Jones v. Barnes

Filing 22

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY (Illston, Susan) (Filed on 1/16/2014) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/17/2014: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service) (tfS, COURT STAFF).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MICHAEL DEAN JONES,

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No. C 12-4244 SI (pr)

Petitioner,

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY

v.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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RON BARNES, Warden,
Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION

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Michael Dean Jones filed this pro se action seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28

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U.S.C. § 2254. The matter is now before the court for consideration of the merits of the habeas

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petition. For the reasons discussed below, the petition will be denied.

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BACKGROUND

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Following a jury trial in Del Norte County Superior Court, Jones was convicted of gross

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vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. “On December 16, 2010, the trial court, based on the

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conviction being a third strike and other aggravating factors, sentenced [Jones] to a prison term

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of 34 years to life.” Docket # 2 at Appendix A (Cal. Ct. App. Opinion), p. 3.

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Jones appealed. His conviction was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal and his
petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court.

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Jones then filed this action, seeking a writ of habeas corpus. On October 9, 2012, this

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court issued an order to show cause on the claim that Jones’ right to due process was violated

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because the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction in that “there was insufficient

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evidence that [Jones’] driving was impaired by reason of drug or alcohol consumption.”1 Docket

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#2, p.4. Respondent filed an answer and Jones filed a traverse.

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The following factual background is taken from the order of the California Court of
Appeal:
At about 9:15 p.m. on November 9, 2008, defendant was driving southbound on
Parkway Drive, a two-lane road in Crescent City. Ivan Beckendorf, driving in the
opposite direction, turned left across the southbound lane to pull into his
driveway. Defendant crashed into the side of Beckendorf’s truck. Though
defendant claims he did not exceed the 50-mile-per-hour posted speed limit on
Parkway Drive, a California Highway Patrol accident reconstruction specialist
estimated his speed before impact was between 94 and 106 miles per hour.
Beckendorf and defendant were seriously injured and taken to a hospital.
Defendant’s passenger and girlfriend, Jolynda Peters, died.
On May 13, 2009, the Del Norte County district attorney charged defendant with
gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated with alcohol or drugs, a violation
of Penal Code section 191.5, subdivision (a).
During trial, the district attorney presented evidence of defendant’s level of
intoxication [FN1] during the crash. Kay Belschner, a senior criminalist with the
California Department of Justice, testified defendant’s blood-alcohol level was .07
percent two hours following the crash. Such a level, she said, could impair a
driver. Belschner also testified defendant’s blood-alcohol could have been even
higher when the crash occurred, as defendant’s body was likely eliminating
alcohol at some point during the two hours following the crash; however, she
lacked the information she would have needed, such as defendant’s drinking
history that day, to predict defendant’s blood-alcohol level at the time of the crash
with a degree of certainty.
FN1. Because, as discussed below, we conclude there was sufficient
evidence of defendant being under the influence of alcohol, we need not
and do not consider whether there was sufficient evidence of him being
under the influence of drugs. We therefore omit extraneous facts about
defendant’s use of drugs.

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Officer Randall, one of two California Highway Patrol officers who responded to
the crash, also testified. He had 10 years on the job and was certified as a drug
recognition expert following a two-week training program. As Officer Randall
approached defendant’s car, he saw Peters’ body lying over the center console.
The top half of her body had crossed from the passenger side into the driver side
of the car and was resting behind defendant’s back. Randall told defendant not to
move Peters’ body, but defendant, saying nothing, pushed the body back to the
passenger side of the car.

