Ramirez v. County of Alameda et al

Filing 20

ORDER by Judge Maria-Elena James granting 16 Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend (cdnS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/23/2013)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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Northern District of California

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ELISA RAMIREZ, Guardian ad Litem for
A.S., a minor,

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No. C12-4852 MEJ
Plaintiff,

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For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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v.
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, ALAMEDA
COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPTARTMENT,
GREGORY AHERN, Sheriff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND
Re: Docket No. 16

Defendants.
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INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Defendants County of Alameda, Alameda County Sheriff’s Department,

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and Sheriff Gregory Ahern’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Elisa Ramirez’s Second Cause of Action

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for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Pursuant to Civil Local

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Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and

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VACATES the February 14, 2013 hearing. Having considered the parties’ papers, relevant legal

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authority, and the record in this case, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ motion WITH

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LEAVE TO AMEND for the reasons set forth below.

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BACKGROUND

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In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges as follows. Alameda County Sheriffs deputies tazed

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Plaintiff A.S. on the evening of September 17, 2011, after he attended a party in San Leandro with

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his girlfriend. Compl. ¶¶ 12-13, 21, Dkt. No. 1. As A.S. and his girlfriend were leaving the party,

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male partygoers attacked his girlfriend. Id. ¶ 14. A.S. defended her and exited the residence. Id. ¶

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15. Sheriff’s deputies wielding submachine guns confronted A.S. in the street near the party and

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trained the laser scopes of their weapons on him. Id. ¶¶ 16-18. They ordered A.S. to get down on

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the ground, and he complied. Id. ¶ 19. Once A.S. was lying on the ground with his hands behind his

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back, he heard one of the deputies shout, “get the black guy!” Id. ¶ 20. A deputy then approached

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A.S. and tazed him. Id. ¶ 21. Another deputy placed a knee on A.S.’s neck while he handcuffed

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him. Id. ¶ 22. The deputies took A.S. into custody and transported him to Eden Medical Center,

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where he was treated for cuts and bruises. Id. ¶ 25. While in the hospital, the deputies made racist

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jokes and taunted A.S. about being tazed again. Id. ¶ 26.

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On September 14, 2012, Plaintiff filed the present Complaint, alleging causes of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against unnamed individual officers and the municipal defendants, and state law

emotional distress, violation of California Civil Code section 52.1, negligence, negligent hiring and

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For the Northern District of California

causes of action for assault and battery, false arrest and imprisonment, intentional infliction of

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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supervision, and vicarious liability. Dkt. No. 1.

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On December 19, 2012, Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss, requesting that the

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Court dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action for municipal liability, which is based upon Monell

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v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Dkt. No. 16. Under Monell,

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Plaintiff must state facts that plausibly show a custom or policy of the municipality caused or

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contributed to the alleged constitutional violation. 436 U.S. at 691. Defendants argue that

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Plaintiff’s allegations regarding custom or policy are wholly conclusory and do not state a claim

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plausible on its face. Mot. at 2. Defendants further argue that in order to hold Sheriff Ahern liable

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in his individual capacity, Plaintiff must plead facts showing Ahern personally participated in the

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constitutional deprivations, yet no such facts are pled. Id.

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LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) where the pleadings fail to state a claim

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upon which relief can be granted. The Court’s “inquiry is limited to the allegations in the complaint,

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which are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lazy Y Ranch

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LTD. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). Even under the liberal pleading standard of

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Rule 8(a)(2), “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires

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more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

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not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.

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265, 286 (1986)).

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Pursuant to Twombly, a plaintiff must not merely allege conduct that is conceivable but must

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instead allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A

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claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

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the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

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556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

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In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court may also consider documents attached to the

omitted). In addition, the court may consider a matter that is properly the subject of judicial notice,

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For the Northern District of California

complaint. Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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such as matters of public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001).

