Hamilton v. Javate et al

Filing 34

ORDER by Judge William Alsup denying 29 Motion to Appoint Counsel ; denying 30 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 17 Motion to Dismiss (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service) (dt, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/19/2013)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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No. C 12-4279 WHA (PR)
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS; DENYING MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff,
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

JAMES BRIAN HAMILTON,
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v.
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DR. JAVATE; DR. HEDDEN; R.N.
WALL; SRYN GRANT; DR. R.
DELGADO; DR. G. THIEL; L.D.
ZAMORA; J. KELSO,

(Docket Nos. 17, 29, 30)

Defendants

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/

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INTRODUCTION
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Plaintiff, an inmate at California State Prison, Soledad, filed this pro se civil rights
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action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the case pursuant
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to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which
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relief can be granted. Plaintiff opposed this motion by filing a motion for summary judgment.
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Defendants and plaintiff filed reply briefs. For the reasons discussed below, the motion to
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dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment is DENIED, as is his second
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motion for appointment of counsel.
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ANALYSIS
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A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

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Failure to state a claim is a grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

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Rules of Civil Procedure. Dismissal for failure to state a claim is a ruling on a question of law.

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Parks School of Business, Inc., v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1995). "The issue is

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not whether plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to

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support his claim." Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987).

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the

statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds

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upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations and internal

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quotations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed

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factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds of his 'entitle[ment] to

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For the Northern District of California

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the

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United States District Court

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relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

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cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

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above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)

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(citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is

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plausible on its face.” Id. at 1986-87. A motion to dismiss should be granted if the complaint

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does not proffer "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570;

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see, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009).

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Review is limited to the contents of the complaint, Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18

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F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994), including documents physically attached to the complaint or

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documents the complaint necessarily relies on and whose authenticity is not contested. Lee v.

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County of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). In addition, the court may take

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judicial notice of facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute. Id. at 688 (discussing Fed. R.

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Evid. 201(b)). Allegations of fact in the complaint must be taken as true and construed in the

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light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d

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979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). The court need not, however, “accept as true allegations that are

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merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Ibid.

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A pro se pleading must be liberally construed, and "however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Twombly, 550 U.S.
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at 570 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Allegations of fact in the

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complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-

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moving party. Symington, 51 F.3d at 1484.

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B.

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ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from chronic cervical pain and that defendants denied

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him necessary medical treatment while he was housed at the California Traninig Facility

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(“CTF”). Specifically, plaintiff claims that defendants denied him x-rays and an M.R.I. of his

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spine between June 2011 and July 2012 because they believed that he was faking his injury and

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they wanted him to take these tests after he was paroled. In order to establish a violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights, plaintiff would have to show that defendants were deliberately

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).

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With respect to the x-rays, it is assumed at this stage of the proceedings, when all

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inferences must be drawn in plaintiff’s favor and all allegations liberally construed, that he was

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in fact in severe pain and that x-rays were medically necessary. However, his medical records

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show that plaintiff did in fact receive x-rays of his spine between June 2011 and July 2012

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(Compl. 32-36). Two sets of x-rays were taken on July 18, 2011, and a third set were taken on

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June 29, 2012 (ibid.).

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These medical records also show that plaintiff had no medical need for an M.R.I.

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between June 2011 and July 2012. The x-rays taken in July 2011 showed that his spinal

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condition was relatively normal, that he had no fractures or subluxation, and that he only had

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“mild” or “minimal age appropriate” degeneration (id. 32-33). Based upon these results, on

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January 27, 2011, Dr. Javate concluded that no M.R.I. was necessary (id. 35-38). The x-rays

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taken on June 29, 2012, showed “moderate to severe” degeneration, but the radiologist opined

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only that an M.R.I. “can be considered . . . if necessary” (id. 34). Plaintiff’s allegation that he

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needed an M.R.I. amounts to no more than a disagreement between him and Dr. Javate and the

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radiologists, neither of whom found that an M.R.I. was medically necessary. Such a

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disagreement does not amount to deliberately indifference within the meaning of the Eighth

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Amendment. See Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) ("A difference of
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opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not

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give rise to a § 1983 claim."). Furthermore, the medical records attached to the complaint show

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that throughout plaintiff’s stay at CTF, including between June 2011 and July 2012, plaintiff

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was seen numerous times by medical staff in the prison, taken to chiropractors outside the

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prison, and prescribed pain medication, including aspirin and naproxen (Compl. 24-29, 68).

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The complaint does not state a cognizable claim that defendants violated his Eighth

and 2012 because medical records attached to the complaint establish that he did in fact receive

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x-rays — in addition to pain medication and other medical care — and there was no medical

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necessity for an M.R.I. during that time. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss will be

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For the Northern District of California

Amendment rights by failing to give him x-rays and an M.R.I. for his spine between June 2011

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United States District Court

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granted, and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment will be denied. The claims cannot be

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cured by amendment because the medical records show that he did not receive constitutionally

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inadequate medical care for his spine during the relevant time period. Accordingly, leave to

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amend the complaint will not be granted.

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CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss (dkt. 17) is GRANTED,

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plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (dkt. 30) is DENIED, and the motion for appointment

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of counsel is DENIED as moot (dkt. 29).

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The clerk shall close the file and enter judgment in defendants’ favor.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: April
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19 , 2013.

WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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