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This claim was alleged in the petition for review that was attached to the federal petition.
The court liberally construed the federal petition to incorporate the petition for review and found
the claim cognizable.
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It was then Randall smelled alcohol coming from the car. Randall could not
conduct field sobriety tests (such as taking blood pressure and temperature and
other measurements) because of defendant’s combative, uncooperative nature.
According to Randall, defendant aggressively tried to get out of the car, tried to
prevent emergency medical personnel from helping him, and did not seem
seriously injured. Once defendant was subdued and in the care of the medics,
Randall could then discern the smell of alcohol was coming from defendant’s
body and breath. Randall concluded defendant was intoxicated based on the smell
of his breath, an open beer bottle left on the driver’s side of the car, his lack of
judgment, poor driving, lack of concern for Peters, and unusual pain tolerance.
Randall also noticed defendant was disorientated. However, Randall conceded the
skid marks defendant’s car left at the crash site were very straight, which would
be consistent with a driver in control of his car.
Sergeant Gray also worked the crash site and afterwards followed defendant to the
hospital. Sergeant Gray, like Officer Randall, had training in drug recognition.
He too testified defendant was intoxicated and impaired at the time of the crash.
He based his conclusion on the circumstances of the collision (including
defendant’s speeding), the open bottle in defendant’s car, and the odor of alcohol
he smelled near defendant’s body in the hospital emergency room. On crossexamination, he admitted the smell of alcohol he had noticed on defendant’s body
could have resulted from the beer bottle spilling on defendant during the crash and
may not have been from his breath.
Defendant denied he was impaired at the time of the crash. He denied consuming
alcohol or drugs on the day of the crash and claimed the beer bottle in his car was
left by a friend. And he denied speeding.
Defendant[’]s[] uncle testified defendant visited him at his home less than an hour
before the crash. The uncle testified defendant was sober and not under the
influence of drugs or alcohol at the time.
On November 17, 2010, a jury found defendant guilty of gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated. On December 16, 2010, the trial court, based on
the conviction being a third strike and other aggravating factors, sentenced
defendant to a prison term of 34 years to life.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on January 13, 2011. He challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction.
Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, pp. 1-3; Ans. Ex. 6.

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE

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This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged
conviction occurred in Alameda County, California, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 84, 2241(d).
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EXHAUSTION

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Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

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proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

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judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

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highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim

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they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not dispute that

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the state judicial remedies were exhausted for the claims in the petition.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

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This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

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custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

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violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

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petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

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court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was

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contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

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determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

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based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

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State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

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arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or

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if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

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indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).

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“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

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if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decision but

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unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal

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habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

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judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

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erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

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federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

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court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

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DISCUSSION

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I.

Due process claim based on insufficient evidence

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Jones claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for gross

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vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated because there was insufficient evidence that his driving

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was impaired by reason of drug or alcohol consumption.

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The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof

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beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is

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charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who alleges that the

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evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have

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led a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt therefore states a constitutional

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claim, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979), which, if proven, entitles him to

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federal habeas relief, see id. at 324. See, e.g., Wigglesworth v. Oregon, 49 F.3d 578, 582 (9th

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Cir. 1995) (writ granted where Oregon procedure of allowing lab reports regarding drug analyses

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to be admitted into evidence without authenticating testimony relieved state of its burden to

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prove beyond reasonable doubt all elements of crime charged); Martineau v. Angelone, 25 F.3d

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734, 739-43 (9th Cir. 1994) (writ granted where evidence found insufficient to convict

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defendants of child abuse based on delay in seeking medical care for child).

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A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction, as in the case at bar, does

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not determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable

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doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 843 (1993).

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The federal court “determines only whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most

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favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

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of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Only if no

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rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, has there been

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a due process violation. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338; Miller v. Stagner,

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757 F.2d 988, 992-93 (9th Cir.), amended, 768 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.

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1048, and cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1049 (1986); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.),

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cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984).

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The state appellate court denied this claim, finding that there was sufficient evidence by

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which a reasonable jury could find Jones was guilty of gross vehicular manslaughter2 beyond

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a reasonable doubt:

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“‘In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence
that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] Reversal
on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever
is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].” [Citation.]’
(People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331...; accord, People v. Steele (2002) 27
Cal.4th 1230, 1249....)” (Torres, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 983.) If
circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s finding on an element of the offense,
“‘“the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 816; People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610,
643.)
It remains “the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth of the facts on which the determination
depends.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) Further, “[i]t is not our
function to decide whether the evidence proves the existence of [an] element [of
an offense] beyond a reasonable doubt, as that finding and weighing of the
evidence has already been performed by the trier of fact at the trial level.” (People
v. Gallardo (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 489, 492; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979)
443 U.S. 307, 318-319 [a court does not ‘“ask itself whether it believes the
evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”].)
Here, the jurors could reasonably credit the investigating police officers’
conclusion that defendant was under the influence of alcohol during the crash.
The officers pointed to the smell of alcohol in defendant’s car and on his breath;

