. After the Social

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Security Administration and ALJ denied social security benefits, Plaintiff sought review of

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those decisions in this Court. Order Remanding at 3-4. This Court then remanded to the

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administrative level, where the ALJ ultimately awarded Plaintiff past-due benefits totaling

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$80,981.00. Order Remanding; Notice of Award (dkt. 28-5) at 3. Moreover, there is no

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evidence that counsel caused delay or that the total past-due benefits awarded to Plaintiff–

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and in contingency fee cases, the fees collected by counsel–are large in proportion to the time

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spent on the case. Accordingly, it is reasonable to award counsel fees for time spent

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representing Plaintiff.

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As mentioned above, courts often defer to contingency fee agreements even where
enforcing those agreements results in relatively high de facto hourly rates. See Hearn, 262 F.
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Supp. 2d at 1037. In this case, the Social Security Administration withheld 25% of

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Plaintiff’s past-due benefits – $20,245.25 – for counsel’s fees. Notice of Award at 4.

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Although Plaintiff and counsel executed a contingency fee agreement providing for fees

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equal to 25% of Plaintiff’s recovered past-due benefits, see Fee Agreement (dkt. 28-2),

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counsel is not requesting that full amount. See Mot. at 2. Instead, counsel asks the Court to

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award her $9,375 for 18.75 hours of work performed at a rate of $500 per hour. Id. Thus,

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the main issue for the Court to decide is whether the amount of fees that counsel requests is

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reasonable. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807; see also McGuire v. Sullivan, 873 F.2d 974, 983

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(7th Cir. 1989) (“Although the contingency agreement should be given significant weight in

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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fixing a fee, a district judge must independently assess the reasonableness of its terms.”).
When combined with the $6,000 awarded to her at the administrative level, see Notice

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of Award at 4, counsel’s total fees would equal $15,375 – about 19% of Plaintiff’s past-due

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benefits. Thus, the amount requested is reasonable in the context of both the contingency fee

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agreement and section 406(b), which allow for fees up to 25% of Plaintiff’s past-due

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benefits. See Fee Agreement; 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Additionally, counsel’s requested billing

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rate of $500 is appropriate. See e.g. Grunseich v. Barnhart, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1035

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(C.D. Cal. 2006) (approving attorneys’ fees at a $600 hourly rate); Hearn, 262 F. Supp. 2d at

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1037 (approving attorneys’ fees at a $450 hourly rate).

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Counsel’s request for attorney’s fees in the total amount of $9,375.00 for 18.75 hours

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of work, at the rate of $500.00 per hour, is reasonable in light of the legal standards set forth

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in Gisbrecht and the facts of this case. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS counsel’s request

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for $9,375.00 in attorney’s fees to be paid out of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: July 2, 2014
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CHARLES R. BREYER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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