Grimes v. Alameda County Social Services/Children Family Services et al

Filing 37

ORDER RANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND by Judge William Alsup [granting 17 Motion to Remand]. (whasec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/21/2012) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/21/2012: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service) (dt, COURT STAFF).

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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CARL ANTHONY GRIMES,
No. C 12-05126 WHA

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
TO REMAND

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al.,
Defendants.
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INTRODUCTION

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In this purported civil-rights action, plaintiff challenges the termination of his parental

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rights. Plaintiff moves to remand this action back to state court. For the reasons stated below,

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the motion is GRANTED.

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STATEMENT
This action arises from state court juvenile dependency proceedings which resulted in the

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removal of plaintiff Carl Anthony Grimes’ two children. Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se,

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brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 against County of Alameda and seven individuals:

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four case workers, a social worker, a therapist, and an attorney. Plaintiff alleges that defendants

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“fabricated and withheld evidence to the [state] court in order to terminate . . . plaintiff’s parental

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rights to his children . . . .” Plaintiff states that he has “a constitutional right to have his children

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returned to him” and seeks $4,000,000 in damages. Plaintiff asserts five claims based on

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violations of his fourth, sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to the United States Constitution

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(Dkt. No. 1 at 7, 8, 10, 18).

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This action has a long procedural history. It dates back to 2008 when the dependency

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proceedings began. Briefly, the juvenile court conducted twelve-month and eighteen-month

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review hearings. At the conclusion of these hearings, the juvenile court terminated reunification

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services. Plaintiff appealed this decision which was affirmed by the state court of appeal.

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The juvenile court then conducted further hearings and terminated plaintiff’s parental rights

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as to both children. Plaintiff again appealed and ultimately did not retain his parental rights.

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On June 2011, plaintiff filed a civil-rights lawsuit in this district court alleging nearly

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identical claims as the present action. See Grimes v. Alameda County Soc. Services, C 11–02977

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WHA, 2011 WL 4948879 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011) (Judge William Alsup). An October 2011
order dismissed plaintiff’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 105).

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Specifically, the October 2011 order found that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the

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Rooker-Feldman doctrine (ibid.).

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On August 2012, plaintiff filed the instant action in the California Superior Court for

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the County of Alameda. Defendants removed the action to this district. Plaintiff now moves

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to remand this action back to state court. Defendants argue that (1) plaintiff’s motion to remand

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is untimely as to any defect other than lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and (2) this court has

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subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims.

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Notice of removal was filed on October 3 (Dkt. No. 1) and the instant motion to remand

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was filed on November 13 (Dkt. No. 17). Thus plaintiff has missed the thirty-day window to

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challenge any other defect than lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. As a result, plaintiff’s sole

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argument for remand must be based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Given that this

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order grants plaintiff’s remand motion, it is not necessary to consider whether this pro se

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plaintiff missed deadlines due to excusable neglect.

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ANALYSIS

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A defendant may remove a civil action from state court to federal court if original

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jurisdiction would have existed at the time the complaint was filed. 28 U.S.C. 1441(a).

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“[R]emoval statutes are strictly construed against removal.” Luther v. Countrywide Homes

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Loans Servicing, LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected
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if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance,” such that courts must resolve

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all doubts as to removability in favor of remand. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.

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1992). The burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction exists is on the party seeking removal.

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Id. at 566–67.

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As stated above, this action is nearly identical to the action which was previously

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dismissed by this district court less than a year and a half ago. In that action, plaintiff alleged

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that “Social Services removed my children from my home and care in violation of my and my

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children’s constitutional amendments rights, Social Services refuse to return my children to my

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custody, Terminated my Parental rights, [and] placed my children for adoption in violation of my
children’s amendments rights” (Dkt. No. 105 at 2). In this action, plaintiff alleges that he has a

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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constitutional right to have his children returned and that defendants use unconstitutional tactics

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to unlawfully terminate his parental rights (Dkt. No. 1 at 17).

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The October 2011 order dismissed plaintiff’s action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

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pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The October 2011 order held that “[a]lthough the

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operative complaint facially asserts constitutional claims, its substance challenges the state

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court’s termination of plaintiff’s parental rights. Plaintiff seeks an order undercutting that

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decision and related decisions by the state court. This district court lacks jurisdiction to review

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those state-court decisions” (Dkt. No. 105 at 3). So too here. Plaintiff’s nearly identical

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constitutional claims, which are facially valid, are again barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

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Plaintiff is again trying to undercut the state court’s decision to terminate plaintiff’s parental

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rights. This district court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear these claims.

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Defendant Jimmy Jun’s opposition to the motion to remand does not even mention the

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Rooker-Feldman doctrine (Jun Opp. 1–4). Defendant County of Alameda’s opposition makes

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a vague reference to Rooker-Feldman but does not address the issue head on (County Opp. 3).

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Defendants instead argue that this court has subject-matter jurisdiction because the Section 1983

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claims are a federal question. Defendants, however, argue in their pending motions to dismiss

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that this court does lack subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

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(Jun Br. 8–9 and County Br. 10). Defendants cannot have it both ways.
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Defendants concede in their pending motion to dismiss, and this order agrees, that there

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is a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This district

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court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s claims and thus the action was

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improperly removed from state court. Accordingly, the motion to remand is GRANTED.

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This order makes no determination as to whether plaintiff does or does not have

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meritorious claims because this action is remanded for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

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There should be a forum where plaintiff’s claims can be heard on the merits. That forum is

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state court, which is a court of general jurisdiction as opposed to federal court, which is a court
of limited jurisdiction.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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This order now addresses defendants’ counsels’ conduct in removing this action

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from state court. Attorneys Raymond MacKay and Lois Anne Lindstrom were lead attorneys

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on the action dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction less than a year and a half ago.

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They concede that plaintiff’s claims are nearly identical to the prior action (Jun Opp. 2

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and County Br. 4–5). Yet they removed this action knowing that our district court lacked

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subject-matter jurisdiction. Worse, they oppose the instant motion to remand, arguing that

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this district court has subject-matter jurisdiction — but argue in their pending motion to dismiss

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that this district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction (Jun Opp. 3 and Jun Br. 8–9; County

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Opp. 3 and County Br. 10). The Court is disappointed that counsels would try to manipulate

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the system in this manner, especially considering plaintiff’s status as pro se.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons mentioned above, the motion to remand is GRANTED. The Clerk shall
FORWARD THE FILE to

the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: December 20, 2012.

WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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