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Under California law, “‘Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful
killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the
driving was in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code... with gross
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“A person is under the influence of alcohol or a drug when, as a result of consuming it,
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ability to drive a vehicle with the caution characteristic of a sober person of ordinary prudence
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77 Cal.App.4th 677, 686-687; [citation omitted.]).” Id.
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defendant’s driving; his aggressive, combative, and uncooperative behavior; his
careless treatment of the deceased; his unusual pain tolerance; and his
disorientation. The officers’ conclusion was corroborated by the blood test two
hours after the crash showing defendant’s blood-alcohol level was .07, a level
capable of impairing a driver. (See People v. Gallardo, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at
p. 494 [a much lower .03 blood-alcohol level corroborated conclusion of
intoxication in gross vehicular manslaughter case].) Indeed, defendant’s blood
alcohol level, according to the Department of Justice criminalist, could well have
been higher at the time of the crash. Further, the testimony of the accident
reconstruction specialist demonstrated defendant was driving approximately 50
miles per hour over the speed limit, indicating a degree of recklessness reasonably
associated with intoxication. With this evidence before them, jurors could
reasonable disregard defendant’s testimony that he had consumed no alcohol on
the day of the crash and was unimpaired, and find him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, pp. 4-6.

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Viewing the evidence here in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it is clear that

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a rational trier of fact could have found that Jones was under the influence of alcohol at the time

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of the crash: a criminalist testified that Jones’ blood-alcohol level of .07 percent two hours

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following the crash could have impaired his driving and that the level could have been higher

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when the crash occurred; Officer Randall, who was one of the first officers at the scene, noted

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Jones’ combative and uncooperative behavior and concluded that Jones was intoxicated based

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on “the smell of [Jones’] breath, an open beer bottle left on the driver’s side of the car, [Jones’]

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lack of judgment, poor driving, lack of concern for Peters, and unusual pain tolerance”; and

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Sergeant Gray, who also worked at the crash site and followed Jones to the hospital, testified that

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Jones was intoxicated and impaired at the time of the crash based on “the circumstances of the

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collision (including [Jones’] speeding), the open bottle in [Jones’] car, and the odor of alcohol

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he smelled near [Jones’] body in the hospital emergency room.” See supra at 2-3. Evidence

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weighing in favor of Jones included Officer Randall’s concession that the straight skid marks

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left by Jones’ car at the crash site were consistent with a driver in control of his car, Sergeant

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Gray’s admission that the smell of alcohol coming from Jones could have resulted from the beer

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bottle spilling on Jones during the crash rather from his breath, Jones’ uncle testimony that Jones

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was sober when he saw him less than hour before the crash, and Jones’ own testimony denying

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that he was impaired or had consumed any alcohol or drugs the day of the crash. Id. at 3. It was

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well within the jury’s discretion to weigh the credibility of the officers’ testimony against that

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of Jones and his uncle, and a jury’s credibility determinations are entitled to near-total deference

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under Jackson.3 See Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, there was

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sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude that Jones was intoxicated and thereby

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impaired at the time of the crash. Jones presents nothing in his traverse to persuade the court

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otherwise. In sum, Jones has failed to show that no rational trier of fact could have found proof

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of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to warrant habeas relief. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 (emphasis

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added); Payne, 982 F.2d at 338.

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The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Jones’ due process claim alleging

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insufficient evidence in support of the gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated

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conviction was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

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Accordingly, Jones is not entitled to habeas relief.

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CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. A certificate

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of appealability will not issue. Reasonable jurists would not “find the district court’s assessment

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of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

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Jones may seek a certificate of appealability from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The clerk

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shall enter judgment in favor of respondent, and close the file.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 16, 2014

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SUSAN ILLSTON
United States District Judge

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Except in the most exceptional of circumstances, Jackson does not permit a federal
habeas court to revisit credibility determinations. See id. (credibility contest between victim
26 alleging sexual molestation and defendant vehemently denying allegations of wrongdoing not
a basis for revisiting jury’s obvious credibility determination); see also People of the Territory
27 of Guam v. McGravey, 14 F.3d 1344, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding conviction for sexual
molestation based entirely on uncorroborated testimony of victim).
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