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If the court dismisses the complaint, it “should grant leave to amend even if no request to

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amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by

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the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). In making this

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determination, the court should consider factors such as “the presence or absence of undue delay,

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bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue

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prejudice to the opposing party and futility of the proposed amendment.” Moore v. Kayport

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Package Express, 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989).

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DISCUSSION

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In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the defendant police officers “had a history of

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engaging in acts of assault and battery; effecting false arrests, and treating persons in a racially

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discriminatory manner, of which defendants . . . knew or reasonably should have known for some

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time prior to the subject incident involving Plaintiff.” Compl. ¶ 32. Plaintiff further alleges

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Defendants

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breached their duty of care to Plaintiff in that they: (1) failed to adequately hire,
retain, supervise, discipline and train police officers . . . [to treat] persons in a manner
that is not racially discriminatory; (2) failed to have adequate policies and procedures
regarding the use of force; effecting proper arrests; and treating persons in a manner

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that is not racially discriminatory; (3) acted with deliberate indifference, in reckless
and/or conscious disregard of the prior misconduct of named defendant police
officers, and, (4) approved, ratified, condoned, encouraged and/or tacitly authorized
named defendant police officers to continue their course of misconduct of use of
excessive force, effecting false arrests and imprisonments, and treating persons in a
racially discriminatory manner, resulting in violations of Plaintiff’s rights, and
injuries and damages to Plaintiff as alleged herein.
Id. ¶ 35.
In their Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff must state facts that plausibly show a custom

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or policy of the municipality caused or contributed to the alleged constitutional violation, yet the

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allegations regarding custom or policy in the Complaint here “are wholly conclusory and do not

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state a claim plausible on its face.” Mot. at 2.

solely by its employees or agents.” 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Rather, to establish § 1983 municipal

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For the Northern District of California

Pursuant to Monell, a “local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted

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liability, a plaintiff must prove that (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality

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had a custom or policy; (3) that amounted to a deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional

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right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. East v. City of

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Richmond, 2010 WL 4580112, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2010). Municipal liability may be based on

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(1) an express municipal policy, such as an ordinance, regulation, or policy statement; (2) a

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widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so

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permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; or (3) the

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decision of a person with final policymaking authority ratifying a subordinate’s unconstitutional

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decision or action and the basis for it. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123-27 (1988).

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Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations consist of a formulaic recitation of the

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elements of a cause of action. Beyond the fact that Plaintiff’s allegations appear to be boilerplate –

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repeatedly referencing “named defendant police officers” when there are no named officers in the

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Complaint – the Complaint does not identify what the training and hiring practices were, how the

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training and hiring practices were deficient, or how the training and hiring practices caused

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Plaintiff’s harm. While a municipality may be held liable for a failure to train that reaches

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constitutional proportions, in order to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim the

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complaint must contain specific factual allegations tending to support the inference that the

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municipality failed to train its employees. See Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149

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(E.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that under Iqbal, where a “complaint does not identify what the training

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and hiring practices were, how the training and hiring practices were deficient, or how the training

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and hiring practices caused [p]laintiffs’ harm[,]” such “threadbare” conclusory allegations will not

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support the claim); see also Canas v. City of Sunnyvale, 2011 WL 1743910, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19,

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2011) (“Other than alleging that the officers’ EMT training was inadequate enable them to assist the

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Decedent after he was shot, Plaintiffs do not explain in detail how the City’s alleged policies or

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customs are deficient, nor do they explain how the alleged policies or customs caused harm to

misconduct’ on behalf of the City. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 ‘does not unlock the

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Plaintiffs and the Decedent. At most, the allegations permit the Court to infer a ‘mere possibility of

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.’”). Accordingly,

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because Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations do not provide the necessary factual content that would

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permit more than an inference of the possibility of misconduct, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

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Motion.

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CONCLUSION
Based on the analysis above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

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second cause of action. Because Plaintiff may cure this pleading deficiency by alleging additional

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facts, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend, consistent with this Order. Plaintiff shall file

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any amended complaint by February 5, 2013.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: January 23, 2013
_______________________________
Maria-Elena James
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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